UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES
THE GIFT OF
MAY TREAT MORRISON
IN MEMORY OF
ALEXANDER F MORRISON
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA
ITS 0RI(;L\, and an account of its riJOGRESS DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN
A. ^Y. KINGLAKE
CHEAPER EDITION VOL. IL
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBUJtGH AND LONDON
M C M I
All Rights izseri:'i
no/
THE YEAR 1S58 AND THE I'EAR ls7fi. A rilEFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION.
(CONTINDED FROM Vol. 1. ^J. XV.)
Of all the impulsions wiiicli brought on the war of 1853, there Avas hardly any one more effective than the fatal voice from this island, which invited the Russian assailant to take heart and cross the border b}^ causing him to imagine that he had nothing to fear from Englaud ; and now once more private citizens boldly planting themselves athwart the path of their own Government, have been cheering liussia into the mood for subversive enterprises. But there, the parallel ends, and there, also, a wide contrast begins ; for, though credulously listened io at St Petersburg, the Peace Party men of 1853, who made bold to lay England's abdication at the feet of the Czar, had no following to support their pretensions; whereas tlie denouncers of last autumn have not only proved their strength, but perhaps, one may say, gained their victory —a victory over their country, and in that
4327S9
Vl PUEKACE.
sense over themselves; for at a moment wheu the State was pursuing its accustomed policy, they inter- posed with a mind to shackle it, and I think it is in vain to deny tliat during a period of several months the State was shackled accordingly.
The truth is, that from the time when observers, unallured by the charm of the East, began to cast critical glances at the polity of the Ottoman Empire, no one well — without smiling — could say it was other- wise than grievously bad, and not many could even see in it the germs of a much better system ; so that, wheji superadded to the spectacle of public bank- ruptcy, and the other abundant proofs that there were of Turkish misgovernment, the outrages committed last May in a part of what some called ' Bulgaria,' * gave such weight, power, and substance to indignant denunciations of the Sultan's rule, that a mass of opinion in this country was brought into harmony with that of the great Kussian people ; the distant multitudes of the East and of the West being thus, as it were, 'made kin' by the touch of a human feeling. Despite intervening distance, the two multitudes were both alike moved by the same pity, the same anger, the same longing to inflict retribution, the same scorn of any cold policy or any unwelcome prudence that seemed standing in the way of their vengeance.
The Russian multitude, as I have shown, were not without means of pressing their entreaties upon the
* The outrages occurred in villages occupied by Bulgarians, but bituatc far south of the Balkan, in the country we cull Kounielia.
PREFACE. Vll
Czar, and pressing them, too, with great force ; * still they necessarily uttered their prayer in general terms, saying only, if so one may speak, that they were ready and eager to begin and carry through a crusade. But in England, the angry denouncers got a tighter grasp of the subject. Including amongst them great num- bers of gifted, well-int'uvmed men, with the prince of all orators at tlieir head, they really were not com- mon throngs, but thousands and thousands of Foreign Secretaries, free from any tough doubt about anything, and they entered upon the duties of the invaded De- partment with minds unhampered by the traditions of Office, nay even so unhampered by Policy that, if reminded by some grey-headed clerk of the connec- tion between Turkish ' independence ' and the burn- ing question of 'the Straits,' they all said there was nothing in that. They undertook a grave task.
To endeavour to govern the progress of domestic legislation by loud utterances of the public voice — this, we know, is a business familiar enough in our islands ; but what the angry myriads last year undertook to do was something of deeper moment. Roused by just indignation, and helped a little, it seems, by an almost ' syn-orthodox ' section of our Anglican Church, but without the least aid from their temporal institutions. Queen or Parliament, or Army or Navy, they undertook — undertook in a few autumn weeks — to change, nay even reverse, the once settled policy of England ; and, the time, as I have sliowii,
* Vol. 1. p. xii. et seq.
viil I'KEFACE.
being ripe, they ilid iiiucli toAvaids acliievinj^ their purpose. They certainly so far achieved it, that, under the impulsion they gave, Lord Salisbury — side by side with Ignatieff — was apparently busied for weeks in assailing that very ' independence of the ' Ottoman Empire ' which England had long held to be a blessing — a blessing so rich as to be worthy of being fought for, and conquered at a huge cost of life and treasure.
In the counsels of men numbered by myriads, there could not but be a diversity of opinion. Some would have liked that England should concur Avith Kussia, or any other Power that might like such a service, in putting force upon the Sultan, that is, making war against him. Many more, however, desired that, in- stead of helping to assail Turkey ourselves, we should ' leave her to destruction,' or in other words, stand by approving, whilst Eussia destroyed or maimed the victim. We were to form, with other like-minded nations, what in the days of pugilism used to be called a ' ring,' with the understanding, however, that, this time, our vows were to be for the assailant against the assailed — for the strong and against the weak. There was a general impression in the assembled crowds, that, when England engaged in the Crimean war, she must liave been yielding lo tlie imjmlse of some strange and misplaced afleotion which we bore towards the Ottoman race, and accordingly the thou- sands came forward with great zeal to protest that, laever, never, never again should this country fight
PREFACE. IX
for the Turks. Certainly, if any statesmen had ever engaged tlieir country in war to please the Turks, or were plotting to do so last autumn, it might have been well to denounce a policy so romantic, or rather grotesque ; but whoever may do me the lionour to read these pages, will see that our people were en- gaged in the war of 1854, by what— whether rightly or not — appeared to be the dictates of policy, rein- forced, it is true, by their own warlike ardour, and especially— as this volume shows — by their craving for an adventurous enterprise. Of course, when under those motives, our people had determined to fend off Kussia from lands in which the Sultan held dominion, they endeavoured to make the best of the mates with whom simple Geography told them they must needs be co-operating; but no one surely imagines that Lord Palmerston, or the statesmen of his day, ever dreamed of going to war for the sake of any Mah- mouds, or Osmans, or Mustaphas. That there were ways of maintaining the policy without resorting to arms, I labour to show, and succeed, as I think, in my effort ; but to decry the policy, because it in- volved alliance with the ill-governed, ill-governing Turks, is much like insisting that Wellington should have abandoned Hougoumont to Napoleon, because the owner of the farm was a Papist.
Still it is vain to deny that, whether wisely or other- wise, a vast proportion of our citizens did in fact make a public vow against all idea of going to war for the sake of the Eastern Question ; and, since England can
X PREFACE.
scarce take up arms witliout the general concurrence of her people, the effect of this protest was to place the power of tlic country in a state of abeyance. Apart from any logical or rhetorical merit it may have, the cogency of any lecture inflicted by one State on another must depend upon the supposition that it can, if it will, at its own chosen time, adduce 'the last ' reason of kings,' and to send England into a great diplomatic arena, after tlie scenes of last autumn, was to send her disabled. If our Government, under the stress of such circumstances, had consulted the dictates of a seemingly becoming, though really perhaps false dignity, it must needs have fallen back upon a policy of inaction, and determined, though watchful reserve.
I have said that by the causes assigned, the feelings of the two angry multitudes of the East and of the West, were brought into harmony ; but in one respect during the autumn, our English denouncers and their gifted, impetuous leader struck deeper against the cause of peace than Russia up to that time had done, for they were the first to contend that the country of the Bulgarians — ground including a great part of Eoumelia — must be wrested from Turkish govern- ance ; and, if it be true that agreement upon other subjects of difference substantially lay within reach, we shall have to confess that the single question which has been threatening and still threatens to prove in- soluble without a i-esort to arms was one furnished — not by liussia but — England.
It so happened, however, that, besides the i)ulicy or
PRRFACK. Xi
the freak of 'leaving the Turks to destruction,' tlu! Englisli multitude had highly approved another and less bloody expedient. They proposed in effect tliat tlie Turks should be scolded out of their country, some thinking that the victorious tongues should drive off all the Ottomans bodily, others saying with a thought- ful air of moderation that, if all the rulers, high and low, were extirpated, the Turks of private life might perhaps be allowed to remain.
Whether in a spirit of grim cynicism, or to show men the consequences of their interposition, our Piime Minister heard the prayer of his people, consented to try their expedient, and sent England into the Council of assembled Europe with free scope to use her tongue, but prevented from even seeming to be potentially belligerent by the staring Neutrality badge which our citizens had afSixed to her shoulder. The Turks, see- ing the badge, declined to l^e talked out of Europe ; and, whatever be the effect of this resolve upon their own destinies, they have at all events maintained for the moment that ' independence of the Ottoman ' Empire ' which our statesmen were accustomed to prize and to cherish with infinite care, and have done this too at a time when the pressure which tried their firmness was in part applied by Lord Salisbury.*
As a lever for wresting from the Sultan the uoveru-
* It was distinctly for the ' independence ' of the Ottoman Empire that the Crimean war was waged. See ' Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. cap. xvii. The integrity of the empire was effectually vindi- cated by Austrin.
xii PREFACE.
ment of his own provinces, the Conference has failed ; and yet in other and better ways it has perhaps done much good. It has apparently brought about a better understanding than before between the Powers repre- sented at Constantinople, and more especially between Eussia and England, has given a strong impulsion to the minds of those Turkish statesmen who are intent upon reforming the polity of the country, and then also by the mere effect of delay, interposed at an opportune time, it has averted war — averted war for the moment, but perhaps for weeks, perhaps even happily for a period much further prolonged.
CONTENTS.
CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.
CHAPTER I.
The Czar annoiincing his willingness to abstain from further
aggression, ..........
Tiie negotiations apparently ripening towards a settlement ; but
rained by the French Emperor and the English Government, Movement at Constantinople, ....
The use made of this by the Turkish Ministers, They succeed in alarming the French Ambassador, Composure of Lord Stratford, ....
His wise and guarded measures for preserving the peace of the
capital, ........
The French Emperor. His means of putting a pressure upon
the English Cabinet, ......
Violent urgency of the French Emperor for an advance of the
fleets to Constantinoiile, ..... Xeedlessness of the measure, ..... Its tendency to bring on war, ....
The English Government yields to the Frencli Emperor, Fleet ordered up to Constantinople, Want of firmness and discretion evinced in the adoption of th
measure, ........
Baron Brunuow's remonstrance, ....
EfiFect of the measure at St Petersburg, .
Count Nesselrode's sorrow, .....
7 7 8 9 10
10 11 12 12
XIV CONTENTS.
CnAPTFR I. — continued.
The Czar's tletiTniination t" retaliate with liis Rlack Sea fleet, 12 Error of the notion tliat the disaster of Sinope was a surprise
achieved by stealth, ........ 18
Ostentatious publicity of tlie Russian operations in the Black
Sea 13
Tidings of an impending attack by tlie Kussiau fleet, . . 14
Inaction of the Ambassadors and the Admirals, ... 15
The disaster of Sinope, 18
CHAPTER 11.
Chasm in the instructions furnished to the Admirals of the Western Powers, . . . . . . . .19
Reception of the tidings of Sinope by the French Government, and by the people in England, ... . . 20
The anger of the English di\-erted from their own rulers and unjustly brought to bear on the Czar, .... 21
First decision of the English Cabinet in regard to Sinope, . 22 Proposal of the French Emperor, ...... 23
Danger of breaking down the old harriers between peace and
war, 23
Ambiguous character of the proposal, 23
The French Emperor ])resses upon the English Calnnet, . . 24
The Cabinet yields, 26
Orders to execute the scheme and to announce it at St Peters- burg, 27
Lord Palmeistou's exclusion from office at the time when this decision took place, 27
CHAPTEK III.
Terms agreed to by the four Powers ; and forced upon the Turks by Lord Stratford, 33
Grounds for expecting an amicable solution, . . . . :i4
Friendly view entertained by tlie Russian Government of the English Caliinet's first decision, ...... 34
Announcement at St Petersburg of the scheme finally adopted by the "Western Powers, ....... 35
The negotiations are ruined, ...... 37
COx^TENTS. XV
Chaptkr Iir. — continued.
Kuptuie of diiiloiuatic relations, ...... 37
The Czar prepares to invade Turkey, ..... 38
Fleets enter the Ku.xinc, 38
CHAFrKlJ IV.
Military error of the Czar in occnpying Wallachia, . . 31»
Of this Omar Paslia takes .skilful advantaf^'c, .... 39
His aiitunui and winter campaigns, ... . .40
Embarrassment and distress of th(! Czar, .... 42
He resorts for aid to Pa.skievitch, ...... 42
Paskievitcli's counsels, ........ 43
Movement of troops in the Kussian Empire, .... 45
CHAPTER V.
Sir John Burgoyne and Colonel Ardent despatched to the Levant, 4il Troops sent to Malta, ........ 47
Tendency of this measure, ....... 47
Jlinisters determine to propose but a small increase of the army, 48 Continuance of Lord Aberdeen's imprudent language, . . 48
CHAPTER VI.
The French Emperor's letter to the Czar, ... .50 Mission to St Petersburg from the English Peace Party, . 53
CHAPTER VII.
Temper of the English an obstacle to the maintenance of peace, 56
Their desire for war, ........ 5(3
Cau.ses of the apiiarent change iu tiieir feeling, . . .56
State of feeling in the spring of 1853, ..... 61
Effect of the Czar's aggression upon the public mind, . 61 Still in foreign affairs the nation looks for guidance to public
men, 62
Lord Aberdeen, ......... 62
ilr Gladstone, .......... 65
u
XVi CONTENTS.
Chapter VII. — continued.
Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone remained in office, . . 66 Effect of this in paralysing the efforts of those wlio wished to
prevent a war, ......... fi7
It was not for want of ample grounds to stand njion, tliat their
cause was brouffht to ruin, ...... 08
Not for want of oratorical power, ...... 69
Mr Cobden and Mr Ihiglit, 69
Reasons why they were able to make no stand, , . . 71
CHAPTEK VIII.
Meeting of Parliament, 76
The Queen's Speech, ... ..... 76
The erring policy which it indicated, ..... 77
Unswerving resolve of Austria (with the approval of Prussia)
to rid the Principalities of Eussian troops, ... 77
Proofs of this drawn from tran.sactions anterior to the Queen's
Speech, .......... 78
Proofs drawn from transactions subsequent to the Queen's Speech, 82 The time when the interests of Austria and Prussia began to
divide them from the "Western Powers, .... 89
From first to last Austria and Prussia never swerved from their resolve to secure the Czar's relinquishment of the Princi- palities, 90
CHAPTER IX.
Spirit of warlike adventure in England, . , . . 92
The bearing of this spirit upon the policj- of the Government, 93 England was under cngiigements with the French Emiieror, . 94 Into this policy the bulk of the Cabinet drifted, ... 95 The Minister who went his own way, ..... 95
His way of masking the tendency of the Government, . 105
Debates upon the Address, 106
Parliament still in the dark as to the real tendency of the Gov- ernment, ...... ... 107
Production of the Papers, . 108
Their effect, 108
The question on which the judginent of Parliament should
have been rested, 110
CONTENTS.
xvii
CHAPTER X.
Austria's proposal for a licstile suiiniioiis to the Czar, Importance of avoiding haste, .....
Pressure of the Fruncli Emperor, .....
Eagerness of the people in Englanii, ....
The Government loses its composure, ....
The summons despatched by England. ....
Instructions to the niesscnger, .....
And to Lord Westmoreland, ......
Austria not re(|uired to take part in the summons which she
had herself suggested, ......
The counter-proposals of Russia reach Vienna at the same time
as the English messenger, ..... They are rejected by the Conference of the four Powers, . Austria and Prussia * support ' the summons, but without talc
ing part in the step, . . . .
The French summons, .......
France and England brought into a state of war with Russia Message from the French Emperor to the Chambers, Message from the Queen to Parliament, ....
Declaration of "War, .......
Difficulty of framing it,
The Czar's declaration and "War manifesto, The Czar's invasion of Turkey is connnenced, . Treaty between the Sultan and the "Westerij Powers, Treaty between France and England, ....
112 113 113 113 114 114 115 115
115
116 116
116 117 117 118 119 119 120 121 121 122 122
CHAPTEE XL
Recapitulation, .......
Standing causes of disturbance, . . . .
Effect of personal governmejit by the Czar,
By the Emperor of Austria,
By the King of Prussia, . . . .
By the French Emperor, . . . . • .
Share which Russia had in bringing about the AVar, Share which Turkey had in causing it, . Share which Austria had, . . . . • In other respects Austria discharged her duty. Share which Prussia had in cau.sing the AVar,
124 124 124 125 126 126 127 131 133 135
i:}5
Xviii CONTENTS.
Chapter XI. — continued.
Ill other rcsiiccts Pruss-iii disfluuged her duty, . . . 137
As dill also the Gcrinaii Coiifeileiatioii, 138
Share whieh the Freiieh Goveiniiieut had in causing the War, 139
Share which Kiigland liad in causing it, HI
The volitions which governed events, Hi'
CHAPTEll XII.
The commanders of the French and the English armies, . 152
Marshal St A rnand, 152
Lonl Ftaglan, 1(54
Marshal St Arnaud and Lord Kaglan brought together at the
Tuileries, . . . . . . . . . .174
Conference at the Tuileries 179
Lord Piaglan's departure, ....... 183
The French and the English troops on the shores of the
Dardanelles, . . . . . . . . .183
Cordial intercourse between the two armies, . . . .183
St Arnaud's scheme for obtaining the command of the Turkish
army, . . . . . . • • • .184
St Arnaud in the presence of Lord Stratford and Lord Kaglan, 186 His scheme defeated, . . . . . . . .189
His scheme for obtaining the command of English troops, . 189
This also defeated, 190
Attempts of this kind checked by the French Emperor, . . 190 St Arnaud suddenly declines to move liis army towards the
seat of war, 190
Lord liaglan's disapproval of the proposed delay, . . .192 St Arnaud's sudden determination to take uj) a defensive posi- tion in rear of the l>alkan, ....... 193
Lord Raglan's determined resistance to this plan, . .194
Lord Kaglan refuses to jdacc any jtart of his army behind the
Balkan, 198
St Arnaud gives way, abandons his plan of a position behind
the Balkan, and consents to move his army to Varna, . 198
The armies moved accordingly, 199
Bos([U('t's overland march, . . . . . . .199
TLe way in which St Arnaud's schemes escaped publicity, . 200
CONTENTS.
XIX
CHAPTER XIII.
Tidings which kiiullcd in Eiixhiml a zeal for the invasion of the Ciiiiien, ........
Si^m; of Silistria, ... .....
Tin! l)attlr of Giurgevo, .......
Elfcct of the campaign of the Danube on the military asccn dancy of Eussia, .......
The agony of the Czar, .......
Lord Kaglan'.s dislike of undiscijilincd combatants,
Importance to England of native au.\iliaries, .
202 202 210
215 217 218 219
CHAPTER XIY
The events on the Danube removed the grounds of the war, Helplessness of the French people, .....
Course taken by the French Emperor, ....
Desire of the English for an offensive war,
Sebastopol, .........
The longing of the English to attack it, ...
The Duke of Newcastle, ......
His zeal for the destruction of Sebasto])ol, Commanding power of the people M'hen of one mind, Jleans of ft)rming and declaring the opinion of the nation. Effect of political writings in saving men from the trouble c
thinking, .........
Want of iinijiortion between the skill of the public writer an
the judicial competence of his readers. The task of ascertaining and declaring the opinion of the
country falls into the hands of a Company . The opinion of the nation, as declared bj- the Company, de
niands the destruction of Sebastoj^ol, ....
The Government yields,
Xo good stand made in rarliament against the Invasion, Preparation of the instructions addressed to Lord llaglan, E.Ktreme importance of the language in which they were to be
worded, .........
Instructions sent to the French commander, .
221 222 222 223 224 224 22.'; 227 228 229
230
230
233
241 24.'> 246 247
247 25U
CON TENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
Tlie Allies at Varna. Their .state of preparation in the middle
of July, 251
Their command of the sea, . . . . . . . 252
Information obtained by the Foreign OlVice as to the defences
of the Crimea, 253
Xo information obtained in the Levant, ..... 253 Lord Raglan conceived that he was absolutely without any trustworthy information,, . _ . . . . . . 254
be given to
CHAPTEli XVI.
The instructions for the invasion of the Crimea reach the Allied
camp, .......
The nn^n who had to determine upon the effect to
the instructions, .....
Marshal St Arnaud,
Admiral Hamelin, ......
Omar Pasha, . .
Admiral Dundas, . . • .
Lord Kaglan,
The instructions addressed to him by the Home Go\ E.xtreme stringency of the instructions, . Considerations tending to justify this stringency, The power of deciding for or against the expediti
practically vested in Lord Raglan alone. Lord Raglan's deliberations, .... He requests the opinion of Sir George P>rown, Lord Raglan's determination, The grounds on which it rested. His decision governed the counsels of the Allies He announces it to the Home Government, . The Duke of Newcastle's reply, The Queen's expression of feeling, .
•ernment, .
on becomes
255
256 256 258 258 258 260 260 266 267
268 269 270 271 272 277 277 278 279
CHAPTER XVII.
Conference at the French headquarters, . Lord Raglan's way of eluding objections. Reconnaissance of the coast, . . . ,
280 281 282
CONTENTS. xxi
Chaptkr XVII. — continued.
Sir Edmund Lyons, 283
Kunioured change in the plans uf tlic Czar, .... 28.^
Second conference, ........ 286
The French urge tlie abandonment of Uie expedition against
the Crimea, ......... 286
Lord Kaglan's way of bending the Fivneli to the phnis of tlie
English Government, ....... 287
Preparations, 287
IncfFectual attempts of the Allies to deceive the enemy, . . 289 Lord Kaglau's appeal to our Home Government in favour of
the native Bulgarians, ....... 200
Fire at Varna, ......... 291
Cholera, .......... 291
Weakly coudition of the English soldiery, .... 294
CHAPTER XVIII.
Arrangements first made for the starting of the expedition, . 296
The embarkations, ........ 296
Failure of the French calculations in regard to their connnand
of steam-power, ......... 299
CHAPTER XIX.
Excitement and impatience of St Arnaud, .... 301 He is induced to set sail without the English, taking with him
all his sailing fleet and the troops on board them. . . 302
The naval forces of the Allies, 302
Duty devolving on the English fleet, ..... 302
Arrangements in regard to the English convoy, . . . 303
The forces and supplies now on board, 303
Troops and supplies left at Varna, 304
Departure of the English Armada and of the French steam- vessels, .........
305
CHAPTER XX.
^Marshal St Arnaud without the English, .... 308 His anxiety, 308
Xxii CONTKNTS.
Chapter XX. — continued.
He sails back 308
Lord Kaglau's reproof, 309
Its Koo^l I't''*^^^ 309
Lord llnglan's increasing ascendancy, 309
The whole Allied Armada comes together at sea, . . . 30!>
But the fleets are again parted, ...... 310
Step taken bj' French olUeers with a view to stop the expedi- tion against Sebastopol, ....... 310
Conference on board the Ville de Paris, ..... 311
St A rnaud disabled by illness, 312
L^^nsigned pajier read to the conference, ..... 312
St A rnaud leaves all to Lord Raglan, ..... 313
Conference adjourned to the Caradoc, . . . . .314
Lord Kaglau's way of dealing with the French remonstrants, . 316 His now complete ascendant, . . . . . . .316
The use he makes of his power, ... ... 317
The English fleet at the point of rendezvous, .... 317
Lord Raglan in person undertakes a reconnaissance of the coast, 317
He chooses the landing-place, ...... 318
The whole Armada converging on the coast of the Crinu^a, . 319
St Arnaud's sudden recover}^ ...... 321
The progress made by Lord Eaglan during the Marshal's ill- ness, 3:il
CHAPTER XXL
Our ignorance of the country and of the enemy's strength, . 322
This gives to the expedition the character of an adventure, . 323
Occujiation of Eupatoria, ....... 324
The whole armada gathers towards the chosen landing-place, . 327
CHAPTER XXII.
The landing-place, .......
Step taken by the French in the night, . Tliis destroyed the whole ]ilan of the landing.
Sir Ednnind Lyons,
His way of dealing with the emergency, .
New laudiiig-plaoe found for the Eugli.sh at Kamishhi.
328 320 330 330 331 331
CONTKNTS.
XXlll
Chapter XXI I. — continued.
Position of the Kiif,'lisli llotilla ailqitcd to tlic cliaiige, Tlie cause and tlie naturt' of tlie change kejit .secret, Position of tlie in-shore squadrons,.
Of the main Knglish llect, Plan of tlie landing, General Airey, .... The first day's landing, . Zeal and energy of the sailors, Wet night's liivouac, Continuation of the landing, . Its completion, .... I'.y the English .... By the French, .... By the Turks, ....
331 334 335 335 336 336 342 345 346 347 348 348 348 349
CHAPTER XXIIL
Deputations from tin- Tartar villages to the English head-
cpiartcrs, 350
Result of exploring exiieditious, ...... 351
The English army — its absolute freedom from crime, . . 352
Kindly intercourse between our soldiery and the villagers, . 352
Outrages perpetrated by the Zouaves, ..... 353
The duty of sweejiing the country for supplies, . . . 353 Airey's (juick perception of the need to get means of land-trans- port, 354
His seizure of a convoy, ........ 355
His continued exertions, ....... 356
Their result, 35G
The Tartar drivers, 357
CHAPTER XXIV.
The forces now on .shore, 358
The nature of the operation by which the Allies were to make
good their advance to Sebastopol, ..... 358
Comparison between regular operations and the system of the
' movable column,' ........ 359
The Allies were to operate as a ' movable column,' . . 365
Perilous character of the march from Old Fort, . . . 367
XXiv CONTENTS.
Chapter XXTV. - covtinned.
Tlic fate of the whole Allied aiiny aciiciicU'iit upon the rinnness
of that portion of it which shouhl take the left, . . . 368
The French take the ri.^ht, .... . . otiy
Their trustfulness ami f,'oocl sense, 370
The advance begun, . . • • ■ . .3/0
The order of march, . . ...... 370
The march, ......•■•• 373
Sickness and failint; .strength of many of the .soldiers, . . 375
The stream of the LJulganak, 376
CHAPTEE XXV.
The affiiir of the Bulganak, .377
CHAPTEE XXVI.
Apparently dangerous .situation of the English army, . 383
Lord Raglan causes it to bivouac iu order of battle, . . 383
APPENDIX.
Note I. —Papers .showing the concord existing between the Four Powers at the time when France and Eng- land were engaging in a separate course of action, 387
Note II. — Lord Clarendon's despatch demanding the evacua- tion of the Principalities, 404
Note III. — Correspondence between Lord Raglan and the Sec- retary of State on the subject of ' Atrocities com- ' mitted by Turks in Bulgaria,' . . .405
Note IV.— Note respecting the torpor of the English Cabinet
on the evening of the 28th of June 1854, . . 407
Note v.— CoiTcspondence respecting the placing of the buoy by the French in the night betwern the 13th and 1 4th of September, 412
CAUSES
INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND IN
THE WAE AGAINST EUSSIA.
ClIArTER I.
The Emperor Nicholas still sought to prolong the chap. ambiguity of his relations with Turkey. On the '
31st of October, Count Nesselrode issued a Cir- announdng ■cular to the representatives of Eussia at foreign ',"esrto"'°" Courts, in which he declared that, notwithstand- ^^,^^^^ '''■°'" ing the declaration of M-ar, and as long as his ^ssrcssion. master's dignity and his interests would permit, liussia would abstain from taking the offensive, and content herself with holding her position in the Principalities until she succeeded in obtaining the satisfaction which she required.* This second endeavour to contrive a novel kind of standing- ground between real peace and avoAved war was destined, as will be seen, to cause fresh discord between Eussia and the Western Powers. * 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 226. VOL. II. A
2 CAUSKS INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAT. The negotiations for a settlement were scarcely
^" interrupted, citlier by 'the formal declaration of
Tiicncgo- ^yj^j. Q^. ]jy tiig hostilities which were commenced
tuitions . ■'
Hpenh'?^' ^''L'th'e banks of the Tianube ; and the Conference scttie7nent; ^^ ^^^^ ^0^^^" ^owcrs represented at Vienna had just agreed to the terms of a collective Note, which seemed to afford a basis for peace, when the Eng- by\he'"^'^ lish Government gave way to the strenuous urg- perorami"' Gucy of the French Emperor, and consented to a Govfrnment. incasure which ruined the pending negotiations, and generated a scries of events leading straight to a war between Eussia and the Western Powers. In the month of September, some weeks before the Sultan's final rupture with the Czar, the pious and M'arlike ardour then kindled in the Turkish Movement Empire had begun to show itself at Constantino- tinoiiie. ' pie. A placard, urging the Government to declare war, was pasted on one of the mosques. Then a petition for war was presented to the Council, and to the Sultan himself, by certain muderris, or theological students. The paper was signed by thirty-live persons of no individual distinction, but having the corporate importance of belonging to the ' Ulemah.' Though free from menace, the petition, as Lord Stratford expressed it, was worded in ' serious and impressive terms, imply- ' ing a strong sense of religious duty, and a very * independent disregard of consequences.' The Ministers professed to be alarmed, and to believe that this movement was the forerunner of revolu- tion ; and Lord Stratford seems to have imagined that their alarm was genuine. It is perhaps more
IN TIIK WAR AGALWST KUSSIA.
likely tliat tliey were skilfully making the most chap. of these occunences, with a view to embroil their '
maritime allies in the approaching war, and tliat ^i^^g^^f ■when they asked the Ambassadors to take part in y,','rk^Ji/'" measures for the maintenance of public tranquil- ^'""s^eis. lity, their real desire was to see the fleets of France and England come up into the Bosphorus. They well knew that if this naval movement could be brought to pass before the day of the final rupture between Ivussia and the Porte, it would be regarded by the Czar as a flagrant violation of treaty.
A curious indication of the sagacity with which the Turkish Ministers were acting is to be found in the difference between their language to the English Ambassador and their language to M. do la Cour. In speaking to Lord Stratford they shadowed out dangers impending over the Eastern world, the upheaving of Islam, the overthrow of the Sultan's authority. Then they went straight to iSI. de la Cour and drew a small vivid picture of massacred Frenchmen. They did not, said M. de la Cour, conceal from him ' that the persons ' and the interests of his countrymen would be ex- ' posed to grave dangers, which they were sensible ' they were incapable of preventing, by reason of ' the want of union in the Ministry and the threats ' directed against themselves.' * This skilful dis- crimination on the part of the Turkish jNIinisters seems to show that they had not at all lost their composure.
• ' Eiisteni Papers,' part ii. p. 115.
4 CAUSES INVOLVING FUANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. Eitlier by tliciv real dread, or by tlicir crafty ' simulation of it, the Turkish statesmen succeeded
hl'aiarmfng^ iu iufecting M. dc ha Cour with sincere aharm. lie Am^7sador. "^^''"^^ easily brouglit to the conclusion that ' the ' state of the Turkish Government was getting ' worse and worse ; and that matters had got to ' such a state as to cause dread of a catastrophe, * of which the inhabitants, Payahs or Europeans, ' Avould be the first victims, and which would even ' threaten the Sultan's throne.' * He called upon the English Ambassador to consult as to what was best to be done ; and both he and the Austrian Internuncio expressed their readiness to join with him in adopting the needful measures. Composure Lord Stratford does not seem to have suspected btra'tfoni. that tlic usc whicli the Turkish INIinisters were making of their divinity students Avas in the na- ture of a stratagem ; but, assuming and believing their alarm to be genuine, he was still proof against the infection, and retained his calm. In- deed, he seems to have understood that a cry for war on the part of the religious authorities was a healthy sign for the Empire. He expressed to his colleagues his readiness to act in concert with them; but he said he was reluctant to take any step which M'as not clearly warranted by the ne- cessities of the case, and that he desired to guard against mistake and exaggeration by gaining a more precise knowledge of the grounds for alarm. He deprecated any joint interference with the Turkish Government, and was still less inclined * 'Eastern rajicrs,' port ii. p. 115.
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 5
to join ill bringing up tlie squadrons to Constanti- chap. nople without more proofs of urgent peril tli;iu ^' liad been yet obtained; l)ut lie suofrested, as an "'s^ise
•' ' oo ' and guarilud
opinion of his own, that the representatives of the for'^pres'efrv- niaritinio Powers should obtain from their respec- pe^^ceofthe tive Admirals such an addition of steam-force as '^"i^"^'- would secure them from any immediate attack, and enable them to assist the Government in ease of an outbreak threatening its existence, without attracting any unusual attention, or assuming an air of intimidation.* This was done.f A couple of steamers belonging to each of the great Western Powers quietly came up to Constantinople. Tran- quillity followed. Every good end was attained without ostentation or disturbance — without the evil of seeming to place the Sultan's capital under the protection of foreign Powers — and, above all, without breaking through the treaty of 1841 in a way which, however justifiable it miglit be in point of international law, clearly tended to force on a war.
But the moderate and guarded policy of Lord The French Stratford at Constantinople was quickly subverted li'is means by a pressure which the French Emperor found a pressure means of putting upon the advisers of the Queen. KngUsh Of course, an understanding with a foreign Power is in its nature an abatement of a nation's free agency ; and a statesman may be honest and wise
* The steam -force of the maritime Powers already in the Golden Horn consisted of vessels which had passed the Dar- danelles by virtue of exceptions contained in the treaty of 1841.
+ 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 121.
6 CAUSKS INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CUAP. in consenting to measures wliicli liave no otlier ^' excuse than that they were adopted for the sake of maintaining close union with an ally. England had contracted a virtual alliance ; and when once she had taken this step, it was needful and right tliat she should do and suffer many things rather than allow the new friendship to be chilled. But tliis yoke was pressed hard against lier. It was not the wont of England to be causelessly led into an action which was violent, and provoking of violence. It was not her wont to rush forward without need, and so to drive through a treaty that many might say she broke it. It was not her wont to be governed in the use of her fleets by the will of a foreign Sovereign. It was not her wont to hear from a Ercnch Ambassador that a given movement of her ]\Iediterranean squadron was 'indispensably necessary,' nor to be requested to go to such a conclusion by ' an immediate de- ' cision.' It was not her wont to act with impas- sioned haste, where haste was dangerous and needless. It was not her wont to found a breach with one of the foremost Powers of Europe upon a mere hysterical message addressed by one French- man to another. But the French Emperor had a great ascendant over the English Government ; for the power which he had gained by entangling it in a virtual alliance was augmented by the growing desire for action now evinced by the English people. He knew that at any moment he could expose Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues to a gust of popular disfavour, by causing it to be
IN THE WAR AOAIXST UUSSIA. 7
known or imagined that France was keen, and CIIAP.
that England was lagging behind. '. —
When M. de la Cour's account of his sensations reached Paris, it produced so deep an impression that the French Emperor, either feeling genuine alarm, or else seeing in his Ambassador's narra- tive an opportunity ibr the furtherance of his designs, determined to insist, in cogent terms, violent
o ' ' o urgeiioy or
that the English Government should join him in theFreuc!.
o ^ hinperor lor
overstepping tlie treaty of 1841, and ordering ana^vw'ce^ llie Allied squadrons to pass the Dardanelles J^J;',™*^""^^- and anchor in the Bosphorus. On the 23d of September, Count Walewski had an interview with Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon at the same time ; and then, after speaking of the crisis at Constantinople which J\I. de la Cour's despatch had led the French Government to expect, lie said that his Government thought it ' indispensably necessary that both fleets should ' be ordered up to Constantinople;' and his Excel- lency added ' that he was directed to ask for the ' immediate decision of Ller IMajesty's Govern- * ment, in order that no time might be lost in ' sending instructions to the Ambassadors and ' Admirals.' *
Now, at the time of listening to these peremi)- Neediess- tor}'' words, the English Government had received mt-asure. no account from their own Ambassador of the apprehended disturbances ; but they knew that the fleets at the mouth of the Dardanelles, being already under orders to obey the requisitions of • ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 114.
8 CAUSES IXVOLVIXG FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, the Ambassadors, could be instantly brouglit up ^' to Constantinople without any further orders for that purpose being sent from home. ^Moreover, the very despatch which brought the alarm showed that the Ambassadors knew how to meet the dan- ger, and that they had already called up that por- tion of the lleet which they deemed it prudent to have in tlie Golden Horn. From first to last the power which France and England had entrusted to their representatives at the Forte had been used with admirable prudence ; and it is hard to understand how it could have seemed right to withdraw, or rather supersede, the discretion hitherto connnitted to the Ambassadors, by send- ing out an absolute order for the advance of the fleets. As it stood, the fleets would go up the moment they were wanted ; and what the French Emperor now required was that, whether they were wanted or not, and in defiance of the treaty of 1841, they should immediately pass the Dardan-
its teiKkncy elles. Eitlicr the Queen's Government had lost
to bring uii
war- its composure, or else, when they gave way to this
demand of tlie French Emperor, and consented to a needless * measure which operated as a sharp provocative of war, the Queen's Government went through the bitter duty of taking a step not right in itself, but forced upon them by the stringency of the new alliance. -f*
* Needless, because the authority to call up the fleets when they were wanted was already vested in tlie Ambassadors.
+ Lord Palinerston personally approved the measure ; and, in- deed, if lie luul not done so, one can hardly believe that lie
IX TIIK WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 9
* I told Count Walewski,' says Lord Clarendon, c H a p. ' that no intelligence of the nature referred to by ^' ' M. de la Cour had been received from Lord ' Stratford de liedcliffe ; and that so long as the ' Porte did not declare war against liussia, and
• desire the presence of the British fleet, it was ' the intention of Her Afajesty's Government to ' observe the treaty of 1841 ; but Lord Aberdeen ' and I concurred in stating to Count AValewsld ' tiiat, under such circumstances as those reported ' by M. de la Cour, the provisions of any treaty ' must necessarily, and as a matter of course, be ' set aside.' And tlien, unhappily, Lord Aber- deen and Lord Clarendon went on to tell Count The Engiisii Walewski 'that they would without hesitation yieidrtd'ti'ia ' take upon themselves to agree to the proposal of Em"er'or.
' the French Government that the Ambassadors ' should be instructed to call up the fleets to Con- ' stantinople for the security of British and French ' interests, and, if necessary, for the protection of ' the Sultan.' *
In compliance with the promise thus obtained
would have allowed tlie Cabinet to Le tlnis jiressed, and ap- parently guided by the French Emperor.
* September 23, 1853. 'Eastern Tapers,' part ii. p. 114. In the opinion of Lord Stratford, this violent and inevitably perturbing measure was unnecessary. After saying that he had been content with the plan of calling up three steamers from each of the squadrons, he writes : — 'I am still of opinion that ' assistance thus limited would have answered every purpose, ' unless, indeed, the Ottoman squadron had taken part against ' tlie Sultan, which was a very extreme case to SK]>pose. /
* vAshed to save Her Majesty's Government from any embarrass' ' mcnts llJccly to accrue from a premature pas^taje of the Dur-
10 CAUSKS INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, from him, Lord Clarendon on the same day ad- ^' dressed a despatch to Lord Stratford, saying, dered°u"-.to ' Your Excellency is therefore instructed to send consuuti- . f-Q,. ^^ijg British fleet to Constantinople' *—tlnis depriving the Ambassador of the discretion which had hitherto been nsed -with singular care and wisdom, and with great advantage to the public service. What makes the course of the English w.intof Government the more extraordinary is, that they discretion"' ruslicd iuto the hostile policy which is involved thL"rdoption in this stringent order to Lord Stratford without measure. having received any despatch of their own from Constantinople, and without any knowledge of the events which had been occuring except what was conveyed by a telegraphic message from a French Ambassador to his own Government. If the English INIinisters had paused five days,-f they would have received Lord Stratford's calm de- spatch, showing that he looked with more plea- sure than alarm upon the petition of the theo- logical students, and that he knew how to avail himself of force without using violence. If they had waited four days more,J they would have found that the hour was at hand Mhen tlie
' daneUes by Admiral Duiulas's squadron, and at llie same time ' to take precautious adequate to tlie appoaraure of danger, 1 ' did not form my ojiinion in tliis rcsjiect without taking tlie ' opinion of Her ]\Iajesty's senior oiiioer in command in the ' I'.osphorus.' Cth October 1853. Ibid. p. 188.
* 'Eastern Papers,' jiart ii. p. IIO.
+ i.e., till 28th September. Ibid. ]>. 121.
t i.e., till 2d October. Ibid. p. Vll.
IN THE WAIl AGAINST RUSSIA. 11
fleets might enter the Dardanelles without any chap. violation or seeming violation of treaty ; and, in '
fact, it happened that this ill-omened order for the entry of the squadrons into the Dardanelles was carried into effect at a moment when a delay of less than twenty-four hours would have made their entry clearly consistent with a due observ- ance of the treaty of IS-il ; for they entered the Dardanelles on the 22d, and on the following day the Sultan, being then at war with Paissia, was released from the engagement which pre- cluded him (so long as he was at peace) from suffering foreign fleets to come up through the Straits.
Baron Brunnow romonsti-ated in strong terms Baron Bnm against the entry of the fleets into the Dardanelles monsirauce. as a breach of the treaty of 1841 ; but although he was well answered by Lord Clarendon so far as concerned the mere question of right, no en- deavour was made to mitigate by words the true import of the measure ; and, in truth, it was of so hostile a nature as not to be susceptible of any favourable interpretation ; for although the apprehension of disturbances at Constantinople might be a sufficing ground for the step, the order to the Ambassadors was not made depend- ent upon the occurrence of any such disturbances, nor even upon any alleged fear of them, but was peremptory and absolute in its terms, and was made applicable, not to such a portion of the naval forces as might be requisite for ensuring
12 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C II A P. I.
Effect of tlie iiieasuie at St Peters- burg.
Count Nes-
selrodu's
sorrow.
Tlie Czar's determina- tion to re- taliate with his Black Sea fleet.
the peace of the city, but to the whole of the Allied squadrons.
AVheu the tidings of this hostile measure reached St Petersburg, they put an end for the time to all prospect of peace ; and even Count Nesselrode, wlio had hitherto done all lie could venture in the way of resistance to his master, now declared with sorrow that he saw in the acts of the British Government a 'settled purpose to ' liumiliate Russia.' He spoke in sorrow ; and his thoughts, it would seem, went back to the times wlien he had sat in gi-eat councils with Wellington. ' He spoke,' says Sir Hamilton Sey- mour, ' with much feeling of the liorrors of war, ' and particularly of war between two powerful ' countries — two old allies like England and ' Eussia — countries which, whilst they might be ' of infinite use to one another, possessed each the
* means of inflicting great injury upon its antago- ' nist ; and ended by saying that if, for any ' motives known to him, war should be declared ' against Russia by England, it would be the most ' unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever
* undertaken.' *
The Czar received tidings of the hostile de- cision of tlie maritime Powers in a spirit which, tliis time at least, was almost justified by the pro- vocation given. In retaliation for what he would naturally look upon as a bitter alfrout, and even a.s a breach of treaty, he determined, it would seem, to have vengeance at sea, whilst vengeance
* ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 180.
IN THE WAR AGAINST IIUSSIA. 13
at sea was still possilile; and it was imdcr tlic CHAP, spur of the anger thus kindled that orders for '
active operations were given to the fleet at Scbas- topol* The vengeance he meditated he could only wreak upon the body of the Turks, for the great offenders of the West were beyond tlie bounds of his power.
It was long believed in England that the dis- Enorofthe
. 1 1 •! J • 1 notion tliat
aster oi Smope was a surprise stealthily contrived tiie disaster
T^ -..-r- 1 1 1 • • • ofSinope
by the Emperor Nicholas, and it is certain that wasasur-
. . prise achiev-
the event fell upon the maritime rowers as a edbystcaitit sudden shock ; but it is not true that conceal- ment was used by llussia. On the contrary, it seems that the attack was preceded by a long- continued ostentation of naval force. In the middle of the month of November, and at a time when the Allied Squadrons were anchored in the Bosphorus, the Sebastopol fleet came out, and was osteniatiou*
•'■ ' ^ publicity of
ranofed in a kind of cordon stretching from north the Russian
^ n operations
to south across the centre of the Black Sea. So •" tiic Biacij
Sea.
early as the 20th of November the Eussian cruiseis captured the Medora, a Turkish steamer \-\
* This conclusion is drawn from dates. The hostile resolu- tion of the Western Powers was known to the Czar a little before the 14th of October, and about the midille of the follow- ing month the Black sea fleet was at sea. If allowance be made for distance and preparation, it will be seen that the sequence of one event upon the other is close enough to warrant the statement contained in the text. In the absence, however, of any knowledge to the contrary, it is fair to suppose that the Czar remembered his promise, and did not sanction any actual attack upon the enemy unless his eonnnanders should be pre- viously apprised that the Turks had conmicnced active warfare.
t ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 315.
14 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, and about tlie same time they boarded a raer- ' chantman, and relieved the captain of a portion of his cargo and of tlie whole of his cash ; * and the Russians were so far from entertaining any idea of secrecy or concealment, that they seem to have hailed neutral merchantmen for the purpose of inquiring about the Frencli and English fleets in the Bosphorus, and asking 'exultingly' if the captures which the llussian fleet had effected were known at Constantinople."!* Tidings cfan FuU ten days I before the fatal .30th of Novem-
impending d • f- c Ml
attack by bcr, a iuissiaii lorce ot seven sail and one war-
the Russmn • ■ • • i , f. o- i
fieet. steamer was cruising in sight ot binope, and
hovering over the Turkish squadron which lay there at anchor. An express despatched from Samsoon by land on the 22d, bore tidings of this to Lord Stratford, and it must have reached him, it would seem, by the 25th or 26th. On Wednes- day the 23d, the Commander of the Turkish squadron descried a Eussian force of seven sail and two steamers coming down under a north-east wind towards Sinope. The Turkish ships were cleared for action, but after some manceuvring, the llussian force stood out to windward and gained an offing. On the following day six Russian ships of the line, with a brig and two steamers, again made their appearance ; and three of them, under easy sail, stood towards the port of Sinope until the evening. 'In fine,' writes the
* ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 316. + lliid. ]>. 31.').
* Iliiil. So early as tlie 22il, the appearance of the squadron was (le.scribcd as haviii_:^ occurred 'sume days back.'
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA, 15
Turkish Comraander, 'six sail of the line, a brig, chap.
I.
' and two steamers, are constantly off tlie port ' above mentioned, and at one time they lie-to,
* and another they beat about. From six to eight ' frigates and two steamers have been seen off the
* port of Bartin and Amasbre, and this news is
* certain. Besides, the great naval port of the
* enemy is near. He may therefore receive rein-
* forcements, or attack us with fire-ships. That
* being the case, if reinforcements are not sent to
* us, and our position continues the same for some
* time — may God preserve us from them ! — It ' may well happen that the Imperial fleet may ' incur disasters.*
The power and habit of concentrating all energy inaction of in a sin^jle channel of action, was one of the sadorsand
° the Afl-
qualities which gave force and grandeur to Lord mirais. Stratford in the field of diplomacy, but it also seems to have had the effect of preventing him from casting a glance beyond the range of his profession ; and it is curious that, when the exigencies of the time called upon him to perform duties not commonly falling within the sphere of a diplomatist, his mind refused to act. England and France, without the wholesome formality of a treaty, had glided into an engagement to defend ' Constantinople, or any other part of the Turkish ' territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, that ' might be in danger of attack.' f So much of this grave duty as consisted in originating a resolve to put forth the naval strength of the Allies remained
* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 313. t Ibid. p. 143.
16 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
c n A r. committed to the two Ambassadors, but it was of ' course understood that any plans for active measures would be concerted between them and the Admirals ; and since the nature of the duty Avhich they might be called upon to nndertake ■was known of course to the Admirals, it Avas evi- dently incumbent upon them, as well as upon the two Ambassadors, to take measures for ascertain- ing whether the Eussians were preparing to oper- ate against the coasts of Turkey. JMoreover, the English Ambassador had been instructed by his Government that, 'if the Russian fleet were to ' come out of Sebastopol, the Heets would then, as * a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus;'* and, implicitly, this instruction required that measures should be taken for ascertaining wliether the Czar's naval forces were in harbour or at sea, for, supposing them to have gone to sea, that was an event which (according to the orders from home) was to be the ground of a naval operation. Yet, not only were no measures taken for ascer- taining the truth, but the rumours of great naval operations in the Black Sea, and tlie despatch of the 22d, announcing that the Russian squadron was hovering over Sinope, and even the despatch containing the touching appeal of the Turkish Commander at Sinope, all alike i'aiUnl to draw men into actiun. This last despatch was com- municated to Lord Stratford on the 29th. Even then an instant advance of the steam squadrons liiight not liave been altogetlier in vain, for though
• ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 1 13.
IN Till': WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 17
tlie attack coininenccd on the 30th, the liussiau chap.
lieet (lid not quit Sinope until the 1st of Decern- L__
her. Yet nothing was done. Nothing but actual intelligence of the disaster was cogent enough to lift an anchor. ^Vhat Lord Stratford says of the causes of all this inaction ought to be stated in his own words. Writing on the 4th of December, he says : ' liuniours of Itussian ships of the line being ' at sea have occasionally prevailed for some time. ' Uncertainty of information, a wish to avoid as ' long as possible the chances of a collision, the ' arrival of a new rrencli Ambassador, and tlie ' state of the weather, were natural causes of de- ' mur in coming to a decision as to sending the ' squadrons into the Black Sea at this time of the * year.' * But even supposing that there were reasons which justified liesitation in sending the squadrons to sea, the Home Governments of tlic AVestern Powers were entitled to ask why some humbler means of ascertaining the truth were never resorted to, and why no measures followed upon the receipt of the alarming despatch from Samsoon, or even upon the appeal for help which had come from the Turkish Commander at Sinope.
On the 30th of November, Admiral Xachimoff, with six sail of the line, bore down upon the Turk- ish squadron still lying at anchor in the port of Sinope. There was no ship of the line in the Turkish squadron. It consisted of seven frigates, a sloop, a steamer, and some transports. The * 'Eastern Tapers,' part ii. p. 311.
VOL. II. B
18 CAUSES INVOLVING Fi;ANUE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. Turks were the first to lire, and to Lriiig upon
'• tlieir little squadron of frigates the broadsides of
six sail of the line; and although they fought
Thfl disaster without liopo, tliey were steadfast. Either they
"'°^'^' refused to strike tlieir colours, or else, if their
colours went down, the Russian Admiral was
blind to their signal, and continued to slaughter
them. Except the steamer, every one of the
Turkish vessels was destroyed. It was believed
by men in authority that 4000 Turks were killed,
that less than 400 survived, and that all these
were wounded.* The feeble batteries of the place
suffered under the enemy's fire, and the town Avas
much shattered.* The Russian fleet did not move
from Sinope until the following day.*
This onslaught upon Sinope, and upon vessels lying in port, was an attack upon Turkish terri- tory, and was therefore an attack which the French and English Ambassadors had been authorised to repel by calling into action the fleets of the "Western Powers. Moreover, the attack had been impending for many days, and all this while the (leets of the Western Powers had been lying still in the Posphorus within easy reach of the scene of the disaster. The honour of France was wounded. England was touched to the quick.
• 'Eastern rapers,' part ii. p. 305.
IN THE WAK AGAINST RUSSIA. 19
CHAPTER II.
EiTUEU from slieer want of foretlioiiglit, or else in chap.
II tenderness to the feelinjrs of men who shunned L__
the bare thought of a collision, the Governments ullffnstruo of France and England had omitted to consider iVishcdTo' the plight in whicli they would stand, if, under ofliic west' the eyes of their naval commanders, a Eussian *'^" Admiral should come out from Sebastopol and crush a Turkish squadron in the midst of the IJIack Sea. It is true tliat this was not the event which had occurred, for the onslaught of Sinope was ' an attack upon Turkish territory,' and was therefore M'ithin the scope of the instruc- tions from home. But it is also true that the Governments of Paris and London had not com- mitted, either to their Ambassadors or their Admirals, any power to take part in a naval engagement against Paissia upon the open sea ; and it was obvious that tliis chasm in the in- structions furnished a ground of palliation to the Ambassadors and the naval commanders ; for after all the angry negotiations that had taken place between Paissia and the Western Powers, a French
20 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C II A r. or an En<^]isli Admiral niiglit naturally be loth to
'. — go watching the movements of a fleet which, so
long as it was upon the open sea, he was not
empowered to strike, and might be honourably
reluctant to move out into tlie Euxine and run
the risk of having to witness a naval engagement
between the sliips of the Czar and of the Sultan,
without being at liberty to take part in it unless
it chanced to be fought within gunsliot of the
Turkish coast. Lut exactly in proportion as this
excuse for the Ambassadors and Admirals was
valid, it tended to bring blame upon the Home
Governments of France and England. The honest
rage of the English peoj^le was about to break out,
and there were materials for a rough criticism of
men engaged in the service of the State. Some
might blame the Home Government, some the
Ambassador, some the Admiral; but plainly it
would fare ill with any man upon whom the
public anger might light.
Reception of On the lltli of December the tidings of Sinope
otsiiioi.eby rcachcd Paris and London. The French Govern-
Govein- mcut fclt the bitterness of a disaster 'endured
bytho' ' as it were under the guns of the French and
England. ' English fleets.' * In England, tlie indignation
of the people ran to a heiglit importing a resolve
to have vengeance ; and if it had clearly been
understood that the disaster had resulted from
a want of firm orders from liome, tlie Government
would have been overwhelmed. But the very
weight and force of the public anger gave the
• M. Drouyu de Lhuys. *Ea.stcin Papers,' part ii. p. 299.
IN THE "WAR AGAINST IIUSSIA. 21
Government a means of eluding it. The torrent chap. had so great a volume that it was worthy to be '
turned against a foreign State. The blaming of The anger of
, . ° ^ , o Uie English
Ministers and Ambassadors and Admirals, and fi>vcrtea
from ttieir
the endless conflict which would be engendered ""P '".''''s,
" and un.iusl ly
by the apportionment of censure, all might be I'lougiitto superseded by suggesting, instead, a demand for czar. vengeance against IJussia. The terms of Count Nesselrode's Circular of the 31st of October* had given ground for expecting that, until provoked to a contrary course, the Czar, notwithstanding the Turkish declaration of war, would remain upon the defensive ; and the people in England were now taught, or allowed to suppose, that Eussia had made this attack upon a Turkish squadron in breach of an honourable understand- ing virtually equivalent to a truce, or, at all events, to an arrangement which would confine the theatre of active war to the valley of the Lower Danube. This charge against Paissia was unjust; for after the issue of the Circular, the Government of St Petersburg had received intelli- gence not only that active warfare was going on in the valley of the Lower Danube, but that the Turks had seized the Paissian fort of St Nicholas, on the eastern coast of the Euxine, and were attacking Russia upon her Armenian frontier. After acts of this warlike sort had been done, it was impossible to say, with any fairness, that Piussia was debarred from a right to destroy her enemy's ships ; and it must be acknowledged also,
• ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 226.
22 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCK AND ENGLAND
CHAP. IL
First deci- siun of the English Cabinet in regard to Siuope.
as I have already said, that tlie destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope was not a thing done in stealth. ]>at the jjeople of England, not know- ing all this at first, and hearing nothing of the Kussian fleet until they heard of the ravage and slaughter of Sinope, imagined that the blow had come sudden as the knife of an assassin. They ^vere too angry to be able to look upon tlie question in a spirit of cold justice. It was therefore an easy task to turn all attention from the faults of public functionaries and fasten it upon a larger scheme of vengeance. Ministers, Ambassadors, and Admirals, went free, and in a spirit of honest, inaccurate justice, the Emperor Nicholas was marked for sacrifice. This time, it was his fate to be condemned on wrong grounds ; but his sins against Europe had been giiev- ous, and the rough dispensations of the tribunal which people call 'opinion' have often enough determined that a man who has been guilty of one crime shall be made to suffer for another. There were few men in England who doubted that the onslaught of Sinope was a treacherous deed.
When first dealing with the question that had been raised by this naval attack on the Turks, our Government took it for granted that the fleets of the Western Powers would forthwith enter the Euxine, and considered that the in- structions addressed to the English Admiral on the 8th of October would be still a sufficient guide, if they were now reinforced by enjoining
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. L'3
liini to prevent the recuiTcnce of a disaster sucli chap. as that of Sinope. ^^-
But on the IGtli of December the ]^!lmperor of proposal ot tlie French once more approached tlie Govei-n- tmijeror?' ment of the Queen with his subtle and dangerous counsels. The armed conflict of States in these times is an evil of such dread proportions that it seems wise to uphold the solemnity of a transi- tion from peace to war, and to avoid those con- trivances which tend to throw down the great landmark; for experience shows tliat statesmen heartily resolved upon peace may nevertheless be induced to concur in a series of gentle steps M'hich slowly and gradually lead down to why. The negotiations for a settlement between Russia Danger of and Tui'key had not only been revived, but were down'tili
r n !• L J.1 • ±- • • ■ old barriers
lar irom being at this time m an unpromising between state; and it is probable that if Lord Aberdeen wTr?^^" and Mr Gladstone had been called upon to say M'hether they would observe peace faithfully, or frankly declare a war, they would scarcely have made the more violent choice. But the alternative was not presented to the minds of the Queen's Ministers in this ])lain and whole- some form.
The ingenious Emperor of the French devised Ambiguous
1 r 1 • 1 • • •. , character of
a scheme or action so ambiguous in its nature theprorosai. that, at the option of any man, it might be called either peace or war, but so certain nevertlieless in its tendency, that tlie adoption of such a course by the maritime Powers would at once blot out all fair prospect of maintaining peace in
2{ CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
c H A P. Eiirope. lie proposed to give Eussia notice ' that
. ' France and England were resolved to prevent
' the repetition of the affair of Sinope, and that
' every Russian ship thenceforward met iu the
* Eiixine would be requested, and, if necessary, ' constrained, to return to Sebastopol ; and that ' any act of aggression afterwards attempted ' against the Ottoman territory or flag would
* be repelled by force.' * This proposal involved, M-ithout expressing it, a defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia ; and if it were adopted, the Emperor of Russia would have to see his flag driven from the waters which bounded his own dominions. It was so framed that Lord Palmer- ston would know it meant war, whilst Lord Aberdeen and 'Mv Gladstone might be led to imagine that it was a measure rather gentle than otherwise, which perhaps would keep peace in the Euxine. Indeed, the proposal seemed made to win the Chancellor of the Exchequer; for it fell short of war by a measure of distance which, though it jnight seem very small to people with common eyesight, was more than broad enough to afford commodious standing-room to a man delighting as he did iu refinements and slender distinctions.
The Frenfh The Enipcror of the French pressed this scheme i.ressesupon upou the Euglisli Cabinet with his whole force. Cabinet. ' Hc uot Only urgcd it by means of the usual channels of diplomatic communication, but pri- vately desired Lord Cowley ' to recommend it iu
• 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 307.
IX TIIK ^VAIi AGAINST RUSSIA. 2o
' tlic strongest terms to the favourable attention c ir a p.
' of Her Majesty's Government as a measure 1__
' incumbent upon himself and them to take ; ' and he avowed 'tlie disappointment which he ' shoukl feel if a difference of opinion prevented 'its adoption.'* This language is cogent — it is also significant ; and, to one who can read it by the light of a little collateral knowledge, it may open a glimpse of the relations subsisting between the Prencli Court and public men in England.
On the 17th, the English Government had taken a step in pursuance of the moderate decision to which the Cabinet had come ; but on the follow- ing day they were made acquainted with the will of the French Emperor. It woidd seem that there was hesitation in the Cabinet (as well there might be) — hesitation lasting fully two days;f but those members of the Government who would have liked to maintain their former decision, had against them our angry people, now joined in their impatience by the French Emperor, and apparently about to be led by one whose power wnthin the last few days had seemed to be rising high. It was at a meeting of the Cabinet on Thursday the 22d, that the proposal of the French Emperor closed in like a net round the variegated
* ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 307.
+ So late as the 20tli, and when within forty-eij^ht hours of the decision, which went in an opposite direction. Lord Clarendon evidently believed that the former determination of the Govern- ment would be maintained. See 7505/ in footcote, p. 36, an extract from his despatch of the 20th.
'J 6 CAUSES INVOLVING FIUNCR AND ENGLAND
CHAP, frroup which composed what remained of Lord ' Aberdeen's Ministry when their strongest man yletdi*'"'"*'* ^^^^ ^^^'^ taken from them, and gathered them all together in its snpple folds. Some submitted to it for one reason, and some for another ; but the pressure of the Preuch Emperor was the cogent motive which governed the result. Still, this time, though the pressure was inflicted by the liand of a foreign sovereign, it was after all from the English people themselves tliat the Erench Emperor drew his strongest means of coercion. Tlieir indignation at the disaster of Sinope made him sure tliat he could bring rnin on Lord Aber- deen's Administration by merely causing England to know that her Government was shrinking from the hostile scheme of action which he had proposed.
The result, however, was that now, for the second time, Erance dictated to England the iise that she should make of her fleet, and by this time perhaps submission had become more easy than it was at first. The IMiliistry, Avith much openness, acknowledged that they were acting without the warrant of their own judgment, and in deference to the will of the Erench Emperor. ' The Government,' said Lord Clarendon, ' having ' announced that the recurrence of a disaster such ' as that of Sinope must be prevented, and that ' the command of the Black Sea must be secured, ' would have been content to have left the manner ' of executing those instructions to the discretion * of the Admirals, but they attach so much ini'
66'
Petersburg.
IX THE WAIJ AGAIXST IJUSSIA. 27
' portaucG not alone to the luiiied action of the chap. * two Governments, but to the instructions ad- ^'' ' dressed to their respective agents being precisely ' the same, that they are prepared to adopt the ' specific mode of action now proposed by llie ' Government of the Emperor.' * With the addi- orders to tion of a proviso that for the present the Sultan .schemrana should be engaged to abstain from aggressive HaTst""''' operations on the Euxine, instructions exactly in accord with the Erench Emperor's proposal were forthwith sent out to the Bosphorus, and at the same time the Erencli and English represen- tatives at St Petersburg were ordered to com- municate tliis resolution to Count Nesselrode.
But who was the statesman removed by some Lord Pai. cause from our Cabinet before the critical day, cxXsion and who again was the statesman then seen to be atTie^time so clothed with power that the very apprehension decision* of having him for an adversary weiglied heavily on °° ^ '"'*' the decision of that Thursday (the 22d of Decem- ber) ? The two were one. Only a few days before, Lord Palmerston had been a member of the Gov- ernment. Tliinking fit, and intending to meet the desire of tlie Tuileries for a close and con- certed action between France and England, he in those days had power, great power over Louis Napoleon ; and, unless for some reason of Jiis own, he would hardly, I think, have allowed the French Emperor to press indecorously upon any Cabinet to which he himself belonged, still less to apply such a pressure with the object of making it
* ' EusterD Papers,' part ii. p. 321.
28 CAUSES INVOLVIXG FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C 11 A P. reverse a decision already taken. Noiwitlistand- ' ing Lord Pabnerston's subsequently expressed assent to the decision of the 22d of December,* there is room, as I think, for surmising that, if his tenure of office had remained uninterrupted, our Cabinet would have stood by its former resolve, and refused to break up the negotiations then almost ripe for agreement by an act which had the strange quality of being even more offensive than war. At all events, it is certain that, if only for his power of controlling the French Emperor, and maintaining with him that kind of concert which English statesmen might ap- prove, Lord Palmerston had been a great source of strength to the Government, On the other hand, it seemed plain that if Lord Palmerston were to be undergoing political banishment at a time when his late colleagues could be accused of flinching from the task of avenging Sinope, the support of an indignant people, connecting every symptom of ]\Iinisterial tamcness with his exclu- sion from office, would make him more powerful than the Queen's Government.
Now unfortunately it happened, though for rea- sons which cannot yet be disclosed, that some days before the ill-omened Thursday, Lord Pal- merston was driven from office. Of the justice or propriety of the measure thus taken against him no one yet can be invited to judge, because its
* In a letter to his brother, published in llr Evelyn Ashley's, most interesting Look.
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 29
grounds arc withheld.* Wlmt we all may kuow chap. is that he found himself compelled to resign ;■{- ' ' . that the Queen accei^itcd his resignation ; and that the Council-day on wliich he would have to de- liver up the seals of ofTice was duly fixed. But no sooner had all this been done, than a sense of Lord Palmerston's immense sterling worth as a
* Tlicy were eve'i witlilicUl, one iiioy sny, from tlio faitliful Baron Stockinar ; for the Prince Consort's letter to liini on the suLject -was not a real and thorough disclosnro. Whether the curious outcry of those days against ' Prince Albert's interfer- 'ence'was in any way connected with the transactions above stated, I do not undertake to say ; but it followed them with a very close step. The outcry Avas one wrongly, nay, almost absurdly directed, and was utterly silenced upon the meeting of Parliament in 1854, by Lord Aberdeen and other public men, who spoke out with unshrinking clearness upon what had seemed until then a tender and delicate subject.
In saying that the outcry was wrongly or absurdly directed, I am far from meaning to represent that it was baseless ; for I think, on the contrarj'', that transactions appearing to have resulted from the hostility of the Crown to Lord Palmerston in the five or six middle years of this century, were a very fit sub- ject for public inquiry, and in the meantime for that healthy, wise uneasiness which awakens the care of Parliament. "What Parliament ought to have asked, and ought to have taken care to learn, was — not whether the Prince Consort, or any other • Private Secretary,' or friend or courtier, had been giving counsel to the Queen, but — whether any of her constitutional advisers had been guilty of undue complacency to the Crown, or of intriguing against a colleague.
If the life of the late Prince Consort in 1853 should be un- reservedly imparted to the public, the 'grounds' above referred to as wanting will not fail to appear. The December of 1853 was a critical month in the Prince Consort's political life.
t A difference with his colleagues on the question of ' Kcfonn' was assigned by Lord Palmerston as a ground for his resigna- tion (see the explanations in Hansard at the opening of the
30 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, colleague, and, along with that also, the thought - of what might be his strength as an adversary,
broke in upon the minds of the Cabinet Ministers still remaining under Lord Aberdeen ; and they, some of them, likewise perceived that his with- drawal had destroyed the equilibrium hitherto maintained in a Government formed by coalition. These last members of the Cabinet, with the assent of some of their colleagues, effected, as it were, an insurrection against the power which had driven Lord Palmerston from office. They urged his restoration ; and to the grievous mortification of those who had compassed his fall, it proved on the whole impracticable to resist their demand. Lord Palmerston, I believe, took no part in pre- paring the counter-movement which thus over- came his assailants, and at first, perhaps, knew nothing of it ; * but, when the progress of the measure was at length made known to him, he did not thwart its completion. Liking work in the public service, and desiring, of course, so
session of 1854) ; and in his month the exphmation was a fair one, because the 'difference' in question had been brandished .ngainst liim in such way as to compel him to retire from tlie Government. (See Lord Palmerston's letters in Mr Evelyn Asliley's book.) But in the midst of those anxious December (lays wlieii England was fast driving towards war, liow came it to happen that a ' difference' on the then liat subject of poor old ' Reform ' was so used as to become the means of driving Lord Palmerston from office ? Thai is the step of which I say in the text that the 'grounds are withheld.'
* The Prince Consort writes as though he believed that Lord Palmerston had himself originated the movement for effecting bis restoration to office, but my information does not warrant me in acceding to His Koyal Iliglincss's idea.
IN THE AVAR AGAINST EUSSIA. 31
imicli i)o\ver as would iiiiikc his labours efleclivr, chap.
II he yet was so free from all jealous, all 'vaulting' .
ambition, as to be proof against the rniglity temp- tation which seemed to be dangled before him by his sudden exclusion from office ; * and being moreover quite capable — perhaps almost scorn- fully capable — of forgiving personal injuries, he goodnaturedly consented to withdraw his resig- nation, returning thus to the Home Office and the Cabinet as though little or nothing had hap- pened to var}"- his political life.f
How the course of events might have run, if no enmity, whether righteous or otherwise, had chanced to be assailing the strongest member of the Government at the critical time of Sinopc — this, of course, is a question which can only be approached by conjecture ; but those who best knew Lord Palmerston will incline to believe that a proposal for bringing England into a state of virtual war with Russia would have been dealt with by him in the Cabinet upon its own merits, without a suggestion of any such motive as the
* If proposing vigorous measures ngaiust Eussia whilst out of office, Lord Palmerston would have had the advantage of acting in virtual concert with the French Emperor, and of being at the same time supported, with great force, by our vehement people at home. It is probable that in such circum- stances, and armed with the public favour, acquired by his exclusion from office, he could hardly have helped becoming Prime Minister in the first month of the then approaching session
t If the operation was effected en rajJe, the acceptance of the resignation, I suppose, must have been first withdrawn, or treated as incomplete, and tlicn the Minister could withdrav/ his resignation.
32 CAUSES INVOLVING TKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, one his late colleagues avowed.* At all events,
I'- wG now see that the ill-omened decision of the
22d of December took place within the brief
period of Lord Palmerston's exclusion from the
Cabinet, f
* See Lord Clarendon's avowal, cited ante, ^ip. 26, 27.
+ There was a widespreail belief that if Lord Pahnerston had not been driven from the Foreign Office, the war would have been prevented. Of this the Prince Consort was aware. H<'. writes, I see, to Baron Stockmar on the 19th of October : ' The Palmerstonian stocks liere have gone up imnienselj', ]ieople ' saying that if he had been at the F. 0., he would, by his ' energy, have brought Pussia to reason.'— 'Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. oiL
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSU. .^3
CHAPTER III.
After much labour, the representatives of the chap. four Powers at Constantinople had agreed upon a "^' scheme of settlement which they deemed likely to ^^™^ ^^ be acceptable to the Emperor Nicholas, and they po^ve^s*"'"^ pressed its adoption by the Porte. The warlike f.ponThp'^ spirit of the Ottoman people had been rising day LoM^^^at. by day, and it became very hard and dangerous ^"'^'^ for the Government to ventui'e upon entertaining a negotiation for peace. But Lord Stratford had power over the minds of Turkish Statesmen ; and he exerted it with so great a force that, although it was now impossible for them to obey him with- out the risk of having to face a religious insur- rection, they obeyed him nevertheless. The fury of the armed divines insisting upon the massacre of worldlings, was less terrible to them than the anger of the Eltchi. To his will they bent. Not only the Turkish Cabinet, but even the Great Coun- cil of State, was brought to accept the terms pro- posed * The difficulty, nay the peril of life, which
* The terms wpre finally accepted on the 31st of December lSr>3. ' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 362.
VOL. 11. C
34 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, had thus been encountered by the Turkish ^linis- ' try for the sake of making peace with Piussia — the fxyecuns^^ succcss achieved at Sinope — and some victories soiutiom*^'^ gained over the Turks on the Armenian frontier, — all these were circumstances tending to assuage the mortification inflicted upon the Czar by the failure of Prince Mentschikoff's mission. Again, it had long been plain that the time was ill-fitted for the promotion of any scheme of Tiussian ambition ; and it was known that the English Ambassador had brought the Turks to the utmost verge of possible concession. Moreover, terms of arrangement, agreed to by the Turkish Govern- ment, were about to be pressed upon the Czar with all the authority of the four great Powers. It might seem, therefore, that all things were con- ducing towards an amicable settlement. Nor was this hope at all shaken when the Government of St Petersburg was made acquainted with tlie first and unbiassed decision to which the English Government had come after hearing of the dis- aster of Sinope. Apprised by his private letters of the tenor of this decision. Sir Hamilton Sey- mour gathered or inferred that the Admirals of the Western Powers, being enjoined to prevent the recurrence of an attack like the attack of Sinope, would assert the command of the Black pvieii.uy Sea ; and when he imparted to the Russian
view enter- . .
tiineii by Govemmcnt the impression thus produced on his
the Russi.-in . , , .
GoveniMunt miud, his communication was received in a wise
oftlieKng. '
lisiiCabi- and friendlv spirit by Count Nesselrode ; for after
net's first J t J )
decision. hearing that the Western Powers would be likely
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 35
to assume the command of the Black Sea, the chap.
Count ' expressed his belief that the Kussian fleet '
' would, in consequence of the advanced season,
' be little likely to leave Sebastopol ; ' and he then
went on to suggest that, if the Eussians were to
be hindered from attacking the Turks, it would
be fair that the Turks should be restrained from
molesting the coast of Kussia. The rest of the
conversation related to the pending negotiations ;
and, upon the whole, it was plain that the first
decision of the English Cabinet was looked upon
as the natural result of the engagement at Sinope,
that it would certainly not lead to a rupture,* and
that at length the Eussian Government was in a
fit temper to receive the proposals for peace which
the four Powers (with the concurrence, this time,
of Lord Stratford, and with the extorted assent of
the Turks) were now again bringing to St Peters-
burg. But whilst this fair prospect was opened AnnouncA-
° i r 1 mental St
by the unceasing toil of the negotiators, there Petersburg
'' o G ' of the
were messengers then iourneving from Paris and ^ciieme
o J V o finally
from London to the Court of St Petersburg ; and fjl^'^estera they carried an announcement that the Western Powers. Powers were resolved to execute the harsh and insulting scheme of action which (in the absence of Lord Palmerston, and during the period of his exclusion from office) had been forced upon the acceptance of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet by the Emperor of the French.f Of course it was not to
* 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 359.
+ Commentators have denied tliat Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet waa pushed from the paths of peace by the urgency of the
36 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, be expected that the friendly spirit in which the
- Piussian Government had received the first and
unbiassed decision of the English Cabinet would
French Government. "With proofs of wliat I liave said about
this, the volnine, I think, abounds ; but see in particular the
avowal in distinct terms by Lord Clarendon, ante, p. 27. For
those who like to see facts and dates put closely together, it
may be convenient to glance at the following statement of tlic
way in which the lever acted upon England between Tuesday
the 20th and Saturday the 24th of December : —
Tuesday, 20th Dec. — Our Government having just determined
that no special instructions to the Admirals were
necessitated by the disaster of Sinope ('Eastern
Papers,' part ii. p. 304), and having up to this day
resisted the French proposals, Lord Clarendon is
able to ^^Tite of ' the unabated desire for peace by
' which the r>ritish Government will be animated'
[i.e., peace between Turkey and Russia], and to
assure Lord Stratford that the course which he waa
' taking with a view to the adoption by the Porte of
* pacific connsds is in accordance with the wishes of ' Her Slajc'sty's Government as lieing calculated to ' prepare the Porte to give a favourable reception ' to the proposals tvhich have been forwarded from ' Vienna.' — ^' Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 320.
Thursday, 22d Dec. — Tlie Government no longer resists the pressure applied (some of the words inflicting the pressure are given in the te.xt), and adopts the Frencli proposals.
Saturday, 24th Dec. — Lord Clarendon announces to Lord Cow- ley tlie adoption by our Government of the French proposals, and adds: — 'Her Majesty's Government ' have not hesitated to adopt the course which the ' honour and dignity of the country prescribe ; but ' at the same time they do not disgui.se from thcin-
* selves that it m.ay at no distant period involve ' Evfjland and France in war with Ilvssia.' — Ibid, pp. 221, 222.
Thus, in the interval of three clear days between Tuesday the 20th and Saturday the 24th, there is a transition from peaceful language, and from obviously strong liopes of even
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 37
eveu for one moment survive an announcement of chap. the scheme which only some ten days later our '
Government had been brought to adopt. It was one thing for the Western Powers to enforce the neutrality of the Black Sea, and another and a very different thing to announce to the sovereign of a haughty State that, even although he miglit be bent on uo warlike errand, still, upon the very sea which washed his coast — upon the very sea which filled his harbours — he was forbidden to show liis Hag.
On the 12t]i of January 1854, the Emperor Nicholas was forced to hear — to endure to hear — that, upon peril of an unequal conflict with the combined fleets of tlie Western Powers, every ship that he had in the Euxine must either be kept from going to sea, or else must sail by stealth, and be liable to be ignominiously driven back into port. The negotiation, which had seemed to The nego-
•,■,,.„ . tiations ara
be almost ripe tor a settlement, was then rumed. ruineo. The Emperor Nicholas did not declare war against the Western Powers ; but, as soon as he received the hostile announcement in a form which he deemed to be official, he withdrew his represen- tatives from Paris and London. The Governments Rupture of of France and England followed his example ; and reiatiouu. on the 21st of February 185-i, the diplomatic
ending tlie then existing war between Turkey and Russia, to a very close prospect of a new war— a war involving England and France; and tlie three days' interval in which this mo- mentous change took place was marked by but one event— by the determination of tlie Cabinet (on Thursday the 22d) to adopt the French proposals.— .Vo^e to ilh Edition, 1863.
132729
38 OAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C H A P. relations between Kussia and the Western Powers ^^^' were brought to a close. Moreover, the Czar prepan's'^ prepared to undertake an invasion of the Otto- Tuikey!^" nian dominions.
Fleets enter Ou tlie 4th of Jauuarj 1854, the fleets of England and France moved up and entered the Euxine.
IN THE WAIl AGAINST KUS3IA. 39
CHAPTER IV.
In a military point of view, and upon the suppo- chap. sition of there beino: no iinderstandingr between '
the Czar in occupying WaUachia.
liussia and Austria, the seizure of the whole e^or^oT of Wallachia by a Kussian army is a dangerous measure; for, after reaching Bucharest, the line of occupation has to bend at right angles, ascend- ing the northern bank of the Danube between au enemy expectant and an enemy already declared, till at length it touches the frontier of the Banat, at a distance from Moscow of not less than a thousand miles. To be in fitting strength at a point thus situate would imply the possession of resources beyond those which Russia could com- mand.
The General at the head of the Turkish army ofthu was Omar Pasha; and it chanced that he was a takes skuiui man highly skilled in the art of bringing poli- tical views to bear upon the operations of an army in the field. He perceived that by protruding his forces into Western, or Lesser Wallachia, tlie Emperor Nicholas was not only distending im- prudently his line of communications, but eom-
ad vantage.
40 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, mitting in other ways a great strategic fault ; and ^^' he also inferred that political reasons and imperial vanity would make the Czar cling to his error. He also knew that, for the rest of that year, the Czar, being kept back by the engagements which lie had taken, by his fear of breaking with the four Powers, and above all, by the insufficiency of his means, would abstain from any further inva- sion of Turkey, and would even be reluctant to alarm Europe by allowing the least glimpse of a Eussian uniform to appear on the right bank of the Danube. Omar saw that the river had thus become a political barrier which protected the Turks from the Eussians, without protecting tlie Eussians from the Turks. He could, therefore, overstep the common rules of the art of war; and disporting himself as he chose on the line of the 'Danube, could concentrate forces on his extreme left, without any fear for his centre or his right.
uis autumn Therefore, in the early part of the autumn,
ttud winter . ,. , i rn i • -i • i.^
cttinpaigns. a large portion ot the Turkish army was quietly drawn to Widdin, a town on the right bank of the river, in the westernmost angle of Bulgaria ; and, on the lifth day from the declaration of war, Omar Pasha was over the Danube, entrenching himself at Kalafat, and so established that he faced towards the east, and confronted the extreme flank of the intruding army.* Trom that moment Nicholas ceased to be the undisturbed holder of the terri- tory which he had chosen to call his ' material
• 28th October 1853. The decluratiou of war became absolute on the 23a.
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 4.1
' guarantee.' His pride was touched. Tortured by c H A p.
the thought that his power to hold the pledge was 1_
challenged by a Turkisli officer, he began to ex- haust his strength in efforts to assemble a force at the westernmost point of his extended flank. This was the error which Omar Pasha wished him to commit. At the close of the year, the Czar had succeeded in pushing a heavy body of troops into Lesser Walhichia ; and in the beginning of Jan- uary the lines of Kalafat were attacked by Gen- eral Aurep. The struggle lasted four days, but it ended in the retreat of the Kussian forces ; and considering the vast distance between the lines of Kalafat and the home of the Eussian army, it may be inferred that this fruitless effort of im- perial pride must have worked a deep cavity in the military strength of the Czar.
Moreover, Omar Pasha took another, and a not less skilful advantage of the political considerations which prevented the Pussians from passing the Danube; for, during the winter, he fleshed his troops by indulging them with enterprises against the enemy's posts along the whole liue of the Lower Danube from Widdin to Passova ; and since these attacks were often attended with success, and could never be signally repressed by an enemy who had precluded himself from the right of crossing the river, they gave the Turks that sense of strenoth in fi"ht which is at the root of warlike prowess.
Early in the winter, the Emperor Nicholas came to understand the fault he had committed
42 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. IV.
Embarrass- laent and distress of the Czar.
He rfisorts for ai<l to Fu«kiuviti'h,
in prescribing the Danube <as a boundary — a boundary to be observed by himself, without the least right for expecting that it would be observed by his adversary. So now he would do the contrary of what he had done. Because he had corani-itted a military fault in forbidding himself from all enterprises against the slowly assembling forces of the Porte in 1853, he would now, in 1854, undertake an invasion which must bring him into conflict with the gathered strength of the Ottoman Empire, and that, too, when it had become certain that the armed support of France and England would not be wanting to the Sultan. But perhaps, after all, it was hardly tolerable for a haughty monarch to have to stand passive under the insulting coercion which was now to be applied to him by the "Western Powers ; and the Czar, having no means of hostile action against the territories or the ships of either France or England, could only strike at his greater foes by striking at the ally whom they had undertaken to befriend. Upon the whole, therefore, he could not so school himself as to be able to abstain from attempting an invasion of Turkey ; but the whole- some trials which he had now undergone had so far disciplined his spirit that at length, after bitter anguish, lie felt and acknowledged to him- self the want of a firm adviser.
Piussia owned a great General who had never sanctioned by his counsels the error of the pre- vious year; and now — baffled — agitated — driven hither and thither by alternating impulses till his
IN THE WAll AGAINST KUSSIA. 43
brain had become a "uide more blind than chance CH a p.
IV
• — the Czar abated his personal claims to the con- '
duct of a war, and came for help and counsel to the veteran Paskievitch. The evil was almost be- yond the old man's hope of cure ; for how could Enssia march upon Constantinople — nay, how iu strict prudence could she march upon the Bal- kan whilst England and France were iu full com- mand of the Euxine ? But was the Czar then simply powerless against Turkey ? Had his million of soldiers been torn from their homes in vain ? Had he not busied himself all his days in organising armies and reviewing drilled men, and grinding down his people into the mere fractional components of an army, until the very faces of soldiers in the same battalion were brought to be similar and uniform? Had his life been utter foolishness, and was the labour of his reign so barren that he could not now make a campaign against the simple Turks, who never took pains about anything until the hour of battle 'i Had he not spoken in the counsels of Europe as though he were a potentate so gi-eat that the Empire of the Ottomans existed by force of his magnanimity ? And now, had it come to this, that at the mere bidding of the Western Powers and without their firing a shot, he was to stand arrested in the pres- ence of scoffing Europe like a prisoner who had delivered his sword ?
Well, Paskievitch, in a painful, soldierly way, Paskio-
. . vitch's
could tell him what would be the least imprudent coimsdt. plan for attacking the inner dominions of the
44 CAUSES INVOLVING FEANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. Sultan. The principles of the art of war have a __Hl_ great stability ; and altliough there is an infinite variety in the methods of applying them, it results that the invasion of one nation by another is re- peatedly undertaken upon the same accustomed route.
By the route which Paskievitch recommended, the invader crosses the Dauube in the neighbour- hood of its great bend towards the north ; makes himself master of Silistria ; encounters and over- comes the assembled strength of the Ottoman Em- pire in front of the great intrenched camp of Shoumla ; then, advancing, forces the difficult passes of the Balkan as best he may ; marches upon Adrianople ; and thence on — thence on, if he can and dares — to the shore of the Bosphorus. Erivanski * could hardly have believed that his master's military power was equal to so great an undertaking as that ; but if it succeeded only in some of its early stages, diplomacy might come to the rescue of the Czar, as it had done in 1829 ; and the plan had this in its favour, that it placed a broad tract of country between Austria and the right flank of the invading army, and another though less extended territoiy between its left flank and the fleets of the Western Powers.
But in the counsels of a wise and faithful sol- dier there is a pitiless candour — a dreadful pre- cision. He comes in his hard way to weights, and to numbers, and to measurements of space and of
* This was Paskievitch's title : it denoted that ho was the conqueror of Erivan, a proviuce conquered from the Persians.
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 45
time. Without mercy to the vanity of his suf- chap. fering master, Paskievitch defaced the cherished '
form of the ' material guarantee/ by insisting that tlie Czar should cease from trying to hold the Principalities entire, and that all his forces should he quickly withdrawn from the Lesser Wallachia. This done, he promised the Czar an invasion of the Ottoman Empire ; but the carrying of the enterprise beyond the valley of the Danube was to be only upon condition that Silistria should fall, and should fall before the 1st of May.*
So now the streams of battalions rumoured to Movement be setting in upon the Lower Danube from the the Russian confines of All the Eussias woke up the mind of ''^'"''''" Europe, and portended a great invasion.
* Jfy knowledge of the counsels tendered to the Emperor hy Paskievitch is derived from papers in the possession of the lata Lord Raorlan.
46 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAPTER V.
CHAP. It has been seen that without treaty, and without
^' the advice or knowledge of Parliament — nay even,
Bur-o^Tie psrhaps, without a distinct conception of what it
and Colonel ^^^^g doinji — the English Government had been
Ardent cle- o o
thei^vaiit gradually contracting engagements which were almost equivalent to a defensive alliance with the Sultan. France, by virtue of her new understand- ing with England, had come under the same obli- gations ; and now that an invasion of the Ottoman Empire was threatened, it became necessary that the AVestern Powers should take measures for its defence. At first, however, their views were limited to the defence of the Sultan's home terri- tories, and especially those which gave the control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Two Engineer officers — Colonel Ardent on the part of France, and Sir John Burgoyne on the part of England — were despatched to Turkey, with in- structions to report upon the best means of aiding the Sultan to defend his home dominions; and almost at the same time it was agreed between the two Western Powers that each of them should
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 47
prepare to send a small body of troops into the cif ap. Levant. ;
Tlie En^dish force was collected at INIalta. Of Troops sent
'^ . to Miiltu
the Ministers who joined in adopting this measure, some foresaw that the few battalions which they were despatching to the East were the nucleus of an army which might have to operate in the field ; but others looked upon them as a force intended to support our negotiations. This ambiguity of Tenriency motive was a root of evil ; for the collateral measure, arrangements which are requisite for enabling an army to live, to move, and to fight, bear a vast proportion to the mere business of collecting the men ; and there is always a danger that a body of troops, sent towards the scene of action with a diplomatic intent, will be unsupported by the measures which are requisite for actual war, and yet, upon the rupture of the negotiations, will be prematurely hurried into the field. On the other hand, the councillors of a great military State are so well accustomed to know tlie cost and tlie labour which must precede the advance of an army, that the mere protrusion of a body of well- equipped troops, unsupported by the collateral appliances of war, does not tell upon their minds as a proof of an intention to act. By despatching a few bat- talions to Malta, without instructing commissaries to go to the Levant and begin buying up the agri- cultural wealth of the country, we not only sub- jected our troops to the danger of their being brought into the field before supplies were ready, but also convinced the Russians that we could not
iimrcasf of tlie array.
48 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. l">e sincerely intending to engage in a war. ^forn-
• over, the slcnderness of the addition which the
Ministers Govcminent proposed to make to our army tended
(letennine '^ ^ •'
to propose ^^ prolonq,' the Czar's fond confidence in tlic ^veiffht
nut a. siiiall 1 C3 o
and strength of the English Peace Party ; and perliaps this dangerous error was strengthened, if Baron Brunnow was able to tell him that, in proposing to the Cabinet a material increase of our land-forces, the Duke of Newcastle stood al- most alone. Continuance The Prime Minister's continued persistency in Aberdeen's thc usc of hurtful language was another of the
imprudent t-i •hit t i i /-\ iti
language. causcs wliich Still hclpcd to kccp the Czar blind- fold. Lord Aberdeen abhorred the bare thought of war ; and he would not have suffered his country to be overtaken by it, if the coming dan- ger had been of such a kind that it could be warded off by hating it and shunning its aspect. But it is not by intemperate hatred of war, nor yet by shunning its aspect, that war is averted. Almost to the last, Lord Aberdeen misguided him- self. His loathing of war took such a shape that he could not and would not believe in it ; and when at last the spectre was close upon him, he covered his eyes and refused to see. Basing himself upon the thouglitless saying of a states- man, who had laid it down that there could be no war in Europe when France and England were agreed, he seems to have imagined that, although he was suffering himself to be drawn on and on into measures which were always becoming less and less short of war, still he could maintain
IN Till-: WAR AGAINST RUSSIA, 40
peace by takinrf care to be always along with cilAP, the French Emperor ; and ho so clung to the '
paradise created by a false maxim that he could not be torn from it. lie would not be roused from a dream which was sweeter than all waking thoughts ; and even now, to any man to whom he chanced to s]:)eak, he continued to say that there could not, there would not be war. Coming irom a Prime INIinister, such words as these did not fail to have a noxious weight with many who heard them, l^aron Brunnow, wo have seen, had looked deeper even at a much earlier period, and now again, no doubt, he took care to warn his master that Lord Aberdeen was under a pas- sionate hatred of war which deprived him of his competence to speak in the name of his country : but by otlier channels the words of our Prime jMinister were carried to the Emperor of Prussia, and, being very welcome to him, and co- inciding with his long - cherished notions, they tended to keep him in tlie perilous belief that Lord Aberdeen was speaking with knowledge, and that England, still clogged by her Peace Party, was unable to (m to war.
VOL. IL V
50 CAUSES INYOLVIA'G fllANCE AHL F^GLA^•D
CHAPTER VI.
CHAP. A NEW opportunity of making his way back to
'. peace was now thrown away by the Czar. The
Enfpcror's'' exigencics of a throne based upon the deeds of theCzar the 2d of December were always driving tlie French Emperor to endeavour to allay the remem- brance of the past by creating a stir in Europe, and endeavouring to win celebrity. When Europe was quiet, he was obliged, for his life's sake, to become its disturber ; but when it was at war, or threatened with war, he was willing, it seems, to take an exactly opposite method of attaining the required conspicuousness ; for he was not a blood- thirsty nor even a very active-minded man, and there seems no good reason to doubt tliat, having brought Europe to the state in which it was at the close of January, he was sincere in the pacific step which he then took. At a moment when war was already kindled and seemed to be on the point of involving the great Powers, the odd vanity and the theatric bent wliich had so strangely governed his life might easily make him wish to conic upon the scene and bestow the
IN THE AVAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 51
blessing of peace upon the grateful, astonished chap. nations. On the other hand, an English Minister ^^' ^ \vould be careless of this kind of celebrity, and, so that peace could be restored to Eui'ope, would be well pleased that the honour of tlie achieve- ment should seem to belong to the French Emperor.
There is no reason to doubt that the English Government assented to the somewhat startling: plan under which the French Emperor conceived himself entitled to speak for the Queen of Eng- land, as well as for himself; and certainly tlie licence, however strange it may appear, was in strict consistency with the spirit of the under- standing which seems to have been established between the two Western Powers.*
On the 29th of January tlie Fi-uncli Emperor addressed an autograph letter to his 'good friend' of All tlie Kussias. Tiie letter in many parts of it was ably worded, and moderate in its tone, but it was mainly remarkable for tlie language in which the French Emperor took upon himself to speak and even to threaten war in the name of the Queen of England. After suggesting a scheme of pacification, he said to the Czar : ' Let your ' Majesty adopt this plan, upon which the Queen ' of England and myself are perfectly agreed, and ' tranquillity will be re-established and the world ' satisfied. There is nothing in the plan which is
* See the inferred purport of this understanding as stated in Vol. I. of ' The Invasion of the Crimea,' pp. 350, 351 of the Cabinet Edition.
52 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND CHAP. ' unworthy of your ^Majesty — nothing Avhicli can
VL
' wound your honour ; but if, from a motive ' diificult to understand, your Majesty sliould ' refuse this proposal, then France as well as ' England will be compelled to leave to the fate * of arms ami the chances of war that which ' might now be decided by reason and justice.'* The French Emperor permitted himself to write this at a time wiien, so far as is known, no threat like that which he chose to utter in the name of the Queen had been addi-esscd by the English Cabinet to the Court of St Petersburg.
With the feelings wliich niiglit be expected from them, English Ministers of State have gen- erally been slow to use threatening words ; and they have been chary, too, in putting forward the name of their Sovereign. Our Government could not have been willing that England should be thrust upon the attention of the world in a way which the too fastidious Court of St Petersburg ^vould be sure to regard as grotesque. No one can doubt the pain with wliich the members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet must have seen the French Emperor come forward upon the stage of Europe, and pidilicly menace the Emperor of Russia in the name of their Queen. The process by which they were brought to suffer tliis is un- known to me. What seems probable is that a draft of the letter was submitted to tliem, ac- companied with significant representations of the • 'Annual Kogi.stcr,' 1S54.
IN THE WAU AGAINST KUSSIA. 53
importance which the French Emperor attached chap.
to it, and that the Cabinet yielded to the pressure, ^
because it feared that resistance might chill the new alliance, and might even perhaps cause it to be suddenly abandoned for an alliance between Kussia and France.
The letter proposed an armistice, in order to leave open a free course for negotiation. It uould seem that, in a military point of view, an armistice for a limited period, commencing in the early days of February, could not have been inconvenient to a Sovereign whose main difficulty at that time lay in the immense marches wliich he had to effect within his own dominions ; and, on the other hand, to any one acquainted with the French Emperor's personal weakness, it was obvious that by a little harmless play upon his vanity, Paissia might hope to obtain a great diplomatic advantage, and to effect a decorous escajje from her troubles. But the Czar was not politic ; and, instead of seizing the proffered occasion, he not only rejected the overture, but aggravated his refusal by an unwise allusion to the French disasters of 1812.
In Ids quest after this sort of fame the French Mission to Emperor was not witliout rivals. "We have seen burg from the share which the English Peace Party had had Peace Purty. in misleading the Emperor of Russia, and tempt- ing him to become a disturber by withdrawing the wholesome fear which deters a man from venturing upon outrage. Certain brethren of the
54 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. Society of Friends, who had been prominent ' members of this Farty, now thought it becoming or wise to proceed to St Petersburg and request the Emperor of all the Russias to concur with them in preserving Europe from the calamity of war.
A little later, and the Czar Nvould have stamped in fury and driven from his sight any hapless aide-de-camp who had come to him with a story about a deputation from the English Peace Party ; for the hour was at hand when his curses were about to fall heavy on the men who had led him on into all his troubles by pretending that Eng- land was immersed in trade, and resolved to engage in no war.* But at this time his hope of seeing our Government held back by the Peace Party had not altogether vanished, and he resolved to give this strange mission a genial welcome.
Of course, the political conversation between the booted Czar and the men of peace was sheer nothingness ; but what followed shows the care with which Nicholas had studied the middle classes of England. When he thouj^ht that the first scene of the interlude had lasted long enough, he sud- denly said to his piim visitors, ' By the by, do you know my wife ? ' They said they did not. The Czar presented them to the Empress. She charmed them with her kindly grace. They came away sor-
• Tlie scene of violence here prospectively alluded to will bo mentioned in a later volume : it occurred in the autuniu.
IN THK WAU AGAINST RUSSIA. ' 55
rowing to think that their wrong-headed country- chap. men in England should be seeking a quarrel with ^^ BO good and well-meaning a man as friend Nicholas Komanoff ; but perhaps what more than all else laid hold of their hearts, was the thought that the Czar called his Empress so naturally by her dear homely title of wife.
50 CAUSES liiYOLVl^'G HtA:;Cli A^D E.NGLA^^D
CHAPTER VII.
CHAP. VII.
Temper of the English an obstacle to tlie main- tenance of peace.
Their desire for war.
Causes of the apparent change in their feeliUL'.
Welcome or unwelcome, the truth must be told. A huge obstacle to the maintenance of peace in Europe was raised up by the temper of the English people. In public, men still used forms of expres- sion implying that they would be content for England to lead a quiet life among the nations, and they still classed expectations of peace amongst their hopes, and declared in joyous tones that the prospects of war were gloomy and painful ; but these phrases were the time-honoured canticles of a doctrine already discarded, and they who used them did not mean to deceive their neighbours, and did not deceive themselves. Tlie English desired war ; and perhaps it ought to be acknow- ledged that there were many to whom war, for the sake of war, was no longer a hateful thought. Either the people had changed, or else there was hollowness in some of the professions which ora- turs had made in their name.
AVhen, by lapse of years, the glory of the great war against France had begun to fade from the daily thoughts of the people, they inclined to look
IX THE "WAR AGAINST EUSSIA. 57
mure narrowly thau before into the ori<an of taxes, CHAP.
. VII.
and were not unwilling to hear that their burthens '
were the result of wars which might liave been easily avoided. INIoreover, it chanced that from after Marlborough's time downwards, or, at all events, from after the period of Chatham's ascend- ancy, the wars in which England found herself engaged had been originated and conducted for the most part under the auspices of the Tory party; and it followed naturally that the Whig or Liberal party, being in antagonism to the party which had long kept the country under arms, should charge itself with the duty of expressing a just hatred of all wars which are needless or unjust. If speakers, in the performance of this duty, often used extravagant or fanatical language, they did not perhaps mean to inculcate much doctrine, but rather to display the vehemence of their hostility to the opposite faction. The ap- jjlause which greeted these denunciations had the same meaning. On the other hand, the Tories declared that they did not yield to their adver- saries in hatred of all needless wars ; and thus, for near foity years, there was a chorus and an anti-chorus engaged in a continual chant, and denouncing wars in the abstract at times when no war seemed impending. To men skim- ming the surface of English politics it was made to appear that the people had a rooted love of peace.
These signs of a peaceful determination had increased in abundance after the great constitu-
58 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND CHAP, tional change which obliged the old ruling classes
VII O D o
., to share their power with the people at large ; and
thence it was inferred that the desire of England to remain at peace was not the mere whim of any Administration or of any political party, but was based upon the solemn determination of the whole people ; and it has been seen that the Emperor Nicholas had deliberately founded his policy upon this belief. A deeper knowledge might liave taught him that a fiery, generous people is more quick to plunge into war than a cold, worldly, politic oligarchy ; and that, even if the policy of England were as much under the control of the masses of the people as he believed it to be, there would be all the more likelihood of her being })rone to take up arms ; because in States which are much under the governance of the democratic principle, a proposal to make war against the foreigner is often resorted to by one of the contending factions as a stratagem for baffling the others. But these truths lay below ; and what appeared upon the surface of English poli- tics was a sincere devotion to the cause of peace. Over and over again it was laid down, with the seeming concurrence of unanimous thousands, that war, if it were not for mere defence, was not only foolish, but was also in a high degree wicked.
But the English can hardly ever be governed by a dogma; for although they are by nature wise in action, yet, being vehement and careless
IN THE WAU AGAINST RUSSIA. 59
!n their way of applauding loud words, they chap,
encourage their orators, and those also who ad- L.
dress them in writing, to be strenuous rather than wise ; and the result is, that these teachers, trying always to be more and more forcible, grow blind to logical dangers, and leap with headlong joy into tlie pit which reasoners call the Absurdum. Then, and not without joyous laughter, reaction begins.
All England had been brought to the opinion that it was a wickedness to incur war without necessity or justice ; but when the leading spirits of the Peace Party had the happiness of behold- ing this wholesome result, they were far from stopping short. They went on to make light of the very principles by which peace is best maintained, and although they were conscientious men, meaning to say and do what was right, yet, being unacquainted with tlie causes which bring about the fall of empires, they deliberately inculcated that habit of setting comfort against honour M'hicli historians call ' corruption.' They made it plain, as they imagined, that no war which was not engaged in for the actual defence of the country could ever be right ; but even there they took no rest, for they went on and on, and still on, until tlieir foremost thinker reached the conclusion that, in the event of an attack upon our shores, the invaders ought to be received with such an effusion of hospitality and brotherly love as could not fail to disarm them of their enmity,
60 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
and convert the once dangerous Zouave into the valued friend of the family.* Then, with great merriment, the whole English people turned round, and although they might still be willing to go to the brink of other precipices, they refused to go further towards that one. The doctrine had struck no root. It was ill suited to the race to whom it was addressed. The male cheered it, and forgot it until there came a time for testing it, and then discarding it ; and the woman, from the very first, with her true and simple instinct, was quick to understand its value She would subscribe, if her husband required it, to have the doctrine taught to charity children, but she would not suffer it to be taught to her own boy. So it proved barren. In truth, the English knew that they were a great and a free people, because their fathers, and their fathers' fathers, and all the great ancestry of whom they come, had been men of warlike quality ; and deeming it time to gainsay the teaching of the Peace Party, but not being sldlled in dialectics and the use of words, they imconsciously came to think that it would be well to express a practical opinion of the doctrine by taking the first honest and fair opportunity of
• I have 110 copy of tliis curious pamphlet before inc, but it has been quoted (I believe by Lord Paliiier.ston) in the House of Coniuioiis, and therefore the passage alhideil to in the text might no doubt be found in Hansard, The writer, I remember, ■went further than is above stated. He argued that tlie French people would be so shiinicd by the kindness shown to their troops that they would never rest until they had paid us a large pecuniary in<lemnity for any losses or inconvenience which the invasion may have caused.
mind.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 61
engaging in war. Still, the conscience of the chap. nation was sound, and the men were as well con- ^"' vinced as ever of the wickedness of a war wrongly ^^''}:^°{
o J feeling in
or wantonly incurred. They were in this mind : o^il^'s'"'* they would not go to war without believing that they had a good and a just cause, but it was certoin that tidings importing the necessity of going to war for duty's sake would be received with a welcome in England.
Therefore when the people gradually came to Effect of
, f xi f> . 1 , -r. . UieCzar'8
near oi the iierce oppression attempted by Prince ag-ression
iM/v> IT • upon tlie
Mentschikon, and the wise, firm, moderate resist- pu^^'ic ance of the Turks, they believed that there might be coming in sight once more that very thing for which they longed in their hearts — namely, a just cause of war. And when at length the seemingly unequal conflict began, the bravery of the Turks on the Danube, and the skill of their General, quickly roused that sympathy which England hardly ever refuses to a valiant combatant who is weaker than his foe ; but when they came to know of the catastrophe of Sinope, and to hear of it as a slaughter treacherously and stealthily com- mitted upon their old ally by an enemy who had engaged to observe neutrality in the Euxine * they were inflamed with a desire to execute jus- tice, and nothing was now wanting to fill the measure of their righteous anger except a disclo- sure of the Czar's cold scheme for the spoliation of the ' sick man's ' house.
* The erroTieousne.ss of tin's impression has Lecn already shown. See ant'', pp. 13 and H.
62 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. But after all, and especially in questions cf ^"" foreign policy, the bulk of a nation must lean for ^riijin guidance upon public men ; and unless it appear nation*iooks ^^^^^ tlid'e werc statesmen deserving the ear of K'bi'if tlie country who faithfully tried to make a stand '"^"^ against error and failed for want of public sup-
port, it is unfair to charge the fault upon the people.
There were two Statesmen high in office, and high in the confidence of the nation, who, more than most other men, were known to be attached to the cause of peace. To them every man looked who desired that his country should not be drawn into war without stringent need.
The impression" produced upon the Court of St Petersburg by the heedless language of our Prime Minister has been already described ; but the effect which he wrought upon the public mind of England by remaining at the head of the Govern- Lor.i inent is still to be shown. Lord Aberdeen's hatred
of war was so honestly and piously entertained, and was, at the same time, so excessive and self- defeating, that in one point of view it had the character of a virtue, and in another it was more like disease. His feelings, no less than his opin- ions, turned him against all war: but against a war with Eussia — our ally in great times against Napoleon — he was biassed by the impressions of his early life ; and perhaps, too, he liad a dim foresight of the perils which might be brought \ipon Europe by a forcible breaking-up of the ties established by the Congress of Vienna and riveted
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 63
by the Peace of Paris.* In an early sta^re of the CHAP.
dispute, he resolved that he would not remain L_
at the head of the Government unless he could maintain peace; and he anxiously sought to choose a moment for making his stand against the further progress towards war. Far from wishing to pro- long his hold of power, he was always labouring to make out when, and on what ground, he could lay down tlie burthen which oppressed him. Every day he passed his sure hour and a half in the Foreign OflSce, and came away more and more anxious perhaps, but without growing more clear- sighted. If he could ever have found the point where the road to peace diverged from the road to war, he would instantly have declared for peace ; and, failing to carry the Government with him,
* I believed — and so wrote in former editions — that Loi-d Aberdeen was also biassed by tlie feelings of ' mutual ' esteem existing between the Emperor Nicholas and himself ; but this was an error; for, although it is true that the Emperor Nicho- las was accustomed to be loud and constant in his expressions of regard for T>ord Aberdeen, the imperial esteem was not recip- rocated. In his anger at the terms which Russia extorted from the Porte at the conclusion of the war, Lord Aberdeen, on the 13th of December 1829, wrote a private letter to Lord Heytes- bun,', at St Petersburg, which contained this passage : — ' Not- ' ■(\'ithstanding our opinion of the falsehood and ambition of the ' Emperor Nicholas and of liis Government, our desire to avoid ' any misunderstanding is as sincere as if we believed them to ' be possessed of honesty and principle.' And more than twenty years afterwards, when out of oflice, Lord Aberdeen wrote thus : — ' I have never been an admirer of the Russian ' Government and policy, and although the Emperor has been ' personally very gracious to me of late years, I believe he has ' always thought me an enemy at lieart, as indeed from former ' experience he had some right to do.' ,
64 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, would have joyfully resigned office, and for his ■ deliverance would have offered up thanksgiving
to Heaven, But his intellect, though not without high quality in it, was deficient in clearness and force. In troubled times it did not yield him light enough to walk by, and it had not the pro- pelling power which was needed for pushing him into opportune action. In politics, though not in matters of faith, he wanted the sacred impulse which his Kirk is accustomed to call ' the word ' of quickening.'* Lord Clarendon's polished de- spatches £0 forced his approval that he could never lay his hand upon one of them and make it the subject of a ministerial crisis. Yet day by day, without knowing it, the Prime Minister was assenting to a course of policy destined to end in a rupture. Lord Clarendon's pithy phrase was less applicable to the country at large than to the Prime Minister. It was strictly true that Lord Aljerdeen drifted.-f He steadfastly faced towards peace, and was always being carried towards war.
* In the course of the ceaseless consultations about poor dear England which were cairicd on between the two intelligent Ger- mans, the Prince Consort and Baron Stockniar, Stockmarlaysit down that the Queen's Prime Minister, LordAberdcen, was want- ing in ' the productive energy which can develop a great lumin- ' ous thought.' — ' Life of the Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. 543.
t Mr Gladstone, this year (1876), made a speech showing that Lord Clarendon's famous expression was applied by him only to the latter — and almost formal — stages by which the country passed into a state of war ; but I do not think that people have ungenerously sought to use Lord Clarendon's ](hrase as a con- fps.iion. The truth is that, in reference to much of what is nar- rated in this History, the verb ' to drift ' is so closely apt that —having once been uttered— it could not but fasten.
IX THE WAR AGALVST KUSSIA. C5
He reinaiiied at tlio liead of the Government; chap. and, the papers being witheld from Parliament, ^^^' the country was led to imagine that all which it was possible to do or suffer for the sake of peace would be done and suffered by a Cabinet of which Lord Aberdeen was the chief.
]jut there was another member of the Cabinet jii oiad^ ■Nvho was supposed to hold war in deep abhorrence. ^Ir Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer ; and since he was by virtue of his office the ap- pointed guardian of the public purse, those pure and lofty principles which made him cling to peace wei'c reinforced by an official sense of the harm which war inflicts by its costliness. Now it happened that, if he was famous for the splen- dour of his eloquence, for his unaffected piety, and for his blameless life, he was celebrated far and wide for a more than common liveliness of con- science. He had once imagined it to be his duty to quit a Government, and to burst through strong ties of friendship and gratitude, by reason of a thin shade of difference on the subject of white or brown sugar. It was believed that, if he were to commit even a little sin, or to imagine an evil thought, he would instantly arraign himself be- fore the dread tribunal which awaited him in his own bosom; and that, his intellect being subtle and microscopic, and delighting in casuistry and exaggeration, he would be likely to give his soul a very harsh trial, and treat himself as a great criminal fur faults too minute to be visible to the naked eyes of laymen. His friends lived in dread
VOL. II. K
60 CAUSKS INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C 11 A P. VII.
Lord
Aberdef-n and Mr Gladstone remained \u oUice.
of liis virtues as tending to make him whimsical and unstaljle; and tlie practical politicians, con- ceiving that he was not to be depended upon for party purposes, and was bent upon none but lofty objects, used to look upon him as dangerous — used to call him behind his back a good man — a good man in the worst sense of the term. In 1853 it seemed only too probable that he might quit office upon an infinitel}^ slight suspicion of the warlike tendency of the Government ; but what appeared certain was, that if, upon the vital question of peace or war, the Government should depart by even a hair's-breadth from the riglit path, the Chancellor of the Exchequer would instantly re- fuse to be a partaker of their fault He, and he before all other men, stood charged to give the alarm of danger ; and there seemed to be no particle of ground for fearing that, like the Prime JMinister, he would drift. The known watchful- ness and alacrity of his conscience, and his power of detecting small germs of evil, led the world to think it impossible that he could be moving for months together in a wrong course without know- ing it.
Xow, from the beginning of the negotiations until the final rupture. Lord Aberdeen continued to be the Prime ^linister, and ^Ir Gladstone the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The result was that, during the session of 1853, and the autumn which followed it, the presence of these two Ministers in tlie Cabinet was regarded as a guarantee of the peaceful tendency of the Government; and wlien,
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. G7
after tlK3 cutastroplie of Sinope, it Lecamc liardly chap. possible to doubt tliat war was at hand, the con- ^^^' tinning responsibility of these good men seemed ^ly^j^,"^ to dispense the most anxious lovers of peace from [h^'^^rtf the duty of further questioning ; for if Lord Aber- ^.'i,o'^f,),ed deen continued to head the Ministry which was a^war"*^"' leading the country into war, people Ihought he must have attained a bitter certainty that war was needed: and, on the otlier hand, it was clear that ]\Ir Gladstone, remaining in office, and taking it upon his conscience to prepare funds for the bloody strife, was giving to the public a sure guarantee that the enterprise in which he helped to engage the country Avas blameless at the very least, and even perhaps pure and hoi}-. It was thus that the conscience of the people got quieted. It was a hard task to have to argue that peace could be honestly and wisely maintained M'heu Lord Aberdeen was levying war. Kone but a bold man could say that the war was needless or wicked whilst jNfr Gladstone was feeding it with his own hand.
It was thus that, by the course which Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had been taking, the efforts of those who loved peace were parah'sed. No doubt a cold retrospect, carried on with the light of the past, may enable a political critic to fix upon more than one occasion when, holding the opinions which they did, these two jNIinisters might have resolved to make a stand for peace ; and it is believed that, long before his death. Lord Aberdeen saw this and grieved : but if any man
C8 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
C H A P. VU.
It was not for want of ani|ile grounds to stand upon, that their cause was brought to ruin.
will honestly recall the state of his own feelings and opinions in the year 1853, lie will find perhaps that he himself at the time was carried down by the flood of events ; and when he has submitted to this self-discipline, he will be the better able to understand that others, though honest and able, might easily lose their footing. At all events, the errors of Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone, if errors they were, were only errors of judgment. The scrupulous purity of their motives has never been brought into question.
But if these were the causes which inclined the bulk of the English people to desire or to assent to the war, they hardly yield reasons sufficing to show why the lesser number of men, who honestly thought that peace ought to be maintained, should suffer themselves to be overpowered without mak- ing stand enough to prove that they clung to their old faith, and that England, however warlike, was, at all events, not of one mind. The hottest de- fenders of the war-policy could hardly refuse to acknowledge that there was much semblance of reason on the side of their adversaries. No one could say that the interest which England had in the perfect independence of the Ottoman Empire was so obvious and so deep as to exclude all ques- tioning ; and even if a man were driven from that first ground, still, M'ithout being guilty of paradox, he might fairly dispute, and say that the inde- pendence of the Sultan was not really brought into peril by a form of words which, during some
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 69
^veeks, had received the approval of every one of cuAP. the five great Powers. ' .
But if these views were only plausible, there ■was another which was sound. It could be fairly maintained that the intrusion of Russia into two provinces lying far away on the south-eastern frontiers of Austria was no cause why England alone, nor why England and Erance together, sliould undertake to stand forward and pierform, at tlieir own cliarge and cost, a duty which at- tached upon Austria in the first place, and next upon Europe at large.
Of course, tlie actual and immediate success of Not for any such struggle for the maintenance of peace oratorical was grievously embarrassed in the way already shown, by the course which had been taken by Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone ; but it is not the custom of the English to be ntterly disheart- ened by political losses ; and it happened that outside the Government Offices the cause of peace was headed by two men who had been powerful in their time, and who retained the qualities of mind and body by which, in former years, they had gained a great sway.
Mr Cobden and jNIr Bright were members of the MrCoMen
" and Mr
House of Commons. Both had the gift of a manly, Bright, strenuous eloquence; and their diction, being founded upon English lore rather than upon shreds of weak Latin, went straiglit to the mind of their hearers. Of these men the one could persuade, the other could attack ; and, indeed, Mr Bright's oratory was singularly well qualified for prevent-
70 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, ing ail erroneous acquiescence in the policy of the . ^^^' day ; for, besides that lie was honest and fearless — besides that, with a ringing voice, he had all the clearness and force which resulted from his great natural gifts, as well as from his one-sided method of thinking— he had the advantage of being generally able to speak in a state of sincere anger. In former years, whilst their minds were disciplined by the almost mathematic exactness of the reasonings on which they relied, and when they were acting in concert with the shrewd traders of the north who had a very plain object in view, these two orators had shown with what a strength, with what a masterly skill, with what patience, with what a high courage, they could carry a great scientific truth through the storms of politics. They had shown that they could arouse and govern the assenting thousands who listened to them with delight — that they could bend the House of Com- mons— that they could press their creed upon a Prime jNIinister, and put upon his mind so hard a stress that, after a while, he felt it to be a torture and a violence to his reason to have to make stand against them. Xay, more : each of these two gifted men had proved that he could go bravely into tlie midst of angry opponents — could show them their fallacies one by our — destroy their favourite theories before their very faces, and triumphantly argue them down. Now, these two men were honestly devoted to the cause of peace. They honestly believed that the impending war with Russia was a needless war. There was no
IX THE "WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 71
staia upon their names. How came it that they chap. sank, and were able to make no good stand for the !_
cause they loved so well ? The answer is simple. Upon the question of peace or war (the very Reasons
f. 1-1 ,1 n why they
question upon which more tlian any other a man wereai.ie might well desire to make his counsels tell) these uo stand. two gifted men had forfeited their hold upon the ear of the country. They had forfeited it by their Ibrmer want of moderation. It was not by any intemperate words upon the question of this war with Russia that they had shut themselves out from the counsels of the nation ; but in former years they had adopted and put forward, in their strenuous way, some of the more extravagant doctrines of the Peace Party. In times when no war was in question, they had run down the practice of M'ar in terms so broad and indiscrimi- nate that they were understood to commit them- selves to a disapproval of all wars not strictly defensive, and to decline to treat as defensive those wars which, although not waged against an actual invader of the Queen's dominions, might still be undertaken by England in the perform- ance of a European duty, or for the purpose of checking the undue ascendancy of another Power. Of course, the knowledge that they held doctrines of this wide sort disqualified them from arguing with any effect against the war then impending. A man cannot have weight as an opponent of any particular war if he is one who is known to he against almost all war. It is vain for him to offer
72 CAUSES INVOLVING FliANCE AND KNGLAND
CHAP, to be moderate for the nonce, and to propose to ' argue the question in a way which his hearers will recognise. In vain lie declares that for the sake of argument he will lay aside his own broad principles and mimic the reasonings of his hearers. Practical men know that his mind is under the sway of an antecedent determination which dispenses him from the more narrow but more important inquiry in which they are en- gaged. They \vill not give ear to one who is striving to lay down the conclusions which ought, as he says, to follow from other men's principles. He who altogether abjures the juice of the grape cannot usefully criticise the vintage of any par- ticular year; and the man who is the steady adversary of wars in general, upon broad and paramount grounds, will never be regarded as a sound judge of the question whether any particu- lar war is wicked or righteous, nor whether it is foolish or wise.
It must be added that there M-as another cause which tended to disqualify ]\Ir Bright from taking an effective part in the maintenance of peace. For one who would undertake a task of that kind at a time when warlike ardour is prevailing in the country, it is above all things necessary that he should be a statesman so truly attached to what men mean when they talk of their country, and so jealous of its honour, that no man could ascribe his efforts in the cause of peace to motives which a warlike and high-spirited people would repudiate. INIr Briglit sincerely desired the wel-
IN THE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 1 ?>
fare of the traders and workmen of the United CHAr.
Kingdom ; and if he desired the welfare of the L_
other classes of the people with less intensity, it may fairly be believed that to all he wished to see justice done: so, if this worthy disposition of mind were equivalent to what a man calls his ' love of his country,' no one could fairly say that Mr Bright was without the passion. But in another, and certainly the old and the usual sense, a man's 'love of his country' is understood to re- present something more than common benevol- ence towards the persons living within it. For if he be the citizen of an ancient State blessed M-itli freedom, renowned in arms, and holding wide sway in the world, his love of his country means something of attachment to the institutions which have made her what she is — means something of pride in the long-suffering, and the battle, and the strife which have shed glory upon his country- men in his own time, and upon their fathers in the time before him. It means that he feels his country's honour to be a main term and element of his own content. It means that he is bent upon the upholding of her dominion, and is so tempered as to become the sudden enemy of any man who, even though he be not an invader, still attempts to hack at her power. Now in this the heathen, but accustomed sense of the phrase, Mr Bright would be the last to say that he was a lover of his country. He would rather, perhaps, acknowledge that, taking 'his country' in that sense, lie hated it. Yet at a time when the spirit
74 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CUAP. of the nation was up, no man could usefully . strive to moderate or guide it unless liis patriot-
ism were believed to be exactly of that heathen sort which Mr Bright disapproved. Thus, by the nature of his patriotism, no less than by the im- moderate width of his views on the lawfulness of wars, this powerful orator was so disabled as to be hindered from applying his strength towards the maintenance of peace.
The country was impassioned, but it was not so mad as to be deaf to precious counsels ; and a statesman who had shown by his past life that he loved his country in the ancient way, and that he knew how to contemplate the eventuality of war with a calm and equal mind, might have won attention for views which questioned the necessity of the war then threatened ; and if, in good time, he had brought to bear upon his opinions a suffi- cing power and knowledge, he might have altered the policy of his country.* But outside the Cabinet the real tenor of the negotiations of 1853 was still unkuov/n ; and Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone consenting to remain members of a
* This was in luiiit before that curious and interesting con- firmation of my statement — my statement of the relations be- tween the Peace Party and their country — which Jlr Cobdeu lias since given to the world. Mr Cobdcn has said tliat at the time of the war neither he nor Jlr l^riglit could win any atten- tion to their views ; and he added that lie (Mr Cobden) will never again try to withstand a warlike ardour once kindled, because, when a people are inllamed in that way, they are no better than 'mad dogs.' — Speech in llie aiduuui of 1862. He sees no defect in the principles of a Peace Party which is to suspend its operations in times of warlike excitement.
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.
•war-going Goverunient, and ]Mr Cobden and j\Ir chap.
Bright being disqualified for useful debate by the 1_
nature of their opinions, no stand could be made. By these steps, then, the English people passed from a seeming approval of the doctrines of tlio Peace Party to a state of warlike ardour; and it ■was plain that, if the Queen should send down to the Houses of Parliament a message importing war, the lioyal appeal would be joyfully answered by an almost unanimous people.
76 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAPTER VIII.
CHAP. When the Endisli Parlicament assombled on the
VIII ... '__ 31st of January, there was still going on in
Padiameut. E^^i'ope a scmblance of negotiation ; but amongst men accustomed to the aspect of public afl'airs, there was hardly more than one who failed to see that France and England had gone too far to be able to recede, and that, by the very weight of their power and its inherent duties, they were now at last drawn into war. This condition of
The Queen's tilings was fairly enough disclosed by the Queen's peecL gpeech, and ravliament was asked to provide for an increase of the military and naval forces, with a view to give weight to the negotiations still pending. But the English Government was not suffered to forget its bond with the French Em- peror; and the Prime Minister, whilst still in- dulging a hope of peace, consented to record and continue the error which had brought him to the verge of war. It seems that for good reasons it was of some moment to the French Emperor to be signally named in the Queen's Speech ; and Lord Aberdeen asain submitted to a form of words
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 77
wliicli carefully distinj^aiislied the posture of chap.
France and England from that of the four Powers. 1_
The Queen was advised to say : ' I have continued * to act in cordial co-operation with the Emperor ' of the French ; and my endeavours in conjunc- ' tion with my Allies to preserve and to restore ' peace between the contending parties, although ' hitherto unsuccesrsful, have been unremitting.'
Like the similar paragraph which had marked The erring
111 /.I T Jiolicy which
the Royal Speech at the close of the preceding it indicated, session, this phrase, strange as it was, gave a true though somewhat dim glimpse of the policy which was leading England astray. In principle she was marching along with all the rest of the four Powers, and yet all the while she was engaged with the French Emperor in a separate course of action. If the aims of Austria and Prussia had been seriously at variance with those of the West- ern Powers, this difference might have been a good reason for separate action on the part of France and England. But the contrary was true. So deep was the interest of Austria in the cause, and unswerving
resolve of
so closely were her views approved by Prussia, Austria that althouoh for several months France and Eng- approval of
11111 • • 1-1 i''"ussia)to
land had been pressing forward in a way which n<i the
r o J Principali-
seemed to endanger the coherence of the quad- ties of
^ _ ^ Russian
ruple union, still even this dangerous course had troops. hitherto failed to destroy the unanimity of the four Powers. If the French Emperor sought to use his alliance with England as a means of strengthening his hold over France, and if Eng- land was be^innins to love the thoufjht of war for
78 CAUSES INVOLVING !■ RANCH AND KNGLAXD
CHAP, war's sake, Austria, from motives of a liigher and
'__ more cogent sort (for she saw her interests vitally
touched, and her safety threatened), was eager and determined to take such steps as might be needed for delivering the Principalities. Prussia agreed with her. It was nothing but the impa- tience and forwardness of France and England which relieved Austria from the necessity of taking the lead ; for the wrong which had to be redressed was one from which she of all the great Powers was the most a sufferer ; and she had the concurrence of Prussia not only in regard to the existing state of things, but even as to the ulterior objects of the war which her resolve might bring upon Germany. Proofs of The proofs of all this abound. By the repeated
tliis drawn t \ ■■, ^ ii jii
from trans- words of respousiblc statesmen, by despatches, by
actions ante-
riortothe collcctive notcs, by protocols, by solemn treaty of Speech. offensive and defensive alliance against Pussia, by peremptory summons addressed to the Czar, and, finally (so far as concerns Austria), by the application of force, the German I*owers disclosed and executed their policy ; and the policy which they so disclosed and executed was the same policy as had been avowed by the Western Powers. It has been seen that in that early period of the troubles, when the Czar had scarce yet crossed the Pruth, Austria took upon herself to endeavour to form a league for forcing the Czar to relinquish the Principalities;* and from that hour down to
• ' Invasion of the Ciiniea,' vol, i. pp. 208 ami 210 of Cab- iu'it Eilition.
IX THE WAR AGAIXST EUSSIA. 79
the time wlien Nicholas gave way and re-entered chap. his own dominions, her efforts to bring about this '^^^^' end were unceasing and restless.
Of the spirit in which Austria was acting tlirough all the early stages of the negotiations, many a proof has been already given. With time, her impatience of the Czar's intrusion upon her southern frontier increased and increased. It is true that she did not desire war : she anxiously ■wished to avoid it. She wished, if it were possible, to achieve the end without war, but to achieve it she was resolved ; and if a vestige of the mediat- ing character which had belonged to her in the summer of 1853, or her legitimate anxiety to spare the Czar's personal feelings, was a motive which tended to soften her language, it did not deflect her policy. Count Buol declared that although, in treating with Eussia, 'more management of ' terras ' * was required from Austria than from the Western Powers, the objects sought by all the four Powers were the same, and that they ought to be compassed by ' a general concordance in the ' M-ay of putting them forward.' f But even the notion of using a gentler form of expression than the one employed by the AVestern Powers was quickly abandoned, and Austria found no difficulty in adopting the exact words of the collective Xote framed by Lord Clarendon in concert with the Prench Government. So anxious was Austria to remain on the same ground with the rest of the four Powers, that she came into every term of 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 231, f Ibid. p. 273.
• <i
80 CAUSES INVOLVING FliANCE AND ENGLAND
C u A P. tlie firm and wise sclieme of actiuii laid duwu by
Lord Clarendon on the IGth of November,* and
bitterly ofTended the Czar by agreeing, at Lord Clarendon's instance, that the Porte should not be even asked to accept any conditiou M'hich it liad already rejected, and by affirming the de- termination of the four Powers to intervene in any settlement of the dispute between Russia and Turkey.
Prussia also gave her imreserved adhesion lo the plan of action laid down by Lord Clarendon, and to the measures resulting from it.-f* By the Protocol of tlie 5t]i of December 1853 both Austria and Prussia joined with the Western Powers in declaring that the existence of Turkey in the limits assigned to it by existing treaties was one of the necessary conditions of the Euro- pean equilibrium.
By the Protocol of the 13th of January the four Powers recorded their approval of the terms agreed to by the Turkish Government, and re- solved to submit them to the Court of St Peters- burg. At the very time when the English Govern- ment were framing the Speech from the Throne which ostentatiously separated Prance and Eng- land from the rest of the four Powers, the two great Courts of Germany were sending back Count Orloff and Baron Budberg to St Petersburg, with not only a decisive refusal to promise neutrality, but also a plain avowal that Prussia and Aus»
• 'Eastern Tapers,' part vii. pp. 238, 25S.
+ Ibid, part ii. p. 263. t \hU. p. 296.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA, 81
tria iuteuded to remain faithful to tlie principles CHAP,
M'hicli tlie four Powers had adopted in concert. '_
Prussia told Baron Jjudber<r that she should have to devise means without liussia for maintaining the equilibrium of Europe. In significant words, the Emperor Francis Joseph told Count Orloif that he should have to he guided by the in- terests and tlie dignity of his Empire.
It is said that, by the tidings which forced him to know that he was alienated from the Austrian Emperor, the Czar was wounded deep. He had conceived a strong affection for Francis Joseph, and wherever he went he carried with him a small statuette which recalled to his mind the features of the youthful Kaiser. It would seem that his affection was of the kind Mhich a loving and yet stern father bears his son, for it was joined with a sense of right to exact a great deference to his will. Nicholas had been strangely slow to believe that Francis Joseph could harbour the thought of opposing him in arms ; and when at last the truth was forced upon him, he desired that the marble should be taken from his sight. But he did not, they say, speak in auger. "When he had spoken, he covered his face with his hands and was wrung with grief.
What we are showing just now is the complete nnion of opinion which was existing between England and the two great Courts of Germany on the 31st of January 1854, and in order to this, we have already referred to a variety of diplomatic transactions coming down to the time in question;
VCiL. II. V
82 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, but the policy of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin L- at the close of the month of January is to be in- ferred, of course, from the transactions which followed this date, as well as from those which preceded it ; and therefore it seems convenient to go forward, as it were, a few paces in advance of the general narrative, so as thus to bring under one view the grounds on which I assert that our Government was well supported in its policy by Prussia as well as by Austria. Proofs Day by day the joint pressure of the four
irawnfroni ^"^ -n, , -r,
transactions Powers became more cogent. By the Protocol ot
iubsequent "
to the the 2d of February the four Powers unanimously
.Jueen 3 *'
■jpeech. rejected the counter-propositions made by Pussia. On the 14th of JNIarch both Austria and Prussia addressed circulars to the Courts of the German Confederation, in which they pointed out that the interests in question were essentially German in- terests, and that the active co-operation of Ger- many might be needed. On the 18th of March the King of Prussia asked his Chamber for an ex- traordinary credit of thirty million of thalers ; and he at the same time declared that he would not swerve from the principles established by the Vienna Conference, and would faithfully protect every member of the Confederation who, at an earlier moment than Prussia, might be called on to draw the sword for the defence of German interests.
Nor were these bare words. Austria, it has been already said, was so placed that, whatever dangers slie might draw upon ]>er other frontiers,
IX TlIK WAIt AGAINST KUSSIA. 83
she could act with irresistible pressure upon the chap.
invader of the rriucipalities. On the Gth and 22d L,
of Februar}'' she reinforced her army on tlie fron- tier of Wallachia by 50,000 men, and thus placed the Russian army of occupation completely at her mercy. On the day when she sent that last rein- forcement into the Banat, she had grown so im- patient of the further continuance of the Russians in the Principalities that she actually pressed Prance and England to summon Paissia to quit the Principalities under pain of a declaration of war, and undertook to support their summons.* Prussia was approving; and on the 25th, Baron Manteuffel wrote to Count Arnim at Vienna ' on ' the subject of a more decided policy which ' it was supposed the Austrian Government was ' about to adopt in the affairs of tlie East, and ex- ' pressed the satisfaction of the Prussian Govern- ' ment at the interests of Germany on the Danube ' being likely to be so warmly espoused.'-j- On the 2d of March the French Emperor had so little doubt of the concurrence of Austria and Ger- many, that he announced it in his speech from the Throne. ' Germany,' said he, ' has recovered ' her independence, and has looked freely to see ' whither her true interests led her. Austria ' especially, who cannot see with indifference the ' events going on, will join our alliance, and will ' thus come to confirm the morality and justice of ' the war which we undertake. We go to Con- * stantinople with Germany.'
* ' Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 53. t Ibul. p. 60,
8-4 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. On the 20th of March the four Powers were so
1- well agreed that, when Greece sought to make a
diversion in favour of Eussia, the representatives of Austria, Prussia, France, and England, all joined in a collective Note, which called upon the Greek Government, in terms approaching menace, to give way to the demands of tlie Porte. On the very day which followed the English declaration of war, the Emperor of Austria appointed the Arch- duke Albert to the command of the forces on the frontier of Wallachia, and at the same time the ' Third Army' was put upon the war footing. A little later,* the Emperor of Austria ordered a new levy of 95,000 men for the defence of his frontiers. Later still, but within one day-f- of the time when France and England were making their alliance, Austria and Prussia joined with France and Eng- land in a Protocol, which not only recorded the fact that the hostile step then just taken by France and England was 'supported by Austria and Prussia as being founded in right,' but went on to declare that, 'at that solemn moment the ' Governments of the four Powers remained united ' in their object of maintaining the integrity of ' the Ottoman Empire, of which the fact of the ' evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is ' and will remain one of the essential conditions ; ' and that ' the territorial integrity of the Ottoman • Empire is and remains the sine qjid non con- ' dition of every transaction having for its ob- *ject the re-establishment of peace between the • May 15. ^ + April 9, 1854.
IX THE WAK AGAINST RUSSIA. 85
* belligerent Powers.' Finally, the Protocol stip- chap,
ulated that none of the ' four Powers should L
' enter into any definitive arrangement with the
' Imperial Court of Russia which should be at ' variance with the principles declared by the
* Protocol without first deliberating thereon in
* common.'*
On the 20th of April Austria and Prussia con- tracted with each other an offensive and defensive alliance, by which they guaranteed to each other all their respective possessions, so that an attack upon the territory of one should be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory, and engaged to hold a part of their forces in perfect readiness for war. By the Second Article they declared that they stood ' engaged ' to defend the rights and interests of Germany ' against all and every injury, and to consider
* themselves bound accordingly for the mutual ' repulse of every attack on any part whatso- ' ever of their territories ; likewise, also, in the
* case where one of the two may find himself, ' in understanding with the others, obliged to ' advance actively for the defence of German ' interests.' f
By the Additional Article they declared 'that ' the indefinite continuance of the occupation ' of the territories on the Lower Danube, under ' the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by ' imperial Russian troops, M'ould endanger the ' political, moral, and material interests of the • ' Eastern Papers,' part viii. p. 2. f Ibid, part ix. p. 3.
86 CAUSES INVOLVING FRA2JCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP.
vin.
whole German Confederation as also of their own States, and the more so as Russia ex- tends her warlike operations on Turkish terri- tory ; ' and then went on to stipulate ' that the Austrian Government should address a commu- nication to the Russian Court, with the object of obtaining from the Emperor of Russia the neces- sary orders for putting an immediate stop to the further advance of his armies upon the Turkish territory, as also to request of His Imperial Majesty sufficient guarantees for the prompt evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, and that the Prussian Government should again, in the most energetic manner, support these com- munications.' Finally, the high contracting parties agreed that, 'if, contrary to expectation, the answer of the Russian Court should not be of a nature to give them entire satisfaction, the measures to be taken by one of the contracting parties, according to the terms of Article II. signed on tliat day, would be on tlie understand- ing that every hostile attack on the territory of one of the contracting parties should be repelled with all the military forces at the disposal of the other.' * Of the intent and the meaning of this treaty, and the use which Austria and Prussia were about to make of it, no doubt could exist. Fail- ing the peremptory summons which was to be addressed to Russia, the forces of Austria alone were to execute the easy task of expelling the
• * Eastern Papers,' part x.
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 87
troops of the Czar from the Principalities ; and in en Ar.
• VIII
order to withstand the vengeance which this step 1.
might provoke, Austria and Prussia together stood leagued.
By the Protocol of the 23d of May, the four Powers declared that both the Anglo-French treaty and the Austro-Prussian treaty bound the parties, in the relative situations to which they applied, to secure the same common object — namely, the evacuation of the Principalities and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.*
Now the mind and tlie solemn determination of Austria and Prussia being such as are shown by the Protocol of the 9th and the treaty of the 20th April, where was there such a difference of opinion — where was there even such a shadow of a difference — as to justify the Western States in pushing forward and separating themselves from the rest of the four Powers ? The avowed prin- ciples and objects of the four Powers were ex- actly the same. If they had acted together, the very weight of their power would have given them an almost judicial authorit}', and would have enabled them to enforce the cause of right without wounding the pride of the disturber, and without inflicting war upon Europe.
Was Austria backward ? Was she so little prone to action that it was necessary for the Western Powers to move to the front and fight her battles for her? The reverse is the truth. The Western Powers, indeed, were inore impatient
* ' Eastern Papers,' part is. p. 1.
88 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCK AND ENGLAND
CHAP, than Germany was to go through the forms which
. L- were necessary for bringing themselves legally
into a state of war, but for action of a serious kind they were not yet ready. Whilst they were only preparing, Austria was applying force. On the 3d of June, with the full support of Prussia, she summoned the Emperor Nicholas to evacuate the Principalities, Her summons was the sum- mons of a Power having an army on the edge of the province into which the llussian forces had been rashly extended. Such a summons was a mandate. The Czar could not disobey it. He could not stand in Wallachia when he was called upon to quit the province by a Power which had assembled its forces upon his flank and rear. He sought, indeed, to make terms, but the German Powers were peremptory. On the 14th Austria entered into a convention with the Porte, which not only legalised her determination to drive the Eussian forces from the Principalities, and to oc- cupy them with her own troops, but which form- ally joined Austria in an alliance with the Porte against Russia; for, by the 1st Article of the convention, the Emperor of Austria 'engages to ' exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other * means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian ' Principalities by the foreign army which occu- ' pies them, and even to employ, in case they are ' required, the number of troops necessary to at- ' tain this end.' * And since Russia could not in- vade European Turkey by land without marching • ' Eastern Fiipris,' part xii.
IN THE AVAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 89
through the Principalities, tliis iindertaking Ly chap. Austria involved an enfraKeraent to free the Sul- _
tan's laud frontiers in Europe from Russian in- vasion. Exactly at tlie same time * Austria and Prussia addressed notes to the Powers represented at the Conference of Bamberg, in which the liberation of the commerce and navigation of the Danube was held out to Germany as the object to be attained.
Austria was upon the brink of war with Ptussia, The tim«
*■ wlien the
was preparing to take forcible possession of the 1,"^*?^^^^^/^^ Principalities, and had despatched an officer to and Prussia
r ' 1 began to
the English headquarters with a view to concert f/^'^^^he*™ a joint scheme of military operations, when the p^f^g^™ Czar at length gave way, and abandoned the whole of the territory which, under the nauseous description of a ' material guarantee,' had become the subject of war. Other causes, as will be seen, were conducing to this result ; but none were so cogent as the forcible pressure which Austria had exerted, by first assembling forces in the Banat and then summoning the Czar to withdraw from the invaded provinces.
Of course, when the object which called forth the German Powers was attained, and when it transpired (as it did at the same time) that the Western Powers were resolved to abandon the common field of action, and to undertake the in- vasion by sea of a distant Eussian province inac- cessible to Austria and Prussia, then at last, and tlien for the fii'st time, the German Powers found • Htli and 16th June.
90 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
dUA?. VIII.
From first to last Austria and Prussia never swerv- ed from their resolve to secure the Czar's relinquish- ment of the Principali- ties.
that their interests were parting them from tlie great maritime States of the West ; for in one and the same week they were relieved from the griev- ance whicli was their motive for action, and de- prived of all hope of support from the Western Powers ; but it is certain that from the moment when the Czar first seized the Principalities to that in which he recrossed the I*ruth, the deter- mination of Austria to put an end to the intru- sion was never languid, and was always increas- ing in force. It is certain, also, that up to the time when the relinquishment of the Principali- ties began, there was no defection on the part of Prussia ; * and that the minor States of Germany, fully alive to the importance of a struggle which promised to free the great outlet of the Danube from Pussian dominion, were resolved to support Austria and Prussia with the troops of the Con- federation.f
* Prussia began to liang back, it seems, on about the 2l8t of July ('Eastern Papers,' part xi. p. 1) ; and this was ex- actly the time when her interests counselled her to do so ; for by that day she knew that the deliverance of the Principali- ties was secured and iu process of execution, and had also, no doubt, learned of the deterniination of the Western Powers to move their forces to the Crimea, thereby uncovering Germany. -Austria, with similar motives for separation, was less inclined to part from the Western Powers. See her Note of the 8th August ISiii, and the various diplomatic transactions in which she took part down to the close of the war.
+ 20th July 1854. The relinquishnuMit of the Principalities virtually began on the 2Gth of June — tlie day when the siege of Silistria was raised — and before the end of July the Russian forces had quitted the capital of "Wallaohia. On the 2d of August they repassed the Pruth.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 91
As soon as tlie Principalities were relinquished CHAP.
by the Czar they were occupied by Austrian 1_
troops, in pursuance of tlie convention wit)r the Porte ; and thus the outrage, which during twelve months had disturbed the tranquillity of Euroix), was then at last finally repressed.
92 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAPTP^R LX,
en A p. For the sake of bringing under one view the
'- — course of action followed by the German Powers
down to the moment when their object was achieved by the deliverance of the Principali- ties, it has been nccessar}^ as we have said, to go forward in advance of the period reached by the main thread of the narrative. The subject thus quitted for a moment and now resumed is the policy which was disclosed by tlie English Government upon the opening of Parliament. Spirit of Distinct from the martial ardour already
Adventure kiudlcd in England, there had sprung up amongst the people an almost romantic craving for warlike adventure, and this feeling was not slow to reach tlie Cabinet. Now, witliout severance from tlie German Powers, there could pLainly be little pro- spect of adventure ; for, besides that the German monarchs desired to free the Principalities witli as little resort to hostilities as might be com- patible with the attainment of the end, it was almost certain that the policy of keeping up the perfect union and co-operation of the four Powers
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA.
would prevent war by its overwheluiiiig force. CHAP. Like tlie power of tlie law, it would operate by '
coercion, and not by clangour of arms. This was a merit; but it was a merit fatal to its reception in England. The popularity of such a policy was Tiie bearing nearly upon the same niodest level as the popu- upon the'"' larity of virtue. All whose volitions were gov- uieuovein- erued by the imagined rapture of freeing Poland, or destroying Cronstadt and lording it with our flag in the Baltic, or taking the command of the Euxine, and sinking the liussiau fleet under the guns of Sebastopol ; all who meant to raise Cir- cassia, and cut olf the Muscovite from the glowing South by holding the Dariel Pass, and those also who dwelt in fancy upon deeds to be done on the shores of the Caspian ; — all these, and many more, saw plainly enough that separation from the German Powers and alliance with the new Bonaparte was the only road to adventure. Lord Aberdeen was not one of these, but it was his fate to act as though he were. He was not with- out a glimmering perception that the firmly main- tained union of the four Powers meant peace ; * but he saw the truth dindy ; and, there being a certain slowness in his high intellectual nature, he was not so touched by his belief as to be able to make it the guide of his action. He seems to have gone on imagining that, con- sistently with the maintenance of a perfect union of the four Powers there might be a separate and still more perfect union between two of them, • 129 Hansard, p. 1(350,
94 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, and that this kiud of alliance within alliance was ^^' a structure not fatal — nay, even perhaps con- ducive— to peace. England was And, after all, England was not free : she was gagemeiits bouud to the Frcnch Emperor. No treaty of French alliance had been signed, but the understanding
Eiiipeior. , p
disclosed in the summer of the year beiore was still riveted upon the members of the English Government. They had been drawn into a weighty engagement in 1853, and now they had to perform it. In the midst of perfect concord between her and her three allies, England had to stand forward with one of them in advance of the rest, and thus ruin that security for the main- tenance of peace which depended upon the united action of the four great Powers. As the price of his consenting to join reluctant France in an alliance with Turkey, the French Emperor was justly entitled to insist on the other terms of the bond, and not only to be signally coupled with Eni^laud in a course of action which was to separate her from the great German States, but to have it blazoned out to the world beforehand that, distinctly from the concord of the four Powers, the Queen of England and he were act- ing together. The Poyal Speech of January 1854 was as clear in this as tlie Speech of the previous August. Both disclosed a separate understanding with the French Emperor. In both, as any one could see who was used to State writings, the mark was set upon England with the same branding-iron.
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 95
To a man looking back upon the past, it seems chap, strange that a Cabinet of English Statesmen could ' .
have been led to adopt this singular policy. It |,oi°.y the would seem that, with many of tlie Cabinet, the c"l!l„"t"" tendency of the measures which they were sane- '^"^'•^'^ tioning was concealed from them by the gentle- ness of the incline on which tliey moved; and if there were some of them who had a clearer view of their motives, it must be inferred that they acted upon grounds not yet disclosed to the world. Of course, what the welfare of the State required was a Ministry which shared and hon- oured the public feeling, without being so carried down by it as to lose the statesman's power of understanding and controlling events. But this was not given. Of the bulk of the Cabinet, and possibly of all of them except one, Lord Claren- don's pithy phrase was the true one. They drifted. Wishing to control events, they were controlled by them. They aimed to go in one direction ; but, lapsing under the pressure of forces external and misunderstood, they always went in the other.
The statesman who Nvent his own way was one TheMinistM whose share in the governance of events was not his own way. much known. He was supposed to be under a kind of ostracism, lie had not been banished from England, nor even from the Cabinet ; but, holding office under a Prime jMinister whose views upon foreign policy were much opposed to his own, and relegated to duties connected with the peaceful administration of justice, it seemed to the
9G CAUSES INVOLVIXa rUAXCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, eve of the conniion observ^er tliat for the time he
IX. . '- — was annulled ; and the humorous stories which
floated about "Whitehall went to show that the deposed Lord of Foreign Affairs had consented to forget his former greatness and to accept his Home Office duties in a spirit of half-cynical, half-joyous disdain, but without the least discontent. And, in truth, lie had no ground for ill-humour. In poli- tics, lie was without vanity. What he cared for was power, and power he had. Indeed, circumstanced as be was, at the time when he chose to accept the Home Office, he must have known that one of the main conditions of his ascendant in foreign affairs was the general belief that he had none. The light of the past makes it easy to see that the expedient of trying to tether him down in the Home Office would alleviate his responsibil- ity and increase his real power. To those who know anything of Lord ralmerston's intellectual strength, of his boldness, his vast and concen- trated energy, his instinct for understanding the collective mind of a body of men and of a whole nation, and, above all, his firm robust will ; nay, even to those who only know of his daring achievements — achievements half peaceful, half warlike, half righteous, half violent, in many lands and on many a sea — the notion of causing him to be subordinated to Lord Aberdeen in Foreign Affairs seems hardly more sound than a scheme providing that the greater shall be contained in the less. Statesmen on the Continent would easily understand this, for they had lived for
IN TIIK WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 97
many a year under the cares brought upon tlieni chap. by his strenuous nature ; but up to the time I '
am speaking of, he had not been called upon to apply his energies in any very conspicuous way to the domestic affairs of England. Besides, he had been more seen in his own country than abroad, and for that very reason he was less known, because there was much upon the mere outside which tended to mask his real nature. His partly Celtic blood, and perhaps too, in early life, his boyish consciousness of power, had given him a certain elation of manner and bearing which kept him for a long time out of the good graces of the more fastidious part of the English world. The defect was toned down by age, for it lay upon the surface only, and in his inner nature there was nothing vulgar nor unduly pretending. Still, the defect made people slow — made them take forty years — to recognise the full measure of his intellectual strength. Moreover, the English had so imperfect a knowledge of the stress which he had long been putting upon foreign Governments, that the mere outward signs which he gave to his countrymen at home — his frank speech, his off- hand manner, his ready banter, his kind, joyous, beaming eyes — were enough to prevent them from accustoming themselves to look upon him as a man of stern purpose. Upon the whole, notwith- standing his European fame, it was easy for him at this time to escape grave attention in England.
He was not a man who would come to a sub- ject with which he was dealing for the first time
VOL. II. G
98 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAI4D
CHAP, with any great store of preconceived opinions, but
L he wrote so strenuously — he always, they say,
wrote standing — and was apt to be so much struck with the cogency of his own arguments, that by the mere process of framing despatches he wrought himself into strong convictions, or rather perhaps into strong resolves ; and he clung to these with such a lasting tenacity that, if lie had been a solemn, austere personage, the world would have accused him of pedantry. Like most gifted men who evolve their thoughts with a pen, he was very clear, very accurate. Of every subject which he handled gravely, he had a tight, iron grasp. Without being inflexible, his will, it has been already said, was powerful, and it swung with a great momentum in one direction until, for some good and sound reason, it turned and swung in another. He pursued one object at a time with- out being distracted by other game. All that was fanciful, or for any reason unpractical — all that was the least bit too Iiigh for him or the least bit too tleep for him — all tliat lay, though only l)y a little, beyond the immediate future with which ho was dealing — ho utterly drove from out of his mind ; and his energies, condensed for the time upon some object to which they could be applied with effect, were brought to bear upon it with all their full volume and power. So, during the whole period of his reign at the Foreign Office, Lord Talmerston's method had been to be very strenuous in the pursuit of the object which might be needing care at any given time without suffer-
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 99
ing himself to be embarrassed by what men call a chap. 'comprehensive' view of our foreign policy; and ' .
although it was no doubt his concentrative habit of mind and his stirring temperament which brought him into this course of action, he was much supported in it by the people at liome; for when no enterprise is on foot, the bulk of the English are prone to be careless of the friendship of foreign States, and are often much pleased when they are told that by reason of the activity of their Foreign Secretary they are without an ally in Europe.
Other statesmen had been accustomed to tliink that the principle which ought in general to determine the closeness of our relations with foreign States was * community of interests ; ' and that in proportion as this principle was departed from under the varied impulses of philanthropy or other like motives, disturbance, isolation, and danger would follow ; but Lord Palmerston had never suffered this maxim to interfere with any special object which he might chance to have in hand at the moment, nor even with his desire to spread abroad the blessings of constitutional government.
As long as Lord Grey was at the head of the Government, the energy of the Foreign Office was kept down ; and even after the first five years of Lord jMelbourne's Administration, the disruption towards which it was tending had made so little way, that when in 1840 the Ottoman Empire was threatened with ruin by France and her Egyptian
100 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, ally, Lord Palmerston, with a majority of only
___! two or three in the House of Commons, but
having a bold heart and a firm, steady hand, had been able to gather up the elements of the great alliance of 1814, and to prevent a European war by the very might and power and swiftness with which he executed his policy ; but at the end of eleven more years, when his career at the Foreign Office was drawing to a close, his energy had cleared a space round him, and he seemed to be left standing alone.*
His system by that time had fairly disclosed its true worth. Pursued with great vigour and skill, it had brought results corresponding with the numerous aims of its author, but corresponding also with his avowed disregard of a general guid- ing principle. Without breaking the general peace of Europe, it had produced a long series of diplomatic enterprises, pushed on in most instances to a successful issue ; but, on the other hand, it had ended by making the Foreign Office an object of distrust, and in that way withdraw- ing England from her due place in the composition of the European system ; for the good old safe clue of 'community of interests' being visibly
* It is not forgotten tliat during a large portion of this last period Lord Aberdeen was at the Foreign Oflice, but he was of course mucli bound by what his predecessors liad been doing before him ; and, speaking rougldy, it may be said that, from the spring of IS^'> until tlie close of 1851, our foreign policy bore the imjiress of Lord Paliiu iston's nnnd. In the period between November 1830 and the autumn of 1834, it was much governed by the then Prime Minister, Lord Gre}'.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 101
discarded, no Power, however closely bound to chap.
IX
us by the nature of things, could vSntury tCii'ely '
upon our friendship. States wliose interests in great European questions .\v,e re exactly; thg p^pe as our own, States which had always looked to the welfare and strength of England as main conditions of their own safety, found no more favour with us than those who consumed much of their revenue in preparing implements for the slaughter of ]^]nglishmen and the sinking of Eng- lish ships. They Avere therefore obliged to shape their policy upon the supposition that any slight matter in which the Foreign OHice might chance to be interesting itself at the moment — nay, even a difference of opinion upon questions of internal government (and this, be it remembered, was an apple which could always be thrown) — would be enough to make England repulse them. From this cause, perhaps, more than from any other, there had sprung up in Germany that semblance of close friendship with the court of St Peters- burg which had helped to allure the Czar into dangerous paths.
From the Emperor Nicholas Lord Palmerstou was cut off, not only by differences arising out of questions on which the policy of liussia and of England might naturally clash, but also because he was looked upon as the promoter of doctrines which the Court of St Petersburg Avas accustomed to treat as revolutionary. Even to Austria, al- though we were close bound to her by common interests, although there was no one national
102 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, interest which tended to divide us from her, he "'"' had. ill this wh:y/ become antagonistic. He liad too much lustiness of mind, too much simplicity 6t..j[xirp(r«e-, to-be capable, of living on terms of close intelligence with the philosophical statesmen of Berlin. To the accustomed foi-eign policy of French statesmen — in other words, to the France that lie had been used to encounter in the Foreign Office — he was adverse by very habit. He spurned the whole invention of the French Eepublic. But his favourite hatred of all was his hatred of the House of Bourbon.* In short, by the Ist of December 1851, though still at the Foreign Office, he had become isolated in Europe. But fortune smiles on bold men. The next night Prince Louis Bonaparte and his fellow- venturers destroyed the French Eepublic, superseded the Bourbons, and suppressed France. Plainly this Prince and Lord Palmerston were men who could act together — could act together until the Prince should advise himself to deceive the English jMinister. Not longer: not an hour beyond the time when the momentous promise which was made, if I mis- take not, before the events of December, should remain unbroken.
So when the Czar began to encroach upon the Sultan, there was nothing that could so completely meet Lord Palmerston's every wish as an alliance between the two Westei'n Powers, which should toss France lieadlong into the Eng-
* This feeling j)roljably drew its origin from the business of the 'Spanish Marriages.'
IN THK WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 103
lisli Policy of upholding the Ottoman Empire; chap.
and the price of this was a price which, far from '
grudging, he would actually delight to pay ; for, desiring to liave the Governments of France and England actively united together for an English object — desiring to prevent a revival of the Erench Republic — and, above all, to prevent a restoration of the House of Bourbon — he was only too glad to be able to strengthen the new Emperor's hold upon France by exalting his personal station, and giving him the support of a close, separate, and published alliance with the Queen of England. And in regard to the dislocation which such a new policy might work, he seems not to have set so high a value upon the existing framework of the European system as to believe that its destruction would be a portentous evil. If he thought it an evil at all, he thought it one which a strong man might repair.
Lord Palmerston had been at the head of the Foreign Office during so many years of his life, and he had brought to bear upon its duties an activity so restless, and (upon the whole) so much steadfastness of purpose, that the more recent foreign policy of England, whether it had been right or whether it had been wrong, was in him almost incarnate. It was obvious, therefore, that whilst he was in the Cabinet, he would always be resorted to for counsel upon foreign affairs b)' any of his colleagues who were not divided from him by strong difference of opinion, by political an- tagonism, or by personal dislike. Again, it was
104 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, scarcely wise to believe that tlie relations whicli • liad subsisted between Lord Palmerston and the President of the French Eepublic would be closed by the fact that tliey had led to I^rd Pahnerston's dismissal from the Secretaryship of Foreign Af- fairs. On the contrary, it was to be inferred that communications of a most friendly kind would continue to pass between the French Em- j)eror and an English Minister who had suffered for his sake ; and the very same manliness of dis- position which would prevent him from engaging in anything like an underhand intrigue against his colleagues, would make him refuse to sit dumb when, in words brought him fresh from the Tuil- eries, an ambassador came to talk to him of the Eastern Question — came to tell liim that the new Emperor had an unbounded confidence in his judgment, wished to be governed by his counsels, and, in short, would disi)0se of poor France as the English Minister wished.
Here, then, was the real bridge by which French overtures of the more secret and delicate sort would come from over the Channel. Here was the bridge by which England's acceptance or re- jection of all such overtures would go back to France,
Thus, from the ascendancy of his strong nature, from his vast experience, and from his command of the motive power which he could bring at any moment from Paris, Lord Palmerston, even so early as the spring of 1853, was the most puissant member of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet; and when,
IN THE WAR AGAINST IIUSSIA. 105
with all these sources of strength, he began to chap.
TX
draw support from a people growing every day '
more and more warlike, he gained a complete dominion. If, after the catastrophe of Sinope, his colleagues had persevered in their attempt to re- sist him, he would have been able to overthrow them with ease upon the meeting of Parliament.
Therefore, in the transactions which brought on the war, Lord Palmerston was not drifting; he was joyfully laying his course. Whither he meant to go, thither he went ; whither he chose that others should tend, thither they bent their reluctant way. If some immortal were to offer the surviving members of Loi'd Aberdeen's Gov- ernment the privilege of retracing their steps with all the light of experience, every one of them per- haps, with only a single exception, would examine the official papers of 1853, in order to see where he could most wisely diverge from the course which the Cabinet took. Lord Palmerston would do nothing of the kind. What he had done be- fore he would do again.
Lord Palmerston's plan of masking the warlike nis way of tendency of the Government was an application tendency of
/ . . 1-11 ^'"^ Govem-
to politics of an ingenious contrivance which the mcnt. Parisians u.sed to employ in some of their street engagements with the soldiery. The contrivance was called a 'live l)avricade.' A body of the in- surgents would seize the mayor of tlie arrondisse- ment, and a priest (if they could get one), and also one or two respectable bankers devoted to the cause of peace and order. These prisoners, each
106 CAUSES INVOLVING FllANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, forced to walk arm-in-arm between able-bodied
IX .* combatants, were marched in front of a body of
insurgents, which boldly advanced towards a spot where a battalion of infantry might be drawn up in close column of companies ; but when they got to within hailing distance, one of the insurgents gifted with a loud voice would shout out to the troops : ' Soldiers ! respect the cause of order ! ' Don't fire on Mr Mayor ! l^espect property ! ' Don't level your country's muskets at one who ' is a man and a brother, and also a respectable * banker ! Soldiers ! for the love of God don't ' imbrue your hands in the blood of this holy ' priest ! ' Confused by this appeal, and shrink- ing, as was natural, from the duty of killing peaceful citizens, the battalion would hesitate, and meantime the column of the insurgents, covered always by its live barricade, would rapidly ad- vance and crowd in upon the battalion, and break its structure and ruin it. It was thus that Lord Palmerston had the skill to protrude Lord Aber- deen and Mr Gladstone, and keep them standing forward in the van of a Ministry which was bring- ing tlie country into war. No one could assail Lord Palmerston's policy without striking at him through men whose conscientious attachment to the cause of peace was beyond the reach of cavil. Deiiaies Li tlio dcbatcs which took ])lace u])nn the Ad-
Address^ dress, the speeches of the iiuofhcial members of Parliament in both Houses disclosed a strange want of acquaintance with the character and spirit of the negotiations which had been going on for
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 107
the last eight months. Confiding in llic peaceful chap. tendency of a Government headed by Lord Al)er- ^^' deen, and having JNIr Gladstone for one of its fore- most members, Mr Bright, in the summer of 1853, liad deprecated all discussion ; and, under his en- parliament couragement, the Government, after some hesita- dark'L to tion, determined to witldiold tlie production of tendency of the papers. With the lights whicli he then had, inent°'^™' Mr Bright was perhaps entitled to believe that the course he took was the right one, and the in- tention of the Government was not only honest, but in some degree self-sacrificing; for it cannot be doubted that the disclosure of the able and high-spirited despatches of Lord Clarendon would have raised the Government in public esteem. It is now certain, however, that the disclosure of the papers in the August of 1853 would have enabled tlie friends of peace to take up a strong ground, to give a new turn to opinion wliilst yet tliere was time, and to save themselves from the utter discomfiture which they underwent in the inter- val between the prorogation and the meeting of Parliament.
The Cabinet of Lord A1)erdeen was not famous for its power of preventing the leakage of State matters ; but the common indiscretion b}'' which simple facts are noised abroad does not suffice to disclose the general tenor and bearing of a long and intricate negotiation. Besides, in the absence of means of authentic knowledge, there were cir- cumstances which raised presumptions o})posite to the truth. Of course the chief of these was
108 CAUSES INVOLVING FPANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, the retention of office by two men whose attach- ^^' ment to the cause of peace was believed to be passionately strong; but it chanced, moreover, that publicity had been given to a highly-spirited and able despatch, the production of the French Foreign Office ; and since there had transpired no proof of a corresponding energy on the yjart of England, it was wrongly inferred that Lord Aber- deen's Government were hanging back. Accord- ingly, Ministers were taunted for this supposed fault by almost all the speakers in either House. What the Government were chargeable with was an undue forwardness in causing England to join with France alone in the performance of a duty which was European in its nature, and devolv- ing in the first instance upon Austria. What they were charged with was a want of readi- ness to do that which they had done. There- fore every one who spoke against the INIinistry was committing himself to opinions which (as soon as their real course of action should be disclosed) would involve him in an approval of their policy.
Production But uow at last, aud within a day or two from
Papers. the conclusiou of the debate on the Address, some of the papers relating to the negotiations of 1853 and the preceding years were laid upon the table of both Houses. As soon as the more devoted friends of peace were able to read these documents, and in some degree to comprehend their scope and bearing, they began to see liow
lueir offeot. their causG had fared under the official guardian-
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 109
ship of Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone. They chap. began to see that for near eight months the Gov- '
crnnient had been foHowiiig a convsc of action which was gently leading towards war. Thuy did not, however, make out the way in which tlie deflection began. They did not see that the way in which the Government had lapsed from the paths of peace, was by quitting the common ground of the four Powers for the sake of a closer union with one, and by joining with the Erench Emperor in making a perverse use of the fleets.
Mr Cobden fastened upon the 'Vienna Note,' and, with his views, he was right in drawing attention to the apparent narrowness of the dif- ference upon which the question of peace or war was made to depend ; but he surely betrayed a want of knowledge of the way in which the actions of mankind are governed when he asked that a country now glowing with warlike ardour should go back and try to obtain peace by re- suming a form of words which its Government had solemnly repudiated four months before. Of course this effort failed : it could not be other- wise. Any one acquainted with the tenor of the negotiations, and with enough of the surround- ing facts to make the papers intelligible, may be able to judge whether there were not better grounds than this for making a stand against the war. The evil demanding redress was the in- trusion of the Eussian forces into Wallachia and Moldavia ; and it would seem that the judgment
110 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, to be prououuced by Parliament upon a Goverii-
__fll_ ment which had led their country to the brink of
war should have been made to depend upon this
question : —
The question Was it practicable for England to obtain the
theludi- deliverance of the Principalities by means taken
Puiiament in commoH with the rest of the four Powers, and
been rested, without rcsorting to the expedient of a separate
understanding with the French Emperor ? *
It may be that to this question the surviving members of Lord Aberdeen's Administration can establish a negative answer, but in order to do this tliey will have to make use of knowledge not hitherto disclosed to Parliament.
A belief, nay, even a suspicion, that there was danger of a sudden alliance between tlie French Emperor and the Czar, would gravely alter the conditions upon which Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet was called upon to form its judgment ; but, so far as the outer world knows, no fear of this kind was coercing the Government. Upon the papers as they stand, it seems clear that, by remaining upon the ground occupied by the four Powers, England would have obtained the deliverance of the Principalities without resorting to war.
* It will be interesting to know what light the furtlur researches of the Prince Consort's biographer may be able to throw upon this stage of the transactions.
IN THE WAR AGAIXST KUSSIA. Ill
CHAPTER X.
The last of the steps which brought on the rup- c fi a P. ture between Paissia and the Western Powers ^' was perhaps one of the most anomalous trans- actions which the annals of diplomacy liave re- corded. The outrage to be redressed was the occupation by Eussia of Wallachia and Moldavia. Of all the States of Europe, except Turkey itself, the one most aggrieved by this occupation was Austria. Now Austria was one of the great Powers of Europe. She was essentially a military State ; she was the mistress of a vast and well- appointed array ; she was the neighbour of Ptussia. Geographically, she was so placed that (whatever perils she might bring upon her other frontiers) her mere order to her officer commanding her army of observation would necessarily force the Czar to withdraw his troops. On the other hand, Prance and England, though justly offended by tlie out- rage, and tliough called upon in their character as two of the great Powers to concur in fit measures for suppressing it, were far from being brought into any grievous stress by the occupation of the
112 CAUSES INVOLVING FEANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, far-distant Principalities ; and moreover, the evil, ' such as it was, was one which they could not dis- pel by any easy or simple application of force. Austria's It was in this condition of things that Austria
k hostiU; suddenly conveyed to France, and through France
summons to , . . . , . p -n i
the Czar. to England, the intimation oi the 22d ot February. In conversation with Baron de Bourqueny, Count Buol said : ' If England and France will fix a day
* for the evacuation of the Principalities, the ex-
* piration of which shall be the signal for hostil- ' ities, the Cabinet of Vienna will support the ' summons.' * The telegraph conveyed the tenor of this intimation to London on the same day. Naturally, it was to be expected that Austria would join in a summons which she invited other Powers to send ; and to this hour it seems hardly possible to believe that the Emperor of Austria deliberately intended to ask France and England to fix a day for going to war without meaning to so to war himself at the same time. Lord Clar- endon, however, asked the question. Apparently he was not answered in terms corresponding with his question, but he was again told that Austria would ' support ' tlie summons. Then, all at once, and without stipulating for the concurrence of the Power which was pressing them into action, the Governments of France and England prepared the instruments which were to bring them into a state of war with Paissia.
Austria at this period had plainly resolved to go to war if the Principalities should not be relin- * ' Easteru Papers,' part vii. p. 53.
IN TIIH WAIl AGAINST RUSSIA. 113
quished by the Czar ; but, before she could take chap. the final step, it was necessary for her to come '
to an understanding with Prussia. This she sue- of'rvoWin" ceeded in doing within twenty-four hours from the *'*®*^' period of the final rupture between Eussia and the Western Powers ; but Prance and England could not bear to wait. The French Emperor, rebuffed by the Czar in his endeavour to appear as the pacificator of Europe, was driven to the opposite method of diverting France from herself; and, although the crisis was one in which a little delay and a little calmness would have substituted the coercive action of the four Powers for an adventurous war by the two, he once more goaded our Government on, and pressed it to concur with him in sending forthwith to Eussia a hostile, im- perative summons. M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared pressure of tliat, in his opinion, the sending of the proposed Emperor, summons was a business which ' should be done ' immediately, and that the two Governments ' should write to Count Nesselrode to demand ' the immediate' withdrawal of the Eussian troops from the Principalities — 'the whole to ' be concluded by a given time, say the end of ' March.' *
It must be owned, however, that the English Kaeemess people were pressing their Government in the in England same direction. Inflamed with a longing for naval glory in the Baltic, they had become tormented with a fear lest their Admiral should be hindered from great achievements for want of the mere legal
* ' Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 53. VOL. II. H
114 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. X.
The Govern- ment loses its compo- sure.
Tlie sum- mons des- patched by England.
formality wliicli was to constitute a state of war. The majority of the Cabinet, though numbering on their side several of the foremost statesmen of the day, were collectively too weak to help being driven by the French Emperor, too weak to help being infected by the warlike eagerness of the people, too weak to resist the strong man who was amongst them, yet in one sense alone. It is likely enough that statesmen so gifted as some of them were, must have had better grounds for their way of acting than have been hitherto dis- closed ; but to one who only judges from the ma- terials communicated to Parliament, it seems plain that at this time they had lost their composure.
By the summons despatched on the part of England, Lord Clarendon informed Count Nessel- rode that, unless the Russian Government, within six days from the delivery of the summons, should send an answer engaging to withdraw all its troops from the Principalities by the 30th of April, its refusal or omission so to do would be regarded by England as a declaration of war. This sum- mons was in accordance with the suggestion of Austria ; and what might have been expected was, that the Western Powers, in acceding to her wish, should do so upon the understanding that she concurred in the measure which she herself proposed, and that they would consult lier as to the day on which it would be convenient for her to enter into a state of war ; in other words, that they would consult her as to the day on which a continued refusal to quit tlie Principalities should
IN THK WAll AGAINST RUSSIA. 1 1 f)
hn'no- tlie Czav into astute of war witli Austria, chap. Fraiic(i, and J^^uglaud. Instead of (aking tliis __Ll__
course, Lord Clarendon I'orwarded tlie snuinions (not as a draft or project, but as a document already signed and complete) to the Court of instructions Vienna, and it was despatched by a messenger, senger. who (after remaining for only a 'few hours' in the Austrian capital) was to carry on the summons to St Petersburg. Therefore Austria was made aware that, whether she was willing to defend her own interests or not, England was irrevocably com- mitted to defend them for her; and instead of requiring that Austria should take part in the step awi to Lord which she herself had advised. Lord Westmore- knu. land was merely instructed to express a hope that the summons ' would meet with the approval ' of the Austrian Cabinet, and that their opinion of Austria not it would be made known by Count Buol to the takei.ait
iu tlie sum-
Cabniet of St Petersburg. Such a step as this on monswincb
" '- she liad her
the part of Austria was preposterously short of seifsug- what the Western Powers would have had a right to expect from her, if they had been a little less eager for hostilities, and had consulted her as to the time for coming to a rupture.
Of course, the impatience of France and Eng- land was ruinous to the principle of maintaining concert between the four Powers, and yet had not the merit of springing from any sound mili- tary views. It is true that the Western Powers were sending troops to the Levant, and fitting out fleets for the Baltic ; but there was nothing in the state of their preparations, nor in the position
IIG CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. X.
The coun- ter-pro- posals of Russia reach Vienna at the same time as the English messenger.
Tliey are rejected by the Confer- ence of the four Powers.
Austria and I'russia 'support' \ho suin- nioiis, but ivithout *Aklng part m the step.
of the respective forces, which could justify tlieir eagerness to accelerate the declaration of war.
It chanced that, simultaneously with the arrival of the English messenger at Vienna, there came thither from St Petersburg the counter-proposi- tions of Eussia. Count Buol saw the importance of disposing of these before the summons went on to St Petersburg ; so, after persuading Lord West- moreland to detain the English messenger, he instantly assembled the Conference of the four Powers. By this Conference the counter-proposi- tions of Eussia were unanimously rejected,* and the bearer of the summons carried this decision of the four Powers to St Petersburg, together with a despatch from the Austrian Government, in- structing Count Esterhazy to support the sum- mons, and throwing upon Eussia the responsibility of the impending war.-f- The despatch, however, fell short of announcing that the refusal to quit the Principalities would place the Czar in a state of war with Austria as well as with the Western Powers. Prussia supported the summons in lan- guage corresponding with the language of the Vienna Cabinet. Baron Manteuffel's despatch to St Petersburg ' was drawn up in very pressing ' language. It urged the Eussian Government to * consider the dangers to which the peace of the ' world would be exposed by a refusal, and de-
* 'The Conference unaniniou.sly agreed that it was impossible ' to proceed with those propositions.' — Protocol of Conference of March 5. 'Ea.stern Papers,' part vii. p. 80.
t 'Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 64.
IN THE AVAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 117
• clared that the responsibility of the war which chap,
X.
' might be the consequence of that refusal would ' rest with the Emperor.' *
The summons addressed by France to the Eus- The French
. , summons.
sian Government was in the same terms as the summons despatched by Lord Clarendon, and was forwarded at the same time.
After receiving the summons of the two Govern- France and ments, Count Nesselrode took the final orders of bWht
. -I t r-i i r '"'^" * state
his master, and then informed the Consuls of of war with
Russia.
France and England that the Emperor did not think fit to send any answer to their notes. A refusal to answer was one of the events which, under the terms of the announcement contained in the summons, was to be regarded b}^ the West- ern Powers as a declaration of war. This refusal was uttered by Count Nesselrode on the 19th of March 1854 The peace between the great Powers of Europe had lasted more than thirty-eight years, and now at length it was broken.f
* ' Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 72.
+ A writer in one of the Reviews said that the state of war did not begin until the decharations of tlie Western Powers were issued ; but that is a mistake. What brouglit the Western Powers into a state of war, was the Czar's refusal to answer the summons ; for the moment that refusal was given, it became, in the mind of the Western Powers, as announced by the ex- press words of their summons, a constructive declaration of war by Russia. The English summons had these words : ' Tlic ' British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of ncgo- ' tiation, is compelled to declare to the Cabinet of St Peterp- ' burg, that if . . . [see the summons at length in the Appcn- ' dix], the British Government must consider the refusal or the ' silence of the Cabinet of St Petersburg as equivalent to a cle- • claration of war.' — ' Eastern Papers,' part vii. p. 61. — Note to ilh Edition.
118 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. X.
Message fiom tlie French Kinperor to the Chanibeia.
On the 27t]i of March a message from tlio Emperor of tlie French informed liis Senate and Legislative Assembly that the last determination of the Cabinet of St Petersburg liad placed France and Eussia in a state of war. In his Speech from the Throne at the opening of the session* he had already declared that war was upon the point of commencing. 'To avoid a conflict,' he said, 'I ' have gone as far as honour allowed. Europe
* now knows that, if France draws the sword, it
* is because she is constrained to do so. Europe ' knows that France has no idea of aggrandisement; ' she only wishes to resist dangerous encroach- ' ments. The time of conquests has passed away, ' never to return. This policy has had for its ' result a more intimate alliance between England ' and France.' It is curious to observe that only a few hours after the time when England became inextricably engaged with him in a joint war against Eussia, and in the same speech in which he announced the fact, the French Emperor ac- knowledged the value and the practicability of the wholesome policy which he had just then superseded by drawing the Cabinet of London into a separate alliance with himself; but when lie was declaring, in words already quoted, that
* Germany had recovered her political indepen- ' dence, that Austria woiild enter into the alli- ' ance, and that the Western Powers would go to ' Constantinople along with Germany,' he had the happiness of knowing that the baneful sunnnons
' March 2.
IN TJIE WAR AGAINST KUSSIA. 119
which was to bring France and England into a chap. .separate course of action, and place them at last in a state of war, had been signed by the English Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was already on the way to St Petersburg.*
On the same 27th of March a message from the Messase Queen announced to Parliament that the negoti- Queen to ations with llussia were broken off, and that Her Majesty, feeling bound to give active aid to the Sultan, relied upon the efforts of her faithful sub- jects to aid her in protecting the states of the Sultan against the encroachments of Eussia.
On the following day the English declaration Declaration of war was issued. The labour of putting into writing the grounds for a momentous course of action is a wliolesome discipline for statesmen ; and it would be well for mankind if, at a time when the question were really in suspense, the friends of a policy leading towards war were obliged to come out of the mist of oral intercourse and private notes, and to put their view into a firm piece of writing. It does not follow that such a document ought necessarily to be disclosed, but it ought to exist, and it ought to be official. In the summer of 1853 the draft of a document, fairly stating the grounds of that singular policy of alliance within alliance which was shadowed out in the Koyal Speech at the close of the ses- sion, would have been a good exercise for the members of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, and would
* The messenger hail reached Berlin on the day of the Freucli Emperor's Speech from the Throne.
120 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND CHAP, have protected them against tliat sensation of
X.
'drifting,' which was afterwards described by the Foreign Secretary. It is known that when the English declaration announcing the rupture with Eussia was about to be prepared, it was found less easy than might be supposed to assign reasons Ditncuity of for the war. The necessity of having to state the cause of the rupture in a solenni and precise form, disclosed the vice of tlie policy which the Govern- ment was following ; for it could not be concealed that the grievance which was inducing France and England to take up arms was one of a Euro- pean kind, which called for redress at the hands of the four Powers rather than for the armed championship of the two.*
Of course the difficulty M'as overcome. When the faith of the country was pledged, and fleets and armies already moving to the scene of the conflict, it was not possible that war \vould be stayed for want of mere words. The Queen was advised to declare, that, by the regard due to an ally, and to an empire whose integrity and inde- pendence were essential to the peace of Europe, by tlie sympathies of her people for the cause of riglit against injustice, and from a desire to save Europe from the preponderance of a Power which had violated the faith of treaties, she felt called upon to take up aiin.'^, in concert with the Em- peror of tlie Frencli, for tlie defence of the Sultan.
* The Qucfii's ailvocate coiiceiveil tliat upon the papers as first supplied to him he couhl not frame a jiropcrDechiration of War, and reipiired further instructions from the Goverimieut.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 121
On the lltli of April the Emperor of Kussia chap. issued his declaration of war. He declared that '
the summons addressed to him by France and Jecw^on England took from Eussia all possibility of yield- mani^fesio. ing with honour; and he threw the responsibility of the war upon the Western Powers. It was for Central and Western Europe that diplomacy shaped these phrases ; but in the manifesto ad- dressed to his own people the Czar used loftier words. 'Kussia,' said he, 'fights not for the ' things of this world, but for the Faith.' * ' Eng- ' land and France have ranged themselves by the ' side of the enemies of Christianity against Eus- ' sia fiditincj for the Orthodox faith. But Eussia ' will not alter her divine mission ; and if enemies ' fall upon her frontier, we are ready to meet them ' with the firmness which our ancestors have ' bequeathed to us. Are we not now the same ' Eussian nation of whose deeds of valour the ' memorable events of 1812 bear witness ? May ' the Almighty assist us to prove this by deeds ! ' And in this trust taking up arms for our perse- ' cuted brethren professing the Christian faith, we ' will exclaim with the whole of Eussia with one ' heart, " 0 Lord our Saviour, whom have we to ' "fear?" "May God arise and His enemies be ' " dispersed ! " ' f
On the fourth day after tlie delivery of tlie TheCzar's
, . , , 1 -T^ • • (. invasion of
message which ijlaced Eussia in a state ot war Turkey is
. commenced
with Frauce and England, Prince Gortschakoff passed the Lower Danube at three points, and,
* 23(1 April. + 21st February.
122 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCK AND ENGLAND
CHAP, entering into the desolate region of the Dobriulja,
X.
began the invasion of Turkey.*
Treaty be- Nearly at the same time France and England
twcen the . • i i n i i • i
suiunand entered into a treaty with tlie bultan, by which
the Western ' *^
Powers. they engaged to defend Turkey with their arms until the conclusion of a peace guaranteeing the independence of the Ottoman Empire and the rights of the Sultan, and upon the close of the war to withdraw all their forces from the Ottoman territory. The Sultan, on his part, undertook to make no separate peace or armistice with Eussia.f Treaty On the lOtli of April 1854 there was signed
France and that treat)'" of alliance between Erance and Eng- land which many men had suffered themselves to look upon as a security for the peace of Europe. The high contracting parties engaged to do what lay in their power for the re-establishment of a peace which should secure Europe against the return of the existing troubles; and in order to set free the Sultan's dominions, they promised to use all the land and sea forces required for the purpose. They engaged to receive no overture tending to the cessation of hostilities, and to enter into no engagement with the Russian Court, without having deliberated in common. They renounced all aim at separate advantages, and
* 24th March. liy thus jiassincj tliat part ol" the river which encloses the Dohrudja, a geiuTal docs }iot efi'cct much. Ho must cross it at and above Kassova licfoie he can W fluid, in the military sense, to have ' broken througli the line of the Danube.'
t 10th of iMarch.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 123
tliey declared their readiness to receive into their chap.
alliance any of the other Powers of Europe. "
This great alliance did not carry with it so re- sistless a weight as to be able to execute justice by its own sheer force, and without the shedding of blood ; but it was a miglity engine of war.
124 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCK AKD ENGLAND
CHAPTER XI.
CHAP. XT.
Recapitu- lation.
Standing causes of disturbance.
Effect of personal government by t)ie Czar.
The train of causes which brought on the war has now been followed down to the end. Great armies kept on foot, and empires governed by princes without the counsel of statesmen, were spoken of in the outset as standing elements of danger to the cause of peace ; and their bearing upon tlie disputes of nations has been seen in all the phases of a strife whicli began in a quarrel for a key and a trinket, and ended by embroiling Europe. Upon the destinies of Eussia tlie effect of this system of mere personal government has been seen at every step. From head to foot a vast empire was made to throb with tlie passions which rent the bosom of the one man Nicholas. If for a few mouths he harboured ambition, tlie resources of the State were squandered in making ready for war. If his spirit flagged, tlie ambition of the State fell lame, and preparations ceased. If he laboured under a fit of piety, or rather of ecclesiastic zeal. All the liussias were on the verge of a crusade. He chafed with rage at tlie thought of being foiled in diplomatic strife by the second Oaiining; and in-
IN THE WAR AGAINST UUSSIA. 125
stantly, without hearing counsel from any living chap.
man, he caused his docile battalions to cross the '
frontier, and kindled a bloody war.
Nor was the personal government of the Em- By uic peror Francis Joseph without its share or mis- Austru. chief; for it seems clear that this was the evil course by which Austria was brought into mea- sures offensive to the Sultan, but full of danger to herself. More than once, in the autumn of 1852, Nicholas and Francis Joseph came together ; and at these ill-omened meetings, the youthful Kaiser bending, it would seem, under a weight of grati- tude, overwhelmed by the personal ascendancy of the Czar, and touched, as he well might be, by the affection which Nicholas had conceived for him, was led perhaps to use language which never would have been sanctioned by a cabinet of Aus- trian statesmen ; and, although it is understood that he abstained from actual promises, it is hard to avoid believing that the general tenor of the young Emperor's conversations with Nicholas must have been the chief cause which led the Czar to imagine that he could enter upon a policy highly dangerous to Austria, and yet safely count upon her assent. The Czar never could have hoped that Austrian councillors of state would have willingly stood still and endured his seizure of the country of the Lower Danube from Orsova down to the Euxine ; but he understood that Francis Joseph governed Austria, and he imagined that he could govern Francis Joseph as though he were his own child.
12G CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
Even in Prussia, the policy of the State seemed to be always upon the point of being shaken by
of Pmss^i."" ^'^^ ^^''^^"^ *^^ ^^^^ ■'^^"S ; ^''^^ although, up to the outbreak of the war, she was guilty of no defec- tion,* it is certain that the anticipation of finding weakness in this quarter was one of the causes which led the Czar into danger. By uie In France, after tlie events of the 2d of Decem-
Eraperor. ber, the system of personal government so firmly obtained, that the narrator — dispensed from the labour of inquiring what interests she had in the question of peace and war, and what were the thoughts of her orators, her statesmen, and her once illustrious writers — was content to see what scheme of action would best conduce to the wel- fare and safety of a small knot of men then hanging together in Paris ; and when it appeared that, upon the whole, these persons would gain in safety and comfort from the disturbance of Europe, and from a close understanding with England, tiie subsequent progress of the story was singularly unembarrassed by any question about what might be the policy demanded by the inter- ests or the sentiments of France. Therefore the bearing of personal government upon the main- tenance of peace was better illustrated by the French (government than by the Emperor Nich- olas ; for in the Czar, after all, a vast people was incarnate. His ambition, his piety, his anger, were in a sense the passions of the devoted mil-
• It was more than three months after tlie outbreak of the vrar that Prussia faltered.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 127
lions of men of whom be was indeed the true chap.
XI chief. The French Emperor, on the contrary, '
when he chose to carry France into a war against Eussia, was in no respect the champion of a na- tional policy nor of a national sentiment ; and he therefore gave a vivid example of the way in which sheer personal government comes to bear upon the peace of the world.
Perhaps if a man were to undertake to distri- siiare winch
ir>-r» T Hussia lj;ul
Dute the blnme of the war, the nrst rower he iu bringing
T • TT 1 • • fibout the
would arraign might be liussia. Her ambition, war. her piet}^, and her Church zeal were ancient causes of strife, which were kindled into a danger- ous activity by the question of the Sanctuaries, and by events which seemed for a moment to show that the time for her favourite enterprise against Constantinople might now at last be com- ing. Until the month of March 1853, these causes were brought to bear directly against the tranquillity of Europe ; and even after that time, they were in one sense the parents of strife, be- cause, though they ceased to have a direct action upon events, they had set other forces in motion. But it would be wrong to believe that, after the middle of March 1853, Eussia was acting in furtherance of any scheme of territorial aggran- disement ; for it is plain that by that time the Czar's vague ambition had dwindled down into a mere wish to wring from the Porte a protector- ate of the Greek Church in Turkey. He had gathered his troops upon the Turkish frontier, and it seemed to him that he could use their presence
128 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, there as a means of extorting an engagement which ' would soothe the pride of the Orthodox Church, and tighten the rein by which he was always seeking to make the Turks feel his power. Tiie vain concealments and misrepresentations by which he accompanied this effort of violent diplo- macy were hardly worthy to be ranked as exer- cises of statecraft, for in reality, they owed their origin to the clashing impulses of a mind in con- flict with itself.
Originally, the Czar had no thought of going to war for the sake of obtaining tliis engagement, and least of all had he any thought of going to war with England. At first, he thought to obtain it by surprise ; and, when that attempt failed, he still hoped to obtain it by resolute pressure, because he reckoned that if the great Powers would compare the slenderness of the required concession with the evils of a great war, there could be no question how they would choose.
As soon as the diplomatic strife at Constanti- nople began to work, the Czar got heated by it ; and when at lengtli he found himself not only contending for his Church, but contending too with his ancient enemy, he so often lost all self- command, that what he did in his politic intervals was never enough to undo the evil which he wrought in his fits of pious zeal and of rage. And when, with a cruel grace, and before the eyes of all Europe, Lord Stratford disposed of Prince Mentschikoff, it must be owned that it was liard for a ])roud man in the place of the Czar to have
IX THE WAR AOAINST KUSSIA. 120
to stand still and submit. Therefore, witliout tak- cji a p. ing counsel of any man, lie resolved to occupy '^^' the Principalities ; but he had no belief that even that grave step would involve him in war ; for his dangerous faith in Lord Aberdeen and in the power of the English Peace Party was in full force, and grew to a joyful and ruinous certainty when he learned, that the Queen's Prime Min- ister had insisted upon revoking the grave words which had been uttered to Baron Brunnow by the Secretary of State. This illusory faith in the peacefulness of England long continued to be his guide ; and from time to time he was confirmed in his choice of the wrong path by the bearing of the persons who represented Erance, Austria, and Prussia at the Court of St Petersburg; for al- though in Paris, in London, in Vienna, in Berlin, and in Constantinople the four great Powers seemed strictly united in tlieir desire to restrain the encroachments of the Czar, this wholesome concord was so masked at St Petersburg by the courtier-like demeanour of Count Mensdorf, Colonel Eochow, and M. Castelbajac, that Sir Hamilton Seymour, though uttering the known opinion of the other three Powers as well as of his own Government, \vas left to stand alone.
After his acceptance of the Vienna Note, the Emperor Nicholas enjoyed for a few days the bliss of seeing all Europe united with him against the Turks, and he believed, perhaps, that Heaven was favouring him once more, and that now at last ' Canning ' was vanquished ; but in a little VOL. II. I
130 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, while the happy dream ceased, and he had the - torment of hearing the four Powers confess that,
if for a moment they had differed from Lord Stratford, it was because of their erring nature. Then, fired by tlie Turkish declaration of war, and stung to fury by the hostile use of the AVestern fleets which the French Emperor had forced upon the English Government, the Czar gave the fatal orders which brought about the disaster of Sinope. After his first exultation over the sinking of the ships and the slaughter, he apparently saw his error, and was become so moderate as to receive in a right spirit the announcement of the first decision that had been taken by the English Cabinet when the news of the catastrophe reached it. But only a few days later, he had to hear of the grave and hostile change of view which had been forced upon Lord Aberdeen's Government by the French Emperor, and to learn that, by re- solving to drive the Eussian flag from the Euxine, the maritime Powers liad brought their relations with his empire to a state barely sliort of wa)'. After this rupture, it was no longer possible for him to extricate liimself decorously, unless by exerting some skill and a steady command of temper. He was unequal to the trial ; and al- though, in politic and worldly moments, he must have been almost hopeless of a good result, he could not bear to let go his hold of the occupied provinces under the compulsion of a public threat laid upon him by England and France.
With the conduct of the Turkish Government
IN THE WAK AGAINST RUSSIA. 131
little fault is to be found. It is true tliat, in the chap. early stage of the dispute about the Sanctuaries, ^^' the violence of the French and the Russian Gov- ^''^'"^ ^'''';'»
rurkey Iia<l
ernments tormented tlie Porte into contradictory j" causing engagements, and tliat the anger kindled by these clashing promises was one of the provocatives of the war ; but from the day of the delivery of the Bethlehem key and the replacement of the star, the Turkish Government ^\'as almost always mod- erate and politic — and after the second week of March 1853 it was firm ; for the panic struck by Prince Mentschikoff in the early days of his mission was allayed by the pi'udent boldness of Colonel Pose, and the Czar with all his hoverin<r forces was never able to create a second alarm.
It has been seen that, by their tenacity of all those sovereign rights which were of real worth — by the wisdom with which they yielded wherever they could yield with honour and safety— by their invincible courtesy and deference towards their mighty assailant— and at last and above all, by their warlike ardour and their prowess in the field — the Turks had become an example to Chris- tendom, and had won the heart of England. And although it has been acknowledged that some of the more gentle of these Turkish virtues were contrived and enforced by the English Ambas- sador, still no one can fairly refuse to the Ottoman people the merit of appreciating and enduring this painful discipline.
Besides, there was a period when it might be supposed that the immediate views of the Turkish
132 CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. Government and of tlie EnHisli Ambassador were
XI
. 1_. not exactly the same; for as soon as the Turkish
statesmen became aware that their appeal to tlie people had kindled a spirit wliich was forcing them into war, it of course became their duty to endeavour to embroil the other Powers of Europe ; and tliey laboured in this direction with much sagacity and skill. They saw that if they could contrive to bring up the Admirals from Besica Ba}^ the Western Powers would soon get decoyed into war by their own fleets ; and in order to this, we saw Eeshid Pasha striving to affect the lofty mind of Lord Stratford by shadowing out the ruin of the Ottoman dominion ; then, mounting his horse, going off to the French Ambassador, and so changing the elevation of his soul, whilst he rode from one Embassy to the other, that in the pres- ence of j\r. de la Cour he no longer spoke of a falling empire, but pictured to him a crowd of Frenchmen of all ranks cruelly massacred, on ac- count of their well-known Christianity, by a host of fanatical jNToslems. And, although the serenity of Lord Stratford defeated the sagacious Turk for the time, and disappointed him in his endeavour to bring up more than a couple of vessels from each fleet, still in the end the Turkish statesman- ship prevailed ; for M. de la Cour, disturbed by the bloody prospect lield out to him, communicated liis excitement to the French Emperor, and the French Em})cror, as we have seen, then put so liard a presssure upon Lord Aberdeen as to con- strain him to join in breaking through the treaty
IN THE "WAll AGAINST RUSSIA. 13.">
of 1841 ; and since tins resolve led straight into chap.
the series of naval movements which followed, _ j
and so on to the outbreak of war, the members of the Sultan's Cabinet had some right to believe that, even without the counsels of tlie great Am- bassador, they knew how to govern events.
In so far as the origin of the war was connected share wiiich
•,in iT-- I •• 1 J • • Austria had.
witli Count Lemmgen s mission, Austria is answer- able ; and although it must needs be true (for so she firmly declares*) that the Czar's reiterated ac- count of his close understanding with her in re- gard to Montenegro \vas purely fabulous, she still remains open to the grave charge of having sent Count Leiningeu to Constantinople armed witli a long string of questionable claims, yet debarred by his orders from all negotiation, and instructed to receive no answer from the Turkish Govern- ment except an answer of simple consent or simple refusal. This offensive method of pressiu" upon an independent Sovereign was constantly referred to by the Czar as justifying and almost compelling his determination to deal with the Sultan in a high-handed fashion ; and in this way
• I have a statement to this efTect. To those who have iiut Leeu called upon to test the relative worth of statements com- ing from diflercut parts of Europe, it may seem that I am facile in accepting this one ; and the more so when 1 acknowledge, as I do, that surrounding facts give an a]>pearance of probability to the opposite assertion. The truth is, tliat, like our own countrymen, the public men of Austria are much accustomed to subordinate their zeal for the public service to their self-respect. To undertake to disbelieve a statesman of the Court of Vienna, is the came thing as to uudertake to disbelieve an English gentleman.
13i CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, (even upon the supposition of there being no per- - nicious understanding between the two Emperors)
Count Leiningen's mission had an ill effect upon the maintenance of peace.
Again, Austria must bear tlie bh\me of employ- ing servants who, notwithstanding the firm and right part which she took in the negotiations, were always causing her to appear before Europe as a Power subservient to the Czar ; and especi- ally slie ought to suffer in public repute for the baneful effect produced at St Petersburg when the Secretary of her Legation appeared at the solemn thanksgivings which the Czar and his people offered up to the Almighty for the sinking of the ships and tlie slaughter of the Turks at Sinope.
There is also a fault of omission for which it would seem tliat Austria is chargeable. The. in- terests of Austria and England, both present and remote, were so strictly the same, that for the welfare of both States there ought to have been going on between them a constant interchange of friendly counsels. Our statesmen are accustomed to proffer advice without stint to foreign States, but it is remarkable that their frankness is not much reciprocated by words of friendly counsel from abroad. Yet there are times when such counsels might be wholesome. It would surely liave been well if Austria had advised the English (government not to quit the safe, honest ground held by the four Powers, for the sake of an adven- ture with the new Bonaparte. There is no trace of any such warnings from Vienna ; and indeed it
IX THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 135
would seem that Austria, tormented by the pres- chap. eiice of the Russian forces on her southern frontier, ^^' was more prone to encourage tlian to restrain the imprudence of her old ally.
These were the faults with which Austria may in other fairly be charged. In other respects she was not Austiiu forgetful of her duty towards herself and towards iiei-auty. Europe ; and it has been seen that, from the day when tlie Czar crossed the Pruth down to the time when he was obliged to relinquish his hold, Austria persisted in taking the same view of the dispute as was taken by the Western Powers, and was never at all backward in her measures for the deliverance of the Principalities.
In the nature and temperament of the King of share wiik-h Prussia there was so much of weakness that his ii'caus'iDa' Imperial brother-in-law was accustomed to speak of him in terms of ruthless disdain ; and it seems that this habit of looking down upon the King caused the Czar to shape his policy simply as though Prussia were null When he found his Eoyal brother-in-law engaged against him in an offensive and defensive alliance, he perhaps under- stood the error which he had committed in assum- ing that the policy of an enlightened and high- spirited nation would be steadily subservient to the weakness of its Sovereign ; but, until lie was thus undeceived, or, at all events, until the failure of Baron Budberg's mission in tlie beginning of 1854, he seems to have closed his eyes to all the long series of public acts in which Prussia had engaged, and to have cheated himself into the
13G CAUSES INVOLVING FKANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, belief tliat she would never take up sueli a ground ^^" as might enable Austria to act freely on her southern frontier, and so drive him out of the Principalities. And although, until after the outbreak of the war between Paissia and the Western Powers, Prussia did not at all hang back,* it is nevertheless true that the Czar's policy was shaped upon a knowledge of the King's weak nature. Therefore the temperament and mental quality of the Prussian monarch must be reckoned among the causes of the war.
Prussia also, in the same degree as Austria, must bear the kind of repute that was entailed upon her by the conduct of her Secretary of Lega- tion at St Petersburg, for he also sanctioned by liis presence the thanksgivings oli'ered up for Sinope. Another fault attributable to Prussia was her invincible love of metaphysical or rather mere verbal refinenients. When this form of human error is brought into politics it chills all human sympathies, and tends to bring a country into contempt, by giving to its policy the bitter taste of a theory or a doctrine, and so causing it to be misunderstood. An instance of this vice was given by the First jMinister of the Prussian Crown, in a speech of great moment which he aildressed to the Lower Chamber on the 18th of March 1854, After an abundance of phrases of a pacilic tendency. Baron ^Manteuffel said that Prussia was resolved ' faithfully to aid any menil)C!r of the Confedera-
• The state of Wiir began on the 19th of Jlarcli. Prussia first began to bang back about tbe 21st of July. See ante.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 137
' tiou who, from liis geograpliical position, might chap. * feel himself called upon sooner than Prussia to .
' draw the sword in defence of German interests.' Now this, to the ear of any diplomatist, fore- shadowed, or rather announced, an offensive and defensive alliance with Austria against the Czar for the delivery of the Principalities ; and accord- ingly, tlie alliance so announced was actually con- tracted by Prussia some four weeks afterwards. But, iu the minds of the common public, a dis- closure couched in this diplomatic phraseology was smothered under the intolerable weight of the pacific verbiage Avhich had gone before ; and the result was, that a speech which announced a measure of offence and hostility to Piussia was looked upon as the disclosure of a halting, timid, and worthless policy.
But, except upon the grounds here stated, there in ou.er was no grave fault to find with tlie policy of pAllfs^ Prussia down to the outbreak of the war between herMuty. the Czar and the Westein PoM'ers. Distant as she was from the scene of the Czar's encroach- ment, she was nevertheless compelled, as she valued her hold upon the goodwill of Germany, to be steadfast in hii)derin<4 Pussia from establishing lierself in provinces which would give her the full control of the Lower Danube ; and up to the time of the final rupture, she always so accom- modated her policy to the views of the Western Powers as to be able to remain iu firm accord with them, both as to the adjudication of the dis- pute between Russia and Turkey, and as to the
138 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, principles wliich should guide the belligerents in _i^_ the event of their being forced into a war by the obstinacy of the Emperor Nicholas.
Of course the Czar's relinquishment of the Principalities took away from Prussia, as well as from Austria, her ground of complaint against the Czar, and with it, her motive for action. Nor was this all ; for by determining to quit the mainland of Europe and make a descent upon a remote maritime province of Eussia, the Western Powers deprived themselves of all right to expect that Austria and Prussia would favour a scheme of invasion which they did not and could not ap- prove. Down to the time when the Czar deter- mined to repass the Pruth, the policy followed by Prussia as well as by Austria was sound and loyal towards Europe. As aid also The German Confederation was brought into
the German . . a i • i -r> • i i.i
couf3dera- thc Same Views as Austria and Prussia ; and thus, so long as the object in view was the deliverance of the Principalities, the whole of Central Europe was joined with the great Powers of the West in a determination to repress the Czar's encroach- ments. I repeat that the papers laid before Parliament have not yet disclosed the ground on whicli the English Government became discon- tent with this vast union, and was led to contract tliosc separate engagements with the Emperor of the Erencli which ended by bringing on the war.*
• TIii3 was published in 18C3, but writing now in 1876, I inay still say tliat tlie blank remains ; the actual truth being
tiou.
IN THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA. 139
The blaine of beginning the dispute which led chap, on to the war must rest with the French Govern- '
inent ; for it is true, as our Foreign Secretary f,'e Fienc!'. '' declared, that ' the Ambassador of France at Con- i^a.nJ,'caus' ' stantinople was the lirst to disturb the status '"'=''■'"' ^^'''" ' quo in which the matter rested ; and without ' political action on the part of France, the ' quarrels of the Churches would never have * troubled the relations of friendly Towers.'* For this offence against the tranquillity of Europe the President of the liepublic was answerable in the first instance ; but it must be remembered that at the time France was under a free Parliamentary Government ; and it is just, therefore, to acknow- ledge that the blame of sanctioning the disinter- ment of a forgotten treaty more than a hundred years old, and of violently using it as an instru- ment of disturbance, must be shared by an Assembly which had not enough of the states- man-like quality to be able to denounce a wanton and noxious policy. It was the weakness of the gifted statesmen and orators who then adorned the Chambers that, like most of their countrymen, they were too easily fascinated by the })leasure of seeing France domineer.
But at the close of the year 1851, the France known to Europe and the world was bereaved of
apparent!}' that the separate engagements with France were either entered into quite wantonly, or else as means judged to be needful for preventing the French Emperor fro!n tlirowing himself into the arms of llussia.
* See 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. i. pp. 43 to 56 of Cabi- net Edition.
140 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, political life ; and thenceforth her complex iuter- ■ ests iu the affairs of nations were so effectually
overruled by the exigency of personal considera- tions, that in a little Avhile she was made to adopt an Anglo-Turkish policy, and, as the price of this concession to the views of our Foreign Office, the venturers of the 2d of December were brought under the sanctions of an alliance with the Queen of England. It has been seen that, by super- seding that conjoint action of the fo\ir Powers which was the true safeguard of peace and justice, the separate compact of the two became a main cause of the appeal to arms. IMoreover, it has been shown how, when once he bad entangled J^ord Aberdeen's Government iu this understand- ing, the French Fmperor gained so strong a hold over it that he became able to guide and over- rule the counsels of England even in the use to be made of her IMediterranean fleet ; and Iiow thenceforth, and from time to time, he so used the English navy as well as his own, that at the moments when the negotiations seemed ripe for peace they were always defeated by an order sent out to the Admirals. The real tendency of this perturbing and dislocating course of action was concealed by the moderation which characterised the French despatches, and, in another and very different way, by the demeanour of" the personage who represented the French Government at St Petersburg; so liiat, at the very times when Lord Aberdeen was brought to consent to a hostile and provoking use of our naval forces, lie was able
IN THE WAU AGAINST EUSSIA. 1 l I
to derive fatal comfort from tlic lanqiiage of chap.
XI
the French diplomacy; and, whenever the grave '
tone of Sir Hamilton Seymonr Avas beginning to produce ■wholesome effect at St Petersburg, his efforts wore quickly baffled by the prostrations of his French colleague.*
It was thus that, by generating the oi'iginal dis- pute— by drawing England from the common ground of the four Powers into a separate under- standing with himself — by causing a persistently liostile use to he made of the ileets — and, finally, by liis ambiguous ways of speaking and acting — tlie Frencli Emperor came to have a chief share in the kindling of the war.
The stake wdiich England holds in the world simrft whirii makes it of deep moment to her to avert disorder iri"causing^ among nations; and, on the other hand, her in- sular station in Europe, joined with the possession of more than sufficing empire in other regions of the world, keeps her clear of all thought of terri-
* For those wlio liave not hail ample means of becoming acquainted with the donbleness which characterises the French Emperor's liabits of action, it will be hard to believe in the extent to which his Envoy at St Petersburg was suffered to carry his adulation of the Czar. At the very time when the French Emperor was pushing our Government into the adop- tion of a measure of vengeance barely short of flagrant war, his Envoy, M. Castelbajac, although lie could not actually attend the public thanksgivings for Sinope in the Cathedral, did nevertheless permit himself to wait on the Chancellor, Count Nesselrode, and tender his congratulations for the slaughter of the Turks at Sinope, and the sinking of their ships. It is believed that he expressly desired to tender these his congratulations to the Czar 'as a Christian, a soldier, and ' a gentleman.' — Note to ith Edition,
142 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CXI A P. torial aggrandisement in this quarter of the globe:
- '. And, although it is the duty of all the rest of the
great Powers as well as of England to endeavour towards the maintenance of peace and order, yet, inasmuch as there is no other great State without some sort of lurking ambition which may lead it into temptation, the fidelity of the Continental guardians of the peace can always be brought into question. Suspicions of this kind are often fanci- ful, but the fears from M'hich they spring are too well founded in the nature of things to be safely regarded as frivolous ; and the result is, that the great island Power is the one which, by the well- informed statesmen of the Continent, is looked to as the surest safeguard against wrong. Europe leans, Europe rests, on this faith.
So, the moment it is made to appear that for any reason England is disposed to abdicate, or to suspend for a while, the performance of her European duties, that moment the wrong- doer sees his opportunity and begins to stir. Thos^e who dread him, missing the accustomed safeguard of England, turn whither they can for help, and, failing better plans of safety, they perhaps try hard to make terms with the spoiler. ^Monarchs find that to conspire for gain of territory, or to have other princes conspir- ing against them, is the alternative presented to tlicir choice. The system of Europe becomes de- composed, and war follows. Therefore, exactly in proportion as England values the peace of Europe, she oufrht to abstain from cverv word and from
IN THE WAR AGAINST IIUSSIA. 113
every sign which tends to give the wrong-doer a chap.
hope of her acquiescence. _ .
This duty was not understood by the more ard- ent friends of peace ; and they imagined that they would serve their cause by entreating England to abstain from every conflict which did not menace her own shores — nay, even by permitting them- selves to vow and declare that this was the policy truly loved by the English race. Moreover, by blending their praises of peace with fierce invec- tive against public men, they easily drew applause from assembled multitudes, and so caused the foreigner to believe that they really spoke the voice of a whole people, or at all events of great masses, and that England was no longer a Power which would interfere with spoliation in Europe.
The fatal eflect which this belief produced upon the peace of Europe has been shown. But the evil produced by the excesses of the Peace Party did not end there. It is the nature of excesses to beget excesses of strange complexion ; and just as a too rigid sanctity has always been followed by a too scandalous profligacy, so, by the law of reaction, the doctrines of the Peace Party tended to bring into violent life that keen warlike spirit which soon became one of the main obstacles to the restora- tion of tranquillity. Therefore England, it must 1)6 acknowledged, did much to bring on the war ; first, by the want of moderation and prudence with which she seemed to declare her attachment to the cause of peace — and afterwards by the exceed- injj eagerness with which she coveted the strife.
lit CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP. It was tlie plain duty of England to take part
'__ in preparing resistance to the encroachment of
the Czar ; and her errors lay — not in the object, Ijut — in a choice of wrong means for attaining it ; for she rejected the course of action which must liave peacefully accomplished her purpose, and adopted a turbulent plan distinctly leading to war. In otlier words, she went wrong, because she suffered herself to be drawn away from that common ground taken up by the four Powers which imparted a bloodless coercion of Eussia, and adopted instead that separate understanding with one of them which induced the appeal to arms.
To distribute the blame attaching upon Eng- land amongst her public men is not a very diffi- cult task.
Loving peace, with a purity of motive and a devotedness of heart which no man has ever questioned, Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had the misfortune to remain members of a Government which went out of the safe paths of peace. They went wrong ; and, although it is true they went wrong at a slow rate, they con- tinued their deviation during a period of eight months ; so that at last, to their grief and dismay, they found they had been leading the country into a cruel war. Deceived by the crude notion that France and England, acting together, could secure peace, they did not undeistand that the way to maintain or restore the tranquillity of Europe was to hold to tlic alliance of the four
IN THE WAR AGAINST IIUSSIA. 145
Powers, and to avoid impairing it liy a separate chap. understanding with one of them. For want '
of this guiding principle, they always failed to see the point at which they could make their stand, and tliey never could choose the day on which it would become them to retire from office So they lingered on in a Cabinet which was, becoming more and more warlike, and their presence there was in two ways hurtful to the cause of peace ; for even the more earnest friends of peace were quieted by seeing that the trusty champions of the cause M-ere still members of the Government, and at last, when they could no longer help seeing that this same Government was going to a rupture with the Czar, the more rational of them thought that there must really be some great State necessity for a war in which Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone were reluc- tantly engaging their country. Moreover, there was a great and good portion of the community Avho, retaining their theoretic disapproval of a needless war, were nevertheless fired with a secret longing for the clash of arms ; and these men were relieved from the pain of a conflict between duty and inclination by finding that for the righteousness of the impending war Lord Aberdeen and IMr Gladstone were their sponsors.
It has been seen that, by his continuance in oftice, Lord Aberdeen kept alive in the mind of the Emperor Nicholas that dangerous notion which has often been a source of European troubles
VOL. II. X
liG CAUSES I^■VOLVI^"G FKANCE Ax\D ENGLAND CHAP. — the notion that England would not go to war;
■y I ^
, and tlie Czar's belief on this subject was so dear
to his heart, that perhaps nothing short of the resignation of the Prime INIinister could have undeceived him. Still, to a common observer, it M'ould seem that some effort might have been made to disperse his error ; and that, as tlie danger was caused in great measure by the last- ing effect of old impressions upon the mind of the Emperor Nicholas, a special mission to St Petersburg might have been usefully resorted to as a means of rousing the Czar to a sense of what might be expected from England. Nothing of this kind was done ; nothing was done to break the fatal smoothness of the incline.
But if the cause of peace was harmed by ill- judging friends in the Cabinet, it was brought to sheer ruin by the disqualification which our country inflicted upon its popular leaders as the punishment of their former excesses.
Mr Cobden and Mr Bright, as we have seen, had shut themselves out from the counsels of the nation. They were powerless. By their indiscriminate denunciations of war in general, they had destroyed the worth of any criticism they could bring to bear upon the pending dis- ])ute. Their arguments, however well pruned and shaped out to suit the occasion, were sure of being treated by an English audience as the off- spring of their doctrines ; and, their doctrines being repudiated, they could make no good use of their privilege of .'Speech. It was impossible
IX Till-: WAIl AGAINST RUSSIA. H7
to consult ■with them upon the question whether chap.
the country was bound in honour to take up '__
arms for the Sultan, because they had spent their lives in teaching that the country could never be bound in honour to take up arms for anybody. If they had not thus disqualified themselves for useful argument, they would surely have been able to make a becoming stand against what Count Nesselrode called ' the most unintelligible ' war ' ever known. But because they had been extravagant before, therefore now they were nidi ; and because they were null, the cause entrusted to their hands was brought to destruction.
The Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen was answerable for the strange course of action which brought England to cast aside the blessings ensured by the xmanimity of the four Powers for tlie sake of what might be hoped from a separate understand- ing with France ; and although it is true that this policy, because novel, rash, and adventurous, was highly approved by our people then glowing Avith warlike ardour, and seeking for fields of enterprise, one never ought to allow that in questions of high policy, the complicity of the public has power to absolve. A minister who has fashioned out a new policy leading his coun- try into a war ought to be able to show — not necessarily that the policy was a wise one (for man is of an erring nature), but— that at the time of its adoption there were better grounds than its mere popularity for believing it to be right. That some such grounds exist may be
118 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, faii'lv imagined by those who have heard of the XI . ^ .
' ability and the varied experience of the mem- bers of Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet ; but hither- to, so far as I know, these grounds have not been disclosed.
Apart from the general policy of quitting the concord of the Four Powers for the sake of a war- like alliance with Louis Napoleon, blame attaches in a more special form upon Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet for yielding up its own better judgment under pressure from the French Government, and consenting to those hostile movements of the Allied fleets which baffled the patient labours of diplomacy, and twice rekindled the strife. "When the warlike spirit in England had once arisen, the French Emperor knew that he could at any moment subject Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet to an access of popular disfavour by causing or alloM'- ing it to appear in England that the Government of the Queen was less eager than himself in the defence of the Sultan ; and it is true, therefore, that although the hand which touched the lever was foreign, the instrument of pressure was Eng- lish. It is probably true, also, that the pressure was never inflicted without the consent of at least one great English Statesman. Still, because tliis facile yielding to the Frencli Emperor in the use of naval forces was popular, or rather was a means of avoiding unpopularity, the propriety of it is not the less in question. It is possible, however, that the hitlicrlo unknown grounds on which the separate understanding with France
IN THE WAU AGAINST RUSSIA. 1-19
may come to be defemled, will extend to justify cnAi».
the plan of deferring in naval transactions to the .
]Mnperor of the French, and consenting at his instance to make our fleet an instrument for the disturbance of tlie pending negotiations.
In so far as concerns the general policy of the Government in these transactions, the merits of Lord Clarendon must be tried, of course, by the tests applicable to the whole body of the Cabinet; but it has been seen that, personally, he was not blind to the danger of allowing the Czar to con- tinue in his belief of England's insuperable peace- fulness ; and that his firm, wholesome words had already flown off towards St Petersburg, when unhappily they were arrested and revoked at the instance of Lord Aberdeen. Lord Claiendon's despatches were Avritten with so much of grace and vigour, and in a tone so fair and manly, that • any one who is familiar with them will under- stand something of the process by which the Prime jNliuister was from time to time forced into what may be called 'a one b}^ one approval' of these able writings, and in that way hindered from finding the happy moment in which he could establish his divergence from the govern- ins minds of the Cabinet, and effect his retreat from office.
Lookinf? back upon the troubles which ended in The voii-
, , „ , . , n , tinnsubi.-h
the outbreak of war, one sees the nations at first govum.a
evcuU.
swaying backward and forward like a throng so vast as to be helpless, but afterwards fidling slow- ly into warlike array. And M'hen one begins to
150 CAUSES INVOLVING FRANCE AND ENGLAND
CHAP, search for the man or the men whose volition was , governing the crowd, the e3-e falls npon the tower-
ing form of the Emperor Nicholas. He was not single-minded, and therefore his will was unstable, but it had a huge force ; and since he was armed with the whole authority of his Empire, it seemed plain that it was this man, and only he, who was bringing danger from the North. And at first, too, it seemed that within his range of action there was none who could be his equal ; but in a little while the looks of men were turned to the Bosphorus, for thither the Czar's ancient adver- sary was slowly bending his way. To fit him for the encounter, the Englishman was clothed with little authority except what he could draw from the resources of his own mind and from the strength of his own wilful nature. Yet it was
O
presently seen that those who were near him fell under his dominion, and did as he bade them, and that the circle of deference to his will was always increasing around him ; and soon it appeared that though he moved gently, he began to have mas- tery over a foe who was consuming his strength in mere anger. When he had conquered, he stood, as it were, with folded arms, and seemed willing to desist from strife. But also in the West there had been seen a knot of men possessed, for the time, of the mighty engine of the French State, and striving so to use it as to be able to keep their hold, and to shelter themselves from a cruel fate. The volitions of these men were active enough, because they were toiling for their lives. Their
I\ THE WWi AGAINST liUSSIA. 151
efforts seemed to interest and to [)lease the lusti- est man of those days, for he watched them from over the Channel with approving smile, and began to declare, in his good-humoured, boisterous way, that so long as they should be suffered to have the handling of France, so long as they would execute for him his policy, so long as they would take care not to deceive liim, they ought to be encouraged, they ought to be made use of, they ought to have tlie shelter they wanted ; and, the Trenchmen agreeing to liis conditions, he was willing to level the barrier — he called it, perhaps, i'alse pride— which divided the Government of the Queen fioni the venturers of the 2d of December. In this thought, at the moment, he stood almost alone ; but he abided his time. At length he saw the spring of 1853, bringing with it grave peril to the Ottoman State. Then, throwing aside with a laugh some papers which belonged to the Home Office, be gave his strong shoulder to the levelling work. Under the weight of his touch the barrier fell. Thenceforth the hindrances that met him were but slight. As he from the first had willed it, so moved the two great nations of the West.
CHAP. XL
152 TKANSACriOi4S
lish armies.
CHAPTER XII.
CHAP. When it had been resolved that the Fi'euch ' and the English forces already despatched to the n.am'iers'of East sliould Lc raiscd to a strength which might and theEng- enable them to be more than auxiliary to the defence of the Turkish dominions, the Erench Emperor named an officer to the command of his army in the field, and the General wlio was to have charge of the Queen's land-forces had already been chosen. It seems right for me now to say something of tliese two commanders ; and, the better to make each of them known, I am will- ing to speak of some of the transactions which brought tliem together between the time of their meeting in Paris and the day when they received their instructions for the invasion of the Crimea. Marshal Tlic ofliccr entrusted with the command of the
French Army in tlie East was a INIarslial of France, and was the person before spoken of who liad changed his name from Le Eoy to 'St • Arnaud,' and from James to 'Achilles.' He impersonated with singular exactness the idea which our forefathers had in their minds wlien
tit Arnaud.
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 153
they spoke of wliat they called ' a Freuchmuu ; ' chap.
for although (by cowing the rich, and by filling . 1_
the poor with envy) the great French Eevolutiou had thrown a lasting gloom on the national char- acter, it left this one man untouched. lie was bold, gay, reckless, and vain; but beneath the mere glitter of the surface there was a great capacity for administrative business, and a more than common willingness to take away human life. In Algerine warfare he had proved himself from the first an active, enterprising officer, and in later years a brisk commander. He was skilled in the duties of a military governor, know- ing how to hold tight under martial law a con- quered or a half-conquered province. The empire of his mind over his actions was so often inter- rupted by bodily pain and weakness, that it is hard to say whether, if he had been gifted with health, he would have been a firm, steadfast man ; but he had violent energies, and a spirit so elastic that, when for any interval the pressure of misery or of bodily pain was lifted off, he seemed as strong and as joyous as though he had never been crushed, lie chose to subordinate the lives and the rights of other men to his own advancement ; therefore he was ruthless, but not in any other sense cruel. No one, as he himself said, could be more good-natured. In the intervals between the grave deeds that he did, he danced and sung. To men in authority, no less than to women, he paid court vv^ith flattering stanzas and songs. He had extraordinary activity of body, and was
154 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, highly skilled in the performance of gymnastic
L_ feats ; he played the violin ; and, as though he
were resolved in all things to be the Frenchman of the old time, there was once at least in his life a time of depression, when (to the astonishment of the good priest, who fell on his knees and thanked God as for a miracle wrought) he knelt down and confessed himself, seeking comfort and absolution from his Church.
He went through more than one career in the army, first entering it in 1816 as a sub-lieutenant of the Eoyal Guard, but soon plunging into a course of life which was of such a kind as to cause him to cease from being an officer. He kept away from France for many years, and became acquainted with several languages. For a long time he was in England, and he spoke our language very well ; but in later years he was accustomed to be silent in regard to the time of his exile, and there is no need to lift the veil which he threw over this part of his life.
When the Revolution of 1830 broke out, he returned to Fiance, and being then thirty-three years of age, he again entered the French army as a sub-lieutenant. He wrote some stanzas to iMeunier, and gained a step by it. ' Tell me, after ' that,' said he, ' that songs are good for nothing ! ' His next enterprise was in prose. It chanced that Bugeaud, then the General in command of the district, had printed a small military work on the camping of troops. St Arnauil or Le Ivoy (for the time of the change of name is not certain)
PIIECEDIXG THE INVASION. 155
translated the Look into several languages, and chap.
presented the fruit of his labour, with, no doubt, 1_
an appropriate letter of dedication, to the General. Bugeaud was pleased ; and from that time until his deatJi he never lost sight of the judicious translator. St Arnaud was immediately put upon tlie General's staff", and soon became one of his aides-de-camp. When the Duchess of Berri fell a prisoner into the hands of the Government, M. St Arnaud, whose regiment was on duty at the place of her detention, found means to make him- self useful to the Government without incurring the dislike of his captive ; and he seemed to be in a fair road to promotion. But again the clouds passed over him.*
In 1836, being then near forty years of age, he began yet another career by entering the 'Foreign ' Legion,' then serving in Algeria, with the rank of lieutenant. Every man of the corps, St Arnaud said, had passed through a wild youth ;f but with comrades of that quality a man might enter- tain better hopes of regaining renown than with a mere French regiment of the line; and St Arnaud at this time made a strong resolve. He said, ' I will be remarkable, or die.' And he re-
* It must not be inferred that in tlie interval between Sep- tember 1835 and November 1836 his name was (for the second time) out of the Army List. lie seems to have been employed at that time in the ' Gj-miiase Militaire ' (' Lettres du Marechal de St Arnaud,' vol. i. p. 9'2).
t 'Jeunesse orageuse.' I translate this by the words, 'wild ' youth ; ' but I believe the phrase, in the mouths of Frenchmen, generally implies that the things done by the person spoken o{ are of a less venial kind than mv translation would imjily
156 TRANSACTIONS
maiued so faithiul to tliis his covenant with him- self, that even by acute illness he could uot be kept out of action. When he lay upon the sick- bed, if it chanced that the Arabs or the Kabyles were offering any prospect of a fight upon ground within reach of the hospital, he almost always managed to drag his helpless, tortured body towards the scene of the conflict ; and this lie would do, not with an idea of being able to take an active part, but simply in order that the list of officers present might not fail to comprise his name. At the storming of Constantine, however, he really helped to govern the event ; for when a great explosion took place, and many were l)lown into the air, the French soldiers ran back with a cry that all was ruined ; but Bedeau and Combes, withstanding the madness of the common terror, strove hard to rally the crowd ; and St Arnaud having with him in his company of the Legion some bold reckless outcasts of the North, he bethought him of the shout, very strange to the ears of Frenchmen, wliich he had heard in other climes. Skilled in the art of imitation, he uttered the warlike cr3^ Instantly from the Northmen around him, Mhether Germans, or Swedes, or Englisli, Scots, Irisli, or Danes, there sprang their native ' Hurrah ! ' and with it came the thronging of men who must and would go forward. It was mainly the torrent of this new onslaught by St Arnaud and liis men of the 'stormy youlli' whicli carried the breach, and brought about tlie full of tlie city.
PKECEDING THE INVASION. ' 157
Even if, for tlie rccruitim/ of Lis Iicaltli, lie ciiAr
• • -I XII were passing a few weeks of holiday in France, L
lie would still seek personal distinction with a singular strength of will. If, for instance, there chanced to be a fire at night, he would lly to the spot, would scale the ladders, mount the roof and contrive to appear aloft in seeming peril, dis- played to a wondering crowd by the lurid glare of tlie flames. Then he would disappear, and then suddenly he would be seen again suspended in the air, and passing athwart the sky that divided one roof from another by the help of a rope or a pole. In the early part of his service in Algeria, his old patron, General Bugeaud, was in command there, and was still a warm friend to him. Of course this circumstance helped to open a path for him ; and the result was that, first by acts of bi'avcry and vigour, and then by a display of administra- tive ability, the all but desperate lieutenant of the Foreign Legion rose in eight years to be entrusted with a General's command.* In 1845 he commanded in the valley of the Chelif ; and he was so dire a scourge to the neighbouring tribes, that the force which obeyed his orders was called the 'Infernal Column.'
When first I saw him in that year he was mov- ing with his force to wreak vengeance on a revolted tribe, and he was to march five weeks deep into the desert. He spoke with luminous force, and with a charming animation ; and it seemed to me, us we rode along by the side of the heavy-laden
* But up to that time witli the rank of Colonel only.
158 TRANSACTIONS - ..
CHAP, soldiery, that the clear incisive words in which he
XII
' described to me the mechanism of the ' movable ' column/ were a model of military diction ; but his keen, handsome, eager features so kindled with the mere stir and pomp of war — he seemed so to love the swift going and coming of his aides- de-camp, and the rolling drums, and the joyful appeal of the bugles — he was so content with the gleam of his epaulettes, half-hidden and half-re- vealed by the graceful white cabaan — so happy in the bounding pride of his Arab charger — that lie did not seem like a man destined to be chosen from out of all others as the instrument of a scheme requiring grave care and secrecy. Yet of secrecy he was most capable ; and at that very time he had upon his mind,* and was concealing, not from me only (for that would be only natural), but from every oiHcer and man around him, a deed of such a kind that few men perhaps have ever done the like of it in secret.
We saw that, before the December of 1851, the enterprising and resolute Fleury was in Algeria, seeking out a fit African officer, who would take the post of JVIinister of War, with a view of join- ing the President in his plans for the overthrow of the Republic. ^Tonsieur St Arnaud formerly Le Roy had not so lived as to occasion any diffi- culty in approaching him with dishonouring pro- posals ; and there was ground for inferring that
* Tlic act here alluih.'il to is spoken of fuithcr on. It took jilacc aljont six weeks before the time when I first saw Colonel St Arnaud.
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 159
he might prove equal to the task which was to chap.
be set before him. The able administrator of a 1_
great district in Algeria might be competent to head a department. The commander of the ' In- ' fernal Column ' was not likely to be wanting in the ruthlessness which was needed ; and if his vanity made it seem doubtful whether he was a man who could keep a secret, there was a confi- dential paper in existence which might tend to allay the fear.
St Arnaud had warmly approved the destruc- tion of life which had been effected in 1844 by filling with smoke the crowded caves of the Dahra ; but he had sagaciously observed that the popular- ity of the measure in Europe was not co-extensive with the approbation which seems to have been bestowed upon its author by the military author- ities. These counter-views guided M. St Arnaud. In the summer of 1845 he received private infor- mation that a body of Arabs had taken i-efuge in the cave of Shelas. Thither he marched a body of troops. Eleven of the fugitives came out and surrendered ; but it was known to St Arnaud, though not to any other Frenchman, that five hundred men remained in the cave. All these people Colonel St Arnaud determined to kill, and so far, he perhaps felt that he was only an imitator of Pelissier ; * but the resolve which accompanied the formation of this scheme was original. He
* It is believed, however, that Pelissier left open some of the entrances to the cave, and that he only resorted to the smoke a? a means of compelling tlie fugitives to come out and surrender.
IGO TRANSACTIONS
CHAT, determined to keep the deed secret even from the
XII
; troops engaged in the operation. Except his hro-
tlier, and INIarshal Ikigeaud, whose approval Avas tlie prize he sought for, no one was to know what he did. He contrived to execute both his pur- poses. ' Then/ ho writes to his brother, ' I liad
* all the apertures hermetically stopped up. I ' made one vast sepulchre. No one went into the ' caverns ; no one but myself knew that under ' there, there are five hundred bricrands who will ' never again slaughter Frenchmen. A confiden- ' tial report has told all to the Marshal, without ' terrible poetry or imagery. Brother, no one is so ' good as I am by taste and by nature. From the ' 8th to the 12th I have been ill, but my con- ' science does not reproacli me. I have done my ' duty as a commander, and to-morrow I would do ' the same over again ; but I have taken a disgust
* to Africa.' *
The officer who could cause French soldiery to be the unconscious instruments for putting to death five Imndred fugitive men, and who could afterwards keep concealed from the whole force all knowledge of wliat it liad done, was likely to be tlie very persoii for whom Fleury was seeking. He was brouglit back to Paris, and made IMinister of War, with a view to the great plot of the 2d of December. France knows liow well, sooner or later, he answered to Fleury'.s best hopes. He kopt liis counsel close until tlio appointed night,
• St Aruan'l's Letters, puMislicd 1>)- his lelntives aft<^r his do.ith.
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 161
and then (whatever faltering there may have been CH AP.
between midnight and three in the morning) he was L.
out in time for the deed ; and before the daylight came he had stabbed France through in her sleep. Amongst men who make a great capture, there Avill often spring up questions concerning the division of the spoil. When he helped to make prize of France, St Arnaud of course got much; but his wants were vast, and he had earned a clear right to extort from his chief accomplice, and to go back again, and again, and yet again, with the terrible demand for ' more ! ' He was in such a condition of health as to be unfit to command an army in the field ; for although, dur- ing intervals, he was free from pain and glowing with energy, he was from time to time utterly cast down by his recurring malady. It is pos- sible that, notwithstanding his bodily state, he may have sincerely longed to have the command of an army in a European campaign ; but whether he thus longed or not, he unquestionably said that he did ; and the French Emperor took him at his word, consenting, as was very natural, that his dangerous, insatiate friend should have a com- mand which would take him into the country of the Lower Danube. Apparently it was not believed that, in point of warlike skill, M. St Arnaud was well fitted to the command ; for the French Emperor, as will l)e seen, resorted to the plan of surrounding him with men who were vir- tually empowered to guide him witli their over- ruling counsels.
VOL. ii. L
162 TRANSACTIONS
u H A P. To try to understand the relations between the
XII . 1_ allied Generals of France and England, with- out knowing something of the repute in which Marshal St Arnaud was held by his fellow- countrymen, would be to go blindfold; and a narrator keeping silence on this subject woidd be hiding a fact which belongs to history, and a fact, too, which is one of deep moment, and fruitful of lessons. Paris stripped of the weapons which kill the body, and robbed of her appeal to honest print, was more than ever pitiless with the tongue; and M. St Arnaud being laid open by the tenor of the life that he had led, his reputation fell a prey to cruel speech. The people of the capital knew of no crime too vile to be imputed to the new Marshal of France now entrusted with the command of her army in the field. Yet, so far as I know, they failed to make out that he had ever been convicted, or even arrested, on a criminal charge; and when I look at the affectionate correspondence which almost through his life M. St Arnaud seems to have maintained with his near relatives, 1 am led to imagine that they at least — and they would have been likely to know something of the truth — could have hardly believed his worst errors to be errors of the more dishonouring sort. There- fore there is ground for .surmising that the Marshal was a man slandered. ]]nt in those times the chief defence against slanders upon public men is to be found in the award that results from free printing; and the right of free printing in France
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 103
Marshal St Arnaud, with his own midnight hand, chap,
liad stealthily helped to destroy. Whether he !_
was a man bitterly wronged by his fellow-country- men, or whether what he suffered was mere justice, the state of his repute in the spring of 1854 is a thing lying within the reach of historical certainty. He had an ill name.
But State policy is a shameless leveller — is a leveller of even that difficult steep which seems to divide the man of high honour from those of mean repute. The plotters of the 2d of December had overturned the social structure of France. They had stifled men's minds, and had made their eloquence mute. They had forced those who were of high estate by character, or by intellect, or by birth, or by honourable wealth, to endure to see France handled at will by persons of no account, and to submit to be governed by tliem, and to pay taxes into their hands, and to maintain them in luxury, and in all so much of pomp as can be copied from the splendour of kings. The new Emperor could not but know that he was breaking down yet another of the world's barriers, and was carrying subversion across the Channel, when he contrived that all Europe should see him presenting his fellow- \enturer of the December night to the appointed commander of an English army.
But when he knew mIio the English General was to be, he might well give the rein to his cynic joy. fie could have been sure that the General placed in command of our armv would
1G4 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, be an officer of unsullied name ; but he who had
XII.
been chosen was one whose life was mixed with
history — the friend, the companion of WellingtoiL It is true this Englishman was known to be very simple, very careless of self — a man hardly cap- able of imagining that he could be humbled by obeying the orders of his sovereign ; and it is true also that the mass of the English people, being eager in the war, and little used to lay stress, as the French do, on the impersonation of a principle, were blind to the moral import of what their Government was doing. But the French Emperor understood England ; and he remembered that his coming guest was one of a great and powerful body of nobles, who were proud on behalf of this favourite member of their class, and fenced him round with honour. Eor the levelling of these heights, and for the bringing down of those in Europe who were tall with the pride which sustains man's old strife between good and evil, no dreamer could dream of a solenmisation more signal than the coming together of Marshal Le Roy St Arnaud, and him whom old friends still called Lord Fitzroy Somerset. The French Emperor knew that the mind of Germany and France would be swift to interpret this public contact, and would see in it the terms of a great surrender. LorJ I conceive that in these latter times the scale
Kaglaii.
upon which we measure warlike prowess has been brought down too low by the custom of awarding wild violent praise to the common
PRECEDING TlIK INVASION. 165
peri'onnauce of duty, and even now and then chap, to actual misfeasance; so, if I keep from this " path, it is not because I think coldly of our army or our navy, but because I desire — as I am very sure our best officers do — that we should return to our ancient and more severe standard of excellence. There is another reason which moves me in the same direction. Not only is the utterance of mere praise a lazy and futile method of attempting to do justice to worthy deeds, but it even intercepts the honest growth of a man's renown by serving as a contrivance for avoiding that labour of narration upon which, for the most part, all lasting fame must rest.
Too often the repute of a soldier who has done some heroic act is dealt with by a formal report declaring that he has been ' brave,' or ' gallant,' or ' has conducted himself to the perfect satis- ' faction of his commanding officer.' The cheap sugared words are quickly forgotten, and nothing remains ; whereas, if his countrymen were told, not of the mere conclusion that a man had done bravely, but of the very deed from which the inference was drawn, the story, however simple, might dwell perhaps in their minds, and they might tell it to their children, and the soldier would have his fame. Now, this history will virtually embrace the whole of the short period in which Lord Raglan's quality as a General was tried : and it seems to me, therefore, that if in narrating what happened I can reach to near the truth; if I give honest samples of what our
IGG TRANSACTIONS
CHAP. General said, and of what he wrote — of his
XII ^ manner of oommancling men, and his way of
maintaining an alliance ; if I show liow he dealt with armies in the hour of battle, and how he comported himself in times of heavy trial, — his true nature, with its strength and with its human failings, will be so far brought to light that I may be dispensed from the need of striving to portray it ; and, contenting myself with speaking of some of the mere outward and visible signs which showed upon the surface, may leave it to his countrymen to ascend, by the knowledge of what he did, to the knowledge of what he was. Where I think Lord Raglan's measures were right, I suppose I sliall allow my belief to appear ; and where I tliink they were wrong, I shall be likely to speak with an equal freedom : but it is not for me, who am no soldier, to undertake to compute the great account between the English people and a General wlio commanded their Queen's army in the field. Still, it must be remembered that the less T take upon myself in this regard, the graver will be the task of those who read. When the countrymen of Lord Raglan shall believe that they have in their hands sufficing means of know- ledge, they will pass judgment, — not, as I should, with the slender authority of a single bystander, but with the weight of an honest nation, in time of calm, judging (iinily, yet not ungenerously, the career of a public servant.
Lord Fitzroy Somerset, afterwards I^rd Raglan, was a vounger son of the fifth l^iiko of Beaufort,
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 167
and of a dauuhter of Admiral Boscaweu. He was chap.
XII
born iu 1788. He entered the army in 1804. _ In 1808, Sir Arthur Wellesley, upon sailing for Portugal, attached the young Lord Fitzroy Somerset to his staff;* and during his career in the Peninsula he kept him close to his side first as his aide-de-camp, and then as military secretary. Between the time of the first restora- tion of the Bourbons in 1814, and the Hight of Louis XVIII. in the spring of the following year. Lord Fitzroy Somerset was secretary of the Em- bassy at Paris. It was during this interval of peace that he married Emily Wellesley, a daugh- ter of the third Earl of Mornington, and a niece of the Duke of Wellington. When the war was renewed, he again became military secretary and aide-de-camp to the Duke of Wellington, and served with him in his last campaign. At Water- loo— he was riding at the time near the farm of La Haie Saintc — he lost his right arm from a shot. But he quickly gained a great facility of writing with his left hand ; and, the war being ended, he resumed his function as secretary of Embassy at Paris There he remained until 1819. He then returned to England, and became sec- retary to the Master-General of the Ordnance. In 1825 he went with the Duke of Wellington to St Petersburg as secretary of h^mbassy. In 1827
* Lord Fitzroy Somorsut was not introduced to Sir Arthur Wellesley until just as lie was startiiit,' for the Peninsula. Sii Arthur Wellesley and Lord Fitzroy Somerset sailed in the same shiis and they worked together at the Spani.sh language.
168 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, he was appoiuted military secretary to the Com-
If Tf
;_ mander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards, and there
he remained until the death of the Duke of Wellington in 1852, After that event he was made Master-General of the Ordnance, was ap- pointed a Privy Councillor, and raised to the peer- age. In February 1854 he became a full General. Thus, from his very boyhood until the autumn of 1852, Lord Fitzroy Somerset had passed his life under the immediate guidance of the Duke of Wellington. The gain was not without its drawback ; for in proportion as the great Duke's comprehensive grasp and prodigious power ol work made him independent and self-sufiicing, his subordinates were of course relieved from the necessity, and even shut out from the opportu- nity, of thinking for themselves ; but still, to have been in the close presence and intimacy ol Wellington from the very rising of his fame in Europe — to have toiled at the desk where the immortal despatches were penned — to have rid- den at his side and carried his orders in all the great campaigns — and then, when peace returned, to have engaged in the labours of diplomacy and military administration under the auspices of the same commanding mind, — all this was to have a wealth of experience which common times can- not give.
But for more than thirty years of his life Lord Eaglan had been administering the cuirent busi- ness of military offices in peace-time, and tliis is a kind of experience which, if it be very long pro-
PRKCEDING THE INVASION. 1G9
traeted, is far from being a good preparative for chap.
the coininand of an army in the held ; because ^
a military office in time of peace is impelled by its very constitution to aim at uniformity ; and, on the other hand, the genius of war abhors uniformity, and tramples upon forms and re- gulations.
An armed force is a means to an end — the end is victory over enemies ; and this is to be achieved, partly indeed by a due use of discipline and method, but partly also by keeping alive in those who may come to have command, a knowledge and love of war, and by cherishing that unla- belled, undocketed state of mind which shall enable a man to encounter the unknown. In England, however, and in mosf of the great States of Europe, the end had been so much for- gotten in pursuit of the means, and the industry exerted in the regulation of troops in peace-time had become so foreign to the business of war, that the more a man was militaiy in the nar- rowed sense of the term, the less he was likely to be fitted for the perturbing exigencies of a cam- paign. In one country this singular perversity of busy, ' cold, formal man,' had been carried so far, that an army and a war had been actually treated as things antagonistic the one to the other ; for the late Grand Duke Constantine of Eussia once declared that he dreaded a war, because he was sure it would spoil the troops, which, with ceaseless care and labour, he had striven to bring to perfection.
170 TRANSACTIONS
OH A P. It is to be observed also, that partly from the — —i — way in which our military system was framed, and partly from political causes, the sympathy which England ought ever to liave with her troops had been materially lessened after the first few years of the peace. The Duke of "Wel- lington, dreading lest our forces should be dan- gerously reduced by the House of Commons, made it his policy to withdraw the arniy as much as possible from public observation. This method had tended still further to dissociate the country from its armed defenders : but naturally the Duke of Wellington's view was law ; and it be- came the duty of those who were employed in the military administration, not to cause the country to practise itself heartily for the eventu- ality of anotlier war, but simply to maintain, as far as they could, a monotonous quiet in the aimy. For half a lifetime Lord Fitzroy Somerset was engaged in preventing and allaying discussion, and making the wheels of office run smooth. Against the baneful effect of this sort of experi- ence, and against the habit of mind which it tended to generate, Lord IJaglan had to combat with all the fire and strength of his nature.
Wlien Lord liaglan was appointed to the com- mand he was sixty-six years old. But although there were intervals when a sudden relaxation of the muscles of the face used to show ihe impress of time, those moments were few ; and, in general, his well-braced features, his wakeful attention, his uncommon swiftness of thought, his upright
PRECEDING THH liNVASION. 171
manly carriage, and liis easy scat on horseback, chap.
made him look the same as a man in the strong !l .
mid-season of life.
He had one peculiarity which, although it went near to being a foible, was likely to give smooth- ness to his relations with the French. Beyond and apart from a just contempt for mere display, he had a strange hatred of the outward signs and tokens of military energy. Versed of old in real war, he knew that tlie clatter of a General briskly galloping hither and thither with staff and order- lies did not of necessity imply any momentous resolve, — that the aides-de-camp, swiftly shot oft' by a word like arrows from a bow, were no sure signs of despatch or decisive action ; and because such outward signs might mean little, he shrank from them more than was right. He would have liked, if it liad been possible, that he and his army should have glided unnoticed from the banks of the Thames to their position in the battle-field. It was certain, therefore, that al- though a French General would be sure to find himself checked in any really hurtful attempt lo encroach upon the just station of the British army, yet that if, as was not unnatural, he should evince a desire for personal prominence, he would find no rival in Lord Eaglan until he reached the enemy's presence.
He was gifted with a diction very apt for public business, and of ft kind rarely found in Englishmen ; for though it was so easy as to be just wliat men like in the intercourse of private
172 TKANiSACTlONS
CHAP, friendship, it was still so constructed as to be fit _ • for the ear of all the world ; and whether he spoke or whether he wrote — wliether he used the French tongue or his own clear, graceful English — it seemed that there had come from him the very words which were the best and no more. It was so natural to him to be prudent in speech, that he avoided dangerous utterance without seeming cautious or reserved.
He had the subtle power to draw men along with him. To say that he was persuasive might mean that he could adduce reasons which tended to bring men to his views. His was a power of another sort, for without pressure of argument, his mind by its mere impact broke down resist- ance for the moment; and although the easy graciousness of his manner quickly set people free from all awkward constraint, it did not so liberate men's minds that, whilst they were still in his presence, they at all liked the duty of try- ing to uphold their own opinions against him. This dominion, however, was in a great degree dependent upon his actual personal presence ; for, with all the power and grace of his pen, he could not, at a distance, work effects proportioned to those which he wrought when he dealt with men face to face.
It is plain that, in one respect, his empire over those who were in his presence was of a kind likely to become dangerous to him in the com- mand of an army, because it prevented men from differing from him, and even made them shrink
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 173
from conveying to him an unwelcome trutli. chap.
Indeed, after the death of the Duke of Welling- L
ton, the proudest Englishman, if only he had intellect and a little knowledge of his country's latter history, had generally the grace to under- stand that, unless he too were a soldier who had taken his orders from the lips of Sir Arthur Wellesley, he could hardly be the equal of one whose mere presence was a record of England's great days. Thence it followed that, without pre- tension on the one side or servility on the other, men who were with him had a tendency to become courtiers. It was in vain that, so far as it had to do with their personal contentment, his manner placed men at their ease ; there was some quality in him, or else some outward circumstance — it was partly, perhaps, the historic appeal of his maimed sword-arm — which was always enforcing remembrance, and preventing his fusion with other men.
In truth, Lord Eaglan's manner was of such a kind as to be, not simply ornament, but a real engine of power. It swayed events. There was no mere gloss in it. By some gift of imagination he divined the feelings of all sorts and conditions of men ; and whether he talked to a statesman or a schoolboy, his hearer went away captive. I knew a shy, thoughtful, seniutive youth, just gazetted to a regiment of the Guards, who had to render his visit of thanks to the military secretary at the Horse Guards. He went in trepidation ; he came back radiant with joy and wholesome
174 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, confidence. Lord Fitzroy, instead of receiving ' • him in solemn form and ceremony, had walked forward to meet him, had put his hand kindly on the boy's shoulder, and had said a few words so cheering, so interesting, and so free from the vice of being commonplace, that the impression clung to the lad, shaping his career for years, and helped to make him the man he was when he was out with his battalion in the winter of the first campaign.* From the same presence the fore- most statesman of the time once came away saying, that the man in England most fitted by nature to be at the head of the Government was Lord Fitzroy Somerset; and he who so judged was himself a Prime Minister. Marshal St The euemies of the Imperial Government in Lord" Raglan Fraucc had loug made it a reproach against the
brought to- ... . 1 ,,.
getheratthe En^Hsli that tliev wcrc loinm" ni close alliance
Tuileries. ° ./ ii o
with the midnight destroyers of law and freedom ; but when Lord liaglan came to Paris — when he went to the Tuileries— when he was presented by the Emperor to INIarslial St Arnaud, — the notion that such things could be was a very torment to those of the Parisian malcontents who chanced to know something of tlie English General : — 'You Englisli are a robust, stirring people, and ' perhaps every man of you imagines that he ' covers himself with dignity and grandeur by ' trampling upon the feelings of the rest of
• The young ofiicer licre iilliuU'd to is no more, and I may venture to name liim — Alexander Mitelidl of Stow, who served iu the Grcnndier fJuards.
PRECEDING THE INVASION, 175
' mankind ; but surely those men wrong you who chap.
' call you a proud people. Pride causes men to ^"'
' stand aloof, as we do, from that which is base ; ' and if ever again we call you haughty islanders, ' you may silence the calumny by reminding us ' of this 13th day of April in the year of grace ' 1854. It was not enough that, for the sake of ' this silly war, you should ally yourselves body ' and soul to " Monsieur de Morny's Lawgiver," ' and that you should suffer him to drag you ' down into close intercourse with persons whom ' the humblest of us here decline to know ; but ' now, as though you really wished that your ' dishonour should be made signal in Europe, ' you send liither your General to be presented by ' " this French Emperor," as you call him, to his ' henchman, Mr Le Eoy St Arnaud, and the man ' whom you choose out for this great public sac- ' rifice is Eitzroy Somerset, the friend and com- ' panion-in-arms of your Wellington. You say ' that Lord Eaglan cares not with whom he associ- ' ates, so that he is under the orders of the Queen * whom he serves, and in the performance of a ' public duty ; but because he, in the loyalty, in ' the high-bred simplicity of his nature, is careless ' and forgetful of self — is that a reason why you ' should fail to be proud for him — why you should ' forget to be careful on his behalf ? If the niod- ' esty of his nature hindered him from seeing ' the momentous significance of his contact with ' the people who have got into our palaces, ought ' you not to have interposed to pievent him from
176
TKANSACTIONS
CHAP. XII.
incurring the scene of to-day. We imagined that you knew how to honour the memory of your Wellington, and that, after his death, when you looked towards Fitzroy Somerset, or spoke to him, or listened to his words, you looked and spoke and listened like men who remembered. Him, nevertheless, you now offer up. To have brouglit you down to this is a great achievement — the realisation of what they call here a " Na- " poleonic idea ! " The prisoner of St Helena is avenged at last. We are classic here, and we strike commemorative medals. You will soon see the honoured image of your Fitzroy Somerset undergoing presentation at the Tuileries. Al- ready our artists have caught some glimpses of him, and they declare it is the colouring, the glow of the complexion, which makes him look so English, and that in bronze he will be grandly Eoman. Those noble lineaments of his, that upright manly form — nay, even the empty sleeve which speaks to you of your day of glory — will worthily signify what England was ; and then the effigy of our counterfeit Ctesar receiving tlie homage of a stainless Englishman, and joining liim hand to hand with Mr Le Hoy St Arnaud, this will show what England is. We hear that you are well pleased with the prospect of all this, and that, far from shrinking, your " virtuous " middle classes," as you call it, is going into a state of coarse rapture. For shame ! ' Lord Raglan, all unconscious of exciting this kind of sympathy in tlie heart of the angry
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 177
Faubourg, had left England on tlie lOtli of April chap.
XII
1854; and on the following day both he and His L_
Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge were received in state at the Tuileries. The presence of a member of our Eoyal Family was welcome to the new Emperor : he understood its signi- ficance. The Parisians love to see a momentous idea so impersonated as to be visible to the eyes of the body ; and when their monarch attained to be seen riding between the near kinsman of the English Queen and the appointed commander of her army in the field — when on a bright spring day he showed his guest some thirty thousand of his best troops in the Champs de Mars, and the scarlet of the ancient enemy sparkled gaily by the side of the blue and the gold — the people seemed to accept the scene as a fitting picture of the great alliance of the West. Almost for the first time in the history of France, the accustomed cheers given to the Head of the State were mingled with cheers for England.
But now the time for concerted action had come; and though France and England were already allied by such bonds as are made with parchment and wax, it remained to be seen whether the great rivals could act together in arms. The conjuncture, indeed, drew them to- wards each other ; but it was certain that the coherence of the union would greatly depend on one man. It might seem that he who had first sworn to maintain the French Eepublic, and had afterwards destroyed it by stealtli in the night-
VOLu II. M
178 TRANSACTIONS
time, would not be much trusted again by his fellow - creatures ; but the alliance rested upon ground more firm than the trust which one Prince puts in another. It rested — not, indeed, upon tlie common interests of France and Eng- land, for France, as we have seen, was suppres- sed— but upon tlie prospect of personal advantage which was offered to the new French Emperor by an armed and warlike alliance with England. It being clear that the alliance was for his good, and that, for the time, he had really the con- trol of France, the only remaining question was, whether he would pursue what was plainly for his own advantage with steadiness and good sense. Upon the whole, it seemed likely that he would ; for, though he was not a man to be stopped by scruples, he did not discard the use of loyalty and faithfulness, where loyalty and faitli fulness seemed likely to answer his purpose ; and tliere was a persistency in his nature which gave ground for hoj)ing tliat, unless he should be induced to change by some really cogent reason, liis stead- fastness would endure. Moreover, as we have seen, he liad the faculty — very easy to apply to geometry, but harder to use in politics — the faculty of keeping himself awake to the distinc- tion between the Greater and the Less ; and he did not forget that, for the time, the alliance with England was the greater thing, and that most other objects belonged to the category of the Ixiss. These qualities, supported by good-humour,
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 179
and ofteu by generous impulses, went far to make chap. him an ally with whom (so long as he might find it advantageous to remain in accord with us) it would be possible, nay easy, and not unpleasant to act.
Lord Raglan submitted to the publicity and con^nnce ceremonial visits forced upon him during the Tuiieriw. days of the 11th and 12th of April, and at one o'clock on the 13th he had a private interview with the French Emperor at the Tuileries. The Emperor and the English General were not stran- gers to one another. They had been frequently brought together in London ; and, indeed, it was by Lord Fitzroy Somerset that the heir of the First Napoleon, deeply moved by the historic significance of the incident, had been brought to Apsley House and presented to the Duke of Wellington. The Emperor showed Lord Eaglan the draft of the instructions which he proposed to address to Marshal 8t Arnaud.
It may be said tliat at this hour Lord Eaglan began to have upon him the weight of that anxious charge which was never again to be tin-own off so long as life and consciousness should endure. He had charge on behalf of England of the great alliance of the West ; and since it happened that, in this the outset of his undertaking, he followed a method which characterised his relations with the French from first to last, there is a reason for now pointing it out. It seemed to him that in the intercourse of two proud and sensitive nations
180 TKANSACTIONS
CHAP, andertakinsf to act in concert, one of the chief
XII
dangers lay in that kind of mental activity which
is generated by the process of arguing. He made it a rule to avoid and avert all needless discus- sion ; and he regarded as needless, not only those discussions which spring out of abstract questions, but many also of those which are generated by men's anxiety to provide for hypothetical conjunc- tures. He was very English in this respect, and he was no less English in the simple contrivance by which he sought to ward off the evil. When- ever there seemed to be impending a question which he regarded as avoidable, he prevented or obstructed its discussion by interposing for con- sideration some practical matter which was more or less important in its way, but not unsafe. And now, when there was perhaps some fear that questions of an embarrassing and delicate kind might be raised by the pondering Emperor, Lord Kaglan kept them aloof by engaging atten- tion to the choice of the camping-ground best suited for the two armies. He seems to have succeeded in confining all discussion to this one safe and practical subject.
When the P^mperor at length brought his guest back into the outer room, there were there assem- bled Prince Jerome, the Duke of Cambridge, Marshal Vaillant the Minister of War, Marshal St Arnaud, and Lord De Eos. The vital busi- ness of making arrangements best fitted to pre- vent collision between the armies was anxiously weighed. Marshal Vaillant, laborious, well in-
PKECEDING THE INVASION. 181
structed, precise, and rather, perhaps, fatiguing chap,
in his tendency to probe deep every question, '_
strove hard to anticipate the eventualities lilcely to occasion difficulty in the relations of the two armies, and to force a clear understanding before- hand as to the way in which each question should be dealt with. This he endeavoured to do by putting it to St Arnaud in a categorical way* to say what solution he proposed for each of the imagined problems ; but St Arnaud, it then ap- peared, was hardly more fond than Lord Eaglan was of hypothetical questions, for after a little while, his endurance of Vaillant's interrogatories came to an end ; and he answered impatiently, and in a general way, that when the conjunctuies arose, they would be met, as best they might, by the concerted action of the Generals.
Tlie period of the great French Eevolution has gathered so much of the mellowness of age from later events, that it seems like a disturbance of chronology to be bringing into the joint council of France and England, in the year 1854, a brother of the first Napoleon. Yet Prince Jerome was one of the speakers, and he spoke with sound judgment upon the great problem of how France and England should act together in arms. He spoke, as might be expected, with less sagacity when the subject of ' The Turks ' floated up into notice. The whole French people, and many
* The Frencli verb ' poser ' would describe Marslial Vaillant's labours ; the English verb active ' to pose ' ^vould describe the eilect upon the patient.
182 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, even of the people of this country, imagine that
■ the wisdom and power of man are tested by his
proximity to the newest stage of civilisation : and from those whose minds are in that state, the true worth of the Osmanli, whether in policy or in arms, must always be hidden. If he sustains re- verses, their minds are satisfied, for in that case, their little equation appears, as they would say, to ' come right ; ' but, on the other hand, his success disturbs their most deep-set notions of logical sequence; and now, after all Omar Pasha's achievements on the Danube, it seemed to be the impression of Prince Jerome and the French Marshals that the Turkish General would be a source of trouble and anxiety to the alliance. They looked upon the events which liad been occurring as accidental and anomalous, and tending to produce a wrong conclusion. The Russians, as they well knew, had carried the industry of military prepaiation to the utmost verge of human endurance. The Turks had provided themselves with a powerful field-artillery, had kept their old yatagans bright, and had cherished their ancient love of war; but, for the rest, they had trusted much in Heaven. Yet during some six or seven months these pious, improvident, warlike men had been getting the better of drilled masses. Their success seemed to carry a dangerous lesson ; and the French Coun- cillors thought it so important for the Turks to be broken in to the yoke of a newer civilisation, that they even said it might be advantagcious for Omar
PRECEDIJS'G THE INVASION. 183
Pasha to undergo the discipline of a few whole- chap.
*
XII.
some reverses.'
From all he observed in the course of these in- terviews, Lord Raglan was led to believe in the stability of the Emperor's character, and the value he set upon the alliance.
After a few days, the arrangements detaining u.ia Kag- Lord Raglan m Pans were complete, and he took ime. his departure for the East.
The ioint occupation by French and English ThePrencii
P i 1 1 11 ,. 1 -r^ 1 and the Eiig-
troops 01 the ground on the shores ot tJie JDardan- lish troops
11 1 1 • 11 1 1 /^ ■ PI 1 on the shores
elles had yielded the first experience ot the rela- oftheDar-
1-11 1 • 1 1 • p ^ danelles.
tions likely to subsist between the armies ot the two nations when quartered near to each other. It quickly appeared that the troops of each force could be cordially good-humoured in their inter- course with those of the other. Canrobert, Bos- quet, and Sir George Brown, all destined to take prominent share in the coming events, made a cordiaiin kindly beginning of acquaintanceship amid the between the early difficulties and discomforts of Gallipoli; and upon the departure of Sir George Brown from the Dardanelles, there occurred one of those opportu- nities for the display of good feeling on which the Frencli are accustomed to seize with a quickness, tact, and grace belonging to no other nation. Sir George Brown was to bring up with him to head- quarters two of the English regiments ; and the
* Some might imagine that this hoj^e must have beeu ex- pressed in jest, but that is not the case. Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless certain that this view was gravely put forward.
184 TKANSACTIONS
CHAP. French — spontaneously, as it appeared, and from ' a simple impulse of goodwill — came down to aid in the embarkation. They set themselves to the work with all that briskness and gay energy by which the French soldiery convert an operation of mere labour and industry into a cheerful and animating scene. The incident in itself was a small one ; but, viewed as a sign of things to come, it had greater proportions. It was ac- cepted at the time by Lord Eaglan as a happy omen — an omen which seemed to promise that the alliance of the "West would hold good. Bt Arnaud's But whilst the soldicr was giving the best of obtaMng^ sanctions to the great Alliance, the Marshal of inand'?f the Francc was putting it in jeopardy. M. St Arnaud anny!^' had uot bccu long on the shores of the Bosphorus when he entered upon a tempting scheme of am- bition. General Bosquet, despatched to the head- quarters at Sluimla, had brought back accounts, which the Marshal at first could hardly credit, of the good state and apparent effectiveness of the Turkish troops ; and it was then, perhaps, that St Arnaud first thought of the step which he afterwards took. He conceived the idea of ob- taining the command of the whole Turkish army. The effect which this united command would have upon the relations between the French and the English General was obvious. The English Gen- eral, with his strength of some twenty-five thou- sand men, had always foreseen that he was likely to be somewhat embarrassed in having to claim due consideration for a force which was less by
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 185
one-half than the army sent out by the Frencli ; chap
XII
but if Marshal St Arnaud should be at the head, L
not only of his fifty thousand French, but of the whole force of Turkey, it would obviously become very hard, nay, even unfitting, for the Englisli General to maintain an equality in council with one who, in this case, would command altogether nearly two hundred thousand men. Marshal St Arnaud pressed his demand with the Ministers of the Porte at Constantinople, and he seems to have imagined that he had obtained their assent to his demand. If, indeed, they did really give a seem- ing assent to the proposed encroachment, they could hardly have meant it to take effect. They perhaps put their trust then where they had put their trust before. They knew that Lord Strat- ford was at Therapia, and they might well believe that he would make the elaborate world go back into chaos before he would suffer the armies of the Caliph to pass, like the contingent of some mere petty Christian State, under the orders of a French Commander.
On the 11th of May, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord Eaglan, and stated, in the course of conversation, that the Turkish Government haf' determined to place Omar Pasha's army under hia (the Marshal's) command ; and that he was then going to Keshid Pasha in order to have the mat - ter finally settled. Lord Eaglan merely said he believed the British Ambassador was not aware of the arrangement. On the 13th, INfarshal St Arnaud sent to propose that Lord Raglau would
186
TRANSAUTIONR
CHAf.
XIT.
et Amaud in the yire- sence of Ijord Strat- ford and Lord Baglan.
meet liim at Lord Stratford's, and intimated that he had an important communication to make. It was arranged that the English Ambassador shouhi receive the Marshal alone, 'in order/ as Lord Stratford almost cruelly expressed it — 'in * order to make his acquaintance,' and that after- wards Lord Eaglan should join them.
It jars upon one's love of fair strife to see Marshal St Aruaud brought in cold blood into the presence of the two men whom he ventured to encounter ; into the presence of Lord Stratford prepared and calmed by his foreknowledge of the intrigue — and of Lord Kaglan, roused by his sense of the danger which threatened the alliance. But the interview took place. The Marshal went to the English Embassy, and the operation of ' mak- ' ing his acquaintance ' was carried into full effect. Imagination may see the process — may see the light, agile Frenchman coming gaily into the room, content with himself, content with all the world, and charmed at first with the sea-blue depth of the eyes that lightened upon him from under the shadow of the Canning brow, but pres- ently beginning to understand the thin, tight, merciless lips of his host, and tlu'ii finding him- self cowed and pressed down by the majesty and the graciousness of the welcome ; for the welcome was such as the great I'^Uchi would be sure to give to one who (for im])evative reasons of State) was to be treated as his honoured guest, Ijut who was also a vain mortal, ]irctending to the command of the Ottoman army, and daring
PKKGKDING TIIK INVASION. 187
to come with his plot avowed into the very pres- cijap.
once of an English Ambassador. Afterwards Lord _L 1_
liaglan carae into the room, and then the Marshal began upon the business in hand. He said he had required, and the Turkish Government had consented, that Omar Pasha should be placed under his orders; that a brigade of Turkish infantry and a battery of artillery should be incor- porated into each of the French divisions ; that fifteen hundred of the Bashi-Bazouks should be dismounted, that their horses should be turned over to the French troopers, and that the Bashi- Bazouks should be paid (it was not said by whom), and then be sent baclv to their homes.
If this proposal had been then for the first time made known to Lord Stratford, his iiery nature would scarcely perhaps have suffered him to hear with temper ; but he had been prepared by Lord Raglan for what was coming, and he seemed all calm and gentleness. After hearing the proposal with benign attention, he quietly asked the Marshal whether he had cognisance of the tripartite treaty ; and then, turning to a copy of the treaty which happened — not at all by chance — to be lying within his reach, he read aloud the fourth article : an article Avhich pro- ceeds upon the assumption that the three armies would be under the orders of distinct commanders. The Marshal — ready perhaps to encounter the more obvious arguments against the expediency of the plan — was scarcely prepared for this quiet reference to the twins of the treaty. Lord liaglan
188 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, then said that he thouglit a good deal of incoii- ^"" venieuce might result from the adoption of the Marshal's plan ; that Omar Pasha was the ablest of the Turkish generals ; that his services had been recognised by the grant of the rank of General- issimo and the title of Highness ; and that to deprive him of the superior command, and to dismember his army, at a moment when it was in presence of the enemy, would not only lower him in the estimation of those who looked up to him with confidence, but would probably in- duce him to throw up his charge in disgust, and declare that he would not suffer himself to be degraded.
But both Lord Eaglan and the English Am- bassador were gifted with the power which is one of the most keen and graceful of all the ac- complishments of the diplomatist — the power of affecting the hearer with an apprehension of what remains unsaid. It is a power wliich exerts great sway over human actions ; for men are more cogently governed by what they are forced to imagine than by what they are allowed to know,
* The Marshal,' Lord Eaglan wrote, ' saw that our
* opinions were stronger than our expression of ' them.' He gave way. He immediately declared that, far from wishing to dimiiiisli the consequence of Omar Pasha, he was anxious to add to it, to u])hold him to the utmost, and to increase his importance ; and he added that he saw the pro- priety of deciding nothing until after a conference with Omar Pasha. By the time that St Arnaud
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 189
passed out of the Embassy gate his enterprise was c f i a p. virtually abandoned.
Some good perhaps resulted from the attempt ms^cheme to bring the Ottoman army under French com- mand. Of all the faults tending to impair the value of Lord Raglan's advice to the Home Government, there was none more grave than his want of power to appreciate warlike people be- lonwinjj to an earlier state of civilisation than that to which he had been accustomed in his later years; and although nothing could ever soften his antipathy towards Turkish Irregulars of all kinds, and especially to the Bashi-Bazouks, he was by this incident drawn more than ever towards the Turkish Generalissimo, and he al- ways thenceforth did his best to defeat any plan which tended to narrow the sphere of the Pasha's authority.
So great was the elasticity of Marshal St niasc^iieme Arnaud's mind, that, far from remaining cast tiiecom- down under the discomfiture which he had under- English
troops.
gone, he very soon entered upon a scheme yet more ambitious than the first. It seems he had become possessed with the idea that great achieve- ments were within his reach, if only he could add to the powers which he already wielded the occasional command of English troops. He pro- posed that, when French and English troops were acting together, the senior offictir, whether he chanced to be French or English, should take the command of tlie joint force ; and although this proposal was so expressed that it might be re-
190 TJIANSACTIONS
CHAP, garded as applying only to the command of de-
^ •^"' tachments, it was surmised that (M. St Arnaud's
military rank being higlier than that of Lord
Eaglan) the control of the whole British force was
the object really in view.
The experience of the conference at the British Embassy had proved the good sedative effect of a * dry document ; and as the instructions addressed to the English General chanced to contain some words directing him to take no orders except from the Secretary of State,* the clause was happily put forward by Lord Raglan as an impediment This also to the proposed plan. Marshal St Arnaud gave " '^■''^' ■ way, and thenceforth desisted from all further prosecution of his scheme.
So skilful was the resistance o])posed to these enterprises of M. St Arnaud, and the character of the Marshal was so free from all admixture of spite and bitterness, that their frustration did not create ill-feeling. It was plain, however, that re- Attempts of currence to projects of this sort would be danger- ch'e'cko'irby ous to the alliaucc ; and when the French Emperor Kmpm.'r' knew that these schemes had been tried and de- feated, he forbade all attempts to revive them. 8t Arnaud Hithcrto the cause which had been tlireatening deciincs^to the coliesioH of the Alliance was M. St Arnaud's nrmyto'-^ ambition. The next obstruction which Lord rMtofwnr. Raglan had to deal with was one of a very dif- f(;rent kind. Checked, as is supposed, by the an-
• The clauso, I iinagiiic, lind been inliodiuid in order to negative th(!.siiii[)0.sitioii that the Ambassador nt ronstantinople wjw to liave the control of tlie inilitar}' oj>erat ions.
PHECEDING THE INVASION. 191
thoritative counsels sent out to liim from Paris, chap. Marshal St Arnaud suddenly announced that, for _^^'_ some time to come, the i>ench army could not be suffered to move towards the seat of the war.
The measures for sending up the British forces to Varna were in progress, and the Light Division had been already despatched, when, at eleven o'clock at night, Colonel Trochu presented him- self at the British headquarters, and requested an immediate interview with Lord llaglan. The name of Colonel Trochu will recur in this narra- tive, for he was an officer of great weight in the councils of the French nrrny. He had come from France so lately as the 10th of May, and although his nominal office was simply that of first aide-de- camp to Marshal St Arnaud, it was known that he came out fully charged with the notions and the wishes of the French Emperor. Colonel Trochu was a cautious, tliiuking man, well versed in strategic science, and it was surmised that it was part of his mission to check anytliing like M'ild- ness in the movements of the French Marshal.* He stated that he had been sent by Marslial St Arnaud to request that Lord Eaglan would post- pone any further movement towards Varna, until the Marshal should have an opportunity of satis- fying himself that any considerable portion of the French army was in a condition to take the field.
Up to this moment no doubt had been enter- tained of tlie forwardness of the French prepara- * Moderer la fougue de M. le MarechaU
192 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, tions : and Lord liaglan, much astonished, ex-
XII
'__ pressed strong objection to the proposed delay.
Colonel Trochu replied that, upon his arrival in the Levant, he had gone to Gallipoli in order to see what degree of forwardness the prepara- tions of the French army had really attained ; and he had come, he said, to the conclusion that the French army was not as yet so equipped and pro- vided as to render it practicable, with anything like common prudence, to attempt operations against the enemy. He went on to justify his conclusion by details, showing the deficiencies under which the French army laboured : he said that he had communicated the result of his inspection and the opinion which he had formed to Marshal St Arnaud, and that Marshal St Arnaud, entirely adopting that opinion, had sent him to the Eng- lish headquarters in order that he might pre- vail upon Lord Eaglan to suspend the intended movement. Lord Rag- Lord Raglan observed that great inconvenience approval of would rcsult from the proposed suspension of the delay. movcment ; that the movement was one actually
proposed by the French and English commanders to Omar Pasha, and by him, as well as by the Turkish Ministers, entirely approved ; and that thus the French and the l*'nglish commanders stood pledged to Omar Pasha, and to the Porte, at a moment, too, when much anxiety existed for the fate of Silistria. Colonel Truchu admittted all this; but he again urged the necessity for delay.
PKKCEDING THE LNVASION. 193
The iuterview lasted till an hour after mid- chap.
XII
night, and Colonel Trochu's request was followed '
up on the ensuing day by written communicatious from the French jMarshal. But the importance of these discussions was superseded by a further and more perilous change in the French counsels.
At seven o'clock in the morning of Sunday the stAmaud-s 4th of June, Marshal St Arnaud called upon Lord termination Iiaglan, and announced that he had determined defensive npon an entirely new ])lan of operations for his rear of the
T IP ■ I ■ n -^r Balkan.
array. Instead oi moving his force to Varna, as had been agreed, he had resolved, he said, to send there only one division, and to place all the rest of his army in position — not in advance, but in rear of the Balkan range. He was to have his right resting on the sea at Bourgas ; his head- quarters were to be at Aidos ; and he hoped, he said, to be able to establish himself there by the third week of June. He invited Lord Baglan to conform to this plan, and to take up a position at Bournabat, a part of the proposed position which was the most remote from the sea.
Thus, at a time when the eyes of all Europe were upon Silistria and the campaign on the Danube, it was proposed tliat the armies of the Western Powers should take up a mere defensive — a timidly defensive — position, placing all Bul- garia, a part of Boumelia, and the whole range of the Balkan, between them and the scene of con- flict ! What made the matter still more grave was this, that Marshal St Arnaud did not come to consult. He had already adopted this almost
VOL. II. N
101 TKAXSACTIOxXS
CHAP, incredible plan, and his troops -svcre then actually
YTT
.^ '__ in march for the new position.
It might now, indeed, seem that those were right who had deemed the great alliance of the West to be impracticable. For all the purposes f.oKi Rns- of the campaign the proposed plan would have m?ned*ie-'" caused the armies of the two Western Powers to iiiis i-ian. become simply null. Lord Eaglan at once de- clared his entire disapproval of it.
Tied, perhaps, to this singular plan by the counsels ^^■hich Trochii had brought him, Marshal St Arnaud, for the time, did not yield. But the English Genera], as I have already said, had a quality which made it difficult and painful for men to maintain a difference with him whilst they Avere in his presence. St Arnaud was under this stress ; and as though he shrank from the ascend- ancy of Lord Eaglan, and sought a respite from the effort of having to oppose him in oral discus- sion, he imagined the idea of bending over a table and writing down what lie had to say. This he did ; and when the writing was finished, he left it with Lord Eaglan. But the Marshal seems to have inwardly determined that Colonel Trochu, wlio liad probably suggested this new })lan of campaign, should himself be made to bear the ]iain of further sustaining it; for he took his leave, saying that the Colonel should be sent to Lord Eaglan on the following day.
In this curious paper, written by St Arnaud in Lord Eaglan's presence, the Marshal said the great advantage of the French and I'higlish having
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 105
only one division each at Yarna would be, that chap. they would not get entangled prematurely in ^^^' hostile operations ; for with such a small force no one could taunt the "Western Powei-s for not marching to relieve Silistria, or for not rrivin" battle to the liussians ; whereas, argued the Mar- shal, if the Allies were present in greater strength, it was to be feared that they might suffer them- selves to be carried away by the Turks. ' It is ' important,' said the ^Marshal, ' not to give battle ' to the Eussians, except with all possible chances ' of success, and the certainty of obtaining great ' results.' Then, after describing the supposed ad- vantages of his intended position in rear of the l^alkan, the Marshal reverted to his dread of beintr carried forward by the warlike Turks. ' We must ' not,' said he, ' lose sight of this ; that we are ' here to aid the Turks — to succour them, to save ' them — but not by following their plans and their * ideas. It is evident that Omar Pasha lias no ' other idea, but that of drawing on the allied ' army to give battle to the Paissians, and to re- ' lieve Silistria. The safety of Turkey is not in ' Silistria ; and it is necessary to aid and succour ' the Turks in our own way.'
No one perhaps will now defend a plan of cam- paign which was to place the allied armies of the Western Powers in a position some hundreds of miles from the scene of any conflict, and to with- draw them from the very proximity of the Otto- man generalissimo for fear of his warlike counsels. Still, such justice as is due must be rendered to
196 TRANSACTIONS
CITAP. the French strategists. France and England bad XII
'__ sent to the East that portion of the two armies
which consists of combatants ; but neither of the Western Powers had hitherto constituted on the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus that vast accumula- tion of stores, of munitions of Avar, and means of ti'ansport which would enable it to live, to move freely, and to fight. Both tlie armies had means of subsistence for the next few days, and were so equipped as to be able to fight a battle on the beach ; but neither army had, nor could have for many months, those vast warehouses of stores and tliose immense means of land-transportwhich could alone sustain regular and extended operations in the field. They had not, in short, as yet, consti- tuted their oriental ' base of operations.' There- fore, if purely military views were to govern, and if liussia were really the formidable invader of Turkey that the world had believed her to be, there would liave been some rashness in pushing forward the combatants of llic two armies towards tlie scene of conflict witli a knowledge that for some time to come, tliey would be unable to move freely in tlie field.
Tlic true ground for overruling the hesitation of tlic French strategists lay in the now obvious fact that (to say nothing of the armies of France and P'ngland assembled on the Bospliorns, with vast means of sea-transport at their command) Eussia, ill-prepared for a great War in the South, driven out of the Euxinc, threatened by Austria, and fiercely encountered and hitherto repulsed by the
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 197
Ottoman forces, was not so formidable an invader chap.
XII
of European Turkey as to deserve that her de- L_
spairing struggles in the country of the Lower Danube should be encountered with all the re- sources of strategic prudence. Besides, the ques- tion was not purely a military one. It was cer- tain that the mere presence of the French and the English forces in the neighbourhood of the conflict would have a moral weight more than proportioned to their actual readiness for offen- sive operations. Finally, the question had been settled. Tlie allied Generals, in their conference with Omar Pasha, had engaged to move their troops to Varna ; and the honour of France and England stood pledged.
But if there was a semblance of military wis- dom in the hesitation of the French to move up to Varna, there was none in their plan for the de- fensive line behind the Balkan at Aides ; for if the want of means of land-transport threatened to hamper the activity of the force even in the advanced position of Varna, it is obvious that the same cause would have reduced the French and English forces to sheer uselessuess if they had taken up a position at so vast a distance as Aides is from the scene of the conflict. If the plan had been followed, no French nor English troops in that year would have seen tlie shape of a Russian battalion. Yet Marshal St Arnaud, so far as conceraed France, had determined thus to forfeit all mihtary significance in the pending campaign, and had done so, and had begun to carry the pluu
198 TRANSACTIONS
CHAP, into execution, without consulting his English
1- colleague.
How France was saved from this humiliation, and how the great alliance was preserved, will now be seen.
On the day following the interview with Mar- shal St Arjiaud, Colonel Trochu came, as had been agreed, to Lord Raglan's quarters. After repeating what Marshal St Arnaud had stated the day before — namely, that Bosquet's Division was already in march for Adrianople — the Colonel pressed the advantages of the position which Marshal St Arnaud had proposed to take up in rear of the Balkan. Lord Raglan Lord Raglan heard all, and then simply re-
l*Bt'USG3 to
i.iaceany qucstcd Coloucl Trocliu to iufomi Marshal St
jiail of his
urmy i.eiiiiid Amaud that he, Lord Raglan, objected to place
tilt Balkan. . o ' J f
any portion of Her Majesty's army in Roumelia,
Lord Raglan added, tliat the movement which seemed to him the best was an advance to the front with a view to join Omar Pasha in an effort to relieve Sili.stria ; and he said that if the Mar- shal were not prepared for such a movement, he (Lord Raglan) would keep his divisions on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, and hold them ready to embark at any moment for Varna. 8t Arnaud Fiminess conquered. On the morning of tlie abandons ills 10th of Juuc, Colouel Rosc came to tlie English i.osition headquarters, and announced that Marshal St
licliilid tlic 1 1 T 1 • 1 n
Uaikan, and Amaud uow conscntcd to abandon Ins plan of
CDnsenls lo . iiitu
move Ilia takinfr UD a defensive position behind the Balkan,
aiiny lu o i. j.
Varna. aud tliat, rcvcrtiug to tlie original determination
PliECEDT.NTt Tin: INVASION. 199
of the Allies, he would assemble his army at chat.
ir XII.
V aril a.
Thus the danger passed. Secrecy, it would appear, had been well maintained ; and the world did not know that, for all purposes of concerted military operations, the alliance of the Western Powers had lain in abeyance for five days.
Leaviuj;? small detachments at Galliuoli, the The armies
. ' moved ac-
French and the English armies were now moved cordingiy. up to Varna. General Bosquet's Division, how- ever, was made to feel the consequences of the resolution adopted by the French strategists ; for, this division having actually commenced its march towards Adrianople in furtherance of the tlieii intended plan of taking up a position be- hind the Balkan, jNIarshal St Arnaud, it seems, did not like to issue a countermand which A\'ould have disclosed to a sagacious soldiery his double change of counsels — nay, perhaps, might have given them a glimpse of the almost ridiculous destiny from which they had been saved by Lord llaglan. So, whilst all the rest of the allied forces were gliding up to Varna by water, Bosquet's cosquet'* Division continued to follow the direction first march. given it, and was brought into Bulgaria by long, painful marches. If the warlike Zouaves compos- ing part of the division had known that their long, toilsome movement in the midst of the great summer-heats was the result of a plan for placing the French army in position at a distance of several hundreds of miles from the enemy, they would have solaced the labours of the march by tearing
200
TRANSACTIONS
CHAP. XII.
The way in
wliich St
Amaud's
achemes
escuped
publicity.
the repute of the schemer who contrived it, and making him the butt for their wit.
It is obvious that the premature disclosui-e, either of Marshal St Arnaud's ambitious schemes or of his faltering counsels, would have been fraught with danger to the alliance ; and since it used to happen in those days that tidings freshly- entrusted to the English Cabinet were often dis- closed to the world, it seems useful to show how it was that Lord Raglan proved able to screen these transactions of JNIarshal St Arnaud from the in- quiring eye of the public. Apparently he did this by being careful in the choice of the time for making disclosures to the authorities at home. Except when there was a good reason for taking a contrary course, he liked to delay the communication of affairs involving danger until the danger was past. Thus, for instance, he would describe the beginning of an intrigue, and also its final defeat, at the same time; and the result was, that the end of the despatch not only made the disclosure of the earlier part of it comparatively harndess, ])ut even destroyed its value as an article of 'news;' for in proportion as people were greedy for fresh tidings, they were careless of things which ranged with tlie past, and the time was so stirring that the tale of an abandoned plan of campaign, or an intrigue already baffled and ex- tinct, was hardly a rich enough gilt for a Minister to carry to a newsman.
Thus were averted the early dangers whicl)
PRECEDING THE INVASION. 201
threateued the alliance ; and thus, after resolving c ir a p.
to take up a position some hundreds of miles dis- 1_
taut from the nearest Eussian outpost, the French Marshal gave way at last to Lord Eaglan's ascen- dant, and was soon pushed forward to a camping- ground within hearing of the enemy's guua.
202
EFFECT riiODUCED BY TlIK
CHAPTER XIII.
CHAP.
XIII.
Tidings wliich kindled in England a zeal for llie invasion of tlie Crimea.
Siege of BtlulriA.
The closing events of the summer campaign in Bulgaria did so much to kindle that zeal whicli forced on the invasion of the Crimea, that it seems right to speak of them here, uot with any notion of putting into the set form of ' lIi.story ' tilings which all Europe knew at the time in the most authentic way, but ratlier for the purpose of showing how the armies at Varna, and tlie states- men and the people in England, were touched, were stirred, nay, governed, by the tidings which came from the Danube, rriiice Paskie- vitch stood charged to execute with liis OAvn hand the plan of campaign which his Sovereign liad persuaded him to design;* and accordingly, in the summer of the year 1854, he found liiiii- self marching on the Danube at the head of tlie I'ussian army then engaged in attempting an in- vasion of the Ottoman Empire. lie had insisted, as we have seen, that, as tlie needful condition of a prosperous canii)aign, Silistria must fall by the first of iNIay.i" It wiis not before the miildle of • See anU', clmp. iv. + Iliid,
OPF.nATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 203
the month that he was able to appear before the chap.
place; but thenceforth he lost no time, and on 1_
the 19th he opened his first parallel.
The new defences of the fortress had been planned by Colonel Grach, a Prussian officer in the sei-vice of the Porte. He had brought to the work a great deal of knowledge and judgment. He was still in the place, and he continued to lend the aid of his science to the garrison when- ever he could do so without going out of his dwelling-house; but adhering, it seems, to the bare terms on which he had engaged his services, he stiffly abstained from taking any other than a scientific part in the struggle.
Prince Paskievitch pressed the seige with a vehemence which seemed to disdain all economy of the lives of his soldiery ; and the place being weakly garrisoned, and seemingly abandoned to its fate, its fall was supposed to be nigh. To uphold tlie Sultan's cause three armies were af hand, but no one of them was moved forward with a view to relieve the place. Omar Pasha, shrewd and wary, was gathering the strength of the Otto- man Empire at Shumla, and it did not enter into his plan of campaign to smooth the path of the Piussian General by going forward in strength to give him a meeting under the guns of the be- leaguered fortress. On the other hand, France and England were rapidly assembling their for- ces in the neighbourhood of Varna, but, for want of sufficing means of land -transport, tliey were not yet in a condition to take the field.
204 EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE
Day by day the two armies at Varna were moved by fitful tidings of a conflict iu which, though it raged within earshot, they were suf- fered to take no part. At first, few men har- boured the thought that, without deliverance brought by a relieving force, a humble Turkish fortress would be able to hold out against the col- lected strength of Russia and the most renowned of her Generals. Soon, it was known that, of their own free will and humour, two young English- men— Captain Butler of the Ceylon Pdfles, and Lieutenant Nasrayth of the East India Company's Service — had thrown themselves into the place, and were exercising a strange mastery over the garrison. On one of the hills overlooking the town there was a seam of earth which, as though it were a kind of low fence designed and thrown up by a peasant, passed along three sides of the slope in a doubtful meandering course. This was the earthwork which soon became famous in Europe. It was called the Arab Tabia. The work was one of a slight and rude sort ; but the ground it stood on was judged to be needful to the be- siegers, and, at almost any cost of life to his ])eople, Prince Paskievitch resolved to seize it. ]3y diligent fighting on the hill-side — by sapping close up to the ditch — by springing mines which more than once blew in the counterscarp and levelled the parapet — by storming it in the day- time— by storming it at niglit — the Russians strove hard to carry the work ; but when they sprang a mine, they ever found that behind the
OPEKATIONS ON TilE DANUBK. 205
ruins the Turks stood retrenched ; and whether chap. they stormed it by day or by night, their masses ^'
of columns were always met fiercely — were al- ways driven back with a cruel slaughter. Prince Paskievitch, the General commanding in chief, and General Schilders, who commanded the siege- works, were both struck down by shot and dis- abled. On the side of the Turks, Mussa Pasha, who commanded the garrison, was killed ; but Eutler and Nasmyth, now obeyed with a touch- ing affection and trustfulness by the Ottoman soldiery, were equal to the historic occasion which they had had the fortune and the spirit to seize. At one time they were laying down some new work of defence ; at another, the two firm lads were governing the judgment of the Turkish commanders in a council of war. Some- times, with ear pressed to the earth, they were listening for the dull blows of the enemy's un- derground pickaxes. Now and then they were engaged in dragging to his place under fire some unworthy Turkisli commander ; and once in their sportive and English way, they were busy in get- ting together a sweepstakes, to be won by him who should name the day when Silistria would be relieved ; but always when danger gathered in the Arab Tabia, the grateful Turks looked and saw that their young English guests were amongst them, ever ready with counsel for the new emer- gency, forbidding all thought of surrender, and even, it seems, determined to lay rough hands on the General who sought to withdraw with his
206' EFFECT PEODUCED BY THE
CHAP, troops from tlie famous earthwork* The pves- XIII
.. _ ence of these youths proved apparently all that
was needed for making of the Moslem hordes a faithful, heroic, and devoted soldiery. Upon ground known to be mined they stood as tran- quilly as upon any other hill-side. ' It was im- ' possible,' said Nasmyth's successor in the Arab Tabia — 'it was impossible not to admire the cool
* indifference of the Turks to danger. Three men ' were shot in the space of five minutes while ' throwing up earth for the new parapet, at which ' only two men could work at a time so as to be
* at all protected ; and they were succeeded by the ' nearest bystander, who took the spade from the
* dying man's hands and set to work as calmly as ' if he were going to cut a ditch by the road-side.' Indeed, the childlike trust which these men were able to put in tlieir young English leaders, so freed them from all doubt and question concern- ing the wisdom of the orders given, that they joyfully abandoned themselves to the rapture of fighting for religion, and grew so enamoured of death — so enamoured of the very blackness of the grave — that sometimes in tlic pauses of tlic figJit a pious jNIussulman, intent on close fighting and blissful thoughts of Paradise, would come up witli a pickaxe in hand, would speak some touching words of devotion and gratitude to Butler and Nasmyth, and then proudly fall to work and dig
• I take it tliat tliis is what was meant by Nasmytli's ex- pression, 'peculiar inducement.' The man upon whom the 'peculiar inducement' wns brought to bear was one whom Butler had dragged out bodily from his hiding-place.
OPERATIONS ON TH^ DANUBE. 207
for liimself the last home, where he charged his chap. comrades to hiy him as soon as he attained to die. . 1_
Omar Pasha not choosing to march to the re- lief of Silistria, but being unwilling to leave its defenders to sheer despair, sent General Cannon* (Behram Pasha he was called in the Turkish army) with a brigade of irregular light infantry and instructed him to occupy some of the wooded ground in the neighbourhood of the place, with a view to trouble the enemy and to encourage the garrison. General Cannon, however, learnt, on reaching the neighbourhood of Silistria, that the hopes of the garrison had already ebbed very low ; and therefore, though without the warrant of orders, he resolved to throw himself into the place with his whole brigade. This, by means of a stratagem and a long circuitous night-march, he was able to do. His achievement, as was natural, gave joy to the garrison ; and, turning to account the enthusiasm of the moment, he administered, as is said, a direful oath to the Pasha in command — an oath whereby the Turk swore that, happen what might, he would never surrender the place.
It was whilst General Cannon was in Silistria that Captain Butler received the wound of which he afterwards died. The Paissians had sapped up so close to the ditch that, if a man behind the
* General Cannon was an oflicer of our Indian army who had served with distinction in India, and in the force (the British Legion) wliich operated in Spain under the orders of General . Evans.
208 EFFECT PIIODUCED BY THE
CHAP, parapet spoke much above a wliisper, the sound
!_ of his voice used to draw the enemy's fire towards
the nearest loophole or embrasure. Captain But- ler, it seems, with a view to throw up a new work of defence, "was reconnoitring the enemy's approaches through an aperture made in the parapet, and was consulting about his plan with General Cannon, when the General's aide-decamp said something in a tone loud enough to be heard by a Russian marksman. The sound brought a rifle-ball in through the loophole and struck Captain Butler the blow from which (being weakened by toil and privation) he died before the end of the siege.
For some reason which he deemed to be im- perative— stringent orders, perhaps, from Shumla — General Cannon marched out of the place with his brigade on the 18th of June, and at his request Nasmyth also went away for a time in order to confer with Omar Pasha at the Turkish head- quarters ; but meanwhile Lieutenant Ballard of the Indian army, coming thither of his own free will, had thrown himself into the besieged town ; and whenever the enemy stirred, there was always, at the least, one English lad in the Arab Tabia, directing the counsels of the garrison, repressing the thought of surrender, and keeping the men in good heart.*
* The narratives of the siege of Silistria which appeared in the ' Times ' were given, as is well known, bj' Nasmyth hini- wlf, and by the o(Hcer who succeeded to him and to Butler in governing the counsels of the garrison and helping to defend the Arab Tabia. Therefore any other account of the siege which 1
OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 209
Tlierc was a part of the allied camp where the chap.
French and the English soldiery could hear in '
a quiet hour the distant guns of Silistria. Day after day they listened for the continuing of the sound ; and they listened keenly, for they were expecting the end, and there was nothing but the booming of the cannon to assure them that the fortress held out. On the 22d of June, and dur- ing a great part of the night which followed it, they heard the low thunder of the siege more continuously than ever before ; but on the dawn of the following day they listened, and listened in vain. The cannonade had ceased, and it was be- lieved in camp that the place had been taken. The opposite of this was the truth. The siege had been raised. The event was one upon which the course of history was destined to hinge ; for this miscarriage at Silistria put an end at once to all schemes for the invasion of the Sultan's dominions in Europe.
Whilst Europe was still in wonder at the deliverance of Silistria, the French and the Eng- lish armies at Varna were greeted with tidings of yet another victory won by the Turks.
Hassan Pasha was at Eustchuk with a large
iiiight have founded upon the official materials in my possession would have been obviously inferior to the newspaper in point of authenticity. Accordingly, with the exception of two or three minor facts drawn from the correspondence wliiuh is in my possession, and the substitution of 18th June for 17th, which I owe to General Cannon, all 1 have said of the siege is taken from those journals of Nasmyth and his successor which were printed in the ' Times' during the summer of 1851. VOL. II. 0
210 EFFECT rUODUCED BY THE
CHAP, body of Turkish troops ; and at Giurgevo, on the ^"^' opposite bank of the river, General SoimonoCf commanded twelve battalions of Eussian infantry, with several squadrons of horse and some guns. Both the Piussian and the Turkish commanders desired that at this time there should be no conflict; and it might be thought that in this respect they would have their way ; for although Ti.ci.aiuoof the forces at Rustchuk and at Giurgevo were near to each other, the broad Danube rolled between them. But the Ottoman soldiery are of so war- like a nature that, when their enemy is at hand, tliey are oftentimes seized with a raging desire for the figlit ; and the one check which tends to keep down tliis passion is a sense of the inco- lierency which results from the want of good officers. But so ready and so deep is their trust in any of our countrymen who will take the trouble to lead them, tliat, if Turkish soldiers be camped within reach of the enemy, the coming amongst them of a few English youths supplies the one thing needed, completes the electric circle, and in general brings on a liglit. Now it happened that, besides General Cannon, who was on duty, and in command of a Turkish brigade, seven young Englisli officers had found their way to the camp of Hassan Paslia. Two of these. Cap- tain Bent and Lieutenant Burke, were officers of tlie Royal Engineers ; Meyncll was a Lieutenant in the 75th Piogimcnt ; Hinde, Arnold, and Ballard (the last of them fresh come from Silistria), were officers of our Indian army ; Colonel Ogilvy was
OPEIJATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 211
Geueral Cannon's aide-de-camp, Imt he gave his chap.
services freely ; and, indeed, it may he said that, _; '__
so far as concerns the part they took in the battle, every one of these seven young Englishmen was there of his own mere will.*
On the morning of the 7th of July it was ob- served that the Eussians had struck their tents ; and they were so posted that their numbers could not be descried from the right bank of the river. It was believed in the Turkish camp that Soimo- noff had withdrawn the main part of his force ; and it seems that wliat Hassan Pasha really meant to do was to execute a reconnaissance, and assure himself of the enemy's retreat. Be this as it may, he ordered, or consented, that the river should be crossed at two points ; and General Cannon, embarking in boats with 300 riflemen, and speedily followed by a battalion of infantry under Ferik Bekir Pasha, succeeded in reaching the left bank of the river without encountering resistance. As soon as they had landed, the Turks tried to gain a lodgment upon a strip of ground where their front was covered by a long narrow mere or pool of water. Soon, however, they were attacked on their left flank by a body of Russian infantry, which issued from an earth- work placed above the western extremity of the
* The two Engineer officers, Captain Bent and Lieutenant Bnrke, had been sent to the Turkisii camp with instructions to advise and aid in the construction of militaiy works; but of course they had not been ordered to lead the Turks into battle ; and therefore I include them with the rest of the seven as men taking part in the battle witliout professional sanction.
212 EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE
CHAP. mere. Cannon and Bent, with their riflemen, not
XIII
L_ only withstood this attack, but drove their assail- ants back into the fosse from which they had issued, and there, it seems, a good deal of slaugh- ter took place. Afterwards the riflemen were forced to give way, and fall back upon the main body of the troops, which had effected their land- ing ; but young Ballard led forward another body of skirmishers, and kept the enemy back. What was needed was, that the troops which had landed should intrench themselves ; but they had como without gabions or sand-bags, and nothing as yet could be done towards gaining a firm lodgment. There was a good deal of confusion amongst the troops, and the enterprise seemed likely to fail, when Ali Pasha, who was a brave and an able officer, came over with fresh troops. He soon restored order, and the men began to throw up intreuchments.
Meanwhile two battalions, led on by Ogilvy, Ilinde, Arnold, Meynell, and Burke, had crossed the river higher up, in detached bodies ; and although these small bands were left from first to last without reinforcements — although they had to move flankwise close under the guns of a Russian battery, which killed very many — and although they were sharply attacked and at one time hard pressed by the enemy's infantry, as well as by four squadrons of cavalry — the rem- nant of these venturesome men fought their way down along the river's bank, and at last made good their junction with the main body, theu
OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 213
intrenchinff itself beliind the mere. But before chap.
XIll
they attained to this they had lost a great proper- :_
tion of their comrades, and of their five youthful leaders they had lost three, for ]>urke, Arnold, and Meynell \vere killed.
Meanwhile fresh troops had been crossing the river at the point opposite to the landing-place first seized ; and at length there was established on the ground behind the mere a force of some five thousand men.
Upon either flank of this body the Russian in- fantry came down in strong columns. Four times the attack was made, and four times the Turks, commanded or led on by Ali Pasha and General Cannon, by Bent, Hinde, Ogilvy, and Ballard, drove back their assailants with great slaughter. With pious and warlike cries, the Turks sallied over their new-made parapets, brought their bay- onets down to the charge, forced mass after mass to give way, and fiercely pressed the retreat.
At sunset the action ceased. All night the Turks were intrenching themselves on the ground which they had gained ; but when the morning dawned there was no sign that tiie enemy would hasten to renew the battle.
To keep a safe hold of the ground which had been won, it was necessary for the Turks to ad- vance in the direction of their left front, and occupy a ridge which went by the name of the Slobenzie Heights ; but Hassan Pasha dreaded the blame which might fall upon him if the movement should prove to be a wrong one.
214 EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE
CHAP. General Cannon pressed him hard — for some time
XIII 1_ in vain ; but at length the Pasha yielded, upon
condition that the English General would give
him a written warranty certifying the wisdom of
the step.
On the third day after the battle, Prince Gort- schakoff came up with a force which was said to number some sixty or seventy thousand men. He had been set free by the raising of the siege of Silistria, and he now appeared upon one of the ranges of hills looking down upon Giurgevo from the north-west. It seemed that he meant to cover over the stain of the defeat sustained at Giurgevo by driving tlie Turks back into the river ; but before he camped for the night the British flag was already in the waters beneath him.
Lieutenant Glyn of the Britannia, with the young Prince Leiningen under him, and thirty seamen accompanied by a like number of sappers, had come up by land, and now took the command of some gunboats already in this part of the river. Glyn quickly carried his gunboats into tlie narrow loopstream which escapes from the main of the river above Giurgevo and meets it again lower down. By this movement Glyn thrust his gunboats into the interval which divided tlie Pussian aiiny from the Turks,* Gort-
• A critic used language which might seem to throw doubt on the above narrative of Lieutenant Gl^'n's operations. So proof may be useful. In a letter now before me, Lieutenant (now Captain) Gli'u writes: — 'lie immediately threw across a * large force, and ordered me to hold the creek between Slo-
OPERATIONS OX THE DANUDi:. 215
schaltofF perhaps overrated the force which had chap.
come with the British flag. At all events, he did
uot instautly move dowu to the attack ; and whilst he seemed to hesitate, the Turks and the English worked hard. Captain Bent and his sappers, with the aid of our seamen and the Turks, threw a bridge of boats across the main stream of the Danube. This done, it was plain that, if Gortschakoff were to attack, he would have to do, not merely with the five thousand Turks already established on the left bank, but with the whole of the force which lay at Eust- chuk. He resolved to avoid the encounter. Retreating upon Bucharest, he no longer dis- puted with the Turks for the mastery of the Lower Danube.
In this campaign on the Danube, those who fought for the cause of the Sultan were helped, it is true, by Fortune, by the anger and unskil- fulness of the Czar, by the assured support of Austria, and by the impending power of England and France ; but still there is one point of view in which their achievement was a great one. Military ascendancy is so closely connected with En-odofthe military reputation, that to be the first to bring ^e"iS« down the warlike fame of a great empire is to °"ry s'lceu-" do a mighty work, and a work, too, which hardly uHsia? can fail to change the career of nations. By the time that Prince Gortschakoff retreated upon
' benzie and the town of Giurgevo with gunboats, which was ' done ; otherwise the Russians would have turned the posi- ' tion of Slobenzie.' — Note lo ilh Edition.
21 G EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE
CHAP. Bucharest, people no longer tliouoht of the Czar
XIII
. L_ as they thought of him eight months before ;
and the glory of thus breaking down the mili- tary reputation of Eussia is due of right, not to the Governments nor the armies of Fi'ance oi England, but to the warlike prowess of the Otto- man soldiery, and the ten or twelve resolute Englishmen who cheered and helped and led them.
The failure of the attempted invasion was almost instantly followed by the relinquishment of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Emperor Nicho- las, as we saw, had been placed by Austria under the stress of a peremptory summons requiring him to withdraw from the Principalities; and the demand being supported by powerful bodies of troops, which threatened the flank of the intruding army, the Czar was schooled at last, and compelled to see that he must surrender his hold of the provinces which lie had chosen to call his ' material guarantee'
Thus, by the course of the events which fol- lowed it, the Czar's last defeat on the Danube was made to appear more signal than it really was. Of course, men versed in war and in poli- tics knew that causes of a larger kind than a few hours' fight at Giurgevo were bringing about the abandonment of the Principalities ; but people who drew their conclusions from the mere ad- vance and retreat of armies, and from the issue of battles, were left to infer that the once-dreaded Emperor of the Eussias was chased from the
OPERATIONS OX THE DANUBE. 217
country of the Danube L}' the sheer prowess of chap.
XI II
the victorious Turks. '__
It is therefore very easy to believe that tliis Tiie agony oi discomfiture at Giurgevo was more bitter to the Czar than any of the disasters whicli had hitherto tried his fortitude. People knew, or affected to know, what the troubled man uttered in torment, and the words they put in his mouth ran some- what to this effect : —
' I can understand Oltenitza — I can even
* understand that Omar Paslui should luive been ' able to hold against me his lines at KaJafat ' — I can partly account for the result of those ' fights at Citate — I can understand Silistria — ' the strongest may fail in a siege — and it ' chanced that both Paskievitch and Schilders
* were struck down and disabled by shot — but ' — but — but — that Turks — mere Turks — led on
* by a General of Sepoys and six or seven Eng- ' lish boys — that they should dare to cross the
* Danube in the face of my troops — that, daring ' to attempt this, they should do it, and hold fast ' their ground — that my troops should give way
* before them ; and that this — that this should be
* the last act of the campaign which is ending in ' the retreat of my whole army, and the abandou- ' ment of the Principalities. Heaven lays upon
* me more than I can bear !'
Many men in the Anglo - French camp were fretted by the tidings of this last Turkish victory ; for, besides that, with their natural and healthy impatience of delay, they were stung by the
218 t:ffkct produced by the ■
CHAP, example of their Moslem ally, there was iu the
XIII . L_ staff of the French and the English armies a
iM^sdisiTke pedantic dislike of wild troops. In this respect
"lined'coMi- ^ovd Raglan had no breadth of view. Far from
batants. understanding tliat the hardy, the fierce, the
devout, the temperate Moslems of the Ottoman
provinces were the rough yet sound material with
which superb troops could be made, he always
looked upon these brave men, but especially
upon the genus wliich people call ' Bashi-Ba-
' zouks/ with an almost superstitious liorror. He
was so constituted, or rather he was so schooled
down by long years of flat office labour, that it
shocked him to see a man bearing no uniform,
yet warlike, and armed to the teeth. Indeed,
from Bulgaria he once wrote and complained
quite gravely tliat every Turk he saw had the
appearance of being a ' bandit ; ' and the prejudice
clung to him ; for long after the period now
spoken of, and even in the very hour when the
fatal storm of the 14th of November was roaring
through his port and his camp, he found time to
sit at a desk and write down the Bashi-Bazouks.*
This hatred of undrilled warriors was the more
perverse, since England above all other nations
was rich in men (men like Ilodson, for instance,
or Jacob) who knew how to make themselves the
adored chiefs of Asiatic soldiers.
* Recent events in the villages iiihaLited by l5ul;,farians will incline peojile to say how right I.onl Kaglan was in dreading the commission of utroeitics by wild levies of this description; but it does not follow that they might not have been brought under proper control by men like our Anglo-Indian officers.
OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE. 219
Besides, it must be borne in mind, that wlien chap.
XllI
an English Government luidertakes to wage war . L_
in a country beyond the seas witliout doing all it ["'EngUiuT can to get soldierly aid from the natives, it does auxiliaifea. not merely neglect a slight or collateral advantage ; on the contrary, it throws away its power of act- ing witli efficient numbers, and is in danger of frittering away the nation'^ strength upon those (often ill-fated) schemes which go by the name of ' expeditions.' Witliout our Portuguese auxil- iaries there would have been no great Peninsular War, no successful invasion of France ; without the native soldiery of Iliudostan there would have been no British India ; without the German auxiliaries who served under Wellington in his last campaign, he could not have given battle to Napoleon in the Netlierlands, and the course of English history would not have run as it did. The truth is, that (especially at the beginning of a war) any body of English troops which our Government brings together at one time and one l^lace is in general so costly, and of so high a quality, but also so scant in numbers, that to use it, and use it singly, for all the work of the cam- paign, is to consume and squander the precious essence of the nation's strength without making it the means of attaining any worthy result.
Therefore, whenever it is possible, a British force serving abroad and engaged in an arduous campaign, ought to have on its side, not mere allies — for that is but a doubtful, and often a poor support to have to lean upon — but auxiliaries
220 OPERATIONS ON THE DANUBE.
CHAP, obeying tlie English commander, and capable of
[ beinj? trusted with a lart-e share of the duties
required from an army in the field. Nor is this an advantage Avliich commonly lies out of our reach ; for in most of the countries of the Old World the cost of labour is much lower than in England ; and it is one of the prerogatives of the English, as indeed of all conquering nations, to be able to lead other races of men, and to impart to them its warlike fire. I'y beginning its prepara- tions at the right time, and by bringing under the orders of some of our Indian officers a fitting number of the brave men who came flocking to the war from every province of the Ottoman Em- pire, our Government might have enabled their General to take the field with an army of great strength — with an army more fit for warlike en- terprises than two armies, French and English, instructed to work side by side, and baflfled by divided command.*
* The opinions wliich the Duke of Newcastle entertained on tliis subject were sound, and liis efforts to give elieet to tlicm were vigorous; hut he was tliwarted hy tlie curious antagonism whicli conimonly shows itself at the beginning of a war — tlie antagonism between views really warlike aud views wliich are o ily 'military.'
ZEAL FOK AN ATTACK ON SEBASIOPOL. 221
CHAPTER XIV.
By their own prowess, with the aid only of a ^^^^^' moral support from their great allies and the
-ri T 1 iti The events
actual presence of a lew youncj iingiish otticers, on the
^ , ,. , , ^^ ^ ,^ • • Danube ro-
the Ottoman soldiery had repelled the invasion; moved the
, . , . , , . grounds of
and, the defence of Turkey being accomplished in the war. a way very glorious to the Sultan, and the deliver- ance of the Principalities being secured, it sud- denly became apparent that the objects for which the Western Powers undertook the war had been already attained. And since (by the mere act of declaring war against the Czar) the Porte had freed itself from the obnoxious treaties which heretofore entangled its freedom, the condition of affairs was such that a prudent statesman of France or of England or of the Ottoman Empire might have well enough rested content. And in that condition of affairs the Emperor of Eussia must have acquiesced ; for having now learnt that he could not maintain an invasion of European Turkey, and being driven from the seas, he was cut off from all means of waging an offensive war against the Sultan except upon the desolate frou-
222 ZKAL FOR A.t
CHAP, tiers of Armenia; and the prcssi.ic of tl\e naval
V TV"
_^ '__ blockade enforced against him by the Allies, to-
gether with the torture of seeing the Baltic and the Euxine placed under the dominion of their fleets, would have more than sufficed to make him sign a peace.
If France had been mistrfss of herself, or if England had been free from passion and craving for adventure, the war wou d have been virtually at an end on the day when the Eussian army \ completed its retreat from the country of the
Danube and re-entered the Czar's dominions.
How came it to happen that, rejecting the peace which seemed to be thus prepared by the mere course of events, the Western Powers deter- mined to undertake the invasion of a Eussian province ? Helpless- France was still lying under the men M-ho had
French got her down on the night of the 2d of Decem- ber ; and it was in vain that her people at that time chanced to love peace better than war, for tliey liad no longer a voice in State affairs. The French Ii^mperor still wielded the whole strength of the nation ; and, labouring to turn away men's thoughts from the origin of his power, he was very willing to try to earn for the restored Empire Course taken that kind of statiou and title which tlic newest of erenrii Rm- dyuastics may acquire by signal achievements in war. It was still of great moment to him to re- main in close friendship with England, and to use the alliance as an engine of war ; but he observed that there was a spirit on this side of the Channel
ATTACK OX SEBASTOPOL. 223
which, springing from motives very unlike his own, was nevertheless tending in the same direc- tion ; and therefore, to draw England in, he no longer needed to resort to those ingenious con- trivances which he had employed against her in the foregoing year. All that he had to do was to encourage her desire to go on with the war, and, if necessary, to make his own plans yield to those of his ally. To do all this he was very ahle ; for he had, as we have seen, at that time, the power of keeping his mind alive to the difference be- tween the greater and the less ; and after he had once resolved to engage in alliance with England, he did not allow his main purpose to be baffled by differences on minor questions. Therefore, now when it became known that the Paissian army was in full retreat, he was so willing to defer to English counsels, that virtually, though not in terms, he left it to the Queen's Government to determine what next step the Western Powers should take in the conduct of the war.
England had become so eager for conflict that Desire of tiie the idea of desisting from the war merely because auoflfensive the war had ceased to be necessary was not toler- able to the people. In the Baltic their hopes had been bitterly disappointed ; and as soon as it became clear that the defence of Tin key was a thing already accomplished, men longed to try the prowess of our land and sea forces in some enter- prise against the Russian dominions. Already they had cast their eyes upon Sebastopol.
With a view to the conquest of empire on the
224
ZEAL FOR AN
CHAP. XIV.
Bsbastopol.
Bosphorus, the ambition of Eussia had taken ad- vantage of the spacious port on tlie south-west coast of the Crimea — had made there a great arsenal, and furnished it with an enormous supply of warlike stores. And having been warned a quarter of a century ago * that, if he thus gathered his strength in Sebastopol, he might have to count some day with the English, the Czar Nicholas had caused the place to be defended towards the sea by forts of great power. In the harbour, barred by these forts, his Black Sea fleet lay at anchor. The longing Plainly it would be a natural and fitting consum- "ishtoat-^ mation of a war in defence of the Sultan to de- stroy those very resources which the labours of years had gathered togctlier against liim. More- over, tlie English, who hate the mechanic contriv- ances which prevent fair, open fighting, could hardly now boar that the vast sea-forts of Sebas- topol should continue to shelter the Russian fleet from the guns of our men-of-war. Those who thought more warily than the multitude foresaw that tlie enterprise might take time ; but they also perceived that even this result would not be one of unmixed evil ; for if Russia should commit herself to a lengthened conflict in the neighbour- liood of Sebastopol, she would be put to a great
Uckit.
* Despatch from Count Poz/o di P.oigo, dutcd tlic 28th of November 1828. ' Althouf,'h,' writes tlio Count, 'it may not ' be probable tliat \vc shall sec an English fleet in the Black ' Sen, it will be prudent to make Sebastopol very secure against ' attacks from the soa. If ever England were to come to a ' rupture with us, this is the point to which she would direct ' her attacks, if only she believed them possible.'
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 22 0
trial, and would see her wealth and strength ruin- chap, ously consumed by the mere stress of the distance L_
between the military centre of the Empire and the south-westernmost angle of the Crimea.
The more the English people thought of the enterprise, the more eager they became to attempt it ; and it chanced that their feelings and opinions were shared and represented with great exactness by the jNIinister of War.
The Duke of Newcastle was a man of a san- The Duke oi
^ __ Kewcastle.
guine eager nature, very prone to action.* He had a good clear intellect, with more of strength than keenness, unwearied industry, and an aston- ishing facility of writing. In the assumption of responsibility he was generous and bold even to rashness. Indeed, he was so eager to see his views carried into effect, and so willing to take all the risk upon his own head, that there was danger of his withdrawing from other men their wholesome share of discretion. lie threw his whole heart into the project of the invasion ; and if the Prime Minister and Mr Gladstone were men driven forward by the feeling of the country, ill spite of their opinions and their scruples, it was not £0 with the Duke of Newcastle. The character of his mind was such as to make him essentially one with the public. Ear from being propelled by others against his will, he himself
* I, of course, kno\v that this view will not be assented toby those who found their opinion upon observation made in later years ; but I am speaking of the summer of 1854, and I am "very sure that the sentence to which this note has been ap- jieuded is true.
VOL. 11. P
22G ZEAL FOR AX
was one of the very foremost members of the war- like throng whicli was pressing upon the Cabinet and craving for adventure and glory. He easily received new impressions, and had nevertheless a quick good sense, which generally enabled him to distinguish what was useful from what was worth- less. He seemed to understand the great truth that, without being military, the English are a warlike people, and that it is one of the great prerogatives of a nation gifted with this higher quality to be able to command other races of men, and to impart to them the fire of martial virtue. He also knew that when England undertakes M'ar against a great European Power, she must engage the energies of the people at large, and must not presume to rely altogether upon the merely pro- fessional exertions of her small Peace Establish- ment. It was not from his default, but in spite of his endeavours, that for several months people lingered in the notion that our military system was an apparatus sufficing for war.
But the degree of public confulence inspired by the Duke was hardly, I think, quite propor- tionate to the evident merits which a reader of his despatches and letters would be inclined to attribute to him. Perhaps the very zeal with which he seized and adopted the ideas of the outer public was one of the causes which tended to lessen his weight ; for he who comes into council with common and popular views, however likely it may be that he will get them assented to, can scarcely hope to kindle men's minds with the fire
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 227
that springs from a man's own thoiifiht and from CHAP.
. XIV.
his own strong- will. jNlorcover, it was by a kind L-
of chance rather than by intentional selection that the Duke of Newcastle had become entrusted with the momentous business of the war; and this circumstance so much weighed against him that, after a while, the propriety of his continuing to liold the office was peremptorily brought into question by one of his principal colleagues.*
From the first, the Duke of Newcastle, resist- niszeaifor
. tlie (lestnio.
ing all proposals for operating agamst Eussia on tionofse- the side of Poland, had warmly shared the popu- lar desire to invade the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol. The Em.peror of the French, steadily following his main policy, had long ago consented to look to this enterprise as next in importance to
* "With liis accustomed frankness, Lord Russell has hini- self declared tliat his only reason for insisting that the Duke of Newcastle should be replaced by another min- ister, was the one above shown. What I have above called 'a kind of chance' was brought about in this way: — Accor- ding to the practice which was in force up to the sum- mer of 1854, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was also the 'Secretary of War.' Before the war, however, the public hardly observed, and in fact hardly knew this, because in peace- time (thanks to the labours of the 'Horse Guards,' the ofEce of the Secretary at War, the Ordnance, and several other ofhces) the duties of the Colonial Secretary, in his character as Secre- tary of War, were very slight ; and, there being no prospect of war when Lord Aberdeen's Ministry was forni'^d, the Duke of Newcastle was of course selected with a view to his qualifica. tions for the administration of the Colonies, and not witli any consideration, either one way or the other, as to his aptitude for the business of the War Department. AVhen the nipturo with Russia occurred, it became apparent that, unless a chaiige were made, the Llinister who happened to be the Colonial Secre- tary would stand charged with tlie business of the war.
2-28 ZKAL FOR AN"
CHAP, the defence of the Sultan's territory; and in the
XIV L_ early part of i\pril instructions to this effect had
been given to the French and the English Generals.
It would seem, however, that at first the Duke of Newcastle was the only member of the Govern- ment who was fired with a great eagerness fur tlie destruction of Sebastopol ; and of himself he had not the ascendancy which sometimes enables a INIinister to bend other men to his purpose. Unless by the help of a mighty force pressing from with- out, he could not have bronght the Cabinet of Lord Aberdeen to partake his zeal for the enterprise.
But — impending over tlie counsels of all the ostensible rulers — there was an authority, not deriving from the Queen or the Parliament, which was destined to have a great sway over events. It would be possible to elude the task ; but it seems to me that a history would be wanting in fulness of truth if it failed to im[)art some concep- tion of this other power. C'jm.uand- England was free ; and aUliough, whilst tlicre iiic iicopie was indifterence or divided oianiun m the country, Bii'i'iii." ""^ the Government liad very full latitude of action, yet, whenever it chanced that the feelings of the l)eople were roused, and that tliey were known to be nearly of one mind, they spoke with a voice so commanding that no Administration could safely try to withstand it.
But the will of tlie nation being thus puissant, who was charged to declare it ?
in former times almost everybody who could was accustomed to contribute in an active way to
ATTACK OX SEBASTOPOL. 229
the formation of opinion. jMeii evolved ilieir own chap. political ideas and drew forth the ideas of their
friends by keen oral discussion, and in later n.rmlngand times by long elaborate letters. But gradually, ovmlon of ' and following somewhat slowly upon the inven- tion of printing, there came to be introduced a new division of labour. It was found that if a small number of competent men would make it tlieir calling to transact tlie business of thinking upon political questions, the work might be more handily performed by them than by the casual efforts of people who were commonly busied in other sorts of toil; and as soon as this change took effect, the weighing of State questions and the judging of public men lapsed away from the direct cognisance of the nation at large, and passed into the hands of those who knew how to utter in print. What had been an intdlectual exercise, practised in a random way by thousands, was turned into a branch of industry and pursued with great skill by a few. People soon found out that an essay in print — an essay strong and terse, but, above all, opportune — seemed to clear their minds more effectually than the sayings which they heard in conversation, or the letters they received from their friends ; and at length the principle of divided labour became so complete in its application to the forming of political opinions, that by glancing at a newspaper, and giving swift assent to its assertions and arguments, many an Englishman was saved the labour of further exa- mining his political conscience, and dispensed
;o
ZEAL FOR AN
CHAP. XIV.
Effect of political writings in saving men from the trouble of thiuking.
Want of jiro- jiortion be- tween llio skill of tlie public writer and the ju'li- cial compet- ence of liis readers.
from the necessity of luaving to work his own way to a conclusion.
But to spare a man from a healtliy toil is not always an unmixed good. To save a free-born citizen from the trouble of thinking upon ques- tions of State is to take from hiui his share of dominion ; and although it be true that he who follows printed advice is under a guidance more skilful and dexterous than any he could have got from his own untutored mind, he is less of a man — and, upon the wliole, is less fair, less righteous — than one who in a ruder fashion contrives to think for himself. Just as a man's quality may in some respects be lowered by his habitual re- liance on the policeman and the soldier who relieve him from the trouble and the anxiety of self-defence, so his intellectual strength, and his means of knowing how to be just, may easily become impaired if he suffers himself to walk too obediently under the leading of a political writer.
But the ability of men engaged in political writing grew even more rapidly than the power to which they were attaining, and after a while, they so gained upon the ostensible statesmen that Par- liament no longer stood alone as the exponent of opinion, and was obliged to share its privilege with a number of gifted men whose names it could hardly ever liiid out.* Still, Parliament had valour and strength of its own, and, except in the matter of mere celebrity, it was a gainer
" In the ilays of which I write there was much more my.stery
thnii there is now as to the authorship of iiorioilical wiitings.
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 231
lather than a loser from the -wliolcsome rivahy chap.
XIV
forced upon it by its now and mysterious asso- '_
ciate. It was the public which lagged. Men commonly take a long time to adapt themselves to the successive advances of civilisation ; and the people were backward in fitting themselves to deal with the increasing ability and the increas- ing knowledge of the public writer. They indeed hardly knew the true scope of the change which liad been taking place ; for whilst the writer was a personage chosen for his skill, and acting with the force which belongs to discipline and organi- sation, the readers were men straying loose ; and for their means of acting in anything like concert with one another, they were dependent in a great degree upon that very engine of publicity which was fast usurping their power. jMoreover, these readers of public prints were slow to understand the new kind of duty which had come upon them. They were slow to see that it became them to look in a very critical spirit upon the writings of a stranger, unseen and unknown, who was not only proposing to guide them, but even to speak in their name ; and they did not yet understand that they ought to read print, not, perhaps, in a captious spirit, but, to say the least, with some- thing of the measured confidence which their forefathers had been accustomed to place in the "words of princes and statesmen. The blessing conferred by print will perhaps be complete when 'the diligence, the wariness, and, above all, the ■'courageous justice of those who read, shall be
232 ZEAL FOR AN
CHAP, brought into fair proportion with the skill and ^^^' the power of those who address them in print. Already a wholesome change has been wrought ; and if in these days a man goes chanting and chanting in servile response to a newspaper, he misses the voices of the tens of thousands of fellow-choristers who sang with him five years ago. But certainly, at the time of the Eussiau war, the common discourse of an Englishman was too often a mere 'Amen' to something he had seen in print.
For a long time there had remained to the general public a vestige of their old custom of thinking for themselves, because in last resort they were privileged to determine between the rival counsels pressed upon them by contending journalists ; but several years before the outbreak of the war, there had come yet another change. The apparatus provided by the constitution for collecting the opinions of the people was far from being complete; and notwithstanding the indica- tions afforded by Parliament and by public writ- ings, the direction which the nation's opinion had taken was a matter which could often be called in question. Some could say that the people desired one thing, and some, with equal boldness, that the people desired tlie contrary. Thence it came that the task of finding out the will of the nation, and giving to it a full voice and expres- sion, was undertaken by private citizens.
Long before the outbreak of the war, there were livinjr in some of the English counties certain
ATTACK OX SEBASTOPOL. 233
widows and Mntlemen who were the depositories chat.
XIV
of a power destined to exercise a great sway over '_
the conduct of the war. Their ways were peace- Js^ctruinh.g ful, and they were not perhaps more turned i','g thT'"' towards politics than other widows and country uiTcouiury gentlemen; but by force of deeds and testaments, )uinds°ofa'* by force of births, deaths, and marriages, they had *^°"'i''''"y- become the members of an ancient firm or Com- pany which made it its business to collect and disseminate news. They had so much good sense of the worldly sort, that, instead of struggling with one another for the control of their powerful engine, they remained quietly at their homes, and engaged some active and gifted men to manage the concern for them in London. The practice of the Company was to issue a paper daily, con- taining an account of what was going on in the world, together with letters from men of all sorts and conditions who were seeking to bring their favourite subjects imder the eye of the public, and also a few short essays upon the topics of the day. Likewise, upon paying the sum required by the Company, any person could cause what- ever he chose to be inserted in the paper as an ' advertisement ; ' and the sheet containing these four descriptions of matter was sold to the public at a low rate.
Extraordinary enterprise was shown by tlie Company in the gathering of intelligence ; aud during the wars following the French Revolution they caused their despatches from the Continent to reach them so early that they were able to
234 ZEAL TOR AN
CHAP, forestall the Government of the day. lu other - • countries the spectacle of a Government outdone in this way by private enterprise would have seemed a scandal ; out the Englishman liked the thought that he could buy and bring to his own home as much knowledge as was in the hands of a Minister of State, and he enjoyed the success of his fellow-countrymen in their rivalry with the Government. From this time the paper gathered strength. It became the foremost journal of the world ; and this was no sooner the case, than the mere fact of its being thus foremost gave a great acceleration to its rise ; fur, simply because it was recognised as the most public of prints, it became the clue with which anxious man went seeking in the maze of the busy world for the lost and the unknown, and all that was beyond his own reach. The prince who was claiming a kingdom, the servant who wanted a place, the mother who had lost her boy, they all went thither ; thither Folly ran hurrying, and was brought to a wholesome parley with Wisdom ; thither went righteous anger ; thither also went hatred and malice. And not in vain was all this concourse ; for either the troubled and angry men got the discipline of finding that the world would not listen to their cries, or else they gained a vent for their passions, and brought all their theories to a test by calling a whole nation — nay, by calling the civilised world — to hearken and be their witness. Over all this throng of appellants men unknown sat in judg- ment, and — v'ioleutly, perhaps, but never cor-
ATTACK OX SEBASTOPOL. 235
niptly — a roiigli sort of justice was done. The chap
style which Oriental hyperbole used to give to L
the Sultan might be claimed with more colour of truth by the journal. In a sense it was the ' asylum of the world.'
Still up to this point the Company occupied ground in common with many other speculators ; and if they had gone no further, it would not have been my province to notice the result of their labours ; but many years ago it had occurred to the managers of this Company that there was one important article of news which had not been effectually supplied. It seemed likely that, with- out moving from his fireside, an Englishman would be glad to know what the bulk of his fellow-countrymen thouglit upon the uppermost questions of the day. The letters received from correspondents furnished some means of acquir- ing this knowledge ; and it seemed to the man- agers of the Company, that at some pains, and at a moderate cost, it would be possible to ascertain the opinions which were coming into vogue, and see the direction in which the current would How. It is said that, with this intent, they many years ago employed a shrewd, idle clergyman, who made it his duty to loiter about in places of com- mon resort, and find out what people thought upon the principal subjects of the time. He was not to listen very much to extreme foolishness, and still less was he to hearken to clever people. His duty was to wait and wait until he observed that some ccmmon and obvious thouglit was
236 ZEAL FOK AX
CHAP, repeated in many places, and by numbers of men ^^^' who had probably never seen one another. That one common thought ^vas the prize he sought for, and he carried it home to his employers. He became so skilled in his peculiar calling that, as long as he served them, the Company was rarely misled ; and although in later times they were frequently baflled in their pursuit of this kind of knowledge, they never neglected to do what they could to search the heart of the nation.
When the managers had armed themselves with the knowledge thus gathered, they prepared to disseminate it, but they did not state baldly what they had ascertained to be the opinion of the country. Their method was as follows : they employed able writers to argue in support of the opinion which, as they believed, the country was already adopting ; and, supposing that they had been well informed, their arguments of course fell upon willing ears. Those who had already formed a judgment saw their own notions stated and pressed with an ability greater than they could themselves command ; and those who had not yet come to an opinion were strongly moved to do so when they saw the path taken by a Conipany which notoriously strove to follow the changes of the public mind. 1'iie report which the paper gave of the opinion formed by the public was so closely blended witli arguments in support of that same opinion, that he wlio looked at the paper merely to know what other people thought, was seized, as he read, by the cogency of the reason-
ATTACK OX SEBASTOPOL. 237
ing ; and, on the other haiul, he who imagined CHAP.
that he was being governed hy tlie ibrce of sheer L_
logic, was merel}^ obeying a guide who, by telling him that the world \vas already agreed, made him go and flock along with his fellows : for as the ntterance of a prophecy is sometimes a main step towards its fulfilment, so a rumour asserting that multitudes have already adopted a given opinion will often generate that very concurrence of thought which was prematurely declared to exist. From the operation of this double process it resulted, of course, that the opinion of tlie English public was generally in accord with the writings of the Company ; and the more the paper came to be regarded as a true exponent of the national mind, the more vast was the publicity which it obtained. Plainly, then, this printing Company wielded a great power; and if I have written with suf- ficient clearness, I have made it apparent that this was a power of more vast dimensions than that which men describe when they speak of ' the ' power of the Press.' It is one thing, for instance, to denounce a public man by printed arguments and invectives which are believed to utter nothing more than the opinion of the writers, and it is another and a graver thing to denounce him iu writings which, tliough having the form of argu- ments, are (rightly or wrongly) regarded as mani- festoes— as manifestoes declaring the judgment of the English people. In the one case the man is only accused ; in the other he seems to stand already condemned.
238 ZEAL FOR a:;
CHAP. But though the Company lield all this power,
' their tenure of it was of such a kind that they could not exercise it perversely or whimsically without doing a great harm to their singular trade ; for the whole scheme of their existence went to make them, not autocratic, but represen- tative, in their character ; and they were obliged, by the law of their being, to keep themselves as closely as they could in accord with the nation at large.
This, then, was the great English journal ; and whether men spoke of the mere printed sheet which lay upon their table, or of the mysterious organisation which produced it, they habitually called either one or the other 'The Times.' jMoreover, they often prefixed to the word such adjectives and participles as showed that they regarded the subject of their comments in the light of a sentient, active being, having a life beyond the span of moi-lal men, gifted with reason, armed with a cruel strength, endued with some of the darkest of the human passions, but clearly liable hereafter to the direst penalty of sin.*
* Tlie form of spcccli wliii;li thus impersonates a manufactory ami its wares has now so olitained in our laiigua^^c tliat, dis- carding the forcible cpitliets, one may venture to adopt in writ- ing, and to give 'The Times' the same place in grammatical construction as though it were the jirojjcr name of an angel or a hero, a devil or a saint, or a sinner already condemned. Custonr makes it good English to say: 'The "Times" will protect him;' 'The "Times" is savage ; ' 'The "Times" is crushing him;' 'The blessed "Times" has put the thing right;' 'That d d "Times" has done all the mischief.'
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 239
On the Sabbath, Ennkuid liad rest : but in the chap.
. XIV.
early morning of all other days the irrevocable L
words were poured forth and scattered abroad to the corners of the earth, measuring out honour to some, and upon others bringiug scorn and dis- grace. Where and with whom the real power lay, and what was its true source, and how it was to be propitiated, — these were questions wrap- ped in more or less obscurity ; for some had a theory that one man ruled, and some another, and some were sure that the Great Newspaper governed all England, and others that England governed the Newspaper, riiilosophic politi- cians traced events to what they called ' Public ' opinion.' With almost the same meaning women and practical men simply spoke of 'The Times.' ]]ut whether the power of the great journal was a power all its own, or whether it was only the vast shadow of the public mind, it was almost equally to' be dreaded and revered by worldly men : for plainly, in that summer of 1854, it was one with England. Its words might be wrong, but it was certain that to tens of thou- sands of men they would seem to be right. They might be the collected voice of all these isles, or the mere utterance of some one nnknown man sitting pale by a midnight lamp, — but there they were. They were the handwriting on the walk
Of the temper and spirit in which this strange power had been wielded, up to the time of the outbreak of the war, it is not very hard to speak. In general 'The Times' had been more willing to
240 ZEAL FOR AN
CHAP, lead the natiou in its tendencies to improvement
XIV. . . . than to follow in its errors : what it mainly sought
was — not to be much better or wiser tlian the English people, but to be the very same as they were — to go along with them in all their adven- tures, whether prudent or rash — to be one with them in their hopes and their despair, in their joy and in their sorrow, in their gratitude and in their anger. So, although in general it was willing enough to repress the growth of any new ])opular error which seemed to be weakly rooted, still the whole scheme and purpose of the Com- pany forbade it all thought of trying to make a stand against any great or general delusion. Upon the whole, the potentate dealt with Eng- land in a bluff, kingly, Tudor-like way, but also Avith a Tudor-like policy ; for though he treated all adversaries as 'brute folk' until they became formidable, he had always been careful to mark the growth of a public sentiment or opinion ; and as soon as he was able to make out that a cause was waxing strong, he went up and offered to lead it, and so reigned.
I have said that, partly by guiding, but more by ascertaining and following, the current of men's opinion, 'The Times' always sought to be one with the great body of the people; and fiince it happened that there was at this period a rare concurrence of feeling, and that the journal, after a good deal of experiment, had now at length thorouglily seized and embodied the soul of the nation, its utterance came with increasing force;
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 241
and ill proportion as the growing concord of the chap.
people enabled it to speak with more and more 1_
authority, power lapsed, and continued to lapse, from out of the hands of the government, until at length public opinion, no longer content to direct the general policy of the State, Avas prepar- ing to undertake the almost scientific, the almost technical duty of planning a campaign.
On the morning of the 15th of June, the great xiie opiuiou newspaper declared and said that ' The grand uon, asaV ' political and military objects of the war could coini.aiiy,
* not be attained as long as Sebastopol and the destmciiou
of Sebas-
' Eussian fleet were in existence ; but that, if topoL
* that central position of the Eussian power in ' the south of the empire were annihilated, the ' whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars ' of Eussia centuries to raise, must fall to the ' ground : ' and, moreover, it declared, ' that the
* taking of Sebastopol and the occupation of the ' Crimea were objects which would repay all the ' costs of the war, and would permanently settle ' in our favour the principle questions in dispute ; ' and that it was equally clear that those objects ' were to be accomplished by no other means — ' because a peace which should leave Eussia in ' possession of the same means of aggression ' would only enable her to recommence the war
* at her pleasure.'
It was natural that some of the members of the Government should have qualms. They knew that Austria (supported for defensive purposes by Prussia) was at that time on the point of joining
VOL. II. Q
242 ZEAL FOR AN
CHAP, her arms to those of the Western Powers: and
XIV
L_ they could not but know that if the French and
English armies were to be withdrawn from the mainland of Europe in order to invade the Crimea, the wholesome union of the Four Powers would of necessity be weakened. The Prime Minister M'as he who loved peace so fondly tliat, though peace M'as no more, he had hardly yet been torn . . from her cold embrace ; and though he lived ■ ■■'■ under a belief tliat the military strength of the "■''•'' Czar was beyond measure vast, yet of the twelve
-^- • months which Paissia gave him for preparation
he liad only used three.* Having the heaviness of these thoughts on his mind, he saw it declared aloud, that tlie country of which he happened to be the Prime Minister could not well do other- wise than invade tlie Eussian dominions. To a prudent man the measure might seem to be rash — to a good man impressed with horror of war, it might even seem to be very wicked ; for it was a violent revival of a war which, unless this new torch were thrown, would expire of its own accord. But the print was clear ; like stern Anangkie, it pressed ui)on feeble man's volition, for it was not to be construed away ; and if an anxious jMinister went back and looked again to see whether by chance he could find some loop in the wording,
• Computing from the time when the Czar's determination to seize the Princii)a]itics was known to our Government. If the computations are to ho made from tlie time wlicn the hos- tile character of Prince McntschikofTs mission became known, several months more would have to be added. See Lord Aber- deen's evidence before the Scbastopjl Committee.
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 243
and whether possibly he might be able to fulfil chap,
liis duty without besieging Sebastopol, he was !_
met by the careful negation which taught him in four plain words that he could fulfil it 'by no * other means.'
Before the seventh day from the manifesto of the 15th, the country had made loud answer to the appeal ; and on the 2 2d of June the great newspaper, informed with the deep will of the people, and taking little account of the fears of the prudent and the scruples of the good, laid it down that ' Sebastopol was the keystone of the ' arch which spanned the Euxine from tlie mouths ' of the Danube to the confines of Mingrelia,' and that 'a successful enterprise against the place ' was the essential condition of permanent peace.' And although this appeal was founded in part upon a false belief — a belief that the siege of Silistria had been raised — it seemed as though all mankind were making haste to adjust the world to the newspaper ; for within twenty hours from the publication of the 22d of June, truth obeyed the voice of false rumours, and followed in the wake of ' The Times.' *
Of course there were those who saw great ob- stacles in the way of the proposed invasion ; and they said that, since Russia was a first-rate mili- tary Power, it must be rash to invade her terri- tory and to besiege her proudest fortress, without first gaining some safe knowledge of the euemy'3
• The siege, as we saw above, was raised early on tlie morn- ing of the 23J.
244 ZEAL FOK AN
CHAP, strength. But the iiairative, then comiuf' home
XIV • '__ in fragments from the valley of the Danube, was
heating the minds of the people of England.
AVhen first England learnt that the Turks were to be besieged in their fortress of Silistria by a great Russian army under the renowned Paskie- vitch, few believed that the issue was doubtful, or even that the contest could be long sustained. But as soon as it became known that, day after day, the military strength of the Czar was exerted against the place with a violent energy, and that every attack was fiercely resisted, and always, as yet, with success, our people began to give their heart to the struggle ; and their eagerness rose into zeal when they heard that two young English travellers had thrown themselves into the for- tress, were heading the Turkish soldiery, and maintaining the defence day and night.
The English were not of such a mettle as to be able to hear of tidings like these without growing more and more eager for warlike adventure. And in their hearts they liked the fact, that the few young English travellers who helped to save Sil- istria, and to turn away the war from the Danube, were men who did these things of their own free will and pleasure, without the sanction of the public authorities ; for our ])eople are accustomed to think more highly of their fellow-countrymen individually than they do of our State machinery ; and they can easily bear to see their Government iji default, and can even smile at its awkwardness, if all the shortcomings of ofQce are effectually
ATTACK ON SEBASTOPOL. 245
compensated by the vigour of private enterprise, chap. Nasmyth has passed away from us. I knew ^^^' him in the Crimea. He was a man of quiet and gentle manners, and so free from vanity — so free from all idea of self-gratulation — that he always seemed as though he were unconscious of having stood as he did in the path of the Czar, and had really omitted to think of the share which he had had in changing the course of events; but it chanced that he had gone to the seat of war in the service of 'The Times,' and naturally the lustre of his achievement was in some degree shed upon the keen, watchful Company which liad had the foresight to send him at the right moment into the midst of events on which the fate of Eussia was hanging ; for whilst the State armies of France and England were as yet only gathering their strength, 'The Times' was able to say that its own officer had confronted the enemy upon the very ground he most needed to win, and helped to drive him back from the Danube in great discomfiture.
Thus, day after day in that month of June, the xiieoovere- authority of the Newspaper kept gaining and "'*'"* ^^^^"' gaining upon the Queen's Government; and if Lord Aberdeen had any remaining unwillingness to renew the war by undertaking an invasion of Russia, his power of controlling the course of the Government seems to have come to its end in the interval between the 23d and the 28th of June. He continued to be the Prime Minister. His personal honour stood so high that no man at-
2-lG OIIDERS AND TEErAl^ATIONS
CIIAP. tributed his continuance in office to otlier than
XIV . worthy and unselfish motives ; but for those who
lay stress upon the principle that office and power
ought not to be put asunder, it -was irksome to
have to mark the difTerence between what the
Prime Minister Avas believed to desire, and wliat
he was now consenting to do.
No good Parliament was sitting, and it might be im-
Btaiid made , , .
iuPariia- alined that there was something to say ajramst
inent against ° . ,. o ^ o
the invasion, the plan for invadiug a province of Eussia at a moment when all the main causes of the dispute were vanishing; but the same causes which I have spoken of as paralysing all resistance to the beginning of the war now hindered every attempt to withstand its renewal ; for the orators who were believed to be tainted with the doctrines of the Peace Party were still lying under the ban whicli they had brought upon themselves by their former excesses of language. So now again in June, as before at the opening of the session, the counsels of these eloquent men were lost to the world. They became as powerless as the Prime Minister ; and the cause which they represented was so utterly brought to ruin, that the popular demand for an invasion, which carried with it the virtual renewal of an otherwise expiring war, had the sound of that voice with which a nation speaks when the people are of one mind.
So now, in presenting to his colleagues this his favourite scheme of an enterprise against Sebas- topol, the Duke of Newcastle, with the strong Palmerston at his shoulder, was upheld, nay,
FOR THE INVASION. 247
urged and driven forward, by forces so over- CHAP. whelming, that scruples and objections and fears were carried away as by a flood ; and when it was proposed in the Cabinet to go and fetch, as it Avere, a new war, by undertaking this bold adven- ture, there was not one Minister present who re- fused to give his consent*
Forthwith the Duke of Newcastle announced preparation the decision of the Government to the General structi'dns commanding the English army in Bulgaria, He LrdKagiau. did this by a private letter written on the 28th of June,7 and nearly at the same time he prepared the draft of a Despatch,-}- which was to convey to the English headquarters, in full detail and in official form, the deliberate instructions of the Queen's Government. This paper constituted the instrument for meting out to the General in com- mand the allowance of discretion with which he was to be entrusted. A Despatch recommending Extreme im- the expedition, but leaving to the General in com- theianguaga mand the duty of determining whether it could uny wcie be prudently undertaken, would not have been worded, followed by any invasion of tlie Crimea; and that which brought about the event was, not the de- cision of the Cabinet already mentioned, but the peculiar stringency of the language which was to
* The sitting of tlie Cabinet which thus adopted the mo- mentous proposal to sanction an invasion of Crim Tartary took place in Downing Street on Tuesday the 27th of June, and lasted several hours. It was with anxious, with thoroughly wakeful care that our ministers weighed and determined the question then submitted to their judgment.
t The contents of this will he given in another chapter.
248 ORDERS AND TREPARATIONS
CHAP, convey it to the English headquarters.* It there- ^^^' fore seems right to speak of what passed when the terms of this cogent Despatch were adopted by Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet.
The Duke of Newcastle so framed the draft as to make it the means of narrowing very closely the discretion left to Lord Eaglan ; and it was to be expected that the Duke might wish his De- spatch to stand in this shape, because he was eager for the undertaking, and very willing to bear upon his own shoulders a large share of the responsibility which it entailed ; but it is difficult to believe that all the other members of the Gov- ernment could have intended to place the English General under that degree of compulsion which is implied by the tenor of the instructions. It is certain, however, that the paper was well fitted to elicit at once the objections of those who might be inclined to disapprove it on account of its co- gency ; for it confined the discretion to be left to the General with a precision scarcely short of harshness.
The Duke of Newcastle took the Despatch to Richmond, for there was to be a meeting of the members of the Cabinet at Pembroke Lodge, and he intended to make this the occasion for submit- ting the proposed instructions to the judgment of his colleagues.'!' It was evening — a summer even-
• The truth of tliis statement will lie sho\\Ti, as I thinlc, in R future chapter, and, indeed, it is well enough proved by the tfnnr of Lord Rafjlan's reply to the despatch.
+ Wednesday the 28th of June.
rOK THE INVASION. 249
ing — and all the members of the Cabinet were chap.
present, when the Duke took out the draft of his !_
proposed despatch and began to read it. Then there occurred an incident, very trifling in itself but yet so momentous in its consequences, that, if occurring under the Olympian Dispensation, it would have been attributed to the direct inter- vention of the immortal gods. In these days, perhaps, the physiologist will speak of the condition into which the human brain is nat- urally brought when it rests after anxious labours, and the analytical chemist may regret that he had not an opportunity of testing the food of which the Ministers had partaken, with a view to detect the presence of some nar- cotic poison ; but no well-informed person will look upon the accident as characteristic of the men whom it befell ; for the very faults, no less than the high qualities of the statesmen compos- ing Lord Aberdeen's Cabinet, were of such a kind as to secure them against the imputation of being careless and torpid. However, it is very certain that, before the reading of the paper had long con- tinued, all the members of the Cabinet, except a small minority, were overcome with sleep.* For a moment, the noise of a tumbling chair disturbed the repose of the Government; but presently the Duke of Newcastle resumed the reading of his draft, and then again the fated sleep descended upon the eyelids of Ministers. Later in the even- ing, and in another room, the Duke of Newcastle
* See Note in the Appendix.
250 OKDEUS AND PllEPARATIOJsS
CHAP, made anotlier and a last effort to wiu attention ^^' to the contents of the draft, Lut again a bliss- ful rest (not this time actual sleep) interposed between Ministers and cares of State ; and all, even those who from the first had remained awake, were in a quiet assenting frame of mind. Upon the whole, the Despatcli, though it bristled with sentences tending to provoke objection, received from tlie Cabinet the kind of approval which is often awarded to an unobjectionable sermon. Nob a letter of it was altered; and it will be seen by-and-by that that cogency in the wording of the Despatch which could hardly have failed to provoke objection from an awakened Cabinet, was the very cause which governed events.
instnictions The iustructions addressed from Paris to the
sent to the -r-. ^ i i • i i -i • i
Fruncii com- i rcuch commanuer did not urge him to propose the invasion of the Crimea, nor even to lend the weight of his opinion to the proposed enterprise ; but they forbade him from advancing towards the Danube. If it should be clear tliat the English were willing to undertake tlie expedition to the Crimea, then the Inench commander was jiot to be at liberty to hold back.*
* I (leiluco this conclusion, in an inferential way, from tlie general tenor of the materials at my command, and not froiu tkny one document distinctly warranting the statement.
FOK THE I^'VASION. 251
CHAPTER XV.
At tlie time when the instructions from the CHAP,
XV
Home Governments reached the camp of the
Allies, the Generals ^ye^e preparing for an active va^t""'**^ campaign in Bulgaria, and JMarshal St Arnand of prepay! had around him, in the neighbourhood of Varna muidie of* or moving thither, four strong divisions of infan- ^" try, -with cavalry and field-artillery. He had no siege-train.
Lord Eaglan had around him four divisions of infantry, the greater part of a division of cavalry, and of his field-artillery seven batteries. He had also on board ship off Yarna the half of a batter- ing-train, and the other half of it was nearly ready to be despatched from England.
The French Marshal was receiving and expect- ing constant additions to his force ; and Lord Eaglan had been apprised that a reserve division of infantry under Sir George Cathcart would speedily reach the Bosphorus.
So long as the French and English forces re- mained camped in the neighbourhood of Varna, tlieir command of the sea-communication insured
252 OKDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, to them the arrival of the supplies which were • sent to them; but the means of land -transport were not yet within their reach. It was estimated that, in order to move effectively in the interior, the English army alone would require packhorses or mules to the number of 14,000. To obtain these was difficult, but not impossible; and at the time to M'hich wo point, about 5000 had been collected. By a continuance of these exertions in Bulgaria, and by due activity in forwarding munitions and stores from England, it is probable that the English force, after a further interval of about six weeks or two months, might have been prepared to move as an army carrying on regular operations ; but of course this would only be true upon the supposition that the army should always march through countries yielding sufficient forage. The preparations of the French were not, per- haps, quite so far advanced as our own ; but it is probable that the two armies would have been found ready at about the same time for an active campaign in Bidgaria. Their coin- The sliips of the Allied Powers were at hand, and their fleets had dominion over all the Euxine home to the Straits of Kcrtch. They had the command of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, tlie Mediterranean, of the whole ocean ; and of all the lesser seas, bays, gulfs, and straits, from the Gut of Gibraltar to witliin sight of St Petersburg. The Czar's Black Sea fleet existed, but existed in close durance, shut up under the guns of Sebastopol.
mand of tlie Bea.
FOR THE INVASION. 253
In the matter of Ktiinii'^' iufoniiation respect- chap,
. XV
ing the enemy's resources, our Foreign Office
had not been idle ; and a great deal of material, obSCi"d by bearing upon this vital business, had been there omce"as'fo received, and collated. It resulted from these of tiie '^"'''^ data, that, spread over vast space, Paissia might nominally have under arms forces approaching to a million of men; but that the force in the Grim Chersonese, including the 17,000 men who formed the crews of the ships, did not, at the highest estimate, amount to more than 45,000 ; and that, although there were a few battalions which Eussia might draw towards Sebastopol from her army of the Caucasus, she had no more speedy method of largely reinforcing the Crimea than by availing herself of the troops then in retreat from the country of the Danube, and marching them round to Perekop, by the northern shores of the Euxine.
Neither the ambassadors of France and Eng- Noiuforma. land at Constantinople, nor any of their generals cd in Uie or admirals, had succeeded in obtaining for tliem- selves any trustworthy information upon this vitally momentous business. For their failure in this respect more blame attaches upon the am- bassadors than upon the military and naval com- manders ; because the ambassadors had been in the Levant during a period of many months, in which (since the war was impending, but not declared) they might have bought knowledge from llussian subjects without involving their infor- mers in the perils of treason. The duty of gather-
2u4 ORDEES AND PREPAEATIOXS
CHAP, iug knowledge by clandestine means is one so ^^' repulsive to the feelings of an English gentleman, that there is always a danger of his neglecting it, or performing it ill. Perhaps no two men could be less fit for the business of employing spies than Lord Stratford and Lord Eaglan. JNIore diligence might have been expected from the French, but they also had failed. Marshal St Arnaud had heard a rumour that the force of the enemy in the Crimea was 70,000, and Vice-Admiral Dundas had even received a statement that it amounted to 120,000; but these accounts were fables. In point of fact, the information obtained by our Foreign Office approached to near the truth, and the Duke of Newcastle had the firmness — it was a daring thing to do, but it turned out that he was right — he had the firmness to press Lord liaglan to rely upon it. It was natural, however, that a general stationed within a few hours' .sail Lord Raglan of the couutry lie was to invade, and yet unable thaulewas to obtaiu froui it any, even slight, glimmer of wHhout'a^ny knowledge should distrust information which had informauou. travelled round to him (through the aid of the Home Government) along the circumference of a vast circle ; and Lord Piaglan certainly con- sidered that, in regard to tlie strength of the enemy in the Crimea and the land defences of Sebastopo). he was simply without knowledge.
FOR THE INVASION. 255
CHAPTER XVI.
On the evening; of the loth of July Marshal St CIIAP.
XVI Arnaud received a telegraphic despatch from his L.
Government. The despatch had been forwarded tions"orTh«
by way of Belgrade, and was in cipher. The tiiec'rhnoa
P , , , Tr> i. c icacli the
message came in an imperiect state, iart or Aiued cai:»F. it was intelligible, but the rest was beyond all tlie power of the decipherer; yet the interpreted symbols showed plainly that the whole message, if only it could be read, would prove to be one of deep import. It forbade jNIarshal St Arnaud from making any advance towards the Danube, and told him to look to the event of his army being conveyed from Varna by the fleet. This was all that could be deciphered. There were the mystic letters and figures which laid down, as was sur- mised, the destiny of the Allied armies, and no one could read. At night Colonel Trochu came to Lord Raglan's quarters, and communicated all that could be gathered from the telegraphic despatch. The English General had just received the Duke of Newcastle's letter of the 28th, but had not vet broken the seal of it. Now, how-
2 5 6 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, ever, Lord lia<ilan opened the letter, and in a
XVI
. '__ few moments he was able to give M. Trochu the
means of inferring the niatter contained in the illegible part of his despatch. Apparently it was the desire of both the Home Governments that the Allied commanders should prepare to make a descent upon the Crimea and lay siege to Sebastopol.
On the 16th of July the despatch of the 29th
of June was received at the English headquarters;
and a despatch forwarded from Paris at nearly
the same time reached the hands of Marshal St
Arnaud.
The men Siucc tliG proposcd expedition involved the em-
determiiie ploymcut of both land and sea forces, the duty
efiect to he of determining upon the effect to be given to the
gh-en to tlie . • /< i i t i ±^ i
insii-uciions. lustructions Irom home devolved upon tliose who had the command of the Anglo-rrench armies and lleets. These were three: Marshal St Arnaud (having Admiral Hamelin under his orders), Lord Juiglan, and Vice-Admiral Dundas.
Marsii.'ii St Marshal St Arnaud had not weight propor- lioned to the magnitude oi las connnand. Ke- puted at first to be daring even to the verge of rashness, we have seen him so cautioned and schooled into strategic prudence as to have deter- mined to place hundreds of miles of territory, and even the great range of the Balkan, between the French and the Kussians ; and now, within the last week, he had been almost reproved by his Covcrnment for want of enterprise. Colonel Trochu, admitted into consultation upon the most
FOR THE INVASION. 257
momentous affairs, seemed to wield great author^ chap ity. At Constantinople and at Varna, no less ^^^- than in Paris, the Marshal had been made the vic- tim of unsparing tongues. Indeed at this time two of his divisional generals openly indulged in merciless invectives against their chief: and soldiers all know that a general officer thus setting himself against the commander-in-chief is never without a great following. Perhaps, as had been at first supposed, it may have been true that boldness and craving for adventure were the true lines of the Marshal's character ; but if that were so, his native ideas had been overlaid by much counsel, and bent into unwonted shapes. After a while, as will be seen, his mind, fatigued by advice, and now and then broken down by bodily illness, began to lapse into a state which rendered him almost passive in very critical moments. ISTaturally, he had been cowed by the result of his endeavours to have his own way against Lord Stratford and Lord Eaglan. He was without ascendancy in the camp of the Allies.
Colonel Troclm was a student of the principles applicable to formal inland warfare, and it miglit well be expected that, the more the obstacles to the proposed undertaking were canvassed, the more he would throw the weight of his scientific advice into the negative scale.
Upon the whole, it resulted, from the composi- tion of the various forces acting upon the mind of M. St Arnaud, that, whatever opinion he might lean to, he was not strong enough to be able to
VOL. u. a
258 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
ciiAP. act upon events. If the English should decide ^^^' against the project, he would be well content, and perhaps much relieved. If, on the other hand, the English should press for its adoption, then the French Marshal would do his best to carry it to a good conclusion.
Admiral The French fleet was commanded by Admiral
Hamelin. It was understood that he disapproved the expedition, but being under the orders of Mar- shal St Arnaud, he had not of course the weight that his voice might have otlierwise carried.
Omar Pasha. It was Hot at that time a part of the project to move any very large proportion of the Turkish army to the coast of the Crimea, and therefore the opinion of Omar Pasha would hardly become a governing ingredient in the counsels of the Allies. It was known, however, that he depre- cated the proposed invasion.
Admiral The English fleet was commanded by Vice-
Admiral Dundas. Most of the Vice-Admiral's latter years had been passed in political and official life, and it was by force of politics that he had now become troubled with the business of war ; for his seat at the Admiralty Board, and his subsequent appointment in peace-time to the command of the INIediterranean fleet, were things which stood in the relation of cause and effect. He had not sought to return to scenes of naval strife, but the war overtook him in his marine retirement, converting his expected repose into anxious toil. He was an able, a steadfast, a genial man, and his square Scottish head, and hia
Dandas.
FOR THE INVASION. 259
rough, shrewd, good-humoured eyebrows, had chap.
grown grey in the faithful service of a political 1,
party. By nature, he was so stout-hearted that he could afford to give free, manly counsel with- out the least dread lest men should say he was too cautious. His habits as a working, subor- dinate member of Government, and perhaps, also, his natural temperament, inclined him to take a homely view of questions — a view recommended by what men term ' common sense.' I am sure, though I never heard him say so, that he believed the war to be extremely foolish, and that the less there was of it, the better it would be for the Whigs, and for all the rest of mankind. He spoke and went straight forward. He thoroughly dis- approved the project of invasion, and he said so in plain words. His opinion sprang, not from dread of peril to the forces which he himself com- manded, but from anxiety — anxiety in every way honourable to him — for the safety of the English army. That that anxiety was altogether vain, or even that it was weakly founded, few men, speak- ing with tlie light of the past, will be ready to say. Still less will it be thought that the Vice- Admiral was wrong in giving bold expression to his views. Admiral Dundas's command was one quite independent of the General in command of the English army; but, the feasibility of the sea- transit not being in question,* it was plain
* Dundas, I think, said faii-ly and bluntly, that he could undertake to land the army on the coast of the Crimea, but that he did not at all make sure of being able to supply it, or to bring it back.
2C0
ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. XVI.
Lord Raglan.
The instruc- tions ad- dressed to him by the Home Gov- ernment.
that the decision would properly rest with those who were responsible for the direction of the land-forces. So, although he held stoutly to his own opinion, the Vice-Admiral did not fail to give assurance that, if the decision of the Gen- erals should be in favour of undertaking the ex- pedition, they might rely upon the aid of the English fleet.
There remained Lord Eaglan: and now it is time to give the words of the instructions which had been addressed to him, as we have already seen, by the Secretary of State.
The private letter which was the forerunner of the detailed despatch ran thus : —
' Since I last wrote to you, events unknown •' to you at the date of these letters have been ' brought to us by the telegraph, and the raising ' the siege of Silistria, and the retreat of the ' Eussian army across the Danube (preparatory, ' probably, to a retreat across the Pruth), give an ' entirely new aspect to the war, and render it ' necessary at once to consider what shall be our ' next move.
'The Cabinet is unanimously of opinion that, ' unless you and jMarshal St Arnaud feel that you ' are not sufficiently prepared, you should lay ' siege to Sebastopol, as we are more than ever ' convinced that, wiiliout the reduction of this ' fortress and the capture of the raissian fleet, ' it will be impossible to conclude an honourable ' and safe peace. The Emperor of the French has * expressed his entire concurrence in this opinion,
FOR THE INVASION. 261
* and, / helicvc,^ lias written privately to the Mar- chap. ' shal to tliat effect. I sliall submit to the Cabinet _^*_. ' a despatch to you on this subject, and if it is
' approved you may expect it by the next mail. ' In the mean time I hope you will be turning ' over in your own mind, and considering with
* your French colleague, what it will be safe and ' advisable to do.' t
The promised despatch was in these words : —
' Secret.
' War Department, 2Wi June 1854.
' My Lord,
' In my despatch of the 10th April, marked ' " Secret," I directed your Lordship to make
* careful inquiry into the amount and condition ' of the Eussian force in the Crimea, and the ' strength of the fortress of Sebastopol.
' At the same time I pointed out to your
* Lordship that, whilst it was your first duty to ' prevent, by every means in your power, the ' advance of the Eussian army on Constantinople, ' supposing any such intention to exist, it might ' become essential for the attainment of the ob- ' jects of the war to undertake operations of an ' offensive character, and that the heaviest blow ' which could be struck at the southern extremi- ' ties of the Eussian empire would be the taking
* I need liardly saj' tliat tlie lUKlerscoving represented Ly these Italics appears iu the original note.
+ Private letter from tlie Duke of Newcastle to I.orJ Raglan, dated 28th June 1854.
262 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, 'or destruction of Sebastopol. The events which
XVI
' have recently occurred, and which have become
' known to Her Majesty's Government by means ' of the telegraph from Belgrade, — the gallant and ' successful resistance of the Turkish army— the ' raising of the siege of Silistria — the retreat of ' the Eussian army across the Danube, and the ' anticipated evacuation of the Principalities, — ' have given a new character to the war, and will ' render it necessary for you without delay to con- ' cert measures with Marshal St Arnaud, and with ' Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, suited to the
* circumstances in which these events have placed
* the Allied forces.
' The safety of Constantinople from any inva-
* sion of the Russian army is now, for a time at ' least, secured ; and the advance of the English ' and French armies to Varna and Pravadi has ' succeeded in its object, without their being ' called upon to meet the enemy in action.
' Any further advance of the Allied armies
* should on no account be contemplated. To ' occupy the Dobrutscha would be productive ' of no beneficial results, and would be fatally ' prejudicial to the health of the troops ; and ' even if the Russian army should not recross the ' Pruth, but continue in the occupation of the ' Principalities, it is the decided opinion of Her ' Majesty's Government that, for the present at ' least, no measures should be taken by you to ' dislodge them.
' The circumstances anticipated in my despatch
FOR THE INVASION". i!63
before referred to have, therefore, now arrived ; chap. and I have, on the part of Her Majesty's Gov- ^^^' ernment, to instruct your Lordship to concert measures for the siege of Sebastopol, unless, with the information in your possession but at present unknown in this country, you should be decidedly of opinion that it could not be under- taken with a reasonable prospect of success. The confidence with which Her Majesty placed under your command the gallant army now in Turkey is unabated ; and if, upon mature reflec- tion, you should consider that the united strength of the two armies is insufficient for this under- taking, you are not to be precluded from the exercise of the discretion originally vested in you, though Her Majesty's Government will learn with regret that an attack, from which such important consequences are anticipated, must be any longer delayed.
' The difficulties of the siege of Sebastopol appear to Her Majesty's Government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay ; and as there is no prospect of a safe and honour- able peace until the fortress is reduced and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is, on all accounts, most important that nothing but insuperable impediments — such as the want of ample pre- parations by either army, or the possession by Eussia of a force in the Crimea greatly out- numbering that which can be brought against it — should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations.
264 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. ' This decision should be taken solely with '^^^^' ' reference to the means at your disposal, as
* compared with the difficulties to be overcome.
' It is probable that a large part of the Russian ' army now retreating from the Turkish territory ' may be j)oured into the Crimea to reinforce ' Sebastopol. If orders to this effect have not ' already been given, it is further probable that
* such a measure would be adopted as soon as ' it is known that the Allied armies are in ' motion to commence active hostilities. As all ' communications by sea are now in the hands of
* the Allied Powers, it becomes of importance ' to endeavour to cut off all communication by ' land between the Crimea and the other parts of ' the ItiiRsian dominions. This would be effectu-
* ally done by the occupation of the Isthmus of ' Perekop ; and I would suggest to you that, ' if a sufficient number of the Turkish army ' can now be spared for this purpose, it would ' be highly important that measures should be ' taken without delay for sending an adequate ' force to that point, and associating with the ' troops of the Sultan such English and French ' officers as would assist, by their advice, in ' holding permanently the position. Witli the ' same object, important assistance might be ' rendered by Admiral Dundas, if he has yet ' been able to obtain any vessels of a light • draught whicli would ])revent the passage of ' Russian troops to the Crimea through the Sea ' of Azov.
FOR THE INVASION. 265
'It is unnecessary to express any opinion, at chap. ' this distance from tlie scene, as to the mode in __1__1_ ' which these operations should be conducted, or ' the ])lace at whicli a disembarkation should be ' effected ; and as the latter will, of course, be ' decided with the advice and assistance of the ' French and English Admirals, it is equally un- ' necessary to impress upon your Lordship the ' importance of selecting favourable weather for * the purpose, and avoiding all risks of being ' obliged by storms to withdraw from the shore ' the vessels of war and transports when only a ' partial landing of the troops has been effected.
' I will not, in this despatch, enter into any ' consideration of the operations which it would ' be desirable to undertake in Circassia or the ' coast of Abasia. The reduction of tlie, two I'e- ' maining fortresses of Anapa and Sujak Kaleh ' would be, next to the taking of Sebastopol, of ' the greatest importance, as bearing upon the ' fortunes of the war ; but not only is their fall ' of far less moment than tliat of Sebastopol, but ' the capture of the latter might possibly secure ' the surrender of the Circassian fortresses.
' In the event, ho^^•ever, of delay in undertaking ' these operations being inevitable, and the trans- ' ports being in consequence available for any ' other service, I wish you to consider, with liis ' Highness Omar Pasha and jNFar.shal St Arnaud, ' whether some part of the Turkish army might ' not be conveyed by steam from Varna, and, by ' a combined movement with the forces of Gen-
266
ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. XVI.
' eral Guyon and Schamyl, so entrap the Eussian ' army in and around Tiflis as to compel its sur- ' render to superior numbers.
' I have only further to express to you, on the
' part of Her Majesty's Government, their entire
' reliance in your judgment, zeal, and discretion;
' and their conviction that, whilst you will not
' expose the army under your command to un-
' necessary risk, you will not forget that to the
' gallantry and conduct of your troops their
' countrymen are now looking to secure, by the
* blessing of Providence, the great object of a
' just war, the vindication of national rights, and
' the future security of the peace of Europe.
' I have the honour to be,
' ;My Lord,
' Your Lordship's obedient humble servant,
' Newcastle.'
'General the Lord Raglan, G.C.B., * &c. &c. &c. '
Extreme stringency of the in- •tructions.
In common circumstances, and especially where tlic whole of the troops to be engaged are un- der one commander, it cannot be right for any Sovereign or any Minister to address such in- structions as these to a General on a distant shore ; for the General wlio is to be entrusted with the sole command of a great expedition must be, of all mankind, the best able to judge of its military prudence, and to give him orders thus cogent is to dispense with his counsel.
But in this war the united forces of France
FOR THE INVASION. 267
and England were under two commanders; and, chap.
. . XVI besides, since the expedition was dependent upon !_
naval co-operation, the Admirals of the two fleets tions't!fndi"ng
would necessarily be taken into council. It is thii"strm-
true that the French Admiral was under the ^^"''^'
orders of Marshal St Arnaud, but there was no
corresponding arrangement in regard to the
English services, and our Admiral's command
was independent of the General commanding
the land-forces.
Thus it seemed to the Home Government that the question, if left to be decided on the shores of the Black Sea, would have to be weighed, not by one commander, but by a council of at least four, and to be actually decided by a council of not less than three ; and it could scarcely be expected that such a body, deliberating freely, would come to that vigorous decision which might easily perhaps be attained by any one of them singly. On the other hand the two Govern- ments were perfectly agreed. Upon the whole, therefore, there was some ground for resolving to transmit to the camps at Varna the benefit of that concord which reigned between Paris and London, and to subject the Generals and Admirals to the overruling judgment of the authorities at home.
Again, the chief reason which makes it unwise to fetter the discretion of Generals— namely, the superior knowledge which they are supposed to have of the enemy's strength and of the field of operations — was in this instance wanting ; for the
268 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. Generals in the camp at Varna liad absolutely no
XVI. . ^ trustworthy information except what came to
them from Paris or London ; and in their power of testing the statements which readied them in this way they were below the Home Govern- ments, for they did not so well know the sources from which the accounts were drawn.
Justice requires that these considerations should have their weight, for they tend in some measure to explain the extreme stringency of the instruc- tions. The Minister who framed them had deter- mined, with a boldness very rare in modern times, to take upon himself an immense weight of responsibility ; and, having brought himself to tliis strong resolve, he rightly and generously did all he could to simplify the task of the Genera' whom he ventured to direct, and to make the path of duty seem clear. Thcpowerof But Lord Raglan had a station in the Allied
deciding for i-i i- t/vip itt
or against camp whicli made it very difficult lor the Home
the expedi- , i i • i i i i
tionbecornos Government to take his burthen ui)on themselves
practically
vested in by aiiy mere bold form of words. He commanded
l.or.l Haglati • -^
alone. the land-forccs, but he was clothed with a power
of older date than the Queen's commission. He had been privy to the business of the wars which England waged in tlie great days ; and if he had seen how Wellington ordered affairs in the field, lu! had witnessed too his endurance, and helped him in the patient, unapplauded toil by wliicli Ik; ])roi)ai'od the end. Men serving under Lord Kaglan were none of them blind to the distance which History herself interposed betwixt their
FOR THE INVASION. 2G9
General and themselves. There were none near chap
XVI
the chief who would not feel bitter jDain if they __! 1_
imagined that words or acts of tlieirs had thrown upon his face a shadow of displeasuie. There were no men near him who would not fly with alacrity to execute his slightest wish. The ascendancy of the English General over his own people could not but reach into the French camp. Upon the whole, Lord Raglan had so great an authority in the camp of the Allies, and amongst public men in England, that if he had taken upon himself to resist the pressure of the Secretary of State, he would not have been left witliout support. On the other hand, if he should determine to follow the will of the Home Government, he would carry the French Marshal with him. So, in effect, the power of deciding for or against the expedition had passed from Paris and from London, and was all concen- trated in the English General.
Of the general officers in the English camp Lord nag- there was one whom Lord Eaglan had always liberations been anxious to have near at hand : this was Sir George Brown. He was a Scotsman, sixty-four years old, and had served, with a great repute for his daring forwardness, in some of the most bloody scenes of the Peninsular War. He was of an eager fiery nature, and devoted to the call- ing of a soldier. After the peace of 1815 he began to hold office in the general staff of the army at the Horse Guards, and in time he be- came Adjutant-General. He- now commanded the
Brown.
270 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. Light Division. His zeal, and his lengthened
1_ toils in the Adjutant-General's office, had drawn
him too far in a narrow path, and he overplied the idea of discipline; but he abounded in en- ergy, and he was in many respects an accom- plished soldier. He wrote on military subjects with clearness, with grace, and seemingly with a good deal of ease. He requests After receiving the Duke of Newcastle's de- of ir/G^orge spatcli Lord Raglan sent for Sir George Brown, and expressed to him a wish to have his opinion about it. He handed the paper to Sir George across the table, and then went on with his writing, leaving Sir George to consider its con- tents at his leisure. When he had read it. Lord Eaglan asked him to give him his opinion. Before giving it, Sir George naturally inquired what information Lord Eaglan had obtained in regard to the strength of Sebastopol, and what force he expected might be opposed to him in the Crimea. Lord Eaglan's answer was, that he had no information whatever; that neither he nor Mar- shal St Arnaud knew what amount of force the enemy had there ; that they believed and hoped there might not be more than 70,000 men in the peninsula; but that, in fact, it had not been blockaded, and that no means had been taken to procure information, and that, therefore, they did not in reality know they might not be opposed by 100,000 men, or even more.
Then Sir George Brown said: 'You and 1 are * accustomed, when in any great difiiculty, or
FOR THE INVASION. 271
when any important question is proposed to chap.
us, to ask ourselves how the Great Duke woukl L
have acted and decided under similar circum- stances. Now, I tell your Lordship that, with- out more certain information than you appear to have obtained in regard to this matter, that great man would not have accepted the respon- sibility of undertaking such an enterprise as that which is now proposed to you ! But, not- withstanding that consideration, I am of opinion that you had better accede to the proposal and come into the views of the Government, for this reason, that it is clear to me, from the tenor of the Duke of Newcastle's letter, that they have made up their minds to it at home, and that, if you decline to accept the responsibility, they will send some one else out to command the army who will be less scrupulous and more ready to come in to their plans.' * This suggestion did not at all govern Lord LordRag- Eaglan's decision. -f* At the time he disclosed no tenmnatioB opinion of liis own ; but he soon made up his mind. His decision was governed by views
* One of my critics imagined that this piece of counsel was the work of tlie Author's ' ingenious ' fancy, and remonstrated with iiim for carrying his love of ridicule to the extreme lengtli of putting 'unmitigated nonsense' in the mouth of a 'gallant ' and sensible ' old soldier like Sir George Brown ; but the words attributed to Sir George Brown in the text are copied, with- out the change of a word, from a written narrative of tlie con- ference, which was handed to me by Sir George Brown him- self.
+ All who were acquainted with Lord Raglan's nature will acknowledge, I think, that his mind would liave refused ti
272 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, which must be explained. He believed that the '_ enterprise was one of a very hazardous kind, and
was not warranted by any safe information con- cerning the state of the enemy's forces. Having that conviction, why did he not feel bound to assert it, notwithstanding the urgency of the Home Government ? Lord Eaglan was, as might be supposed, deeply imbued with reverence for TiioRiounds the authority of the Duke of Wellington; and,
on wUieh it ... . , , , . . . '
rested. rightly interpreted, that authority is surely the safest guide that an English general can follow. But there is a certain danger in the precepts of the Great Duke, unless when they are construed down to their right degree of significance by applying to them the splendid context of his deeds ; for he was accustomed to use sayings founded on quaint and very literal readings of our English law ; and tlie loyalty of his nature rose so high above the reach of all cavil, that the maxims which he uttered seemed to give a noble simplicity to the tenor of his public life, though in reality he rarely or never permitted them to derange his policy, still less to confuse him in the management of war. Naturally, therefore, men were in danger of being misled by a too narrow
harbour, for one instant, tlie notion .subniittcd to liini by Sir George P)ro\vii — tlic notion of engaging liis army in an impru- dent undertaking from an apprehension of linding himself superseded in the command by some one less scrupulous and more ready to come in to the plans of the Government.
Lord Raglan, after this conference, was, I think, less inclined than before to single out Sir George Brown as the one man with whom to consult upon affairs of great moment.
FOR THE INVASION. 273
reading of liis precepts. Now, one of the Duke's theories was, that an officer commanding an army on foreign service owed obedience to the Secretary of State — obedience close akin to that which a military subordinate owes to his military chief. If this precept were to be narrowly construed, a Secretary of State who conveyed the wishes of the Government to a general commanding forces abroad would be in danger of finding that he had shut out from his counsels the one man in all the world who could best advise him ; and the lela- tions of the Austrian generals with the old Aulic Council at Vienna would have to be adopted as a guide, instead of being valued as a warning. Against this doctrine, understood in its narrow sense, the Duke of Wellington's whole military career in Europe was an almost unceasing rebel- lion ; and it would be hard to find an instance in which he suffered his designs to be bent awry by the military opinions of the Home Government. During the Peninsular War he did not surely pass his time in obeying the Home Government, but rather in setting it right, and in educating it, if so one may speak, for the business of carrying on war.*
* The fierce, wilful, and contemptuous way in wliicli the Duke of Wellington dealt with a Secretary of State who ven- tured to think he might take him at his word, and make him obey his wish, must be familiar to every reader of the De- spatches ; but I may refer to the specimen which will be found in Sir Arthur Welleslcy's letter to Lord Castlereagh of the 5th *f September 1 808. I mean the passage beginning ' In respect ' to your wish that I should go into the Astiirias, to examine VOL. IT. S
CHAP. XVL
274 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. It is knowiij however, that Lord Eaglaii ac- • cepted the Great Duke's precept without much qualification ; and when lie a})plied it to the de- spatch which had come to him from the Secretary of State, he saw, as he believed, where the path of duty lay; for now, in all its potency, the strange sleep which had come upon the Cabinet on the 28th of June began to tell upon events. But for this, or some like physical cause, it could hardly have chanced that fifteen men, all gifted with keen intellect, and all alike charged with a grave, nay, an almost solemn duty, would have knowingly assented to the draft of a long and momentous despatch, without seeking to wedge into it some of those qualifying words which usually correct the imprudence and derange the grammatical structure of writings framed in Council. A few qualifying words of this sort would have enabled Lord Eaglan to act upon his own opinion. But the tranquil mood of the Cabinet on the evening of the 28th of June had prevented the mutilation of the despatch ; and it retained so perfectly all that bold single- ness of purpose which characterised the mind of the framer, that it virtually directed the Eng-
' the country and form a judgment of its strength, I have to ' mention to you that I am not a draughtsman.' It happened that, just six days before — namely, on the 30th of August — Sir Arthur liad addressed to the same Secretary of State his customary professions of obedience : — ' I shall do whatever the ' Government may wish ; ' but he never thought of suffering himself to be hindered from penning an angry refusal on the 5th of September merely because he had used a submissive phrase on the 30th of August.
FOR THE INVASION. 275
lish General to undertake the invasion, unless chap. it should happen that he had obtained fresh ^^^-^ knowledge of the enemy's strength — fresh know- ledge of such a kind as would enable him to controvert the statements sent out to him by the Home Government, and say distinctly that the Eussian forces in the Crimea were too numerous to be encountered with common prudence by the Allied armies. Now, Lord Eaglan had not suc- ceeded in obtaining any information at all on the subject, and, therefore, the one circumstance which might have relaxed the stringency of the despatch was entirely wanting. In the state of things which actually existed, the Duke of New^- castle's communication was little short of an absolute order from the Secretary of State. The English General determined to obey it.
It was thus that Lord Eaglan persuaded him- self into the belief that he would be justified in foregoing his own opinion, and acceding to the will of the Home Government ; but perhaps, though he knew it not, he was under the power of a motive more heating than this bare process of the reason. There were sentences in the de- spatch which seemed as though they were meant for the guidance of one not sufficiently prone to action. The writer seemed to have busied him- self in closing the loops by which a general might seek to escape from the obligation of hav- ing to make the venture. In reality, as we have seen, the despatch had been framed with a view of giving unanimity to a council of generals
276 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, and admirals, but it reached its destination at a
XVI 1_ time when (for the purpose of this decision) the
whole power of the camp at Varna was centred in the English General. Whether meant for tlie guidance of a council or not, the despatch was addressed to one man — and that man was Lord liaglau. Some may deem it wrong, and may call it a plan of life too closely deriving from times of chivalry ; but it is still the habit of the English gentleman to think that his personal honour is no part of the property of the State, and that even, for what may seem the public good, he ought not to do a violence to his self-respect. He has his code formed in the time of his boyish conflicts or of his early manhood; and if there be fire and strength in Ids nature, he will not depart from it merely because he has become responsible and mature in years. Lord liaglun was of the bodily nature of those whose blood Hushes hot to the face under the sting of an indignant thought ; and if mortal eyes could have looked upon him when he revolved the contents of the despatch, they would have seen him turn crimson in poising the question whether he ought to resist the pressure of the Queen's Government, — and to resist be- cause of mere danger. AVhat the Duke of New- castle meant was to do all he reasonably could to enforce the invasion ; and, so intending, he did honestly in making his order as peremptory as possible ; but if, in any times to come, it shall be intended that an English general commanding ou a foreign service is to exercise his judgment
FOR THE INVASION. 277
freely and without passion, the Secretary of State chap. must not challenge him as Lord Eaglan was ^^^' challenged by the despatch of the 29th of June.
Lord Eaglan's decision governed the counsels His decision of the Allied camp ; for although the Staff of the counsels of
-P, , */-iT TIT Tn-r. the Allies
Jbrench army* (mchidiug, as 1 believe, JNl. fet Arnaud himself) were averse to the undertaking, the Marshal's instructions were so framed that, if the English should be ready to go forward, he was virtually ordered to concur in the enter- prise ; -f- and we have seen that he had not such a weight in the French camp as would have enabled him to oppose any valid resistance to the wishes of his own Government and the determination of the English General.
In announcing his decision to the Home Hean- Government, Lord Eaglan thus wrote to the to the iiome Duke of Newcastle : — ment.
'It becomes my duty to acquaint you that
* it was more in deference to the views of the ' British Government as conveyed to me in your ' Grace's despatch, and to the known acquiescence ' of the Emperor Louis Napoleon in those views, ' than to any information in the possession of the ' naval and military authorities, either as to the ' extent of the enemy's forces, or their state of ' preparation, that the decision to make a descent
* upon the Crimea was adopted.
* This will be shown b\- the narrative contained in a subse- quent chajitcr.
t Lord Raglan had the advantage of knowing (by means of a communication from Lord Cowley) that the ' Emiieror quite ' concurred in the views of th'^ British Cabinet.'
278 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. 'The fact must not be concealed that neither ^^^- ' the English nor the French Admirals have been
* able to obtain any intelligence on which they ' can rely with respect to the army which the
* Eussians may destine for operations in the field, ' or the number of men allotted for the defence of ' Sebastopol ; and Marshal St Arnaud and myself ' are equally deficient in information upon these ' all-important questions, and there would seem ' to be no chance of our acquiring it.'*
The Duke of The Dukc of Newcastle's reply to this despatch repTy. was in full consistency with that fearless and un-
shrinking assumption of responsibility which had marked his instructions of the 29th of June.
' I wish,' he writes, t 'that circumstances which ' are engrossing my attention this afternoon per- ' mitted my expressing to you the feelings of in- ' tense anxiety and interest which your reply of ' the 19th of July to mine of the 29th of June ' have created in my mind. I cannot help seeing, ' through the calm and noble tone of your an-
* nouncement of the decision to attack Sebastopol, ' that it has been taken in order to meet the views ' and desires of the Government, and not in entire
* accordance with your own opinions. God grant
* that success may reward you, and justify us !
* I wrote to the Queen the moment I received
* your despatch, and in answer she said : " The
* " very important news wliicli he conveyed to
* " her in it, of the decision of the Generals and
• 19th July.
t Private luUcr to Lonl Raglan, 3d August 1854.
FOR TlIK INVASION. 279
" Admirals to attack Sebastopol, have filled the chap. " Queen with mixed feelings of satisfaction and ^^^' " anxiety. May the Almighty protect her army Jx^r^ssfn ' " and her fleet, and bless this great undertaking of feeling. " with success ! "
' Let me add my humble aspirations and prayers to those of our good Queen. The cause is a just one, if any war is just ; and I will not believe that in any case British arms can fail. INfay honour, victory, and the thanks of a grateful world attend your efforts ! God bless you and those who fight under you ! '
280 OUDEliS AKJJ PllEPAKATiONS
CHAPTER XVII.
CHAP. On the 18th of July a conference took place at
XVII
]\Iarshal St Arnaud's headquarters. It was at-
couference tended by the Marshal, by Lord Eaglan, and by Jm^^^rs'"'^' Admiral Hamelin, by Admiral Bruat (who was the second in command of the French fleet), by Vice-Admiral Dundas, and by Eear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, who was the second in command of the English fleet. It lasted four hours.
Perhaps most of the members of the conference imagined that they were met for the purpose of determining upon the expediency of undertaking the invasion ; but Lord Eaglan had already determined — not merely to support the wish of his Government in the Allied camp, but — to cause its actual adoption ; and he was so constituted that he could bring the resources of liis mind to bear upon the object in view with as much iibuiidance and slreiigtli as if ]\o. liad liimself approved or even devised it. Clearly a discussion upon the expediency of undertaking tlie enter- prise would have been fatal to it ; for no member of the conference, except Lyons and (]')0ssibly)
FOR THE INVASION. 281
Briiat, could have couscientiously argued that the chap.
scheme was wise or even moderately prudent. L
How was it to be contrived that a council of war, disapproving the enterprise, should be prevented from strangling it ?
As almost always happened in conferences Loni uag-
■> ri. ],,j, J. way ol
where Lord Raglan had the ascendant, the grand eluding ob- question was quietly passed over, as though it were either decided or conceded for the purpose of the discussion, and it was made to seem that the duty which renuiinud to the council was that of determining the time and the means. The French had studied the means of disembarking in the face of a powerful enemy. Sir Ealph Aber- cromby's descent upon the coast of Egypt in the face of the French army was an enterprise too brilliant and too daring to allow of its being held a safe example, for he had simply landed his in- fantry upon the beach in boats, without attempt- ing, in the first instance, to bring artillery into action. It seems that hardly any stress of cir- cumstances will induce a French general to bring his infantry into action upon open ground with- out providing for it the support of artillery. Naturally, therefore, the French authorities at Varna were impressed with the necessity of be- ing able to land their field-guns in such a way as to admit of their being brought into action simultaneously with the landing of their battal- ions ; and, having anticipated some time before that a disembarkation in the face of an enemy might be one of the operations of the war, they
282 ORDEKS AND PlIEPAKATIONS
CHAP, had already begun to make the boats required for ^^^' the purpose. These were flat-bottomed lighters, somewhat in the form of pimts, but of great size, and so constructed that they would receive the gun-carriages with the guns ujDon them, and allow of the guns being run out straight from the boat to the beach. It was understood that the build- ing of these fiat lighters would take about ten days ; and it was determined that, in the mean- time, a survey of the coast near Sebastopol should be made from on board ship, in order to determine the spot best suited for a descent. Bcconnais- With a vicw to covcr the recoimaissance and coast. draw off the enemy's attention, the Allied Ad-
mirals cruised with powerful fleets in front of the harbour of Sebastopol ; and meanwhile the officers chosen for the service went northward along the coast in the Fury, seeking out the best place for a landing. The officers of the land-service who performed this duty were, on the part of the French, General Canrobert and Colonel Trochu, with one engineer and one artillery officer ; and on the part of the English, Sir George Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel Lake, K.H.A., Captain Lovell, R.E., and Captain Wetherall, of the Quartermas- ter-General's department. The Fury was com- manded by Captain Tathani, and on board her there also was one who had lent himself to the enterprise of the Invasion with impassioned zeal. In the moment when Lord Raglan determined to treat the instructions of the Government as imperative, and to put them in course for cxecu-
FOR THE INVASION. 283
tion, lie came to another determination (a deter- chap.
XVII
minatiou which is not so mere a corollary from '_
the first as men unversed in business may think): he resolved to carry the enterprise through. He knew that, though work of an accustomed sort can be ably done by official persons acting under a bare sense of duty, yet that the engine for con- quering obstacles of a kind not known beforehand, when they are many and big and unforeseen, must be nothing less than the strong, passionate will of a man. If every one were to perform his mere duty, there would be no invasion of the Crimea, for a rank growth of hindrances, springing up in the way of the undertaking, would be sure to gather fast round it, and bring it in time to a stop.
Amongst the English Generals there was no sir Edmund one who had given his mind to the enigma which ^°^ went by the name of the ' Eastern Question ; ' but Eear-Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons had been for many years engaged in the animating diplomacy of the Levant. In Greece, the activity of the Czar's agents, or, perhaps, of his mere admirers, had been so constant, and had generated so strong a spirit of antagonism in the minds of the few conten- tious Britons who chanced to observe it, that the institutions called 'The Russian Party' and ' The English Party ' had long ago flourished at Athens ; and since Sir Edmund Lyons had been accredited there for several years as British ]\Iin- ister, he did not miss being drawn into the game of combating against what was supposed to be the ever-impending danger of Russian encroach-
284 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, nient. Lon<^ am tliercfore, he had been whetted
fortius strife; and now that tlie 'Eastern Ques-
' tion ' was to be brought to the issue of a war in which he had part, ho was inflamed with a pas- sionate zeah Eesuming at once the uniform and the bearing of his old profession, he cast aside, if ever he had it, all semblance of diplomatic reserve and composure, and threw himself, with all his seaman's heart, into the business of the war.
Lord Raglan drew Sir Edmund Lyons into liis intimate counsels. I know not whether this con- cord of tlieirs was ever put into words ; but I imagine that, at the least, I can infer from their actions, and from the tenor of their intercourse, a silent understanding between them — an under- standing that no lukewarmness of others, no shortcomings, no evasions, no tardy prudence, no overgrown respect for difficulty or peril, should hinder the landing of the Queen's troops on the coast of the Crimea. From the time that Lord Kaglan thus joined Lyons to the undertaking he gave it a great moincntum. To those, within the grasp of tlie Itcar-Adiniral's energy it seemed that thenceforth, and until the troops should be landed on the enemy's shore, there could be no rest for man, no rest for engines. The Agamemnon was never still. In the ])ainful, consuming passion with which Lyons l(Mled, and even, as some im- agined, in the anxious, craving expression of his features, there was something wliich reminded men of a greater name.
With the cordial approval of Lyons, Tathair
FOR THE INVASION. 285
carried the Fury * in so close to the shore that chap.
the coast could be reconnoitred with great com- '_
pleteness. The officers came to the conclusion (a conclusion afterwards overruled, as we shall see, by Lord Eaglan) that the valley of tlie Kat- cha was the best spot for a landing.
We saw that the Czar's withdrawal from the Rumoured Principalities would deprive the German Powers the ikns oi of their main ground of quarrel with Ptussia, and that our plan of engaging in a great marine ex- pedition against Crim Tartary would cause Aus- tria and Prussia to despair of all effective support from the West, thus driving or tending to drive them into better relations with Nicholas. Before the 28th of July there were signs that this change was beginning to set Russia free from the sti'aits in which she had been placed by the unanimity of the four Great Powers ; and tidings which reached the camp at Varna made it appear (though not with truth) that the Russian com- mander had not only suspended his retreat, but was commencing a fresh movement in advance. To deliberate upon this supposed change in the character of the war, a conference was held at the French headquarters, and was attended by Mar-
* It seems that before retiriug to rest at night, Sir Edmund Lyons simply directed Tathani ' to take the ship in as before,' and that, this direction having been duly complied with, Lyons found upon coming on deck the next morning that the Fury was already ' close in.' Captain Tatham, a few days previously, had carried the Fury in so near to Sebasto])ol as to come to au exchange of shots with a part of the Kussian fleet, and it was on that account that Dundas selected the Fury for this service.
286
OEDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. XVII.
Sftcoiul conference.
Tlie French urge the abandon- ment of the expedition against the Crimea.
slial St Arnaud, Lord Raglan, General Canrobert, Sir Edmund Lyons, General Martimprey, Sir George Brown, and Colonel Troclni. The French Generals grasped this as an occasion for bringin" about the relinquishment of an enterprise which they had always held to be rash. They sub- mitted that the general instructions addressed to both of the Allied commanders made it their duty to provide, in the first instance, for the safety of the Ottoman territory, and that, until that object was secured, they were not warranted in attempt- ing an invasion of a Eussian province far distant from the threatened frontier of European Turkey ; that the order to invade the coast of the Crimea had been framed by the Home Governments, and acceded to by the Allied Generals upon the as- sumption that the armed intervention of Aus- tria, then believed to be imminent, or, at the very least, a continuance of her menacing attitude on the flank of the Russian army would preclude any attempt by the Czar to resume his war on the Danube ; that tliat assumption now unfor- tunately turned out to be unfounded; and that the abandonment by Austria of the common cause made it the bounden duty of the Allied commanders to return to their defensive meas- ures; because it was now plain that, if they quitted Bulgaria, Omar Pasha, without aid from any quarter, would have upon liis hands the whole weight of the Russian army. Now tlien, supposing the premises to be conceded, the French counsellors had made out good grounds for aban-
FOR THE INVASION. 287
douing a resolution which, only a week ago, had chap.
been adopted by the Allied commanders. '_
Lord Raglan, however, was resolved that the Lord Ra-- enterprise should go on. From the moment he bending the knew that the siege of Silistria had been raised the plans of
1 1 1 1 1 n T '''"' English
he never doubted that, lor that year at least, the Government invasion of European Turkey was at an end. But he knew that clever men who have taken the pains to build up a neat logical structure, do not easily allow it to be treated as unsound merely because it rests upon a sliding foundation. With- out, therefore, combating the French arguments, he quietly suggested that the time which must needs elapse before the embarkation might throw new light on the probability of a renewed attack upon Turkey ; and he proposed that, in the mean- time, the preparations for the descent on the Crimea should be carried on with all speed. This opinion was adopted by every member of the con- ference. The preparations were carried on with increasing energy ; and the theory that it was the duty of the Allied commanders to abandon the enterprise was never put down by argument, but left to die away uncontested.
Lord Eaglan had been struck with the value Prepara,
tiODS.
of the French plan for landing artillery on flat lighters, and Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown were despatched to Constantinople, with instructions to do all they could towards supply- ing the British army with means which would answer the same purpose. They discovered that a platform resting upon two boats might be made
288 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, to serve nearly as well as one of the French ^^"- lighters.* How they toiled the world will never know, for History cannot pause to see them ran« sacking Constantinople and the villages of the Bosphorus in their search after carpenters and planks ; hut before the appointed time, the whole work was done. This was not all. Sir Edmund Lyons and Sir George Brown propelled the ar- rangements for buying and chartering steamers, trampling down with firmness, perhaps one might say with violence, all obstacles which stood in the way. Of those obstacles one of the most formidable was what was called in those days the 'official fear of incurring responsibility.' Lyons and Sir George Brown taught men that, in emergencies of this sort, they should be pur- sued with the fear of not doing enough, rather than with the dread of doing too much. ' I can- ' not venture,' said a cautious official — ' I cannot * venture to give the price.' ' Then I can,' said Sir George Brown ; ' I buy it in my own name ! ' It is thus that difficulties are conquered. When the restless Agamemnon came back into the Bay of Varna with Lyons and Sir George Brown on board, Lord Eaglan was at the head of a truly British armament. He had the means, by steam- power, and at one trip, to descend upon the
• I bflicvo that tlie merit of inakiug this discovery, and of tlie irresistible energy by wliich it was carried into effect, be- longed to Mr lioberls, late a Master in the Navy. See the forcible exposition of Mr Kolierts's services, and of his cruelly frustrated hopes, in a little work called 'The Service and th,e ' Reward,' Ijy Mr George John Cayley.
FOR THE INVASION. 289
enemy's coast, with all his divisions of infau- chap.
• XVII
try, with his brigade of light cavalry, and with '__
the whole of his field-artillery ; and he would be enabled, if he landed in face of an enemy, to bring his guns into action whilst his infantry formed upon the beach.
When the allied commanders determined to ineffectual
attemiits of
execute the orders addressed to them, they saw the Auiea
_ _ , to deceive
the importance of endeavouring to veil their pro- the enemy, ject from the enemy. With this view they tried to induce a belief that Odessa was to be the object of attack ; but the measures which they took for this purpose were very slight and weak. To de- ceive the enemy by the mere spreading of a report, the first step for a general to takii would be that of uttering the false word to some of his own people. That would be a difficult service for Lord Raglan to perform ; and I do not believe that he ever could or ever did perform it.
Another contrivance for diverting the enemy's attention from the Crimea was that of endeavour- ing to alarm him for his Bessarabian frontier. Partly to attain this end, and partly, as was sur- mised, with the more ambitious object of striking a blow at some of the Czar's retiring columns, Marshal St Arnaud moved no less than three divisions into the Dobrudja. But, in truth, all secrecy was forbidden to the Allies. The same power which dictated the expedition precluded its concealment. It was in a council of the whole people that England had resolved upon tlic enter- prise ; and'what advantage there is in knowlcd;::e
VOL. II. T
2 DO ORDERS AND rREPARATIOXS
CHAP, of an enemy's plans, that she freely gave to Rus-
L. sia. It might seem that for the Emperor of the
French, who had shown tliat he was capable of the darkest secrecy in his own designs, it must have been trying to have to act with a power which propounded her schemes in print. But, happily, he understood England, and knew some- thing of the conditions under which she moves into action. L-rd RnB- Lord Eaglau soon learnt that the native Bul- to our Home gariaus abstained from coming in with their farm
Government . i , i i ^ • • n
in favour of producc to supply the ready market awaiting them
the native f,_,.|^'' . '' ,. ,,.
Bulgarians, m the English camp, and ascertaining that their backwardness ai'ose from fear of their Turkisli masters, combined, as he thought, with a hope of being freed from the yoke they wore, he addressed our Home Government on the subject in grave, earnest, thoughtful language. Having observed tliat the Kayahs went unarmed, whilst their mas- ters, the Turks, stalked proudly under the burthen of the many bright weapons they carried for cut- ting, stabbing, and shooting their imaginary foes, he warned the Secretary of State that, so long as this inequality should be maintained, the condi- tion of the people, kept down by such a distinc- tion, must needs be very like tliat of slaves ;* but
* Pjivate lultur of Lord I!:iglan, 8Lh August 1854, to tlie Duke of Newcastle. Lord Raglan's coiresiiondence on tliis subject ■with the Duke of Newcastle bears so closely upon a question which has Intcly been raised— a ([ucstion of great moment to tho peace of Eurojio — that I ])lace it in the Ap- l>endix. Veiy soon after writing his a])pcal of the 8th of August, in favour of the Lulgarian Rayahs, Lord Eaglan was
rOK THE INVASION. 291
although his appeal drew a wavmly concurring chap. response from the Duke of Newcastle, it produced
no other effect, and he himself when receiving it was on the eve of embarking for the Crimea.
On the 10th of August a fire broke out in the rireat
,, . . , . ^_ - . . Varna.
J>ritish magazines at Varna, and a large quantity of military stores was consumed.
But another and more dreadful enemy had now cuoicra. entered the camp of the Allies. From the period of its arrival in the Levant, the French army had been suffering much from sickness. In the Brit- ish army, on the contrary, though slight com- plaints were not unfrequent, the bodily condition of the men had been upon the whole very good ; and so it continued up to the 19th of July. On that day, out of the whole Light Division, there were only 110 in hospital. But it seems that one of the omens which portend the visitation of a great epidemic is a more than common flush of health. With the French, the cholera first showed itself on board their troop-ships whilst passing from Marseilles to the Dardanelles. It then ap- peared among the French quartered at Gallipoli, and followed their battalions into Bulgaria. There, its ravages increased, and before the beginning of the last week in July it reached the British army.
summoned away to a distant land; hut the exceeding earnest- ness of his appeal gives me ground for believing that, if Bul- garia had continued to be the theatre of war, Lord Kaglaii would have persisted in his eflforts to raise up the subject peoiile of the province, and obtain for them, if not good government, at all events a much easier yoke than the one under which thov tlien lived.
292 ORDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP, By the 19th of August our regiments iu Bulgaria •^^^^' had lost 532 men. But it was amongst the three French divisions marched into the Dobrudja, and especially in General Canrobert's Division, that the disease raged with the most deadly virulence. In the day's march, and sometimes within the space of only a few hours, hundreds of men dropped down in the sudden agonies of cholera ; and out of one battalion alone, it was said that, besides those already dead, no less than 500 sufferers were carried alive in the waggons. On the 8th of August it was computed, by an officer of their Staff, that out of the three French divisions which marched into the Dobrudja, no less than 10,000 lay dead or struck down by sickness.
If the cholera had been confined to the land- forces, the Generals would not, perhaps, have allowed it to delay their embarkation ; but it now reached the fleets. In a few days the crews were in such a slate that all idea of at- tempting to embark the troops was, for the mo- ment, quite out of the question; and on the lltli and 12th of August the Admirals put out from their anchorage, in the hope of driving away the disease with the pure breezes of the sea. But they had scarcely done this when, on board some of the ships, the mysterious pest began to rage with a violence rare in Europe. The Britannia alone out of 985 lost no less than 139 men.*
• In foinicr editions (owing to some mistake of figures Avliich 1 liavc not traced to its canno) I stated the lo.ss at only 105 ; but act;oidiny to tlic btalLiiieiit furnished by Dr Rees, the
FOIi THE INVASION. 293
The number of those stricken, and of those at- chap.
tending upon them, was so great, that it was L.
impracticable to carry on the common duties of the ship in the usual way ; and if the disease had continued to rage with undiminished violence for three days more there would have been the spec- tacle of a majestic three-decker floating helpless upon the waves for want of hands to Mork her. This time of trial proved the qualit}^ of those who remained unstricken. There was a waywardness in the course of the disease on board British ships, for which it is difficult to account, — it spared the officers. On board British ships of war the sea- man is accustomed to look to those who command with a strong affectionate reliance ; and now the poor sufferers, in their childlike simplicity, were calling upon their officers for help and comfort. An officer thus appealed to would go and lie down by the side of the sufferer, and soothe him as though he were an infant. And this trust and this devotion were not always in vain. Even against malignant cholera the officer seemed to be not altogether powerless ; for, partly by holding the sufferer in his kind hands, partly by cheering words, and partly by wild remedies, in- vented in despair of all regular medical treat- ment, he was often enabled to fight the disease, or to make the men think that lie did.
■Tirgeon of the Britannia, and, as 1 personally know, a most able and excellent officer, the number was what I now state it. Out of the first 60 cases 55 died, and of these, 50 died withiu the first 20 hours.
294 OEDERS AND PREPARATIONS
CHAP. Almost suddenly the pestilence ceased on board . • the British ships of war. The dead were over- board, and the survivors returned to their accus- tomed duties with an alacrity quickened by the delight of looking forward to active operations against the enemy. Instinctively, or else with wise design, both officers and men dropped all mention of the tragedy through which they had passed.*
In a few days from the time when the cholera had been raging with its utmost fury, the crews of the fleet were ready to undertake the great business of embarking the troops and landing them on the coast of the Crimea. Weakly con- In the camps of the Allied armies, at this Eng^rsh '^ time, the cholera had abated, but had not ceased. ery. "j^-^q^q -were fevers, too, and other complaints. Grievous sickness fell upon that part of our camp which had been pitched in the midst of the beauteous scenery of the lake of Devna, but the whole English army at this time began to show signs of failing health. It appeared that, even of the men out of hospital and actually present under arms, hardly any were in the en- joyment of sound health — hardly any were capable of their usual amount of exertion.
This weakly condition of the men was destined to act, with other causes, in bringing upon the army cruel sufferings ; and it may be asked
• I was for several days on board the Britannia without once, I think, hearing the least allusion to the pestilence
whi^li just four weeks before had slain 139 of the ship's crew.
FOR THE INVASION. 295
■whether, with the soldiers iu this condition of chap.
XVII
body, it was right to undertake an invasion. '_
The answer would be this : the medical author- ities thought, and with apparently good reason, that, for troops sickening under the fierce sum- mer heats of Bulgaria, the sea voyage, the descent upon another and more healthy shore, and, above all, the animating presence of the enemy, would work a good effect upon the health of the men ; and, although these hopes proved vain, they .seemed at the time to rest upon fair grounds. And, after all, it is hard to say what other dis- position of the troops would have united the advantages of being better and possible. To re- main in Bulgaria, or to attempt to operate in the neighbourhood of the Danube, was to linger iu the midst of those very atmospheric poisons which had brought the health of the army to its then state ; and, on the other hand, our people at home would hardly have borne to see the army sent back to Malta, and forced to recede from the conflict, for the bare reason that some of the men were in hospital, and that the rest, without being ill, were said to be iu a weakly coudition.
296 THE EMBARKATION.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CHAP. Our Admiral had at his command the means for
L conveying the British force to the enemy's shore
m^ntTfirst either in steam-vessels or in sailing-ships towed SngVf'^ by steam-power ; and, until the eve of the em- the^expecii- -jjarkation, the French believed that their resources would enable them to achieve a like result. So, at a conference of the four Admirals held on the 20th of August, it was arranged that the whole of the French and English armament sliould move from the coast at the same time under steam- power ; and the 2d of September was looked for- ward to as the day when tlie armament might per- haps go to sea, but the exact time would of course depend upon weather and other circumstances be- yond the reach of exact calculation. The em- On tlic 24th of August the huge operation of
embarking the armies had ah-eady begun. The French embarked 24,000 infantry and 70 pieces of field-artillery ; but, since they were straitened in their means of sea-transport, tlie number of horses they allotted to each gun was reduced from six to four. Tlie French embarked no
barkatioDS.
THE EMBARKATION. 297
cavalry.* A large portion of the rrench troops chap.
were put on board ships of war,-|- and other por- z^
tions were distributed among a great number of sailing-vessels. Some of these were very small craft.
Attached to the French army, and placed un- der the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, there was a force of between 5000 and 6000 Turkish infantry. These men were embarked mainly or entirely on board Turkish vessels of war.
Sir Edmund Lyons was charged with the duty of embarking the English forces ; and having first got on board our 60 pieces of field-artillery, com- pletely equipped, with the full complement of horses belonging to every gun, he proceeded with the embarkation of the 22,000 infantry and the full thousand of cavalry whicli Lord Eaglan intended to move from Bulgaria to the coast of the Crimea. To put on board ship a body of foot-soldiers is comparatively a simple process ; but the shipping of horses involves so heavy a cost, so great an exertion of human energy, that he who under- takes such a task upon anything like a large scale
* They took with them from SO to 100 horsemen to perform escort duty ; but of course I do not regard this as an exception to the statement that 'no cavalry was embarked.'
+ Our naval officei-s are strongly opposed, to the practice of putting troops on board ships of war. They are not the men to set their personal convenience against the exigencies of tlie public service, but they cannot endure that the eflBciency of a man-of-war should be for one moment suspended. It is well ascertained, too, that the presence of a great number of sol- diers— men who, for the time of the voyage, are almost neces- sarily idlers — is injurious to the discipline of a ship.
298 THE EMBARKATION.
CHAP, must needs be a man in earnest. On tlie other
.^ 1 hand, it was clear that, for an invasion of the
Crimea, a body of cavahy was strictly needed; therefore a sagacious interpreter of warlike signs, who saw that the English General was embarking a thousand cavalry horses, and that the French were embarking none, would be led to conjecture that the English were resolved to make the de- scent, and that the French were not. It will be seen, by and by, that such a conjecture would have been sound.
The time necessary for embarking a given num- ber of foot-soldiers is small in proportion to that required for getting on board an equal number of troopers with their chargers. Nor is this all. The embarkation of infantry is not necessarily stopped by a moderate swell : the embarkation of cavalry is rendered very slow and difficult by even a slight movement of the sea, and is stopped altogether by a little increase of surf. The business of embarking the British cavalry was checked during some days by a wind from the north - east, and its consequent swell ; but afterwards the weather changed, and the whole force was got on board M'ithout the loss of a man.*
Lord Eaglan could not repress the feeling with which he looked upon the exertions of our naval
• The French were not so fortunate, for a painful accident occurred in the course of their embarkation. One of their Bteam-vessels ran down a boat laden with Zouaves. The men, encumbered by their packs, could do little to save themselves, and more than twenty were drowned.
THE EMBARKATION. 299
officers and seamen. ' The embarkation,' he wrote chaI' on the 29th of August — ' the embarkation is pro-
' ceeding rapidly and successfully, thanks to the ' able arrangements of Rear- Admiral Sir Edmund ' Lyons, and the unceasing exertions of the officers ' and men under his orders. It is impossible for ' me to express, in adequate terms, my sense ' of the value of the assistance the army under ' my command derives from the Eoyal Navy. ' The same feeling prevails from the highest to 'the lowest — from Vice-Admiral Dundas to ' the youngest sailor ; an ardent desire to co-
* operate, by every possible means, is manifest ' throughout ; and I am proud of being associated ' with men who are animated by such a spirit, ' and who are so entirely devoted to the service
* of their country.'
Of course, the French, unencumbered with cav- Faimre of airy, were on board before the English embarka- calculations tion was complete ; but the steam-power at the their'coin- command of the French fell short, and the ueces- steam- sity of a variation from the plan determined upon by the four Admirals was now announced. On the 4th of September, Admiral llamelin, and au officer on the staff of the French army, informed Vice- Admiral Dundas that their resources would not, as they had expected, enable them to have their sailing transports towed by steamers.
No explanation was given of the failure which had thus suddenly crippled the French armament; and yet, it must be owned, the discovery was one that might well make men anxious, for they saw
power.
300 THE EMBAEKATION.
CHAP, that the whole flotilla would be clo^fred by tlie
xvin
slowness of the sailing-vessels in which the Mar- shal's troops were embarked, and, accordingly, the fate of the enterprise then appeared more than ever dependent upon the accidents of weather. Marshal St Arnaud sjrew restless.
TILE EMBAlvKA-TION. SOI
CHAPTER XIX.
We have seen that the 2d of September had chap. been looked forward to as the time for the depar- ^^^' tare of the united armaments, and on tliat day, fnd'impa"' with military punctuality, Marshal St Arnaud stSud. went to Baljik; but the wind and the waves are still undisciplined forces, and the French em- barkations were not destined to be completed until the evening of the 4th. The IMarshal, there- fore, was kept waiting at Baljik ; and meanwhile sickness began to make havoc with his troops, for they were densely crowded on board the transports. The Marshal was much tortured by the anxiety Mdiich he had had to bear during these three pain- ful days, and (possibly to calm his mind) Vicc- Admiral Dundas seems to have suggested to him that, his sailing-vessels not being provided with steam-power to tow them, he might as well cause them at once to weigh anchor. By these causes, joined to his irritation at what he thought the backwardness of the English embarkations, the Marshal was induced to determine, not merely that he would act upon Dundas's suggestion, but that he himself would wait no longer, and would
302 THE EMBARKATION.
CHAP, put to sea on the 5th of September with his sail-
XIX
__^J_ ing fleet; so when, on the same morning, Lord
^ucid'toset Ra-ghin reached Baljik, he was surpvised by the theEngirsh! intelligence tliat the Marshal had already sailed wm anT.il^' out on board the Ville de Taris. and?he"'"* On the evening of the 6th the British arma- boTrTthem. mcut was ready, and the arrangements for the The naval voya^TC of the wholc flotilla complete. The French
forces of the ^ , , . , p^„ ■^ n i
AUies. fleet already at sea consisted of fifteen sail of the line, with ten or twelve war-steamers, and the Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, with three war-steamers; but the French and the Turkish vessels were doing service as transports, and were so encumbered with troops that they could not have been brought into action with common prudence. It was upon the English fleet, therefore, that the Dutydcvoiv- duty of protecting the whole armada really de- Engiishfleet. volvcd ; aiid, supposiug that the enemy were aware of the helpless state of the French and Turkish vessels laden with troops, and of the enormous convoy of transports which had to be protected, he might be expected to judge that it was incumbent upon him to come out of the har- bour and assail the vast flotilla of transports ; for under the guns of Sebastopol the Paissians had fifteen sailing ships of the line,* with some frigates and brigs, and also twelve war-steamers, though of these the Vladimir was the only powerful vessel.-f- To encounter this force, and to defend from its enterprises the rest of the armada,
* Some say sixteen.
t Unless the Bessarabia be countcil as a powerful steamer.
THE EMBARKATION. 303
the English had ten sail of the line (including chap.
. XIX
two screw-steamers), two fifty-gun frigates, and
thirteen lesser steamers of war heavily armed.
The anxious duty of disposing and guiding the Arrange-
'' ^ T-v 1 c • i^ients in re-
convoy was entrusted by Admiral Dundas to bir- gard to tiie '' T I J • tngiish con-
Edmund Lyons ; and, under Sir Edmund s dircc- voy.
tions, Captain Mends of the Agamemnon framed
the programme of the voyage. On the evening of
the 6th the captains of transports were called hy
signal on board the Emperor, and tliere, Mends
read to them the instructions which he asked
them to obey. The captains thus addressed were
not in the Queen's service, but they were English
seamen, and their answer was characteristic. They
were not flighty men. They respectfully asked for
an assurance that, in the event of death, their
widows would be held entitled to pensions ; and
as to the question whether, of their own free
will, they would encounter the chances of a naval
action, they answered it with three cheers. It is
not by the mere muster-roll of the army or the
navy that England counts her forces.
With his force of horse, foot, and artillery, Lord iiie forcpn
Rao'lan had on board the transports (now all col- now on
. . board.
lected at Baljik)* the full number of ammunition- carts required for the first reserve of ammunition, the beasts required for drawing them, and sixty other carts, also provided with draught - power. But, in order to move so large a force at one trip, it was found necessary to dispense with the b&t-
* At the time here spoken of there were two artillery trans- ports lagging, but they were up in sufficient time.
304 THE EMBAKKATION.
CHAP, horses of the army, and the force was not provided
'__ with means of land-transport either for the tents
of the men or for the baggage of the officers. There were also on board large supplies of field- ammunition, of food for the troops, and of barley and hay for the horses. In some of the horse- transports there was an insufiiciency of the forage required for the voyage. With that grave excep- tion, all the arrangements seem to have been good. Due means had been taken for insuring, so far as was possible, the simultaneous transit, not only of our ships of war, but of the whole force which Lord Eaglan had embarked, together with its vast appendage of warlike stores and pro- visions ; for every sailing-vessel, whether she were a ship of war or a transport, was towed by a suf- ficiently powerful steamer. None of our ships of war carried troops on board ; they were all, there- fore, ready for action. Troops an.i In addition to the forces and the means of land- at Varna. transport which were actually on board, Lord Kag- lan had in readiness for embarkation the whole brigade of heavy cavalry, another division of in- fantry, a siege-train, and some five or six thou- sand pack-horses.* The sick remained in Bulgaria, and such of the men out of hospital as seemed to be in a very weakly state were left at Varna and employed in garrison duty.
* Tho additional division of infantry (the 4th Division) was at Varna ; the Scots Greys were on tlio Bosijhorus ; and the rest of the lieavy cavalry in Bulgaria, wlicrc also the Lat-borsca were left. Tiic sir^c-train was on board ofT Varna.
THE EMBAKKATION. 305
Vice-Admiral Dundas, commanding tlie whole CHAP.
XIX British fleet had his flag on board the Britannia ; 1_
Lyons, in the Agamemnon, had charge of the convoy. Each vessel had assigned to her the place she was to take when the signal for mov- ing should be given.
Before night, the whole of the English flotilla, together with tliat part of the French and the Turkish flotilla which had the command of steam- power, was assembled in Baljik Bay, and in readi- ness to sail on the morrow.
Men remember the beauteous morning of the Departure of 7th of September. The moonlight was still float- Armadlan.i ing on the waters, when, from numberless decks, steam-
V6SS6lS
eyes straining out towards the east were able to hail the dawn. A gentle, summer breeze was blowing fair from the laud. At a quarter before five, a gun from the Britannia gave the signal to weigh. The air had become obscured by the busy smoke of the engines, and it was hard to see how and whence due order would come ; but presently the Agamemnon moved through, and with signals at all her masts, for Lyons was on board her, and the colours, one after another, flying cease- lessly out to the breeze, seemed to picture the eagerness of a mind engaged in directing the con- voy. The French steamers of war went out with their transports in tow, and their great sailing vessels formed line. The French went out more quickly than the English, and in better order. Many of their transports were vessels of very small size ; and of necessity, therefore, they were VOL. II. u
306 THE EMBAKKATION.
CHAP, a swarm. Our transports went out in five col- ^^^' umus of only thirty each. Then — guard over all — the English war-fleet, in single column, moved slowly out of the bay.*
Here, then, and apart from the bodies of foot and artillery embarked by the French and the Turks, there was an armament not unworthy of England. Without combat, and by the mere stress of its presence, our fleet drove the enemy's flag from the seas which flowed upon his shoreSji* and a small but superb land-force, complete in all arms, was clothed with the power of a great army by the ease with which it could be thrown upon any part of the enemy's coast.}
Lord Eaglan had not suffered himself to be dis- concerted by the departure of Monsieur St Arnaud, and the consequent severance of the Allied forces. No steamer was sent to re-knit his communica- tions with the errant French Marshal.
* I did not reach the fleet till some three days afterwards, when it was anchored at the rendezvous ; and my impression of the scene in the Bay of Baljik is derived partly from some MSS. which liave been furnished to nie, but partly also from what struck me as a very good account of it, which I saw in a printed book, by Mr Wood, a spectator.
t I am justified in speaking of the English fleet as the force which kept the enemy's sliips in duress, because, as we have seen, the French men-of-war were doing duty as transports, and were not, tlierefore, in a state for going into action.
:}; I of course speak here of the inlierent jiowcr of such an armament, without refirence to the fact that strictly-defined instructions had been addressed to Lord Raglan, and that tlio purport of these had become known to the enemy. The fixed- ness of tlie i>lan of campaign, and the publicity which it had obtained, reduced the power of the force to the level of its actu.il numbers and il.s intrinsic strength.
VOYAGE OF TUE AKMADA. 307
CHAPTER XX.
We have seen that Marshal St Ainaiid, under chap.
feelings of some vexation, put to sea on the morn- ing of the 5th of September. He could not but know that, by his abrupt separation from the British fleet and army, he had offended against the English General. Upon reflection, he could not but grieve that he had done this. But he had put to sea, and had since heard no tidings from the shore. No swift steamer had followed him with entreaties to stay his course. He was left free to pursue his voyage ; and the voyage was growing more and more dismal.
' The Black Sea ' is a truer name than the ' Euxine.' Now, as in old times (if the summer be hardly past), the voyager leaves a coast smil- ing bright beneath skies of blue and glowing with sunny splendour ; yet, perhaps, and in less than an hour, the heavens above and the waters around him are dark with the gloom and threatening aspect belonging to the Northern Ocean.* Mon-
* The contrast between the climate of the Black Sea and that of the countries Avhich suriouml it is one of the euitjinas to
XX.
308 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
CHAP, sieur St Arnaud encountered this change. The
^^' wind blew from its dark quarter. Every hour
Marshal -^yas Carrying the Marshal farther and farther into
Bt Ai-naud -^ <=>
the centre of the inhospitable sea, farther and without the farther from the English fleet, farther and farther English. fj^QYn Lord Eaglan. If he went on, there was no junction to look for except at an imaginary point His anxiety, marked with a pencil on the charts, but having no existence in the material world ; and from the wind and angry waves, no less than from his own fast-cooling thoughts, he began to receive a dis- tressing sense of his isolation. The struggle in his mind was painful, but it came to an end. ' I
* am nearly twenty leagues,' writes the Marshal, on the evening of the Gth, to Lord Eaglan — ' I ' am nearly twenty leagues north-east of Baljik,
* separated from the Euglish fleet, and from the ' part of my own convoy which was to sail with ' the convoy of the English fleet. Admiral Dun- ' das's last letter being worded conditionally, so ' far as concerns his sailing this morning, I am ' not sure of not seeing increased, in great propor- ' tions, the distance which separates me from you, ' and then there is reason to fear circumstances ' of wind or sea which would render our junc- ' tion difficult, and might compromise everything
H,,3i,, 'definitively. In this painful situation I decide ***■■''• ' to invite Admiral Hamelin (on his declaration
* that he cannot wait where he is) to return to ' meet the fleets and the convoy.' So the Mar-
wliich scientific men have applied tlieir minds ; but whether, as yet, with success, I cannot say.
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 309
shal sailed back. Thus, happily, ceased the im- chap. pulse which had threatened to sunder the fleets. '
Lord Eaglan's answer was stern. He removed Lord Rag-
. . lan'a reproof.
the grounds which the ^Marshal had assigned for his departure, and then pointed gravely to the true line of duty for the future. ' Thanks be to ' God,' he wrote, 'everything now favours our ' enterprise. Very soon we shall reach the ' appointed rendezvous, and then we shall have ' an opportunity of showing that our manner of ' acting together remains unaltered, and that the ' sincerity of whicli you speak will continue, as ' at present, to be our guide and our mutual ' satisfaction.'*
Coming from Lord Raglan, this language was a reproof; but the result tends to show that it was happily adjusted to the object in view. Thence- its good forth there was no longer any tendency on the part of Marshal St Arnaud to break away from his colleague. From the hour of the first confer- ence at the Tuileries, in the spring of the year. Lord Eaglan's authority in the Allied councils Lord Rag- had been always increasing ; and now, as we shall ingascen^^" presently see, it gained a complete ascendant. ''"'^'
On the 8th the great flotilla, moving under Tiie whole
i 11" 1
steam, came up with the French and the Turkish Annada sailing fleets which had left Baljik on the 5th ther\\ aL' of September. The French fleet was in double column, and tacking to eastward across the bow3 of the steam flotilla ; but upon being approached.
* Translated from the French, in wliieh the letter was written.
310 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
CHAP, the French ships backed topsails and lay - to. ^^' Every one of the French vessels had kept its position beautifully ; and the moment the signal to lie-to was given, it was obeyed with a quick- ness which was honestly admired by our seamen. The Turkish fleet also lay-to, and for a while the whole armada of the Allies was gathered together. But tha But the English fleet, being moved by steam, kept iigahi parted, ou to wiudward ; and presently the French and the Turks began to sail off on opposite tacks. Between the fleets thus disparting, the English flotilla of transports passed through in five columns.
The rendezvous was to be at a point forty miles due west of Cape Tarkan, and thither moved the three fleets with all their convoy, step taken There were in the French army several officers omfere^witii holding high command, and being otherwise men stop The" of great weight, who had become very thoughtful IgainsV°° on the subject of the contemplated descent upon po . ^j^^ enemy's coast. Personally, they were men quite as dauntless as those who gave no care to the business in hand ; but being versed in the study, if not in the practice, of the great art of war, they had become strongly impressed with the hazardous character of the intended enterprise. It seems probable that, up to this time, they had relied upon the mature judgment and the sup- posed discreetness of Lord Raglan to prevent what they regarded as a rash attempt. It might well seem natural to them that two Governments in the West of Europe, attempting to dictate an
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 311
invasion of a Russian province at a distance of chap.
3000 miles, would, sooner or later, be checked '__
in their project by the generals commanding the forces ; and, of course, they would have liked that the disfavour which unjustly attaches to military prudence should fall upon the English General rather than upon themselves or their own commander. But in the course of the 7th of September it became known to them that Lord Eaglan was already at sea. They then knew, or rather they then recognised the fact, that the whole armada was really gliding on towards the enemy's coast, and the ferment their minds under- went now brought them to take a strange step.
Lord Raglan was on board the Caradoc ; and on the 8th of September, whilst the fleets lay near to one another, this vessel was boarded by Vice-Admiral Dundas. He came to say that a French steamer had conveyed to him the desire of the Marshal St Arnaud to see Lord Raglan and the Vice-Admiral Dundas, and to see them on board the Ville de Paris, because the Marshal himself was too ill to be able to move. It hap- pened that the sea at this time was rough, and conference the naval men thought that it would be difficult vniede for Lord Raglan, with his one arm, to get up the side of the three-decker in which the Marshal was sailing ; Lord Raglan, therefore, deputed his military Secretary, Colonel Steele, to accompany Vice-Admiral Dundas on board the Ville de Paris.
The Vice-Admiral and Colonel Steele found
312
VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
CHAP. XX.
8t Amaiid disabled by illness
Unsigned paper read to the con- ference.
the Marshal sitting up, but in a state of much suffering, and they were informed that he was very ill. He, however, sat at the conference ; and tlie other persons present were — Admiral Hameliu, Admiral Bruat, Admiral Count Buat Wiliaumez, Colonel Trochu, General Eose, Vice- Admiral Dundas, and Colonel Steele. The Mar- shal took no part in the discussion which ensued. It seems he could hardly speak.
It was stated that the meeting had been sum- moned in order that a paper might be read to it. The document bore no signature, and Marshal St Arnaud was no party to it ; but it was stated that it emanated from General Canrobert, General Mar- timprey, and the principal officers of the French artillery and engineers ; and it M'as said, too, that General Eose* had furnished some of the ma- terials from which it had been composed.
The document took it for granted that there were three places for landing which merited dis- cussion— the Katcha, the Yetsa, and Kaffa ; and it then went on to show the advantages and the drawbacks which would attend an attempt to land at each of those three spots. The objections to the landincr at the Katcha were stated with so
• Now, LordStralliiiiiini, the oflicer spoken of as Colonel Rose in Vol. I. He was at tliis time accreditfd as British Commis- eioner at the French lieadquartors. I have no reason for sup- posing that he intended to give any sanclicn to the step taken by the Fren('h remonstrants ; and I imagine that any materials which he may liave put in their hands must have been confined to maps or statements showing the physical character of the country about to Le invaded.
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 313
much force as to show that the fiamers of the cilAP.
XX
document entirely disapproved it; and indeed .
they urged that any landing north of Sebastopol would be surely followed by disastrous results. The document also raised weighty objections to a descent upon the coast near the Yetsa. The only plan which was made to appear at all justifi- able was that of a landing at Kaffa ; and although the difficulties attending even that operation were placed in a strong light, it was orally stated that the framers of the document considered that plan to be one nearly free from objection.
Now Kaffa was a seaport in the eastern part of the Crimean peninsula, and divided from Sebas- topol by many long marches over mountain-roads. The autumn had already come. The landing at Kaffa implied an abandonment, for that year at least, of all attempts against Sebastopol. It was to attack Sebastopol forthwith, and in the year 1854, that the great flotilla with all its precious freight had been gathered together ; and now, whilst the vast armada was moving towards the enemy's coast, there came from the men of weight and science in the French army this singular protest — for that is what it really was — against an enterprise already begun.
Marshal St Arnaud was in a painful strait. stAmaud
_ . , , . , , . , leaves all to
Being, as he knew, without ascendancy in the LordRagiaa French army, he apparently thought that the weight attaching to the combined opinion of all the protesting officers was too great to warrant hira in meeting their interposition with reproof
314 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
CHAP, or inattention ; yet, suffering as he did at the
XX •
time under bodily anguish, he was ill able to go
into the discussions thus strangely forced on by the remonstrants. He found a solution. He desired Colonel Trochu to say that he would con- cur in any decision to which Lord Eaglan might come. Conference The confereuce, therefore, was adjourned to the tiie Ciuadoc. Caradoc ; and Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were then present at it, together with all those who had met on board the Ville de Paris, except only Marshal St Arnaud.
Thus, then, the ebullition of prudence which had broken out amongst the officers of the French army came under the arbitrament of the English General ; and with him, and with him only, it rested to determine the movements of the whole Allied force.
The business of the conference was opened by Colonel Trochu. This officer, as we have already seen, was supposed to be better acquainted than any one else with the mind of the French Em- peror ; and his counsels, no longer bending in the direction of extreme caution, were now rather in favour of enterprise. The Colonel had possession of the document. He read it aloud ; and, as he went on with the perusal, he commented upon every point ; but he declared that he was no party to the contents of the paper, and that he did not sliare the anxieties* either of the army or the navy as to the disasters which might be expected to * 'Preoccupations.'
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 315
follow from a landing on the coast to the north of chap. Sebastopol. '
Thereupon, Admiral Bruat repudiated the sup- position of his being a party to the apprehensions attributed to the Admii-als. Lyons also repudi- ated it. Neither he nor Vice-Admiral Dundas had known before the conference that any such step as that of framing and presenting the remon- strance had been imagined by the French officers, and, as might be expected, they were both very sure that nothing of the kind had sprung from the British navy.
The inference which Lord Eaglan drew from the document was, that it evinced 'an iudisposi- ' tion to the expedition amongst the officers who ' are supposed to be looked up to and to exercise ' influence in the French army ; ' and, ' in fact,' said he, ' we were told as much at the meeting here ' on Friday.'
These, tlien, were the ' timid counsels ' * of
which the French Emperor afterwards spoke
when he ascribed the glory of overruling them to
Marshal St Arnaud. If it was right, as most men
will think it was, that these counsels should be
overruled, there was merit due to St Arnaud ; but
* 'TimiJes avis.' When this letter of the French Emperor first appeared, it was imagined that the imputation of giving 'timid' counsels was intended to be cast upon some of our Generals or Admirals ; but the Duke of Newcastle, with a becoming spirit, determined instantly that this should not be suffered to pass ; and the ' Moniteur ' was afterwards made to explain ofScially that the ' timides avis ' were attributed by the Emperor, not to any Englishman, but to some unnamed officeru in the French service.
310
VOYAGE OF THE ARMAJ)A
CHAP. XX.
Lord Rag- lan's way of dealing with the French remon- Blrunts.
IIU now complete ucendaut.
Lis merit lay, not in any personal resistance which lie was able to oppose to Lis counsellors (for he was helpless, as we have seen, from bodily ill- ness), but in the sagacity and good sense which had led him to intrust the decision to his Eng- lish colleague.
Lord Eaglau's method of dealing with the pro- test of the French authorities was cliaracteristic of himself and of the EnfrlisL nature. He did not mucL combat tLe objections set down in tLe paper, but Le passed tliem by, and quietly lowered tLe debate from the high region of strategy to a question of humbler sort — a question as to what four steamers could be most conveniently employed for a reconnaissance on the enemy's coast.
So the conference whicli had been summoned to judge whether the enterprise against Sebastopol should not be brought to a stop, now found itself only deciding tliat tLe vessels sent on tlie recon- naissance sLould consist of one French steamer, together with tLe Agamemnon, tLe Caradoc, and tLe Sampson.
But, in trutL, tLe powers of tLe conference had silently passed into tlie hands of one man. Thenceforth the protest was dropped ; for, if its framers had risen up against the notion of being drawn on into what they thought a rash venture by the mere effect of M. St Aruaud's acquiescence, they were calmed when they came to know tliat the whole force at last had a leader. 1 f still they held to their opinions, they did so in a spirit of
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA, 317
clieerful deference, which prevented them from chap
• XX
throwing any further obstacle in the way of the 1_
enterprise. The armada moved on.
Again and again it has happened that mighty The use he
• f T 1 P n TO, makes of his
armaments, including the forces of several States power. and people of diverse races, have been gathered and drawn into scenes of conflict by the will of one man ; but, in general, when such things have been done, the compelling mind has been brought to its resolve by the cogency of satisfied reason or by force of selfish desire. What was new in this enterprise was, that he who inexorably forced it on did not of himself desire it, nor deem it to be wise, nor even in a high degree prudent; and the power which had strength to bend the whole armada to the purpose of the invasion was, not ambition inflamed, nor reason convinced, but the mere loyalty of an English officer refusing to stint the obedience which he owed to the Minister of his Queen.
On the 9th, the whole of the English fleet with The English its convoy was anchored in deep water at the poiutof appointed rendezvous, a spot forty miles west of Cape Tarkaud.
Lord Eaglan made haste to use the great powers Lord nagian with which he was now invested, and he deter- undertakes a
reconnais-
mined to reconnoitre the coast with his own eyes, sanceof At four o'clock on the morning of the 10th, General Caurobert and the other French officers who were to attend the reconnaissance came on board the Caradoc. Lord Eaglan had with him Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir John Burgoyne, and Sir
318 VOYAGE OF THE AEMADA
CHAP. George Brown. Not long after daybreak the Caradoc neared Fort Constantine, aud then ap- proached the entrance to the harbour. It was a fair, bright morning, and the Sunday bells were ringing in the churches when Lord Eaglan first saw the great forts, and the ships, and the glitter- ing cupola'd town. Afterwards, the vessel being steered round off Cape Chersonesus, he could see two old Genoese forts, and ridges of hills dividing the great harbour from tlie southern coast of the peninsula, WJiat he looked on was for him fated ground, for the Genoese forts marked the inlet of Balaclava, and the ridges he saw were the ' heights ' before Sebastopol.' But the future lay hidden from his gaze.
The Caradoc was now steered towards the north, and the officers on board her surveyed the mouths of the Belbek, the Katcha, the Alma, and the Bulganak, and the coast stretching thence to Eupatoria. Of the sites thus reconnoitred, General Canrobert thought the Katcha the one best fitted for a landing. Lord Eaglan entirely disapproved of the Katcha, and he did not at all like the ground at the mouths of the other rivers; but when, moving on in the Caradoc, he was off the part of the coast which lies six miles north of the Bulganak, he observed an extended tract of beach, which seemed to him to be the gj'ound for which the Allies were seeking. Without gener- ating a debate upon the subject, he nevertheless HechoosM elicited so much of the opinion of those around place. "' him as he deemed to be useful. Then he declared
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 319
liis resolve. He said that the Allied armies chap.
XX
should land at Old Fort, '_
There are times when, to anxious, doubting mortals, no boon from Heaven is so welcome as the final resolve which is to govern their actions. It was so now. Debating ceased, and a happy alacrity came in its stead. That day our fleet and the swarming convoy close gathered around had been still lying anchored in deep water at the point of rendezvous. To many those long, peaceful Sabbath hours seemed to token a wanton delay, or worse than delay — some falter- ing in the great purpose of the Allies : but at night the Caradoc came in ; and soon, though few could tell whence came the change, nor what had been passing, there flew from deck to deck a joy- ful belief — a belief that in some way — in some way not yet understood, the enterprise had gath- ered new force.
The French and Turkish fleets, less amply pro- vided with steam - power than the English, had fallen to leeward ; but on the evening of the 11th they were anchored within thirty miles of the British fleet, and the communication was of course kept up by steam-vessels.
During the whole of Tuesday the 12th, the The whole French, Turkish, and English fleets were slowly verging on .
, . , , , , . . , the coast of
drawing together and converging upon the theo-imea. enemy's coast. Before sunset the armed navies were all near together, and from their decks men could make out with glasses the low cliff to the north of Eupatoria. The English fleet anchored
320 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
CHAP, for the uii-lit. The French Admiral sent to in- • timate that he would not anchor, but go on all night, in the hope of being ready for the landing the next morning. Vice - Admiral Dundas saw that that hope was vain, because large portions of the French convoy were still so distant that there could be no landing on the following day. The French, it will be remembered, were without steam-power for their transports, and the breezes were light. So, although every hour saw fresh clusters of vessels slowly closing with the fleet, the sea, towards the west, was always strewed with distant sails, and, before the hulls of those hove well in sight, the horizon got speckled again with sails more distant still. So the English Admiral anchored his fleet for the night.
The next morning, the 13th, the Ville de Paris, under tow of the Napoleon steamer, had come up ; and, although, so Lite as noon, some of the French ships of war, and very many of their trans- ports, were still distant, they were under such breezes as promised to enable them to close before long with the fleets. So, virtually, the moment- ous voyage was over. The weather — and upon that, in such undertakings, the hopes of nations must rest — the weatlier had favoured the enter- prise ; but the pest of modern armies had not relented. The cholera had followed the men into the transports. Many sickened on board the troopships whilst they were still off Varna or Bal- jik, and were carried back to die on shore. Dur- ing the voyage many more fell ill, and many died.
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 321
But Marshal St Ariiaud, whose illness scarce chap.
XX
three days before seemed bringiug him fast to his '
end, was now almost suddenly restored, and on fua'^^u''"*^'^ the morning of the 13th he was like a man in ""ecovcry. health. During the interval of five days, in The progrese which the Marshal's illness had invested his Lord Rlgiau English colleague with a supreme control, Lord MarsiTaVs
illiicss
Eaglan had used to the full the occasion which Fortune thus gave him. In that time he had repressed the efforts of the French Generals wlio strove to bring the enterprise to a stop ; he had committed the Allies to a descent upon the enemy's shores — on his shores to the north of Sebastopol ; he had reconnoitred the coast ; he had chosen the place for a landing; and mean- while he had drawn the fleets on, so that now, when men looked from the decks, they could see the thin strip of beach where the soldiery of tb.e Allies were to land.
VOL n.
322 VOYAGE OF THE AltMADA
CHAPTER XXI.
ciiAP. Concerning the country which they were going -1 — ^ to invade, the Allies were poorly informed. Of rance^ouhe Scbastopol, the goal of the enterprise, they knew ofthe'^^'*"^ little, except that it was a great military port sirc'n'gth. and arsenal, and was deemed impregnable to- wards the sea. Respecting the province generally, it was known, by means of books and maps, that Crim Tartary, or 'the Crimea,' as people now called it, was a peninsula situate between tlie Black Sea and the Sea of Azof ; and thei'c was a theory — not perfectly coinciding with the truth — that the only dry communication with the main- land was by the Isthmus of Perekop. It was understood that the north of the peninsula had the character of an elevated steppe — that towards the south it was rocky and mountainous — and that the undulating downs which connected the steppe with the mountainous region of the south were seamed with small rivers flowing westward from the summits of the highland district.* It
* A great body of most valuable information respecting tlie Oriiiica had been imparted to the English public by General
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 323
was believed that tlie inhabitants were for the most part Tartars, men holding to the Moslem faith. Of the enemy's forces in this country, the Allies, in a sense, were ignorant ; for although the information which had come round to them by the aid of the Foreign Office was in reality well founded, they did not believe at the time that they could at all rely upon it, and therefore they were nearly as nmch at fault as if they had had no clue. They knew, however, that the peninsula was a province of Eussia — that Eussia was a great military power — that, so long as three months ago, the invasion had been counselled in print — and that afterwards the determination to undertake it had been given out aloud to the world. From these rudiments, and from what could be seen from the decks of the ships, they in- ferred that, either upon their landing, or on some part of the road between the landing-ground and Sebastopol, they would find the enemy in strength.
But beyond this, little was known ; and the im- Tins gives agination of men was left to range so free that, j.ediUo^n the although they were in the midst of their ' nine- an^^vcu- ' teenth century,' with all its prim facts and statis- tics, the enterprise took something of the character of adventure belonging to earlier ages. Common, sensible, fanciless men — men wise with the cynic wisdom of London clubs — were now by force
(then Colonel) Mackintosh, and the Colonel had also addressed important reports on the same subject to the military authori- ties. What I intend to indicate in the text is, not that the means of knowledge were wanting, but that they had not been extensively taken advantage of.
324 VOYAGE OF THE AKMADA
CHAP, turned into venturers, intent, as Argonauts of old,
XXI • • L_ in gazing upon the shores of a strange land to
which they were committing their lives. From many a crowded deck they strained their eyes to pierce the unknown. They could not see troops. They saw a road along the shore : now and then there appeared a peasant with a cart ; now and then a horseman riding at full speed. Neither peasant nor horseman seemed ever to pause in his duty that he might cast a glance of wonder at the countless armada which was gathering in upon his country. At the northern end of the bay there was a bright little town : maps showed that this was Eupatoria. ooeapatioii At uoou ou the 13th, the English tieet had drawn near to this port of Eupatoria. There were no Russian forces there except a few con- valescent soldiers ; and the place being defence- less. Colonel Trochu and Colonel Steele, accom- panied by Mr Calvert the interpreter, were despatched to summon it. The governor or head man of the place was an official personage in a liigh state of discipline. He had before his eyes the armed navies of the Allies, with the countless sails of their convoys ; and to all that vast arma- ment he had nothing to oppose except the forms of office. But to him the forms of office seemed all-sufficing, and on these he still calmly relied ; so, when the summons was delivered, he insisted upon fumigating it according to tin; health regula- tions of the little port. When he understood that the Webtern Powers intended to land, he said that
lEnpatoiia.
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 326
decidedly they might do so ; but he explained that chap. it would be necessary for them to land at the Lazar- ^^^' etto, and consider themselves in strict quarantine. On the following day the place was occupied by a small body of English troops. The few- Russian inhabitants of the place, being mainly or entirely official personages, had all gone away, but the Tartar inhabitants remained ; and al- though these men did not exhibit, as some might have expected, any eager or zealous affection for the allies of the Caliph, they seemed inclined to be friendly. Thoughtful men cared deeply to know whether between these natives and the Allies the relation of buyer and seller could be established — for it was of vital moment to the success of the expedition that the Allies should be able to obtain supplies of cattle and forage in the invaded country; and it was probable that much would turn upon the success of the first attempt to make purchases from the people of the country. The first experiment which was made in this direction elicited a curious proof of the difficulty which there is in causing mighty nations to act with the forethought of a single traveller. It was to be expected that, at the commencement of any attempted intercourse, the willingness of the natives to sell would depend upon their being tempted by the coins to which they were accustomed ; because just at first they would not only be ignorant of the value of foreign money, but would also dread the consequence of being found in possession of coin plainly re-
326 VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA
C H A P. ceived from the invaders. Yet the precaution of ^^^' bringing liussian money had been forgotten by the public authorities; and when Mr Hamilton of the Britannia was preparing to land, with a view of endeavouring to begin a buying-and-sell- ing intercourse with the natives, he had nothing to offer except English sovereigns. It chanced, however, that there were two or three English travellers on board the flag-ship, and that these men (foreseeing tlie likelihood of their having to buy horses or make other purchases from the natives of the invaded country) had supplied themselves with some of the gold Russian coins called ' half-imperials,' which were to be obtained without difficulty at Constantinople. The travel- lers— Sir Edward Colebrooke, I think, was one of them — advanced as many of these as they could spare to the public authorities ; and Mr Hamilton being thus enabled to land with a small supply of the magic half- imperials, and being, besides, a good-tempered, humorous man, with a tendency to make cordial speeches in English to all his fellow-creatures alike, whether Eussian, or Tar- tar, or Greek, he was able to make a merry begin- ning of that intercourse with the natives which was destined to become a fruitful source of strength to the Allied armies. The gains made by the first sellers soon drew fresh supplies into the place from the surrounding country ; the com- missariat afterwards began its operations in the town, and in time a good lasting market was opened to the invaders.
ACROSS THE BLACK SEA. 327
After receiving the surrender of Eupatoria on u u a p.
the afternoon of the 13th, the assembled armada '__
moved down towards the south. All day there Ti'e whoio
"^ arniada
were sailinsj-vessels approaching from a distance, ^-ithers
o irf o ' towards tlie
and closing at last with the rrencli fleet ; but ?''°s'l" '^"^ before night (with the exception, it is believed, of two or three small lagging transports) the three tieets and the host of vessels they convoyed, were anchored near Old Fort in Kalamita Bay. The united armada extended in a line parallel with the coast, and in a direction, tlierefore, not far from north and south. The French and the Turkish fleets were on the south or right- hand side ; the British fleet took tlie north, and formed the left of the Allied line.
828 THE LANDING.
place
CHAPTER XXII.
CHAP. The ground chosen by Lord Raglan for the land ^^"- ing of all the Allied forces is five or six miles The landing- nortli of the Bulganak Eiver. It gained its name of ' Old Fort ' from an indication appearing on the maps, rather than from any slight traces of the structure then remaining. Along this part of the coast the cliffs rise to a height of from 60 to 100 feet, and for the most part, they impend too closely over the sea to allow much room for the beach. Near ' Old Fort,' however, the high grounds so recede that at first sight they appear to embrace a small bay or inlet of the sea, but upon a nearer approach it is perceived that the inner part of the seeming bay is a salt-water lake, and that this lake is divided from the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach. A little further north the same disposition of land and water recurs ; for there, also, another salt lake, called the Lake of Kamishlu, is divided fi'om the sea by a low, narrow strip of beach a mile and a half in length. The first-mentioned strip of beach — namely, the strip opposite to Old Fort — was the one which
THE LANDING. 329
Lord Raglan had chosen for the landing of all the chap Allied armies. ^-^'^^-
It was arranged that a buoy should be placed off the centre of the chosen ground to mark tlie boundary between the French and the English flotilla.* The French and the Turkish vessels were to be on the south of the buoy, the British on the north ; and in the evening and night of the 13th tlie ships and transports of the three nations drew in as near as they could to their appointed landing-places.
But in the night of the 13th there occurred a step taken transaction which threatened to ruin the whole Frencii in plan for the lauding, and even to bring the har- '^ '"^ ' mony between the French and the English forces into grievous jeopardy. During the darkness, the French placed the buoy opposite, not to the centre, but to the extreme north of the chosen landing- ground ; f and when morning dawned, it appeared that the English ships and transports, though really in their proper places, were on the wrong side of the buoy — or rather, that the buoy was on the wrong side of them. Whether the act which created this embarrassment was one resulting
* Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain, thonglit proper to write a letter to a newspaper on the 18th of March 1863, saying, 'It might suffice for me simply to say that I re- ' member nothing about a buoy ; ' but on the 5th of the follow- ing April ho did me the honour to address a letter to me, in which he said, 'It would seem there was a buoy.' See the correspondence on the subject in the Appendix. — Note to i(h Edition.
+ See the extract from Lord Eaglan's private letter on this jiibject, which is given in the next footnote.
330
THE LANDING.
CHAP.
xxir.
This de- Btroj-s the whole plan of the landing.
Sir Edmund Lyons.
from sheer mistake on the part of our allies, or from their over - greediness for space, or from a scheme more profoundly designed, it plainly went straight towards the end desired by those French officers who had been labouring to bring the en- terprise to a stop. For what was to be done ? If the English, disregarding the altered position of the buoy, were to persist in keeping to their as- signed landing-ground, their whole ilotilla, their boats and their troops, when landed, would be hopelessly mixed up with the French ; and what might be expected to follow would be ruinous confusion — nay even, perhaps, angry and violent conflict between the forces of the Allies. To pro- pose to move the buoy, or to get into controversy with the French at such a time, would be to delay and imperil the whole undertaking; and yet the boundary, as it stood, extruded the Eng- lish from all share in the chosen landing-ground. It might seem that the whole enterprise was again in danger of failure, but again a strong will interposed.
From the moment when Lord Eaglan consented to undertake the invasion, he seems to have acted as though he felt that the belief which he enter- tained of its hazardousncss was a reason why he should be the more steadfast in his determina- tion to force it on. Nor was he without the very counsel that was needed for overcoming this last obstacle. Lyons, commanding the in-shore squad- ron of the British fleet, was entrusted with the direction of our transports and the whole man-
THE l.AiNDLNG, 331
agemeiit of the lauding. Moving long before chap.
dawn in the sleepless Agamemnon, he saw where L
the buoy had been placed by the French in the l^eaiing wui. night-time, and gathered in an instant all the genc'j"'*'^' perilous import of the change. He was more than a mere performer of duty, for he was a man driving under a passionate force of purpose. Without stopping to indulge his anger, he darted upon the means of dealing with the evil. He had observed that about a mile to the north of ' Old ' Fort' there was that strip of beach, before spoken of, which divided the Lake of Kamishlu from the sea. There, Lord Eaglan and he now determined New land- that the landing of the Lritish forces should take found' for place.* It was true that this plan would sever at KamWik
* One of the most conspicuous of my critics denied with great confidence the wliole statement alDOve made in reference to the buoy, and was supported (during a period of more than a fort- night) by the testimony of Captain Mends. It therefore seems right to give an extract from the private letter in which Lord llaglan narrates the facts to tlie Duke of Newcastle : —
Extract from Lord Raglan's Narrative of the Lauding, ad- dressed as a Private Conmiunication to tlie Duke of New- castle, the Secretary of War, and dated 'Camp above Old ' Fort Bay, September 18, 1854.' 'The disembarkation of both armies commenced on the ' morning of the 14th.
' It had been settled that the landing should be effected in ' Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy .should be placed in the centre ' of it to mark the left of the French and the right of the Eng- ' lish ; but when the Agamemnon came upon the buoy at day- * light, Sir Edmund Lyons found that the French naval officer ' had deposited it on tlie exti-eme northern end, and had thus ' engrossed the whole of the bay for the operation of his own ' army. This occasioned considerable confusion and delay, the ' English convoy having followed closely upon the steps of
332 THE LANDING.
CHAP, the French from the British forces during the ^^^^- operation of landing, but the evil thus encoun- tered was a hundred-fold less grave than the evil avoided — for, even in the face of an enemy, the separation of the French from the English would have been better than dispute or confusion ; and, moreover, the observations of the previous day had led the Allies to conjecture that the enemy did not intend to resist the landing. The morn- ing showed that this conjecture was sound: there- fore, great as was the danger from which the Alliance had been delivered, it turned out in the
' their leader, and got mixed with the French transports ; but ' Sir Edmund Lj^ons wisely resolved to make the best of it, ' ' and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next to the ' northward.'
I may add that all the many accounts wliicli I have seen of tlie movements and counter-movements of tlie ships and the transports on the early morning of the l-lth of September tally perfectly with the above statement by Lord Ilaglan. In saying this, I include Captain Mends's letter to the newspaper. See the Appendix. It Avill be seen that the facts which he de- scribes in tlie fourth and fifth paragraphs of that letter are ex- actly those wliich would naturally result from the discovery and the change of plan which Lord Kagbm communicates to the Minister of War.
I may add that Sir George Brown was on board the Aga- memnon ; that he was personally cognisant of the change which Lord Kaglan described ; that many years ago he recorded what occurred in language tallying perfectly with Lord Raglan's account ; and, fmally, that he (Sir George I5rown) is still alive. —Note (slightly altered) to 4th Kdilinn.
The kiudiiess of Captain Arinytage (who was first lieutenant of tlio Iligliflier at the time of the landing) has now enabled mo to give the words of the written order from Sir Edmund Lyons, proving the absolute accuracy with wliich Lord Raglan wrote when he said 'it had been settled that the landing should be * effected in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed
THE LANDING. 333
result that the immense advantatje of haviiii? two chap
XXTI
extended landing-places instead of one, was not .*
counterbalanced by any evil resulting from the severance of the two armies.
In point of security from molestation on the part of the enemy, both of the two landing-places were happily chosen. Both of them were on shores which allowed the near approach of the fleets, and placed the whole operation under cover of their guns. Also both landing - places were protected on the inland side by the salt lakes, which interposed a physical obstacle in the way of any front attack by the enemy ; and the access to the flanks of the disembarking armies was by strips of land so narrow that they could be easily defended against any force of infantry or cav- alry. It is true that the line of disembarkation of either army could have been enfiladed by artillery placed on the heights ; but then those heights could be more or less searched by a fire from the ships ; and the enemy had not attempted to
' in tli£ centre of it to mark the left of the French, and the
' right of the English.' The order ran thus : —
' Light Division to be actually under weigh at 1 o'clock.
' 4th Division at 2 ,,
'1st ,, ,, 3 „
'2d „ „ 4 „
* Steer SSE. 8 miles. Rendezvous Lat. 45°. Not to go
' within 8 fathoms. Those vessels v hich iiave cast off are to
' make fast tlieir hawsers the moment they receive this note.
(Signed) Edmund Lyons. Rear- Admiral.^
This order was received liy Armytage at 3 a.m. Tiie as- signed latitude is 11' ][)" S. of Eupatoria. — Note to bth Edition.
334
THE LANDING.
The cause and the nature of the change kept secret.
prepare for himself any kind of defence on the high ground.
The necessity of having to carry the English flotilla to a new landing-place occasioned, of course, a painful dislocation of the arrangements which had already been acted upon by the com- manders of the transports; but after much less delay and much less confusion than might have been expected to result from a derangement so great and so sudden, the position of the English vessels was adapted to the change.
Meanwhile, few of the thousands on board un- derstood the change which had been effected,* or even saw that they were brought to a new land- ing-ground. They imagined that it was the better method or greater quickness of the French which was giving them the triumph of being the first to land. Both Lord Eaglan and Lyons were too steadfast in the maintenance of the alliance to think of accounting for the seeming tardiness of the English by causing the truth to be known ; and even to this day it is commonly believed
* Amongbt these uninformed thousands was Captain Mends, Sir Edmund Lyons's flag-captain. See his letter to the news- paper in tlie Appendix, containing {inter alia) those words : — ' It mi(jhl mffi.cc for me simply to say, I remember nothing about ' a buoy.' The placing of a buoy for fixing the anchorage of each French column is officially narrated by the French in these words :— ' Le Primauget, le Caton, et la Mouette ontpris ' les devants, avec la mission de placer, h. petite distance de ' la plage de debarquomcnt, des bouees de couleur differente ' destinees k indiquer par leur alignement le mouillage de nos ' trois colonnes que le Primauget a detwrmiue dans I'excursion ' de la vcille.' Narrative enclosed to his Government, and de- clared accurate by Admiral Ilanielin. Note to Uh Edition.
THE LANDING. 335
tliat the English army effected its landing at Old chap. Fort. ^^^^-
The bend of the coast-line at Kalamita Bay is Position of of such a character that a spectator on board a squadrons, vessel close iu-shore is bounded in his view of the sea towards the south by the headland near the Alma; but if he stands a little way out to sea, the coast opens, and he then commands an unobstructed view home to the entrance of the Sebastopol harbour. So, whilst the in-shore squadrons approached the beach so closely as to be able to cover the lauding, the bulk of the Eng- lish fleet, commanded byDundasin person, lay far of the main enough out to be able to command the whole of °^ '^ the vast bay from Eupatoria to Sebastopol, keep- ing up an unbroken chain of communication from cape to cape, and always held ready to engage the Russian fleet if by chance it should come out and give battle.* Detached vessels reconnoitred the coast, and practised their gunners upon every en- campment or gathering of troops which seemed to be within range. As though in the arrogant yet quiet assertion of an ascendant beyond dispute, one solitary English ship, watching off the Sebas- topol harbour, stood sentry over the enemy's fleet.
* It has been already explained that the French men-of- war were doing duty as transports, and were not therefore in a condition to engage the enemy. There were people who thoughtlessly blamed Duudas for not taking part with the iu-shore squadron in the bustle of the landing. Of course his duty was to hold his off-shore squadron in readiness for an engagement with the Sebastopol fleet; and this he took Cflre to'd...
336
THE LANDING.
CHAP. XXII.
Plan of the Icisding.
General Airey.
Men had heard of the domiuiou of the seas, and now, what they bad heard of they saw.
The plan of the English disembarkation was imitated from the one adopted by Sir Ealph Aber- cromby when he made his famous descent upon the coast of Egypt; and was based upon the principle of so ranging the transports and the boats that the relative positions of the several companies, whilst being rowed towards the shore, should correspond with those they would have to take when landed, and forming line upon the beach.*
All the naval arrangements for the landing were undertaken by Sir Edmund Lyons ; but to dispose the troops on the beach — to gain a lodgment — to take up a position, and, if necessary, to intrench it — these were duties which specially devolved upon the Quartermaster-General. The officer who held this post was General Airey ; and, since it was his fate to take a grave part in the business of the war, and to share with Lord Eaglan his closest counsels, it seems useful to speak here at once, not of the quality of his mind (for that will best be judged by looking to what he did, and what he omitted to do), but rather of those cir- cumstances of his life, and those outer signs and marks of his nature, which any bystander in the camp would be likely to hear of or see.
A strictly military career in peace - time is a poor schooling for the business of war ; and the
* I abstain from giving a detiiiled account of the landing ojieration, because it was nnt resisted by the enemy
THE LANDING. 337
rough change which had ouce broken in upon chap. Airey's professional life helped to make him more ^^^' able in war than men who had passed all their lives in going round and round with the wheels. Airey was holding one of the offices at the Horse Guards when he was suddenly called upon by his relative Colonel Talbot, the then almost famous recluse of Upper Canada, to choose whether he and his young wife would accept a great territorial inheritance, with the condition of dwelling deep in the forest, far away from all cities and towns. Airey loved his profession, and what made it the more difficidt for him to quit it was the favour with which he was looked upon by the Duke of Wellington. It chanced that he had once been called upon to lay before the Duke the maps and statements required for showing the progress of a campaign then going on against the Cafires ; and the Duke was so delighted with the perfect clear- ness of the view which Airey was able to impart to him, that he instantly formed a high opinion of an officer who could look with so keen a glance upon a distant campaign and convey a lucid idea of it to his chief. Airey communicated to the Duke of Wellington Colonel Talbot's proposal, and explained the dilemma in which he was placed. • You must go,' said the Duke ; ' of course you ' must go — it is your duty to go ; but we will ' manage so that whenever you choose, you shall ' be able to come back to us.' Airey went to Canada. It had been no part of Colonel Talbot's plan to smooth the path of his chosen inheritor. VOL. II. Y
338 THE LANDING.
CHAP. He gave him a vast territory, but omitted to •^^^^' give him a home.
So, left isolated in the midst of the forest, aud with no better shelter than a log-hut half-built, the staff-of&cer, hitherto expert in the prim tradi- tions of the Horse Guards, now found himself so circumstanced that the health, nay, the very life of those most dear to him, was made to depend upon his power to become a good labourer. He could not have hoped to keep his English servants a day if he had begun by sitting still himself and order- m<y them to do the rough work to which they were unaccustomed ; so he worked with his own hands, in the faith that his example would make every kind of hard work seem honourable to his people; and being endued with an almost violent love of bodily exertion, he was not only equal to this new life, but came to delight in it. Clad coarsely during the day, he was only to be distinguished from the other workmen by his greater activity and greater power of endurance. Many English gentlemen have done the like of this, but com- monly they have ended by becoming altogether just that which they seemed in their working hours — by becoming, in short, mere husbandmen. It was not so with Airey. When his people came to speak to him in the evening, they always found him transformed. Partly by the subtle change which they were able to see in his manner, partly even by so outward a thing as the rigorous change in his dress, but most of all perhaps by his natural ascendant, they were prevented from forgetting
THE LANDING. 339
that their fellow -labourer of the morumg was chap their master — a master to whom they were every xxii. day growing more and more attached, but still their master. He therefore maintained his sta- tion. He did more: he gained great authority over the people about him ; and when he bade farewell to the wilderness, he had become like a chief of old times — a man working hard with his own hands, yet ruling others with a firm command.
It was during a period of some three or four years that Airey thus wrestled with the hardsliips of forest life, but at length coming home to Eng- land, he resumed his military career. Those who know anything of tlie real business of war will easily believe that this episode in the life of General Airey was more likely to fit him for the exigencies of a campaign and for the com- mand of men than thrice the same length of time consumed in the revolving labours of a military department; nay, perhaps they will think that, next to a campaign, this manful struggle with the wilderness was the very work which would be the most sure to set a mind free from the habits, the bylaws, and the petty regulations of office.
Before the expedition left England, Lord Eag- lan had asked General Airey to be his Quarter- master - General. Airey, preferring field duty with the divisions, had begged that some other might be appointed, and Lord Eaglan acceded to his wish ; but when, on the eve of the depar-
340 THE LANDING.
CHAP, tiire of the expedition from Varna, Lord De lios ^•^"^ returned to England,* the Quartermaster-Gen- eralship was again pressed upon General Airey in terms which made it unbecoming for him to refuse the burthen. His loyalty and affec- tionate devotion to Lord Eaglan were without bounds ; and he imagined that he was always acting with a strict deference to the wishes of his chief. But then Airey was a man of great ardour, of a strong will : and having also a rapid, decisive judgment, he certainly accustomed him- self to put very swift constructions upon Lord Eaglan's words. No one ever used to see him in the pain of suspense between two opinions. Either he really knew with minuteness Lord Eaglan's views, or else he was so prone to take a great deal upon himself, that in his zeal for the public service he might almost be called unscrupulous. Men who were hesitating and trying to make out what was the path of their duty, soon came to know that Airey was the officer wlio would thrust away their doubts for them ; because rightly or wrongly, whether with or without due authority, he used to speak in such a way as to untie or to cut every knotf He was himself, it would seem, unconscious of exercising so much power as he really did ; but it is certain enough that those who complained
* Lord de Ros went home on account of ill-liealth. He was so ill that he had to be carried on board.
t An illustration of this way of his (which was supplied to me after the publication of the 3d Edition) will be found ;?o««, in the note at the foot of p. 355.
THE LANDING. 341
of his ascendancy were not very wrong in believ- chap.
ing that he held a great sway ; for though, being _J L
guileless and single-hearted, he always liked to receive his first impulsions from the chief, yet, when once he was thus set moving, his strong will used to burst into action with all its own proper force, and very much, too, in its own direction,
Notwithstanding this proneness to action, his manner had all the repose which is thought to be a sign of power. He did not, in general, speak at all until he could speak decisively ; and he was more accustomed than most other Englishmen are to use that degree of precision and completeness of language which makes men content to act on it. Officers hesitating in the pain of suspense used to long to hear the tramp of his coming — used to long to catch sight of his eager, swooping crest (it was always strained for- ward and intent) — his keen, salient, sharp-edged features — his firm, steady eye — for they knew that he was the man who would release them from their doubts. He was gifted by nature with the kind of eloquence that it is good for a soldier to have. His oral directions to those in authority under him were models of impera- tive diction ; but when he spoke of what he had seen, the vivid pictures he drew were marked with a sharpness of outline hardly consistent with a perfect freedom from exaggeration — they want- ed the true English haze. He was too eager for action to be able to stand still weighing phrases;
342 THE LANDING.
CHAP, and I imagine that he did not even know how •^^^^' to try the exact strength and import of words in the way that a lettered man does. Upon the whole, his qualities were of such a kind as to make it impossible for him to be M'ithout great weight in the army. His friends would call hira a man plainly fitted for high command — his adversaries would say that power in his hands was likely to be used dangerously ; but all would alike agree that, whether for good or whether for evil, he had from nature the means of impress- ing his own will on troops. The first The arrangements of the French were like those
ing.^ '"' ' of the English; and at half-past eight o'clock on the morning of the 14th of September 1854, their first boat touched the shore. The English had made such good haste to retrieve the time spent in moving to their new landing-place, that very soon afterwai'ds their disembarkation began.
The morning was fine ; the sea nearly smooth. The troops of the Light Division were in the boats, and the seamen were at tlieir oars, expect- ing the signal. The signal was given, and in- stantly, from along the whole of the first line of transports, an array of boats freighted with troops — boats ranged upon a front of more than a mile — began to dart in towards the shore. It was said that tlie boat commanded by Vesey of the "Brit- annia was the first to touch the beach.* He Avas
* The question as to which of the English boats was the first to land has excited more interest than it apparently deserves ; for the lauding did not take place in face of the enemy. Per
THE LANDING. 343
an officer who would do all man could to be fore- chap. most. ^^"-
As soon as the boats had landed, the soldiers stepped ashore, and began to form line upon the beach ; but presently afterwards they piled arms. There were some Tartar peasants passing along
haps one of the causns Avhich led men to look at the question with something more than mere cariosity, was tlie siu-prise of finding that, notwithstanding all the charges of want of zeal which had been brought against Admiral Dundas, a boat from his flag-ship (the Britannia) was said, after all, to have been the first to land.
According to one opinion. Captain Dacres, with the gig of the Sanspareil, was the first to reach the shore ; and tliere are antecedent reasons for supposing that this would be likely to be the case ; for, besides that Captain Dacres was (as the work of that and the four follomng days sliowed) an officer of great zeal and ability, he had been entrusted with the naval command on the beach (he was beach-master), and would of course be anxious to reach the .shore as soon as possible. It seems that there got to be, as it were, a kind of race between the Britannia boat and the gig of the Sanspareil, and a race, too, which was a very close one ; for although the Britannia boat, laden with troops, could not match its speed with the gig, it liad a start just long enough to make up for the superior swiftness of its rival. Cap- tain Dacres never doubted that he, ^^-ith the gig of the Sans- pareil, was the first to land ; but among tliose who were on board the Britannia boat (and 1 speak now of soldiers as well as sailors) the belief was that that was the boat which won.
On both sides the statements are positive, and on one side they are also circumstantial. They are also rather interesting ; and I would have given them here, if it were not that I am un- willing to place men in an attitude of direct conflict with one anotlier upon an unimportant matter of fact.
If Vesey, with tlie Britannia boat, was the first to land. Colonel Lysons of the 23d Fusiliers must have been the first man of the land service who touched the shore. If, on the other hand, Dacres, with the gig of the Sanspareil, landed first, Sir George Brown, I think, must have been the first English officer of the land service wlio reached the shore of the Crimea.
344 THE LANDING.
CHAP, the coast-road with small bullock waggons. The ^^"- waggoners showed little or no alarm, and, knowing that they could not move off quickly with bul- locks, they did not attempt to get away. Ap- parently they were not struck with any sense of unfairness when they saw that the English took possession of the waggons ; and yet it could scarcely have been explained to them at that moment (as it afterwards would be) that every- thing taken by the English from private own- ers would be paid for at a just price. One of the waggons was laden with small pears, and the soldiers amused themselves with the fruit whilst the natives stood and scanned their in- vaders.
After a while, many of the battalions which had landed were ordered forward to occupy the hill on our right ; and thenceforth, during all the day, the acclivity was sparkling with the bayonets of the columns successively ascending it. But what were those long strings of soldiery now beginning to come down from the hill-side and to wind their way back towards the beach ; and what were the long white burthens horizontally carried by the men ? Already? already, on this same day ? Yes ; sickness still clung to the army. Of those who only this morning ascended the hill with seeming alacrity, many now came down thus sadly borne by thair comrades. They were carried on am- bulance-stretchers, and a blanket was over them. Those whose faces remained uncovered were still alive. Those whose faces had been covered ovei
THE LANDING. 345
by their blanket were dead. Near the foot of the chap
XXII
hill the men began to dm graves. 1
But meanwhile the landing went merrily on. zeaiai'd It might be computed that, if every man in the thesauors navy had only performed his strict duty, the land- ing would have taken some weeks. It was the su- pererogation, the zeal, the abounding zeal, which seemed to achieve the work. No sailor seemed to work like a man who was merely obeying — nc officer stood looking on as if he were merely com- manding ; and though all was concert and dis- cipline, yet every man was labouring with the whole strength of his own separate will.* And all this great toil went on with strange good- humour — nay, even with thoughtful kindness towards the soldiers. The seamen knew that it concerned the comfort and the health of the sol- diers to be landed dry, so they lifted or handed the men ashore with an almost tender care : yet not without mirth — nay, not without laugh-
* When it is seen that I conceive myself warranted in apply- ing this language to the exertions of the navy at the time of the landing, it may be asked whether there was not some one man who had the merit of giving a right direction to the zeal and energy of the seamen thus toiling on the beach ? There was. The officer who commanded on the beach was Captain Dacres ; and I believe one might safel}' echo the words of him who once said to Captain Dacres, ' The 14th of September was your day.' Both Dundas and Lyons were doing all tliat was right ; but, so far as concerns the vast operation going on upon the beach, their wisdom lay in the wise trustfulness with which they committed the business to a fit man, and then left him alone, undisturbed and unfrctted by orders. I believe that during the four days and four nights which followed the commencement of the land- ing. Captain Dacres never received any orders from Sir Edmund Lyons. — Note to ilk Edition.
346 THE LANDING.
CHAP, ter far heard — when, a.s though they were giant
" ' maidens, the tall Highlanders of tlie 42d placed
their hands in the hands of the sailor and sprang
by his aid to the shore, their kilts floating out
wide while they leapt.
After mid-day the sea began to lose its calm- ness, and before sunset the surf was strong enough to make the disembarkation difficult, and in some degree hazardous. Yet, by the time the day closed, the French had landed their Ist, 2d, and 3d divisions of infantry, together with eighteen guns ; and the English had got on shore all their infantry divisions, and some part of their field-artillery.
Wet nights Somc fcw of the English regiments remained on the beach, but the rest of them had been marched up to the high grounds towards the south, and they there bivouacked. At night there fell heavy rain, and it lasted many hours. The men were Avithout their tents.* Lying in w^et pools or in mud, their blankets clinging heavy with water, our young soldiers began the cam- paign. The French soldiery \vere provided with what they call dog-tents — tents not a yard high, but easily carried, and yielding shelter to soldiei's creeping into them. It was always a question in the Frcaich army wlietluir these tents gave the men more liealth and comfort than they could find in the upon air.
* This was because there were iio sufficing means of land- transport for conveying the camp equipage towards Sebasto- pol. After tlie 14lh the tents were landed, but they weio after- wards reshipped.
THE LANDING. 347
The next morning was fine, but the surf had so OHAP. much increased that for several hours the landing was suspended. After the middle of the day it be- continua- came practicable, though still somewhat difficult, to landing . go on with the work ; and great eftbrts were made to land the Engiisl] cavalry and the rest of the ar- tillery with the appertaining horses and equipages.
Unless a man has stood in the admiring crowd which gathers to see tlie process of landing one horse upon an open sea-shore ; and unless, whilst he carries in his mind the labour and energy brought to bear upon this single object, he can imagine the same toil gone through again and again and again and again, till it has conquered the whole assigned multiple, he will hardly know wliat work must be done before a general can report to his Government that he has landed upon an open coast, with a thousand cavalry and sixty guns all in readiness for either movement or com- bat. By labour never once intermitted (except when darkness or the state of the sea forbinle it), and continued from the morning of the 14th until the evening of the 18th, the whole of the English land-force, which had been embarked at Varna (together now with Cathcart's Division), was safely landed upon the enemy's coast.*
The result then was, that under circumstances
* Cathcart's Division —the 4th — had been meant to con- stitute a reserve for our army, and was tlierefore, as we saw, left beliind when the invading armies embarked; but Lord Raglan soon perceived the expedienc}' of having this force with him in the Crimea, and the orders he therefore gave brought it up by the time above shown.
348
THE LANDING.
CHAP. XXII.
Its com- l»letion ;
liy tlie Bnglisli ;
by the Trench ;
of weather which were, upon the whole, favour- able, and with the advantage of encountering no opposition from the enemy, an English force of some 26,000 infantry and artillerymen, with more than a thousand mounted cavalry, and sixty guns, had been landed in the course of five September days ; and, although the force thus put ashore was without those vast means of land-transport which would be needed for regular operations in the in- terior, and was obliged to rely upon the attendant fleet for the continuance of its supplies, it was nevertheless so provided as to be able to move along the coast carrying with it its first reserve of ammunition, and food enough for three days.
The operation was conducted with an almost faultless skill, and (until a firm lodgment had been gained), it proceeded in the way that was thought to be the right one for landing in the face of the enemy. Though the surf was at times somewhat lieavy, not a man was lost.
For Marslial St Ainaud, who had brought no cavalry with him, the task of effecting his descent on the shore was one of comparative ease ; and he might have placed himself in a condition to march long before the English were ready ; but knowing that the disembarkation of a large num- ber of horses must needs cost a good deal of time, he had no strong motive for hurrying; and ac- cordingly, during the whole of the five days which our people consumed in the process, there was always work going on at the landing-ground used by the French.
THE LANDING. 349
The Turks did the work of landing very well ; chap. and, indeed, they quickly showed that they had ^^^^- an advantage over the French and the English in ^^J^^ their more familiar acquaintance with the mode of life proper to warfare. They did not let the want of land-transport prevent them from landing their camp equipage ; for, with them, the carriage of tents is a very simple business. Two soldiers, one at each end, bear the pole of a tent between them, and the canvas is carried by others in turns. So early as the 15th, the first day after that on which the landing began, the Turks were comfortably en- camped on the ground assigned to them; and whilst the young troops of France and England were still sitting wretched and chilled by the wet of their night's bivouac, the warlike Osmanlis seemed to be in their natural home. Soliman, who commanded them, was able to welcome and honour the guests who went to visit him in his tent as hospitably as though he were in the audi- ence-hall of his own pashalic. He had all his tents well pitched ; and his men, one could see, were still a true Moslem soldiery — men with arms and accoutrements bright, yet not forgetful of prayer. He had a supply of biscuit and of cart- ridges, and a good stock of horses, some feeding, some saddled and ready for instant use. He was not without coffee and tobacco. His whole camp gave signs of a race which gathers from a great tradition, going on from father to son, the duties and the simple arts of a pious and warfaring life.
350 KESOUllCES OBTAINED FROM
CHAPTER XXIII.
CHAP. When the people of the neighbouring district
■^^"^' came to see the strength of the armies descend-
Deputations j^-jf^ upon their coast, the head men of the villages
from 111 e Tar- ir> I ' c
[S'the En- hegan to present themselves at the qnarters of "uartera ° ^^^^ Allics. The fiist of these deputations was received by Lord Eaglan in the open air. The men were going up to headquarters when they passed near a group of officers on foot in blue frock-coats, and they learned that the one whose maimed arm spoke of other wars was the English General. They approached him respectfully, but without submissiveness of an abject kind. Neither in manner, dress, appearance, nor language, would these men seem very strange to a traveller ac- quainted with Constantinople or any of the other cities of the Levant. They wore the pelisse or long robe, and although their head-gear was of black lamb-skin, it was much of the same shape as the Turkish fez. They spoke with truthfulness and dignity, allowing it to appear that the invasion was not distasteful to them, but abstaining from all affectation of enthusiastic sympathy. They
THE INVADED COUNTRY. 351
seemed to understand war and its exigencies ; chap. for they asked the interpreters to say that such of their possessions as might be wanted by the English army were at Lord Eaglan's disposal. Pleased with the demeanour of the men, as well as with the purport of their speech, Lord Eaglan told them that he would avail himself of some of their possessions, more especially their wag- gons and draught animals, but that everything taken for the use of the English army would be paid for at a proper rate. Much to Lord Eaglan's surprise (for he was not accustomed to the people of the East), the head man of the village resisted the idea of the people being paid, and anxiously pressed the interpreter to say that their posses- sions were yielded up as free gifts.
Pure ignorance of the invaded country gave Resuiioi- charm to every discovery tending to throw light expeditions upon the character and pursuits of the inhabi- tants ; and if our soldiery had found in the vil- lages high altars set up for human sacrifices, they would scarcely have been more surprised than they were when, prying into the mysteries of this obscure Grim Tartary, they came upon traces of modern refinement and cultivated taste. In some of the houses at Kentugan there were pianos ; and in one of them a music-book, lying open and spread upon the frame, seemed to shoM' that the owner had been hurried in her flight. But the owners of these dwellings must have been oflQcial personages. The mass of the country people were Tartars.
352 RESOURCES OBTAINED FROM
CHAP. Ill the villages there was abuudauce of agricul- ^^"^- tural wealth. The main waut of the country was water ; but General Airey caused wells to be sunk. The English system of payment for supplies rapidly began to bear its usual fruit, and the districts from which the people came in to barter with us were every day extending. The English In their passage across the Euxine our battal- abToVo'' ions had not yet been followed by that evil from crime, horde who are accustomed to cling to an army selling strong, noxious drinks to the men. There- fore our army was without crime.* It was with something more than mercy, it was with kindness and gentle courtesy, that the people of the vil- lages were treated by our soldiery ; and the inter- preters had to strain the resources of the English tongue in order to convey a faint apprehension of the figures of speech in which the women Kindly in- wcrc cxprcssing their gratitude. Their chief fa- betw^nlur vouritcs, it secms, were the men of the Eifle the'vniagcri Brigade. Quartered for a day or two in one of the villages, these soldiers made up for the want of a common tongue by acts of kindness. They helped the women in their household work ; and the women, pleased and proud, made signs to the stately ' Kifles ' to do this and do that, exulting in the obedience which they were able to win from men so grand and comely. When the inter- preter came, and was asked to construe what the
• This stateineut, broad aa it looks, i.s iiuaiit to bo taken literally, and to be regarded as a .statement taken from tlie ri"ht olficial source.
THE I^'VADED COUNTRY. 353
women were sayiufj so fast and so eagerly, it chap.
. . . XXIII
appeared that they were busy with similes and 1
metaphors, and that the Eifles were made out to be heroes more strong than lions, more gentle than young lambs.
A dreadful change came over that village : the outrages
-r^n -ii T 1 rr 11 perpetrated
lutles were withdrawn — the Zouaves marclied by the
Zouaves.
in. There followed spoliation, outrage, horrible cruelty. When those tidings came to Lord Eag- lau, he was standing on tlie shore with several of his people about him. He turned scarlet with shame and anger. The yoke of the alliance had wrung him.
In general, it would fall within the duty of The duty of light horse to sweep the face of the invaded ter- the couutry
, , . . , . , , -,, -for supijlie*.
I'ltory and bring m supplies ; but the 1 rench M'ere without cavalry ; and although the body of horse which we had landed was called ' the Light ' Brigade,' the Lancers, the Hussars, and the Light Dragoons of which it consisted, were not troops of such nimble kind, and not so practised as to be all at once apt at foraging. Besides it was plain that in advancing througli the enemy's couutry, the power of the invaders would have to be measured by the arm in which they were weakest, and a material loss in our small, brilliant force of cavalry might bring ruin upon the whole expedition. There was the Commissariat. The officers of that depart- ment were gentlemen taken from a branch of the Treasury ; and although they could make requisi- tions on the military authorities with more or les3 hope of a result, they had no force of their own VOL. II. z
354
RESOURCES OBTAINED FROM
CHAP.
XXIII.
Alrey's quick per- eeiitiou of tlie need to get nicaii3 of land- transi-ort.
with which to act. The regimental officers were of course busied wdth their respective corps. Yet it was certain that the power of operating effec- tively with the English army would depend upon its obtaining a large addition to its existing means of land-transport. In the result, it was the chief of one of the business departments of our Head- quarter Staff who pressed forward into the gap, and succeeded in achieving the work uj^on which, in a great degree, the fate of the campaign seemed likely to hinge.
From the first General Airey had seen that the mere inert presence of armies in an invaded pro- vince is a thing very short of conquest. Conquest, he knew, must generally rest upon the success with which supplies can be drawn from the in- vadad province ; and he never forgot that, unless the country could be made to yield means of land- carriage, tlie Allies would have to creep timidly along the shore, tethered fast by the short string of carts with which they had come provided ; therefore, even within a few minutes from the time when the landing began, lie was alread}'' striving to gain — not the mere occupation of the soil — not the mere licence for the troops to stand or lie down on the ground — but that hold, that military grasp of the country which would make it help to sustain the invasion. When only a few battalions of the Light Division had landed, and were beginning to form on the beach, he had hastened up to the high ground on our right. There, at once catching sight of a long string of
THE INVADED COUNTRY. 355
Nvasiu'ons escorted by a body of Cossacks lie oL- chap.
. . XXIll
tained the aid of a company of the 23d Eusiliers
under JNIajov Lysons, and with these advanced ° a convoy quickly in skirmishing order. The Cossacks tried hard to save the convoy by using the points of their lances against the bullocks, and even against the drivers ; but, the Fusiliers advancing and beginning to open fire, the Cossacks at length retreated, leaving Airey in possession of just that kind of prize which the army most needed — a prize of some seventy or eighty waggons, with their oxen and drivers complete. * Never ceasing to think it was vital to have more and more means
* After the publication of the 3d Edition, I received from Colouel Lysons a more detailed narrative of this incident than is given in the text. He says: 'Shortly after landing, Sir ' George Brov.n ordered me to extend the company that was ' with me along the top of the ridge -which overlooked the ' landing-place. "While there, General Airey came up to me, ' and, pointing to a line of arabas which was moving across the '. plain some way off, asked if I could take them. I answered, ' " Yes, but Sir George had ordered me to stay where I was." ' The General (Airey) then began to write on a piece of paper ' to ask leave to send me from my post ; but on looking up, ' and seeing that the waggons were already far off, he exclaimed, ' " "We shall lose them if you don't go at once. I will take the ' " responsibility on myself." So away I went in skirmishing ' order. On approaching a hillock, which screened the arabas
* from our view, I saw the long lances of some Cossacks waving ' iu the air. Fearing they might attack us, I closed my men
* to the centre on the march ; but as we cleared the top of the ' rising ground, these gentlemen (the Cossacks) galloped off to ' the arabas, on which we had gained considerably. A few ' minutes after, I saw the Cossacks making the drivers unyoke ' their bullocks, that they might drive them away from us. ' Knowing they would beat me at that game, 1 desired three ' old soldiers to fall out of the ranks and fire at the Cossacks.
* The first shot fell short. On the second being fired, I saw one
356
KESOURCES OBTAINED FKOM
CHAP, XXIII.
His con-
tinucJ
exertious.
itelr result.
of tiausport, Airey afterwards despatched the officers of his department in all directions to bring in supplies. Sending Captain Sankey to Tuzla and Sak, he thence got 105 waggons. Sending Captain Hamilton to Bujuk Aktash, to Beshi Aktash, to Tenish, and Sak, he got 67 camels, 253 horses, 45 cartloads of poultry, barley, and other supplies, with more than a thousand head of cattle and sheep.* At a later date, and when the army was moving, he took 25 waggons from a village near the line of march. One day, moreover, it happened that General Airey sent his aide-de-camp ISTolan to explore for water, and, though he was without a cavalry escort, Nolan boldly cut in upon a convoy of 80 government waggons laden with flour, and seized the whole of it. In all, some 350 waggons were obtained, with their teams and their Tartar drivers.
' of the Kussians jump up from his saddle as though he was ' liit, . . . and forthwith tlie wliole jjarty scamiered away ' over the j)lain. The drivers then came running to us, and ' kneeling down and embracing our knees. I made them yoke ' their bullocks again, and took the train back, and handed ' them over to General Airey. On our way back we passed Sir ' George Brown.'
"We saw that (suitposing the Britannia boat to liave been the first to touch the beach) Colonel I.ysons was the first English soldier who landed in the Crimea, and the above incident enabled liim also to say not only that the first shot fired by our soldiery was fired under his orders, but that the first piize taken from the enemy was taken by him — was taken by him in derogation of the standstill commands which had been given liim by Sir George Brown, but in obedience to the boldly-ventured order by which General Airey unleashed him. — Note to 4ih Edition.
* In some, but not all of these expeditions, Sankey and Hamilton had cavalry escorts.
THE INVADED COUNTRY. 357
In general, the appropriation of the resources en A P.
of the country is a business which ranges among 1
mere commissariat annals ; but in order to this invasion, the seizing of means of land-transport was a business hardly otherwise than vital. Even as it was, the army was brought to hard straits for want of sulficing draught-power; and without the cattle and waggons which were seized whilst the troops were landing, the course of events must have been other than what it was.
Those Tartar drivers of whom I have spoken, The Tartar
drivers,
were a wild people, little fit, as it seemed, for the obedience and patient toil exacted from camp- followers ; but the descent of the Allies upon the coast was the first military operation that they had witnessed, and before their amazedness ceased, they found themselves unaccountal)ly marshall- ed and governed, and involuntarily taking their humble part in tlie enterprise of the Western Powers. j\Iany of them wore the same expres- sion of countenances as hares that are taken alive, and they looked as though they were watching after the right moment for escape ; but they had fallen, as it were, into a great stream, and all they could do was to wonder, and yield, and flow on. There were few of those captured lads who had strength to withstand the sickness and the hard- ships of the campaign. For the most part, they sank and died.
358
THE ?LA2^ OF THE ENTERPRISE.
CHAPTER XXIV.
CHAP. XXIV.
The forces now on Btore.
The nature of tlio
operation by whicli the Allies were to make good their ailvanco to Subastoiiol.
There were now upon the coast of the Crimea some 37,000 French and Turks,* with sixty-eight pieces of artillery, all under the orders of jNIar- shal St Arnaud ; and we saw that 27,000 Eng- lish, including a full thousand of cavalry, and to- gether with sixty guns, had been landed by Lord Eaglan. Altogether, then, the Allies numbered 63,000 men and 128 guns. These forces, partly by means of the draught animals at their com- mand, and partly by the aid of the soldier himself, could carry by land the ammunition necessary for perhaps two battles, and the means of subsistence for three days. Their provisions beyond those limits were to be replenished from the ships. It was intended, therefore, that the ileets should fol- low the march of the armies ; and that the invad- ers, without attempting to dart upon the inland route which connected the enemy with St Peters- burg, should move straight upon the north side of Sebastopol by following the line of the coast.
• 30,204 Frenchmen and 7000 Turks, ncconling to the French accounts. Lord Raglan, I believe, thought that the French force was less, and put it at 27,600.
THE PL AX OF THE ENTERPRISE. 359
The whole body of the Allied armies, was to ^^f^ operate as a ' movable column.' *
Between an armed body engaged in regular Comranson operations, and that description of force which the '^^^l^^^\^^^ French call a ' movable column,' the difference is ^^'^"^^ ^jf^^^^" broad ; and there is need to mark it, because the :'^^';^^ way in which regular operations are conducted, is not even similar to that in which a ' movable ' column ' is wielded. It is, of course, from the history of Continental wars that the principle of regular operations in the field is best deduced. A prince intending to invade his neighbour's terri- tory takes care to have near his own frontier, or in states already under his control, not only the army with which he intends to begin the invasion, but also that sustained, gatherhig of fresh troops, and that vast accumulation of stores, arms, and munitions, which will suffice, as he hopes, to feed the war. The territory on which these resources are spread is called the ' base of operations.' When the invading general has set out from this, his strategic home, to achieve the object he has in view, the neck of country by which he keeps up his communications with the base is called the ' line of operations ; ' f and the maintenance of
* I make this endeavour to elucidate the true character of the operation for the purpose of causiug the reader to under- stand the kind of hazard which was involved in the march along the coa.st, and also in order to lay the ground for explain- ing {in a future volume) the causes which afterwards brought upon the army cruel sufTcrings and privations.
+ This is generally, but not invariably, the same line as the one by which he has advanced.
360 THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE.
CTIAP. this line of operations is tlie one object which ^^^^' must never be absent from his mind. The farther he goes, the more he needs to keep up an inces- sant communication with his ' base ; ' and yet, since the line is lengthening as he advances, it is constantly becoming more and more liable to be cut. Such a disaster as that he looks upon as nearly equal to ruin, and there is hardly anything that he will refuse to sacrifice for the defence of the dusty or mud-deep cart-roads which give him his means of living and fighting.
On the other hand, the commander of a ' mov- ' able column ' begins his campaign by wilfully placing himself in those very circumstances which would bring ruin upon an army carrying on regu- lar operations. He does not profess nor attempt to hold fast any ' line of operations ' connecting him with his resources. He says to his enemy: ' Surround me if you will ; gather upon my front; ' hover round me on flank and rear. Do not ' affront me too closely, unless you want to see ' something of my cavalry and my horse-artillery; ' but, keeping at a courteous distance, you may ' freely occupy the whole country through which
* I pass. I care nothing for the roads by which I ' have come ; what I need wliilst my task is doing ' I carry along with me. I have an enterprise ' in hand ; that achieved, I shall march towards ' the resources which my countrymen liave pre- ' pared for me. Those resouices I will reach or
* else perish.' If an army engaged in regular operations were likened to an engine drawing its
THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE. 3G1
supplies by means of lons^ pipes from a river, the chap.
XXTV
principle of the ' movable column ' would be well .*
enough tokened by that simple sldnful of water which, carried on the back of a camel, is the life of men passing a desert.
Each of the two systems has its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantages enjoyed by an army undertaking regular operations are : the last- ing character of its power, and its comparative security against great disasters. The general con- ducting an army in regular operations is constantly replenishing his strength by drawing from his ' base ' fresh troops and supplies to compensate the havoc which time and the enemy, or even time alone, will always be working in his army ; and if he meets with a check, he retires upon a line already occupied by portions of his force, already strewed with his magazines. He retires, in short, upon a road prepared for his reception, and the farther he retreats, the nearer he is to his great resources. The drawbacks attending this system are : the great quantity of means of land-transport required for keeping up the communication, and the eternal necessity of liaving to be ready with a sufhcient force to defend every mile of the 'line of operations' against the enterprises of the enemy.
Tlie advantages of the ' movable column ' are : that its means of land-transport may be compara- tively small — may, in fact, be proportioned to the limited duration of the service which it under- takes ; and that, not being clogrjed with the duty
362 THE PLAN OF THE ENTEKPKISE,
CHAT, of maintaining a 'line of operations,' it lias, in XXIV L truth, nothing to defend except itself. But grave
drawbacks limit the power of a ' movable column.' In the first place, it is an instrument fitted only for temporary use; because, during the service in which it is engaged, it has no resources to rely upon except what it carries along with it. An- other drawback is the hazard it incurs — not of mere defeat, but of total extermination; for it is a force wdiich has left no dominion in its wake, and if it falls back, it falls into the midst of enemies having hold of the country around, and emboldened by seeing it retreat.
Then, also, a ' movable column,' even though it be never defeated in any pitched battle, is liable to be brought to ruin by being well harassed; and very inferior troops, or even armed peasants, if they have spirit and enterprise, may put it in peril ; for, having the command of the country all round it, they can easily prepare their measures for vexing the column by day and by night. Again, the 'movable column' cannot send its sick and wounded to the rear. It must either abandon the sufferers, or else find means of carrying theni wherever it marches, and this, of course, is a task which is rendered more and more difficult by every succeeding combat. Again, if tlie ' movable 'column' is brought to frequent halts by the necessity of self-defence, there is danger that the operation in which it is engaged will last to a time beyond the narrow limit of the supplie:? which it is able to carry along with it.
THE PLAN OF THE ENTEKPRISE. 363
111 Alfforia the French had brou2;ht the system chap.
XXIV
of using small ' movable columns ' to a high state 1
of perfection. One might there see a force com- plete in all arms, carrying M-ith it the bread and the cartridges, and driving betwixt its battalions the little herd of cattle which would enable it to live and to ficrht ; mirdit see it biddiuf^ farewell — farewell for perhaps several weeks — to all its other resources, and boldly venturing into the midst of a wihlerness alive with angry foes. But the Arabs and Kabyles, though not without some of the warlike virtues, were, upon tlic wliole, too unintelligent and too feeble to be able to put the system of the ' movable column ' to a test sufficing to prove that the contrivance would hold good in Europe.*
Upon tlie wliole, it may be acknowledged that, for operating in a country where the enemy is looked upon as at all formidable, the employment of a 'movable column' is a measure which will be likely to win more favour from those who love an adventure, than from those who arc acquainted "with the art of war.
lUit whichever of the two methods be chosen, it is of great moment to choose decisively, taking care that the operations are carried on in a way consistent with the priuci})le of the system on which they proceed. A general conducting regu- lar operations must be wary, circumspect, and
* It was the custom of tlic Arabs to abstain rigorously from night attacks, and this liabit of theirs was of inestimable advan- tage to the French.
351: THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE.
CHAP, resolutely patient. The leader of a 'movable ^^^'^- ' column ' must be swift, and even, for very safety's sake, lie may have to be venturesome ; for what would be rashness in another may in him be rigid prudence. The two systems are so opposite, that to confuse the two, or to import into the practice of one of them the practice applicable to the other, is to rnn into grave tronbles and dangers. Yet this is what the Allies did. When the English Government committed to this enterprise a large proportion of their small, brilliant army, and ap- pointed to the command of it a General mature in years, and schooled by his long subordination to Wellington, they acted as though they meant that the army should engage with all due prudence in regular operations. Wlien they ordered that this force should make a descent upon the Crimea without intending to prepare for it a base of operations at the landing-place, they caused it to act as a ' movable column.' It will be seen hereafter that, from this ambiguity of purpose, or rather from this dimness of sight, the events of the campaign took their shape.
Again, it is right to see how far it be possible to change with tlio same force from one of the two systems to the other. Upon this, it can be said that an army engaged in regular operations may well enough be able to furnish forth a ' movable ' column ;' but to hope that a 'movable column' will be able to gather to itself all at once the lasting strength of an army prepared for regular operations, is to hope for what cannot be. It is
THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE. 3G5
true, as we shall see hereafter, that by dint of chap. great efifort and the full command of the sea, ^^^^- the two miglity nations of the west were able in time to convert tlie remains of their ' movable 'column' into an army fitted for regular opera- tions ; but we shall have to remember that, before the one system could be effectually re- placed by the other, the soldiery underwent cruel sufferings.
The 63,000 invaders now preparing to march TheAiiies towards the soutli M'ere the largest, and by far the atllsV^'^'' best appointed, force that the Powers of modern 'column.- Europe had ever dared to engage in what (as distinguishing it from regular operations) may rightly be called an adventure. Their plan was to advancs towards the north of Sebastopol, suffering the enemy to close round their rear, and intending to march every day to a new point of contact with the fleet. It was only at the mouths of the rivers that the cliffs between Old Fort and Sebastopol left room for anything like a landing-place ; and (except so far as concerned the mere interchange of signals), the land-forces, whilst marching from the banks of one river to the banks of another, could not expect to be in communication with the fleets. Moreover, the Allied Generals were stiJl in ignor- ance of the numerical strength of the enemy whom they were thus to defy. All they knew M-as that, so far as concerned his numbers of brave, steady, highly-drilled troops, the Czar was reported to be the foremost potentate of the world ; and that the publicity of the Allied counsels had given him a
366- THE PLAN OF THE ENTEKPRISE.
C n A P. good deal of time for reinforcing the garrisons of
Y XT V • o o
J '_ the invaded province.
It may be said tliat, since the Allied armies were to be attended along the coast by their fleets, they were not in the strictest sense a ' movable ' column.' Each night, no donbt, they expected to be in communication with their sliips; but, during each of the marches they were about to undertake, their dangers were to be in all respects the same as those which attend upon any other ' movable column ; ' for every morning they wgtq to cast loose from the ties which connected them with their resources, as well as with their means of retreat, and were to ground tlicir hopes of re- covering their communications upon their power to force their way through a country hekl by the enemy. In short, the Allied armies were a 'movable column;' but a movable column which could hope to find means of succour, and, if neces- sary, of retreat, by fighting its way to a point of contact with the attendant fleets, and covering its withdrawal by a victory. There is the more need for showing this by dint of words, since it happened that the true nature of the expedition was obscured by the course of events. It passed for a measure more prudent than it really was, because Prince Mentschikoff, being wilful and unskilled, did not take tlie right means for expos- ing its rashness.
The march now about to be undertaken by the invaders was of such a kind that an enterprising enemy who understood his calling might bring
THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE, 3G7
tliein to a lialt whenever he chose; and, forcing chap. them to tiy to convei't their flauk into a front, ^^^^' inifrht compel tliem to liLiht a battle with their Penioua
o 1 o character of
back to the sea-cliff— to figlit, in short, upon }r^o'nJ'o[^'' ground where defeat would be ruin. "When, ^'"^• therefore, on the 19th of September 1854, the Allied armies broke up from their bivouacs and marched towards the south, they were engaging in a venturesome enterprise.
It seems that, although by human contrivance a whole people may be shut out from the know- ledge of momentous events in which its armies are taking a part, there is yet a subtle essence of truth which will permeate into tlie mind of a nation thus kept in ignorance. To a degree which freemen can hardly imagine to be possible, the first Napoleon had succeeded in hiding the achievements of the English army from the sight of the French people; and since the French in after years were little tempted to gather up by aid of history the events which they had been hindered from learning in the form of 'news,' there was — not merely in tiie French army, but even in all France — a verv scant knowledge of the way in which the two mighty nations of the West had encountered one another in the great war. Yet, now that the time had come for test- ing the faith which one army had in the prowess of the other, it suddenly appeared that a belief in the quality of the English soldier was seated as deep in the mind of the French army as though it were a belief founded upon historic knowledga
tbe left.
3G8 THE PLAN OF THE ENTERPRISE.
CHAP. This will be understood by observing the relative
^^^^' place which the French commander was content
to take in the order of march, and by looking at
it in connection with what then promised to be
the character of the impending campaign.
The fate of When oncc the invaders had landed and seized
the whole ■,• n • i-
Allied army tlic coast-road, the one line or communication
dependent . /> t i • i.1.
upon the which tlic Kussiaus could trust to for linking the
firmness of ■ i i -i
that portion oarrisoii of Sebastopol to the mainland was by
of it wliich ■= '- . ~ .
Bho'jw^take the great road which passes through Bakshi Serai and Simpheropol. It was vital to the Eussian commander to be able to hold this road, for by that his reinforcements were to come. On the other hand, he had to try to cover Sebastopol ; but such was the direction in which the Allies were preparing to march upon the place that, by manceuvring with his back towards the great road passing through Simpheropol, he could cling to his line of communication, and yet be able to come down upon the flank of the invading armies whilst they wei'e marching across his front. In this way he would cover Sebastopol much more effectively than by risking his communications in order to place his army like a mere inert block between the invaders and their prey. INIoreover, he was known to be relatively strong in cavalry, and the country was of such a kind that the Allies, advancing from Old Fort to the Belbec, would have upon their left a fair, undulating steppe, such as horsemen exult to look upon. It was, therefore, to be expected that the whole stress of the task undertaken by the invaders
THE PLAN 01' THE ENTEEPRISE. 369
uould be tlirowii, in tbe first iustauce, iipou that chap. portion of the Allied force which might be chosen ^^^' to form their left wing.
In the armies of Europe the riglit is the side of The French precedence, and from the time that the AVestern right '* Powers had begun to act together in Turkey, the French had always claimed, or rather had always taken, the right. Now, it happened that, both in Turkey and in the Crimea, the side of precedence was the side nearest to the sea, whilst the left was the side nearest to the enemy. Lord Raglan had observed all this, but he had observed in silence ; and finding the right always seized by our Allies, he had quietly put up M'ith the left. Yet he was not without humour ; and now, when he saw that, in this hazardous movement along the coast, the French were still taking the right, there was something like archness in his way of remarking that, although the French were bent upon taking precedence of him, their courtesy still gave him the post of danger. This he well might say ; for, so far as concerned the duty of covering the venturesome march which was about to be under- taken, the whole stress of the enterprise was tlu'own upon the English army. The French force was covered on its right flank by the sea, on its front and rear by the fire from the steamers and on its left by the English army. On the other hand, the English army, though covered on its right flank by the French, was exposed in front, and in rear, and on its whole left flank, to the full brunt of the enemy's attacks. If the VOL. IL 2 A
370 THE FIRST day's MARCH.
CHAP. Itussiaii General should act in anything like con- ^^^' formity to the principles of tlie art of war, the whole weight of his attacks would have to be met, in the first instance, by the English alone ; and althougli the French would have an oppor- tunity of acting as a reserve, tliey would do so under circumstances rendering it very difficult for them to retrieve any check sustained by their
Tieir trust- Allies. In short, the French could not but know
good sense, that, if the enemy shoukl direct his enterprises against the open left flank of the invaders, the least weakness on the part of the English might enable him to roll up the whole Allied force, involving French and English alike in one com- mon disaster. Yet so steadfast was the trust which the French reposed in the English, so un- shaken the courage and good sense with which they committed themselves to the prowess of their ancient foe, that they never for an instant sought to meddle with the duty of covering the march from an attack on tlie left Hank. They planned that the English should be tliere.
The advance On the morning of the lOtli of September tlie ^^^' Allied armies began their advance towards the south. On the riglit, and nearest the sea, tlie French army marched in a formation adopted by Marslial Bugeaud at the battle of Isly. The out- line of the ground covered by their troops took the shape of a lozenge — a lozenge, whereof the
Tbe order of forcmost apcx was fomicd by the 1st Division, the angles on either flank by tlie 2d and 3d, and the rearmost point by the 4th Division. "Within
THE FIKST day's MARCH. 371
the mascle or hollow lozenge thus formed, there chap.
marched the Turkish battalions and those portions 1
of tlie artillery and the convoy which were not specially attached to one or other of the divisions. Each French division* marched in two columns consisting each of one brigade, and the artillery and encumbrances belonging to each division marched between the two brigades. Each brigade was in regimental column at sectional distance. The Allied fleets, slowly gliding along the coast, covered the Erench army on its right flank, and carefully reconnoitred every seam and hollow of the ground in front which could be reached by the eyes of men looking from the ships.
Since the English army was to advance in a way which left it open to the enemy in front, in rear, and on its left flank, Lord Eagian of course deemed it likely that he would be attacked in his march ; and that upon smooth, open ground, his army would be called upon to defend both itself and its trailing convoy against the assaults of an enemy who was strong in the cavalry arm. But this task was rendered less hard than it would otherwise be by the quality of the English soldier, and the peculiar order of battle in which he loves
* It was intended and ordered tliat tlio 1st and 4tli French Divisions should effect a lozenge formation analogous to that which characterised the general order of march, but the direc- tion was not practically attended to. No one knows better than an African General the art of enfolding the helpless por- tions of a column in battalions of infantry ; but, the French force being covered on all sides in the way already described, no elaborate precautions were needed.
372 TUE FIKST day's M-VECII.
CHAP, to figlit. He fights in line; and therefore, with
XXT V
1 his moderate force of infantry and artillery, Lord
llagian was able to resolve that, from whatever quarter the onset miglit come, he would be ready to meet it with a front of bayonets and field-artil- lery, extending along nearly two miles of ground.
In order to be able, at a few minutes' notice, to show a front of this extent either towards the south, the east, or the north, Lord IJaglan kept each of his infantry divisions massed in close column, and he disposed his 1st, 2d, 3d, and Light Divisions in such a way that the whole body liad both a front and a depth of two divisions. The distances between the divisions were so arranged that, without dislocation, they could form line either in front or towards the flank. The artillery attached to each division marched on the right or seaward Hank of the force to which it belonged.
The advance-guard consisted of the 11th Hussars and the 13th Light Dragoons under Lord Car- digan. In rear of the small infantry advance- guard, which followed the liorsemeii, there marched a detachment of the Ifities in extended order. Then, on tlie right, came the 2d Division ; and, on the left, the Light Division. The 3d Division marched in rear of the 2d, and the Light Division was followed by the 1st Division. Of the 4th Division, the 63d liegiment and two companies of the 4Gth had been left (with a troop of the 4th Light Dragoons) to clear the beach at Kaniislilu ; but the remainder of tlie division, under Sir Geoi'ge Cathcart, marched in rear of the 1st Divi-
THE FIRST day's MARCH. 373
sion. Along the left flank of the advancing col- CHAP.
X XTV
nmns, and at a distance from them of some 200 '_
yards, were riflemen in skirmishing order, and a line of skirmishers from the same force closed the rear of the infantry. On tlie left flank, and nearly in the same alignment as the leading infantry divisions, was the 8th Hussars ; and on the same flank, but in an alignment less advanced than the rearmost of tlie infantry columns, there was the 17th Lancers. The cattle and the baggage marched in rear of the 3d Division, and so as to be covered towards the left by the 4th Division. Then fol- lowed the rear-guard, and then a line of Eifles disposed at intervals in extended order. Last of all came the 4th Light Dragoons, under Lord George Paget.
Thus marched the strength of the "Western The march. Powers. The sun shone hotly, as on a summer's day in England ; but breezes springing fresh from the sea floated briskly along the hills. The ground was an undulating steppe alluring to cav- alry. It was rankly covered with a herb like southernwood ; and when the stems were crushed under foot by the advancing columns, the whole air became laden with bitter fragrance. The aroma was new to some. To men of the western counties of England it was so familiar that it carried them back to childhood and the villajje church ; they remembered the nosegay of ' boy's ' love ' that used to be set by the Prayer-Book of the Sunday maiden too demure for the vanity of flowers.
3T4 THE FIRST day's MARCH.
CHAP, In eacli of the close-massed columns which
XXIV « L ■were formed by our four complete divisions there
were more than 5000 foot soldiers. The colours were flying ; the bands at first were playing ; and once more the time had come round when in all this armed pride there was nothing of false ma- jesty ; for already videttes could be seen on tho hillocks, and (except at the spots where our horse- men were marching) there was nothing but air and sunshine, and at intervals the dark form of a single rifleman, to divide our columns from the enemy. But more warlike than trumpet and drum was the grave quiet which followed the ceasing of the bands. The pain of weariness had begun: Few spoke — all toiled. "Waves break upon the shore ; and though they are many, still "'■■'""" distance will gather their numberless cadences into one. So, also, it was with one ceaseless hissing sound that a wilderness of tall crisping herbage bent under the tramp of the coming thousands. As each mighty column marched on, one hardly remembered at first the weary frames, the aching limbs which composed it ; for — instinct v/ith its own proper soul and purpose, absorbing the volitions of thousands of men, and bearing no likeness to the mere sum of the human beings out of whom it was made — the column itself was tho living thing — the .slow, monstrous unit of strength which walks the modern earth where empire is brought into question. But a little while and then the sickness which had clung to the army began to make it seen that the columns
THE FIRST day's MARCH. 37 5
in all ilieir pride were things built with the bodies chap.
of suffering mortals. '
We saw tliat, before the embarkation, our troops sickness
iTPTT . r>iii T1 •'"'^ failing
nad lallen into a weaK state of health, and that, strength of
. manv oi tht
even of those who were free from serious illness, sowiers there were hardly any Mdio had been able to keep their accustomed strength. It had been hoped that the voyage would bring back health and strength, but the hope proved vain ; and Lord Eaglan, knowing the weakly state of the men, had ordered that they should be allowed to enfold the few things they most needed in their blankets and to land and march without their knapsacks. Yet now, before the first hour of march was over, the men began to fall out from tlie ranks. Some of these were in the agonies of cholera. Their faces had a dark choked look ; they threw them- selves on the ground and writhed, but often with- out speaking and without a cry. ]\Iany more dropped out from mere M'eakness, These the officers tried to inspirit, and sometimes they suc- ceeded ; * but more often the sufferer was left on the ground. It was vain to tell him, though so it was believed at the time, that he would fall
* The officers were themselves so heavily hiden that they could not get through the clay's march without having to en- dure great fatigue; for the scantiness of tlie means avaihiMe for land-transport had made it necessary for Lord Raglan to ask that the officers -wouUl trust to their own bodily strength for the carriage of all they required. This most 'unusual' demand upon their fortitude was met at the time in such a S])irit that, in narrating the fact to tlie Secretary of War, Lord luiglan waa oUe to say, 'I have not heard a single murmur.' Published Despatch, 23d S^'ptember 1854.
376
THE FIRST DAY S MAKCII.
CHAP.
XXIV.
The stream of the
Bui 'anak.
into the hands of the Cossacks. The tall stately men of tlie Guards dropped from their ranks in great numbers. It was believed at the time that the men wlio fell out would be taken by the enemy ; but the number of stragglers at length became very great, and in the evening a force M'as sent back to bring them in.
During the march, the foot-soldiers of the Allied armies suffered thirst ; but early in the afternoon the troops in advance reached the long -desired stream of the Bulganak ; and as soon as a divi- sion came in siglit of the water, the men broke from their ranks, and ran forward that they miglit plunge their lips deep in the cool, turbid, grateful stream. In some of the brigades a stronger governance was maintained. Sir Colin Campbell, for instance, would not allow that even the rage of thirst should loosen the discipline of his grand. Highland regiments. He halted them a little before they reached the stream, and so ordered it that, by being saved from the con- fusion that would have been wrought by their own wild haste, they gained in comfort, and knew that they were gainers. A like discipline was maintained by General Codrington, and pro- bably by several other commanders. "When men toil in organised masses, they owe what well- being they have to wise and firm commanders.
It was on the banks of this stream of the Bul- ganak that the Allied armies were to bivouac for tlie night.
THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK. 377
CHAPTER XXV.
Early in the afternoon. Lord Eaglan, riding in CHAP. advance of the infantry divisions, had reached ' ' the banks of the river, and, observing a group Jf\^i,e'^'''' of Cossacks on the brow of the hill towards the Buiganak south, he ordered the squadrons which Lord Car- digan had with him * to move forward and recon- noitre the ground. Lord Lucan was present with this portion of his cavalry force.
Where the post-road from Eupatoria to Sebas- topol crosses the Bulganak, the ground on the south side of the river rises gradually for some hundreds of yards from the banks of the stream, then dips a little, then rises again, then dips rather deeply, and then again rises up to the summit of the ridge wldch bounds the view of an observer in the valley of the Bulganak.
Our reconnoitring squadrons went forward a great %vay into the lower dip, and when they were there, it was perceived that, confronting them from the hill above, there was a body of cavalry 2000 strong. Our four squadrons halted
• The 11th Hussars and 13th Light Dragoons.
318 THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK.
CHAP, and formed line. The Russian cavalry came
^^^'' forward a little, then halted, and, throwing out
sldrmisliers, attempted some long fruitless shots
with their carbines. Our squadrons also threw
out skirmishers.
But Lord Piaglan, who had remained with his Staff on the northern side of the hollow, had now discerned the formidable body of cavalry which was confronting our four squadrons ; and General Airey, being gifted M-ith a keen, far-reaching sight, ■. . r^."." was able to make out that the glitter which could be seen between the second crest and the summit was the })lay of tlie sun upon the points of bay- onets, and that in the upper hollow, there were several battalions. It was soon made plain that, within a few hundred yards of our four squadrons, the enemy was present with all three arms, and in some force. lie had there, as we now know, about GOOO men of his 17th Division, two bat- teries of artillery, a brigade of regular cavalry, and nine sotnias of Cossacks.
Lord Eaglan, whose army was still on its march, saw that he must take care to avoid provoking an action ; but also he had to provide for the retreat of the fjur squadrons, which stood rooted in the centre of the lower hollow, so near to an over- whelming enemy's force of all arms, and so far from their supports, that tlicy were in some dan- ger. The problem was to extricate them, and to do this, if possible, witliout getting into tliat sort of conflict which would be likely to bring about a serious engagement. Lord Raglan saw that
THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK. 379
what made the Paissians hesitate was the steadi- CHAP.
ness and the exact ceremonious formation of the '_
little cavalry force of four squadrons which tran- quilly confronted them ; and that, if he were to withdraw it before he had made arrangements for covering its retreat, it would be pursued and roughly handled by overwhelming numbers, lie was anxious — for, small as was this little body of horse, it was a large proportion of Ids wliole strength in the cavalry arm ; but he saw that its safety would be best provided for by bringing up troops to its support, and allowing it in tlie mean time to remain where it was, confusing the enemy by its obstinate presence and its careful array. He ordered up in all haste the Light and the 2d "Divisions, the 8th Hussars, and 17th Lancers, and afterwards the nine-pounder batteries attached to the Light Division. When our infantry divisions came up they were formed in line, and the cav- alry supports took a position in left rear of the advanced squadrons. All these operations the enemy suffered to take place without resistance, and when they were completed his opportunity Avas gone.
So, all being now in readiness. Lord IJaglan M'ished that the four squadrons should forthwith retire ; and the more so as he Avas apprehensive lest these horsemen, in their evident longing for a combat, should be tempted to charge the body of cavalry in their immediate front. Still he was unwilling to embarrass Lord Lucan (close as he then was to the enemy) by an order too precise
380 THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK,
CHAP, or imperative. In these circumstances General
XXV
L_ Airey galloped forward to give effect to Lord
Uaglan's wishes.
When Airey came up, he found that by com- municating Lord Eaglan's wishes without deliver- ing a positive order, he was supplying materials for a debate between Lord Lucan and his briga- dier. Yet for a wordy debate the time and the place were ill-fitted, for the four squadrons, as we have seen, were within but a little distance of overwhelming forces. There is some obscurity as to the exact way in which General Airey brought his will to bear ; but he saw what was wanted, and he said the force must retire immediately, and by alternate squadrons. Though he spoke in terms which might have meant that he was only giving his own opinion, yet perhaps the decisiveness of his speech and manner led to the impression that he was delivering Lord Eaglan's orders. Be this as it may, the result was quickly attained. Lord Lucan understood that he had to go forthwith to Lord Raglan. Lord Cardigan un- derstood that the force was to retire immediately, and by alternate lines. The operation instantly commenced, and was conducted witli excellent precision, for during tlie whole retreat there were always two squadrons out of the four which were showing a smooth front to tlie enemy.*
• Colonel Douglas, coinmaiiding the 11th Hussars, had the tact to see tliat considering the close presence of the enemy, it was expedient to depart from the usual practice, and to retire at a walk instead of a trot. His wise deviation from the common method made Lord Cardigan very angry. — Note tc 5(h Edition.
THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK. 381
The moment the withdrawal of our little cav- chap.
XXV.
airy force began, the enemy's artillery-teams, un- seen before, came bounding up from the hollow, and his guns, being quickly unlimbered, were soon in battery upon the ridge. With these he opened fire upon our retreating squadrons ; but he saw that these horsemen, no longer isolated, were retiring upon ample supports of all arms ; he did not therefore venture to pursue with his cavalry. Two men in our cavalry force were wounded, and four or five horses killed. The six- pounder guns attached to our cavalry replied to the enemy's artillery without good effect; but when our nine-pounder guns were brought into action, they caused the enemy's artillery to lim- ber up and retire. They also, it seems, inflicted some loss upon the enemy's cavalry, for it was said that as many as thirty-five of his troopers were killed or wounded. The Russians were soon out of sight.
The slight combat thus occurring on the Bul- ganak was the first approach to a passage of arms between Eussia and the Western Powers. The pith of what had happened was this : — The Eus- sians had been making a reconnaissance in force at a time when Lord Raglan was making a re- connaissance with only four squadrons ; and as the nature of the ground concealed the enemy's strength, our lesser force was exposed for some minutes to a good deal of danger ; but the enemy, being slow to take advantage of fortune, had given the English general full time to extricate
382 THE AFFAIR OF THE BULGANAK.
CHAP, his squaJrous by the use of the three arms. Lord
'_ Eaglan was so well pleased with the success of
this last operation, and with the steadiness shown by our cavalry, that, even on the night of the Alma (when it might have been supposed that the impressions produced by the battle would have superseded the recollection of the previous day), he spoke with complacency of this affair on tlie Bulganak.*
* 111 speaking of tlie alTair of the Bulganak, Lord Kaglan's despatch says : ' In the afLiir of the previous day, Major-Gen- ' eral the Earl of Cardigan exhibited tlie utmost spirit and ' coolness, and kept his brigade under perfect command.' Published Despatch of tlie 23d of September 1854.— A'oi!« to ith Edition.
TUE NIGHT OX THE BULGANAK. 383
CHAPTER XXVI.
When this affair was coucluded, Lord Eaglair chap. began to prepare for a contingency of graver "
import. The enemy, as it now appeared, had a ^wfcnjii's^ force of all arms in the immediate neighbour- tife'En°?is°h hood, and it was known that he had his whole ^'"'"^" field -army within a few hours' marcli of the Bulganalc. On the other hand, Lord Eaglan was exposed to attack in front, left flank, and rear; and even on his right flank he was without immediate support, for the course of the day's march had thrown an interval of a mile between the French and the English armies. It was to be apprehended that the enemy, issuing during the night from his intrenched position on the Alma, would place himself in sucli a position as to b-c able to fall upon our army in front and flank at dawn of day. Lord Eaglan, therefore, r.oni Ra-ian determined that the troops should bivouac in bivouac iu° order of battle, and so as to be rapidly able to battle, show a deployed front to the enemy either in front or flank. lie placed the troops himself, fixing their exact position with minute care.
384 THE NIGHT ON THE BULGANAK.
CHAP. The first brigades of tlie 2d and Li'^lit Divisions
, L were drawn up in line parallel with the river,
and some hundreds of yards in advance of it. The first brigades of the 1st and 3d Divisions were placed in an oblique line receding from the left of the Light Division, and going back to the river's bank. The troops thus deployed formed, with the river, a kind of three-sided enclosure, iu which tlie principal part of tlie cavalry and the encumbrances of tlie army were enfolded. The second brigade of each of the divisions already named was formed in column in rear of the first or deployed brigade. The 4th Division and the 4th Light Dragoons were placed in observation on the northern side of the river. Finally, Colonel Lagondie, one of the French Commis- sioners at our headquarters, was requested to suggest to Prince Napoleon tlie expediency of his drawing his division somewhat more near to the English right.^
Our troops piled arms, and bivouacked in order of battle."!* There was a post-house at the point where the road crossed the river, and there Lord Rnglan passed the night.
Upon the supposition tliat the Allied armies might be promptly attacked on the morrow, their situation during those hours of rest was certainly, as all must see, critical ; but when morning
• Colonel LagonJio fulfilled his mission ; but on Lis return, being a ncar-sighteil man, ho rode into the uiidat of a Cossack picket, and was taken prisoner.
t See the I'lan.
THE NIGHT ox THE BULGANAK. 385
dawned, it appeared that the enemy having chap. drawn off was attempting nothing against them. J 1.
It is common to attribute great results to care- ful design ; but the truth is, that the Allies owed tlieir prosperous landing and their tranquil march to the forbearance of the Russian commander.
The enemy had fallen back to an intrenclied position on the left bank of the Alma, and was tliere awaiting his destiny.
VOL. n. 2 B
APPENDIX.
NOTE I.
Papers showing the Concord existing between the FouK Powers at the time when France and England
WERE ENGAGING IN A SEPARATE COURSE OF ACTION.
Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, February 2, 1851.
(Translation.)
Present : The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, have met together in conference to hear the communication which the Austrian Plenipotentiary has been good enough to make to them of tire proposition sub- mitted by the Cabinet of St Petersburg in reply to those wiiich he had undertaken, on the IStli of January, to for- ward to the Imperial Government, and which were sanc- tioned by the approval of the Powers represented in the Conference of Vienna. The document which contains them is annexed to the present Protocol.
The undersigned, after having submitted the above- mentioned propositions to the most careful examination;
388 APPENDIX.
liavo ascertained that, in their general character and in their details, they so essentially differ from the basis of negotiation agreed upon on the 31st of December at Con- stantinople, and approved on the 13th January at Vienna, that they have not considered them to be such as should bo forwarded to the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.
It consequently only remains for the undersigned to transmit the annexed document to their respective Courts, and to Avait till they shall have taken their final reso- lutions.
(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORELAND.
ARNIM.
The Earl of Westmoreland to the Earl of Clarendon.— {Received February 13.*)
Vienna, February 8, 1853. My Loiiu, —
I have just left the Conference to which Count Buol had this morning invited me, in conjunction with my col- leagues. Upon our assembling, he stated that ho had no proposal to make to us ; but in consideration of the per- fect union existing amongst us upon the Eastern Question, he thought he was forwarding our common objects by com- municating the despatclies he had addressed to Count Esterhazy, for the purpose of being submitted to Count Nesselrode.
Count Buol then read to us tlicsc despatches. The first
• i.e., just one fortnight before England despatched the hostile sum- mons which broucht her into a state of war.
APPENDIX. 389
gave an account of the proposal brought forward by Count OrlofF, that the Emperor of Austria should, in conjunction with Prussia, take an engagement with the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of a strict neutrality in the war now existing with the Porte, and in which the INIari- time Powers seemed likely to take part. Count Buol, in liis despatch, develops in the clearest and most distinct language the impossibility of the adoption by the Emperor of any such engagement. He states, with all courtesy to the Emperor Nicholas, the obligations by which the Aus- trian Government is bound to watch over the strict main- tenance of the principle of the independence and integrity of Turkey — a principle proclaimed by the Emperor Nicho- las himself, but which the passage of the Danube by his troops might, by the encouragement of insurrections in the Turkish Provinces, endanger. Count Buol, therefore, states that he cannot take the engagement proposed to him. The second despatch to Count Esterhazy relates to the answer which has been returned to the proposals for negotiations transmitted by Count Buol with the sanction of the Con- ference on the 13th ultimo.
In this despatch, Count Buol states with considerable force the disappointment felt by the Emperor at tlie want of success Avhich had attended his recommendation in favour of the Turkish propositions. He enters very fully into the subject, and renews the expression of the Em- peror's most anxious desire that the Emperor Nicholas may still adopt the proposals which had been suV)mitted to him.
The last despatch is one in which Count Buol replies to the reproach which was addressed to the Imperial Govern- ment, that by its present conduct it was abandoning the principles upon which the three Governments of Russia, Austria, and Prussia had hitherto acted for the mainte- nance of the established interests and independence of the
390 APPENDIX.
clifrerent States of Europe, and that, by so doing, it was endangering the established order of things in Europe, and the security at present existing.
The answer of Count Buol to this reproach is very firmly and clearly stated.
It is impossible for me to give your Lordship a more detailed account, before the departure of the messenger, of these despatches ; but I must add, that they met with the entire approbation of the members of the Conference, that they were looked upon as most ably drawn up, and that, Avhile using every courteous and friendly expression to- wards the Emperor Nicholas, they most clearly pointed out the present position which the Austrian Government would maintain with the view of upholding the principles they had proclaimed, and the engagements which they had taken for their support.*
Protoccl of a Conference held at Vienna, March 5, 1854.f
(Translation.)
Present : the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
The undersigned, Eepresentatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, having again met in Conference on the summons of the Austrian Plenipotentiary, the an- nexed document which had been communicated to the Cabinet of Vienna by the Envoy of Russia, and which contains the preliminaries of the Treaty to be concluded between Russia and the Porte, was read to them, the
* The rest of the despatch relates only to a suggestion for an arrango- ineut which came to nothing, and is therefore omitted.
t i.e., whilst messengers were carrying the hostile summons from Parii Mid Loudon to St PetersUirL'.
APPENDIX. 391
Court of Austria being requested by the Cabinet of St Petersburg to apply for the support of the two Maritime Powers, in order to obtain the acceptance of these prelimi- naries by the Sublime Porte.
After mature deliberation, the Plenipotentiaries of France and Great Britain, taking as the basis of their examination the previous documents which had received the sanction of the four Powers, established the existence of radical differences between those documents and the proposed preliminaries.
1. Inasmuch as the evacuation of the Danubian Princi- palities, which is fixed to take place after the signature of the preliminaries, is made to depend on the departure of the combined fleets, not only from the Llack Sea but from the Straits of the Bosphorus and of the Dardanelles — a condition which could only be admitted by the Maritime Powers after the conclusion of the definitive Treaty.
2. Inasmuch as the document now under consideration tends to invest with a form strictly conventional, bilateral, and exclusively applicable to the relations of the Porte with Eussia, the assurances relative to the religious privi- leges of the Greeks — assurances which the Porte has only ofi'ered to give to the five Powers at the same time and in the form of a simple identic declaration. The assurances, in fact, once inserted in the preliminary Treaty, must then needs be reproduced in the definitive Treaty, and would be accompanied, moreover, by an official note confirmatory of the said privileges exclusively addressed to the Court of Russia, a note which, in its turn, Avould be considered as annexed to the Treaties ; that is to say, as having the same force and the same effect.
3. Inasmuch as the preliminaries communicated to Vienna are, by implication, withheld from any discussion in Conference upon the modifications considered necessary to make them correspond with the original text of the
392 APPENDIX.
Acts which had received its assent, and inasmuch as the conclusion of the definitive Treaty contains no greater re- servation for its inspection and interference.
4. Inasmuch as, Avhilst the propositions of the Porte ex- pressly require the revision of the Treaty of 1841, so as to make Turkey participate in the guarantees of the public law of Europe, this condition is passed over in silence.
The Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia, appreciat- ing the force of the observations ofTored by the Plenipo- tentiaries of rFrance aud of Great Britain, recognised in like manner on their part the remarkable differences pointed out between the Russian draft of preliminaries and the Protocols of the 13tli of January and 2d of February.
In consequence, the Conference unanimously agreed that it was impossible to proceed with those propositions.
(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIK BOURQUENEY. WESTMORELAND. ARNIM.
Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, April 9, 1854.*
(Tmuslation.)
Present: The Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
At the request of the Plenipotentiaries of France and of Great Britain, the Conference met to hear the documents read which establisli that the invitation addressed to the Cabinet of St Petersburg to evacuate the Moldo-Wallachian provinces within a fixed time having remained unanswered, the state of war already declared between Russia and the
• i.e., the veiy day before tlie Treaty of Alliance between England and France.
APPENDIX. 393
Sublime Porte is in actual existence equally between Eus'^ia on the one side, and France and Great Britain on tliu other.
This change whicli has taken place in the attitude of two of the Powers represented at the Conference of Vienna, in consequence of a step taken directly by France and Eng- land, supported by Austria and Prussia as being founded in right, has been considered by the liepresentatives of Austria and Prussia as involving the necessity of a fresh declara- tion of the union of the four Powers upon the ground of the principles laid down in the Protocols of December />, 1853, and January 13, 1854.
In consequence, the undersigned have at this solemn moment declared that their Governments remain united in the double object of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, of Avhich the fact of the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities is and Avill remain one of the essential conditions ; and of consolidating in an interest so much in conformity with the sentiments of the Sultan, and by every means compatible with his independence and sovereignty, the civil and rehgious rights of the Christian subjects of the Porte.
The territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire is and remains the nine qua non condition of every transaction liaving for its object the re-establishment of peace betAveen the belligerent Powers ; and the Governments represented by the undersigned engage to endeavour in common to dis- cover the guarantees most likely to attach tlie existence of that Empire to the general equilibrium of Europe ; as they also declare themselves ready to deliberate and to come to an understanding as to the employment of the means calcu- lated to accomplish the object of their agreement.
Whatever event may arise in consequence of this agree- ment, founded solely upon the general interests of Europe, and of wliich the object can only be attained by the return
394 APPENDIX.
of a firm and lasting peace, the Governments represented by the undersigned reciprocally engage not to enter into any definitive arrangements with the Imperial Court of Russia, or with any other Power, which would be at vari- ance with the principles above enunciated, without previ- ously deliberating thereon in common.
(Signed) BUOL-SCIIAUENSTEIN. BOURQUENEY. WESTMO It ELAND. AKNIM.
Treaty of Alliance, Offensive and Defensice, between Austria and Prussia.
(Translation.)
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His IMajesty the King of Prussia, penetrated with deep regret at the fruitlessness of their attempts hitherto to prevent the breaking out of war between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, France, and England on the other ;
Mindful of the moral obligations entered into by them by the signing of the last Vienna Protocol ;
In the face of the military measures ever gathering on btjth sides around them and of the dangers resulting there- from for the general peace of Europe ;
Convinced of the high duty which, on the threshold of a future pregnant with evil, is imposed, in the interest of the European welfare, on Germany, so intimately united with the States of the two High Parties ;
Have determined to ally themselves in an offensive and defensive alliance for the duration of the war which has broken out between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey,
APPENDIX. 39.3
France, and England on the other, and have appointed for tlie conclusion of it the following Plenipotentiaries :
His IMajesty the Emperor of Austria, the Baron Henry de Hess, his actual Privy Councillor, &c. &c. ; and the Count Frederick de Thun-Hohenstein, his Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, &c. &c.;
And His Majesty the King of Prussia, the Baron Othon Theodore de INIanteuffel, his President of the Council of Ministers, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, &c. &c.
The same having exchanged their full powers found to be in good order, have agreed upon the following points :
Article I.
His Imperial Apostolic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Prussia guarantee to each other reciprocally the possession of their German and non-German possessions, so that an attack made on the territory of the one, from what- ever quarter, will be regarded by the other as an act of hostility against his own territory.
Article II,
In the same manner the High Contracting Parties hold themselves engaged to defend the rights and interests of Germany against all and every injury, and consider them- selves bound accordingly for the mutual repulse of every attack on any part whatsoever of their territories ; like- wise also in the case where one of the two may find him- self, in understanding with the otlier, obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interests. The agree- ment relating to the latter-named eventuality, as like- wise the extent of the assistances then to be given, will form a special, as also integral, part of the present Convention.
39 G APPENDIX.
Article III.
In order also to give due security and force to the condi- tions of the offensive and defensive alliance now concluded, the two Great German Powers bind themselves, in case of need, to hold in perfect readiness for war a part of their forces, at periods to be determined between them, and in positions to be fixed. With respect to the time, the extent, and the nature of the placing of those troops, a special stipulation will likewise be determined.
Article IV.
The High Contracting Parties will invite all the German Governments of the Confederation to accede to this alli- ance, with the understanding that the federal obligations existing in virtue of Article 47 of the final Act of Vienna will receive the same extension for the States who accede as the present Treaty stipulates.
Article V.
Neither of the two High Contracting Parties will, during the duration of this alliance, enter into any separate alli- ance with other Powers which shall not be in entire har- mony with the basis of the present Treaty.
Article VI.
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as pos- sible by the High Contracting Sovereigns.
Done at Berlin, April 20, 1854.*
(L.S.) HENRY BON. DE HESSE.
(I..S.) F. THUN.
(L.S.) ]50N. OTir. THEOD. MANTEUFFEL.
• i.e., ten days after tlie date of tlie Anglo-Fretich alliance.
APPENDIX. 397
Additional Article to the Offensice and Defensive Alliance between Austria and Prussia of April 20, 1854.
(Translation. )
According to the couditioiis of Article II. of the Treaty concluded this day between His Imperial Majesty tlie Em- peror of Austria, and His Majesty tlio King of Prussia, for the establishment of an offensive and defensive alliance, a more intimate understanding Avith respect to the eventu- ality when an active advance of one of the High Contract- ing Parties may impose on the other the obligation of a mutual protection of the territory of both, was to form the svibject of a special agreement to be considered as an integral part of the Treaty.
Their Majesties have not been able to divest themselves of the consideration, that the indefinite continuance of the occupation of the territories on the Lower Danube, under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Porte, by Imperial Eussian troops, would endanger the political, moral, and material interests of the whole German Confederation, as also of their own States, and the more so in proportion as Russia extends her warlike operations on Turkish territory.
The Courts of Austria and Prussia are united in the desire to avoid every participation in the war Mdiich has broken out between Russia on the one hand, and Turkey, Prance, and Great Britain on the other, and at the same time to contribute to the restoration of general peace. They more especially consider the declarations lately made at Berlin by the Court of St Petersburg to be an important element of pacification, the failure of the practical influ- ence of which they would view with regret. According to these declarations, Russia appears to regard the original motive for the occupation of the Principalities as removed by the concessions now granted to the Christian subjects
398 APPENDIX.
of the Poi'te, which oflfer the prospect of realisation. They, therefore, hope that the replies awaited from the Cabinet of Eussia to the Prussian propositions, transmitted on the 8 th, will offer to them the necessary guarantee for an early withdrawal of the Eussian troops. In the event that this hope should be illusory, the Plenipotentiaries named on the part of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, Freiherr Earon von Hosse and Count Thun, and on the part of His Majesty the King of Prussia, Earon Manteuffel, have drawn up the following more detailed agreement with respect to the eventuality alluded to in the above-mentioned Article II. of the Treaty of Alliance of this day :
iSiiigle Article.
The Imperial Austrian Government will also on their side address a communication to the Imperial Eussian Court with the object of obtaining from the Emperor of Eussia the necessary orders, that an immediate stop should be put to the further advance of his armies upon the Turkish territory, as also to request of His Imperial Ma- jesty sufficient guarantees for the prompt evacuation of the Danubian Principalities ; and the Prussian Government will again, in the most emphatic manner, support these communications with reference to their proposals already sent to St Petersburg. Should the answer of the Eussian Court to these steps of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin — contrary to expectation — not be of a nature to give them entire satisfaction upon the two points afore-mentioned, the measures to be taken by one of the Contracting Parties for their attainment, according to the terms of Article II. of the Offensive and Defensive Alliance signed on this day, will be on the understanding that every hostile attack on the territory of one of the Contracting Parties is to be repelled with all the military forces at the disposal of the other.
APPENDIX. . 399-
But a nuilual offensive advance is stipulated for only in tlie event of the incorporation of the Principalities, or in the event of an attack on, or passage of, the Balkan by Russia.*
The present Convention shall be submitted for the rati- fication of the High Sovereigns simultaneously with the above-mentioned Treaty.
Done at Berlin the 20th of April 1854.
(Signed) HESS. (Signed) MANTEUFFEL.
THU:s\
Protocol signed at Vienna on the I'id of May 1854 hy the Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
(Translation.)
Present : The Eepresentatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia.
The undersigned Plenipotentaries have deemed it con- formable to the arrangements contained in the Protocol of the 9th of April, to meet in conference in order to com- municate reciprocally, and record in one common Act, the Conventions concluded between France and England on the one hand, and between Austria and Prussia on the other, upon the 10th and 20th of April of the present year.
After a careful examination of the aforesaid Conventions, the undersigned have unanimously agreed :
* Of course the contemplated marcli of Austrian troops into tha Principalities (though undertaken with a view to expel the Russian forces) could not be a 'mutual offensive advance.' The clause de- fines the circumstances in which the two great German sovereigns should be bound to attack Russia, and does not cast any obscurity upon that part of the treaty which provided for the event in which ' one of the two may find himself, in understanding with the other, • obliged to advance actively for the defence of German interest.'
400 APPENDIX.
1. That the Convention concluded between France and England, as well as that signed on the 20th of April between Austria and Prussia, bind both of them, in the relative situations to Avhich they apply, to secure the maintenance of the principle established by the series of Protocols of the Conference of Vienna.
2. That the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and the evacuation of that portion of its territory Avhich is occupied by the Eussian army, are, and will continue to be, the constant and invariable object of the union of the four Powers.
3. That consequently, the Acts communicated and an- nexed to the present Protocol correspond to the engage- ment which the Plenipotentiaries had mutually contracted on the 9tli of April, to deliberate and agree upon the means most fit to accomplish the object of their union, and thus give a fresh sanction to the firm intention of the four Powers represented at the Conference of Vienna, to combine all their efforts and resolutions to realise the object which forms the basis of their union.
(Signed) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
r.OURQUENEY. WESTMORELAND. ARNIM.
Convention between His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria and the Ottoman Porte. Signed at Boyadji- Keuy, June 14, 1854.
(Translation.) His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, fully recognising that the existence of the Ottoman Empire within its pres- ent limits is necessary for the maintenance of the balance of power between the States of Europe, and that, specifi-
"f
APrENDIX. 401
Ciilly, the ovacuatioii of the Danubian Principalities is one of the essential conditions of the integrity of that Empire ; being, moreover, ready to join, with the means at his dis- posal, in the measures proper to insure the object of the agreement established between his Cabinet and the High Courts represented at the Conference of Vienna :
His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having, on his side, accepted this offer of concert, made in a friendly manner by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria ;
It has seemed proper to conclude a Convention, in order to regulate the manner in which the concert in question shall be carried into effect.
With this object. His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, have named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say :
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, ^I. le Earon Charles do Bruck, Privy Councillor of His Imperial and Poyal Apostolic Majesty, his Internuncio and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Ottoman Porte, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold, Knight of the Imperial Order of the Iron Crown of the first class, &c. ;
And His Imperial ^Majestythe Sultan, Mustapha Peshid Pasha, late Grand Vizier, and at present his Minister for Foreign Affairs, decorated with the Imperial Order of Medjidi(^ of the first class, ifec. ;
Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles :
Article I.
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria engages to exhaust all the means of negotiation, and all other means, to obtain the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the foreign army which occupies them, and even to employ, in
VOL. II. 2 C
402 APPENDIX.
case tliey are required, the number of troops necessaiy to attain this end.
AUTIOLB II,
It will appertain in this case exclusively to the Imperial Commander-in-chief to direct the operations of his army. He will, however, always take care to inform the Com- mander-in-chief of the Ottoman army of his operations in proper time.
Article III.
His Majesty the Emperor of Austria undertakes, by common agreement with the Ottoman Government, to re- establish in the Principalities, as far as possible, the legal state of things such as it results from the privileges secured by the Sublime Porte in regard to the administration of those countries. The local authorities thus reconstituted shall not, however, extend their action so far as to attempt to exercise control over the Imperial army.
Article IV.
The Imperial Court of Austria further engages not to enter into any plan of accommodation with the Imperial Court of Russia which has not for its basis the sovereign rights of His Imperial Miijesty the Sultan, as well as the integrity of his Empire.
Article V.
As soon as the object of the present Convention shall have been obtained by the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between the Sublime Porte and the Court of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria will immediately make arrangements for witlidrawing his forces with the least pos- eiblo delay from the territory of the Principalities. The
APPENDIX. 403
details respecting the retreat of the Austrian troops shall form the object of a special understanding with the Sublime Porte.
Articlb VI.
The Austrian Government expects that the authorities of the countries temporarily occupied by the Imperial troops will afford them every assistance and facility, as Avell for their march, their lodging, or encampment, as for their sub- sistence and that of their horses, and for their communi- cations. The Austrian Government likewise expects that every demand relating to the requirements of the service shall be complied Avith, which shall be addressed by the Austrian commanders, either to the Ottoman Government, through the Imperial Internunciate at Constantinople, or directly to the local authorities, unless more weighty reasons render the execution of them impossible.
It is understood that the commanders of the Imperial array will provide for the maintenance of the strictest dis- cipline among their troops, and will respect, and cause to be respected, the properties as well as the laws, the religion, and the customs of the country.
Article VII.
The present Convention shall be ratified, and the rati- fications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of four weeks, or earlier if possible, dating from the day of its signature.
In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it and set their seals to it.
Done in duplicate, for one and the same effect, at Boyadji-Keuy, the fourteenth of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty four.
(L.S.) V. BuucK. (L.S.) Keshid
404 APPENDIX.
NOTE 11.
Lord Clarendon's Despatch demanding the Evacua- tion OF THE Principalities.
The Eakl of Clat.endon to Count Nesselrode.
Foreign Office, February 27, 1854.
M. leComte, — As the ordinary channels of communica- tion between England and Enssia have been closed by the recent interruption of diplomatic relations between the two Courts, I am under the necessity of addressing myself directly to your Excellency on a m<atter of the deepest im- portance to our respective Governments and to Europe.
The British Government has for many months anxiously laboured, in conjunction with its allies, to efiect a reconci- liation of differences between Eiissia and the Sublime Porte, and it is with the utmost pain that the British Government has come to the conclusion that one last hope alone remains of averting the calamity which has so long impended over Europe.
It rests with the Government of Eussia to determine whether that hope shall be realised or extinguished ; for the British Government, having exhausted all the efforts of negotiation, is compelled to declare to tlic Cabinet of St Petersburg, that if Russia should decline to restrict within jnirely diplomatic limits the discussion in which she has for some time past been engaged -with the Sublime Porte, and does not, by return of the messenger who is the bearer of my present letter, announce her intention of causing the Russian troops under the orders of Prince Gortschakoff to commence their march with a view to recross the Pruth, so that the Provinces of Moldavia and "Wallachia shall be completely evacuated on the 30th April next, the British
APPENDIX. 405
Government must consider the refusal or the silence of tlie Cabinet of St Petersburg as ecj^uivalent to a declaration of war, and will take its measures accordingly.
The messenger who is the bearer of this letter to your Excellency is directed not to wait more than six days at St Petersburg for your reply; and I earnestly trust that he may convey to me an announcement on the part of the Russian Government that by the 30th of April next the Principalities will cease to be occupied by Russian forces, — I have, &c.,
(Signed) CLARENDON.
NOTE III.
Correspondence between Lord Eaolan and the Sec- retary OF State on the subject of 'Atrocities com- ' JUTTED BY Turks in Bulgaria.' *
Lord Raglan to the Seci:etahy of Siate ecu "Wak.
[From Varna], 8th August 1854. My Lord Duke, — The way in which the Christian population is treated by the Turks in Bulgaria has come so prominently under the notice of Her Majesty's officers since the army has been stationed in this neighbourhood, that I think it my duty to bring the subject under the official notice of your Grace ; and with this view, I beg to lay before you copies of three despatches which I have found it necessary to write to the Ambassador : the two
* Tbis heaJiug looks as if it belonged to the present day — January 1877 — or to the summer or autumn of last year ; but it is couched in the exact words which were used by Colonel Steele (the Military Secretary) when he docketed and labelled the answer to the above despatch in tha year 1854.
40G APPENDIX.
first, containing representations of atrocities committed in the vicinity of his camp, by Lt. -General Sir De Lacy Evans, and the last forwarding a letter from Lt.-General the Duko of Cambridge, with a detailed Report from the Assist.- Adjutant - General of the 1st Division, Lt. -Col. Honble. Alexander Gordon, who was directed by H.RH. to ascer- tain, with the assistance of an interpreter, how it aroso that the Lnlgarian peasantry manifest such reluctance to bring supplies to our camps.
The reason is now obvious. These unfortunate people dare not appear there. They are liable to be robbed on their return home, and to be ill-used as soon as it is known that they are in possession of any money ; and they are fortunate if they are not carried oflF, and, if not ransomed at the price demanded, murdered, as the accompanying jjapers show to have been tlio case in more tlian one instance.
Hence it is that the Christian inhabitants of the pro- vince hail any change as preferable to the yoke under which they are now being crushed ; and it may be relied upon, that so long as the Turks are allowed to load them- selves with arms, and the Bulgarians are not permitted to carry any, the existence of the latter will be, to use the language of Colonel Gordon, little better than that of slaves.
The treatment of these poor creatures has excited a most painful impression in the army under my command.
TnR Duke of Newcastle lo Loud PAniAN.
{Private.)
Osborne, 2'2d August 1854.
IMt dear Lord Raglan, — Amongst your official de- spatches received yesterday, there is only one, [ think, which requires any particular answer. I allude to your
APPENDIX. 407
tlpspatcli of tlio 8tli August, complaining of tlie infamous treatment of the Christian population of Bulgaria by the Turks, I quite agree with you that Ave cannot permit such atrocities to be committed under the eyes of the troops we have sent to protect the perpetrators from foreign aggression, and that we must resort not merely to strenuous remonstrance, but to something stronger, if neces- sary. Either the Turks should be disarmed, or the Chris- tians permitted equally with them to bear arms. Indivi- dual acts of atrocity must be expected in time of war in any country ; but equality of laws and the right of self- defence may be conceded by a Government, however unable to repress outrage by its own arm. I will write to Lord Clarendon with the vicAV to a formal application to tlie Porte through Lord Stratford, and you shall have a copy next mail.
NOTE IV.
Note respectixq the Torpor of tub English Cabinet ox THE Evening of the 28th of June 1854.
When a man has been set to sleep by a document, he com- monly imagines that he was awake all the time, and that he ' heard every Avord.' A firm impression of that sort is one of the known phenomena of sleep in a chair ; and it is obvious, therefore, that any of those who slept tlie sleep of which I have spoken may honestly contradict the state- ment in the text without, however, being entitled to expect that their contradiction will have any weight. Eut though the accuracy of the statement Avill be denied — and denied in perfect good faith — by those Avho slept, it will not, I am sure, be questioned by any of those who remained awake. Of course the deliberations of a Cabinet ought to be kept
408 APPENDIX.
secret ; but sleep is not deliberation, and there is no rule nor principle wliicli precludes a Minister from describing any natural phenomenon which he may have observed at a Cabinet meeting.
I own that, to me, the assenting disposition of those who remained awake (for they were anxious, careful, laborious men) is harder to account for than the condition of tliose who were in a complete state of rest ; and I incline to the solution which I have spoken of as likely to be ofTered by the analytical cliemist, because his theory (that of a narcotic substance having been taken by some nuschance) would account for a torpor which affected all more or less, though in different ways and in different degrees.
That I am right in the view I take as to the inexorable stringency of the Despatch, is shown, I think, clearly enough by the effect which it instantly had upon the minds of the tAvo men who first saw it Avhen it reached the camp — namely. Lord Eaglan and Sir George Brown. Lord Eaglan's letter of the 19th of July (p. 277) shows clearly that he submitted to act with soldierly readiness under in- structions whicli he looked upon as imperative, or, at all events, violently cogent; and Sir George BroAvn gives his interpretation of the Despatch (p. 271) with a bluntness which precludes all doul)t about the light in which lie re- garded it. The Government, he considered, were resolved that, at all hazards, the expedition should proceed ; and if Lord liaglan should not consent to lead it, he thought they would instantly send out some one (dse who would.
It may be said that this sleep of the Cabinet is one of those things which, however true they may be, it is better not to disclose. Certainly no one is obliged to go and state a thing thoughtlessly, or without a j)urpose, merely because it happened. But I have to account for a great transaction — the invasion of a Eussian province. I ascer- tain that this invasion was caused, and caused entirely, by
APPENDIX. 409
the peculiar wording of a despatcl). ]Jut why was it tliat a despatch so worded received the approval or the tacit as- sent of a Cabinet? It would be unfaithful for me to stop sliort at that point in the chain of causation unless I were brought to a stop by the want of knowledge, or by the want of a right to disclose what I know. It so happens, how- ever, that neither of these excuses is available to me. I know the truth, and I learnt it under circumstances which gave me a full right to disclose it. — End of Note to \d Edition,
It is now, I believe, declared that, before the opening of the momentous Despatch, some long tiresome papers on other matters were read out to the Cabinet, and that the sound thus produced was the real narcotic. — Note to 4th Edition).
The Despatch of the 29th of June 1854 was no ordinary document. It directed the venturesome invasion of a Kussian province in language evincing an unusually bold assumption of responsibility on the part of the Guvernnient, and besides, had the literary merit of being extremely Avell penned. The writer of such a State mandate might fairly expect that some one or more of his colleagues would be startled at the wording of a Despatch which went so far in the exercise of authority as to leave barely any discretion to the commander of our distant army ; and on the other hand, it would have been natural for him to imagine be- forehand that the mere composition of this historic paper, upon which great issues depended, must needs provoke a few words of praise from the men who were to have it read out to them. To expect a reception of that keenly critical, yet laudatory, kind, and to find instead that his words were sending the hearers to sleep — this might Avell disappoint any author ; and accordingly, in describing the scene at Pembroke Lodge, the Duke of Newcastle used to speak in a way which showed, as T thought, that he had been personally vexed by the torpor of his colleagues.
4 1 0 APPENDIX.
Both the sleep of those wlio slept, and the dead acqui- escence of those fewer members of the Cabinet who did not fall into a state of unconsciousness, may be partly, as I now think, accounted for, when one hears of the foregone conclusion at winch they had arrived by mistake at the Cabinet of tlie previous day. Having there well weighed and adopted the proposal then submitted for approval, and having also, I believe, heard there read to them a draft of tlie Duke's private letter, they, some of them, if not all, imagined that they had already approved the substance of tlie instructions which were to be sent out to Lord Raglan, and accordingly took it for granted that the new, lengthy draft of Despatch which the Duke brought down to Pem- broke Lodge was virtually a mere repetition (in expanded official form) of the private letter of the 28th — a paper lead out to tlicm fur form's sake, but not seriously de- manding a renewal of that anxious care and attention that tiiey had bestowed upon the subject, in Cabinet, on the pre- vious day. I have a letter before me from one who was a 111 ember of Lord Aberdeen's Government, and present at the Cabinet of tlie 27th in Downing Street, as well as at tlie Cabinet meeting of the following day at Pembroke liodge, in which the writer insists upon the completeness of the deliberation on the first of those days as sufhciently accounting for the inattention of the niembei-s of the (jabiiiet on the day following, and for the actual sleep to which most of them yielded.
Of the soundness of the view thus insisted ujion, all who handle this volume can judge. If they think that the Duke of Newcastle's private letter of the 28th (with the substitution of ' IMy Lord ' for the words * My dear * Lord Eaglan ') would alone have sufliced to make Lord llaglan undertake the expedition against the dictates of Ids own judgment, they may consistently go on to say that the phenomenon of the sleeping Cabinet, however
APPENDIX. 411
curious or interesting to the collector of small trifling anecdotes, was not an event really fraught with any his- toric consequences. That conclusion, as is seen hy the text, I have not myself reached ; for it seemed, and still seems to me, that what really obtained Lord Raglan's assent to the behest of the Government was — not the bare intimation of its desire (which the private letter alone would no doubt have sufficed to convey), but — the pressure applied by those sentences — those stringent, elaborate sen- tences which abounded in the Official Despatch. In other words, I have judged that the almost irresistible cogency of the instructions sent out to Lord Eaglan was not im- parted to them by the mere decision of the Cabinet of the 27th, but by tlie wording or, as Frenchmen would say, the ' redaction ' of the Despatch of the 29th ; and the conclu- sion of course is obvious, because the expediency of adopt- ing that same cogent wording or ' redaction ' was the very question which lulled the Ministers assembled at Poni- bruke Lodge.
After all, as I have now come to learn, the phenomenon of a sleeping Cabinet is not one so entirely unheard of as many perhaps might suppose. The truth is, that at an anxious time, and when Parliament is sitting, our ^Minis- ters often tax their strength to the very verge of what is possible ; and, when they strive to do yet more, nature puts her gentle veto on their attempted excesses, and makes them sleep the sleep of the weary instead of pressing on with their toils. There have been brought to my know- ledge several instances of Cabinets endeavouring to de- liberate in the later hours of the evening, and succunibing, as on the 28th of June 1854, to the narcotic eifect of a voice reading out a lengthy document. — Note to 6lh Edition.
412- APPENDIX.
NOTE v.*
Correspondence respecting the placing of the Buoy by THE French in the night between the ISth and 14th OP Septembep..
FIRST LETTER
Captain Mends on the sihjed of the Btioij.
TO TUK EDITOR OF TUE 'TIMES.'
SiK^ — jVIay I ask the insertion in your columns of the following remarks'?
As I have been referred to by many as to the truth of Mr Kinglake's statement, in his ' Invasion of the Crimea,' ' that the landing of our army at Old Fort was materially * delayed by the wilful misplacement of a buoy by the ' French,' I feel called upon, in justice to the French naval service, to state the facts which came under my own ob- servation ; and here I desire to observe that, during two years of very close intercourse with that service, their whole conduct, so i'ar from being such as to bring oui harmony into grievous jeopardy, was that of chivalrous, loyal allies.
As I am the officer who, by the direction of Sir Edmund Lyons, planned the whole of the details connected with the embarkation, transfer, and landing of the army, it initjht suffice for me ainipJi/ to sai/ that J rememher iiothiinj about a buoy ; that Mr Lower, the master of the Agamem- non, who conned the ship under my orders, remcnihers nothlufj about a buoy ; and that Captain Spratt (who then
* The imblicalion of the above coiTesi)ond(.Mii.e as an ' Addunduiu' to this socoiid volume takes place with tlie assent of Captain Mends. For the purpose of indicating passages vhich seem to me to be among the most important in regard to the rpiestiou of fact, 1 have taken the liberty of causing some portions of Captain Mends's letters to be printed in italics.
AITKNDIX. 4 1 3
coiiimaiiJcd llic Si)itlirc, aiul, as tlic .senior surveying officer, was usually entrusted with such delicate and im- jmrtant duties), remembers nothivg about a buoy ; hut I will not take upon myself to state positively that there was no buoy in question, as it is rot impossible that Sir Edmund Lyons may have entered upon a confidential agreement with the French Admiral that the duty of plac- ing a buoy on the coast selected by the Allied Admirals and Generals during the final reconnaissance on the 10th should be kept in the hands of the French, to be laid by them during the night preceding the landing, in order to prevent so significant a mark of the designed locality be- coming known to the enemy; but it is passing strange that Sir Edmund Lyons, in Avhose confidence I was, and who had entrusted the whole of the arrangements to me, shouhl have given me no instructions relative to it, if he attaclied importance to it.
The Agamemnon, having weighed from Eupatoiia at 1 A.M., accompanied by the Sanspareil, Triton, and Spitlire, and followed by all the transports, Avas the advance ship, by a long way, of the Allied flotilla. Sir Edmund Lyon.?, in his eager desire to be in the van, pushed on to the southward of the beach, behind wliich lay Lake Kamishli, the southernmost of the three lakes marked on the maps, until we arrived ofi' the rocky headland lying between two sliallow bays, Avithin which lay the beaches, one having Lake Kamishli at the back of it (being that on Avhich the British ultimately landed), the other and more southern beach (on which the French landed) having no lake behind it, and being circumscribed in its limits.
When off the Point, Sir Edmund Lyons, who was anxi- ously scanning the coast, desired me to stop the engines ; while thus hove-to, with the ship's head brought round to tlie N.E., or inshore, the French Admiral, heading his fleet, came up, and passing close to us, hailed to say we worn
4 U APPENDIX.
too far to the southward ; upon which a conversation en- sued between Sir Edmund Lyons and the French Admiral from the poops of thviir respective ships nntil the onward movement of the French ship terminated it, whereupon a French naval officer came on board immediately Avith a message from his Admiral to Sir E. Lyons to say tliat Ave were too far to the southward, the Point off which we then Avere being the line of demarcation between the armies. During this short suspense I called the attention of Sir Edmund to the approach of the transports, and pointed out that they Avould fall into confusion if ho did not quickly decide upon his anchorage, as the Spitfire and Triton, the two steamers told off to anchor as the points Avithin Avhich our flotilla had been instructed to bring up, Avere looking to the Agamemnon for position. Sir Edmund instantly gave me orders to steer back to the nortliAvard of the Point, and close in Avith the beach as near as possible. ^Eean- Avhile the Agamemnon's boats had been hoisted out and the artillery rafts put together, so that on the moment of anchoring, Avhich we did about half-past six, Ave Avere ready to commence the operation of landing, Avhich Sir E. Lyons desired to do at once, but Sir George BroAvn, avIio Avas on board the Agamemnon, Avished to await the decision of Lord Eaglan, Avho was approaching on board the Caradoc. The French had by this time many men landed, for seeing no prospect of opposition they began to disembark tis fast us their ships got to the anchorage. As soon as the Cara- doc closed. Lord Kaglan came on board the Agamemnon, and flfter a short consultation Sir Edmund Lyons desired me to make the signal to land, and we commenced imme- diately.* Thus it Avill be seen that the French were the
• A careful reader will observe that all the movements backwards and forwanls, and the conferences hero described, are exactly such as might have been expected to occur upon the su])position that Lord Rjiglan'i account, as jjivcn in the next page but one, is strictly accural^.
AlTEiNDIX. 415
cause of no serious delay, as Eritisli tiansports Lad never even arrived at the Point, to the southward of which a buoy is said to have been pLiced. If the choosing of the beach was left in the hands of the Freiieh, they certainly gave us the advantage of position, our landing-place hav- ing the lake at the back, and being less circumscribed.
Had it been decided to land both armies in the bay selected by the French, the space on the beach would not have sufficed for the work, and serious confusion would have ensued, while the anchorage would have been too limited for the assembling of so many vessels.
T am, Sir, your obedient servant,
^Y. R. ilENDS. Captain, 11. N.
United Service Club, Pall Mall, March 18.
SECOND LETTER.
M)- KiiKjlaJce to Caj'jfain Mends.
VI St James's Place, April 4, 1S63. Sir, — I have the honour to enclose an extract from that part of Lord Eaglan's private letter to the Secretary of AVar which relates to the affair of the buoy.
Since the appearance of your letter to the newspaper, you have probably received some communications on the subject ; and if there be anything in those communica- tions, or in the enclosed extract from Lord Eaglan's letter, which is calculated to modify the impression under which 3'ou thought it your duty to come forward and question my statement, I feel certain that you will take the course which your own sense of fairness must dictate.
I have the honour to be. Sir, your obedient humble servant.
(Signed) A. W. KINGLAKE. Captain Mknds, Pv.N., kc. kc. &c.
416 APPENDIX,
Enclosure accompanying Mr Kinglahes Lciter. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.
THE PLACING OF THE BUOY BY THE FRENCH IN THE NIGHT BETWEEN THE 13th AND 14tii OF SEPTEMBER 1851.
Captain Mends having stated (in a letter wliich ho thought proper to address to the Editor of a newspaper) that he remembers nothing about a buoy, it may be con- venient for readers of the book which was tlie subject of Captain ]\Iends's remarks to have before them the words in Avhich Lord Raglan described the transaction.
Extract from Lord Eaglan's Narrative of the Landing,
addressed as a Private Communication to the Duke of
N'ewcastee, the Secretary of War, and dated ' Camp
' above Old Fort Bay, September 18, 1854.'
' Tlie disembarkation of both armies commoneod on the
* morning of the 14ih.
' It had been settled that the landing should be effected
* in Old Fort Bay, and that a buoy should be placed in
* the centre of it to mark the left of the French and tlie ' right of the English ; but when ilie Agamemnon came ' upon the buoy at daylight. Sir Edmund Lyons found ' that the French naval officer had deposited it on the ex- ' treine northern end, and had thus engrossed i,he whole of
* 1.1 le bay for the operation of his own army. This occa- ' .sioned considerable confusion and delay, tlie English ' i-onvoy having followed closely upon the steps of their ' leader, and got mixed with the French transports; but ' Sir Edmund Lyons wisely resolved to make tlie best of ' it, and at once ordered the troops to land in the bay next < to the northward.'
APPENDIX. 417
THIRD LETTER.*
Capiain Mends to Mr Kinglake.
Blooufielu Crescent, Harrow Road, W., 5th April, 1863.
SiE, — In reply to your communication of the 4th instant enclosing an extract from Lord Raglan's private letter to the Secretary of War, which relates to the alfair of the ' buoy,' I have the honour to acquaint you that, since writ- ing my letter to the * Times ' of the 18th ult., I have heard nothing which is calculated to modify the impression under which I wrote it ; for though it toould seem there was a buoy, and though I differ from Lord Eaglan, whose memory I so highly respect, I aver that not the slightest inconvenience, confusion, nor delay, was occasioned to the disembarkation of the British by any act of the French, I never heard of the buoy until I saw your book ; and 1 feel satisfied that were Sir Edmund Lyons alive, he would be one of the lirst to do justice to the chivalrous conduct of his colleague. Admiral Bruat, whose heart and soul were in the success of the undertaking, and whose example was cordially followed by every officer under his command; that in my opinion, luherever the buoy loas placed, none but the most upright motives prompted the act, and the most sound practical reasons warranted the selection of the spot.
I have the honour to be. Sir, your obedient humble
servant.
(Signed) W. R. MENDS.
A. W. KlNQLAKE, Esq., jM.P., &C. &C. &C.
— Note to ith Edition.
* It seems right to say that this copy has been carefully compared
with the original, and found to be strictly correct. In the original, the words ' by any act of the French ' ai'o vuiderseorcd.
VOL. II. - i>
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